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No Subject Line Found
Filename:011pgv.91p
3-28-91
Assessment of the BW Threat against U.S. Forces in Southern Iraq 
and Civilians in Iraq
       Prior to Operation Desert Storm,       [ (b)(2) ]          
 assessed that Iraq had a mature biological warfare (BW) program, 
with anthrax and botulinum toxin having reached the weaponization 
stage by December 1990. Although may details of the program were 
known, 
	[  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ]
Subsequent coalition bombing of identified Iraqi BW facilities 
seriously damaged Iraq's capability to produce, weaponize and 
store biological agents. However, numerous unverified reports have 
alleged that Iraq either had planned redundancy in the system by 
establishing back-up BW facilities or was able to move production 
capabilities and stockpiles to alternate sites prior to or during 
hostilities. To date, none of these alleged facilities have been 
located. Furthermore, no biological agents were used against 
coalition forces during hostilities, and no biological munitions 
were found in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). Possible 
reasons for Iraq's failure to use BW are 1) difficulty in moving 
the weapons to the theater of operations, 2) fear of the
consequences BW use might engender, 3) inappropriate 
meteorological conditions for BW use, 4) destruction of Iraq's BW 
use capability by allied bombing, 5) lack of confidence in the 
weapons or 6) an inability to actually weaponize the agents in the 
first place. We believe that Iraq retains a vestigial capability 
to produce and deliver BW agents. However, we assess that Iraq is 
unlikely to use BW against U.S. forces remaining in the area 
because Saddam Hussein perceives that to do so would initiate 
resumption of hostilities and provide the coalition a reason to 
forcibly remove him from power. In addition, Iraq's capability to 
transport and use BW agents, if any still exist, is seriously 
degraded. Although we assess that Iraq is unlikely to use BW 
against rebel forces and civilians in Iraq, Saddam is more likely 
to use BW against rebel forces in Iraq than against coalition 
forces because he may believe that use within the country would be 
difficult to prove.