Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
Filename:0618rpt.91m
[ b.2. ]
RESPOND TO [ (b)(2) ]
PASS TO THE ITF OPS OFFICER
12 MAR 91 1240 [ (b)(6) ]
Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
1. PURPOSE: To provide [ (b)(2) ] an assessment of why
chemical weapons were not used by Iraq during the war.
2. MAJOR POINTS: Iraq's restraint with chemicals cannot be
completely evaluated without a full accounting of the plans
made by the Iraqi military and political leadership in
preparation for the war, and the execution of those plans.
Intelligence information on this subject remains limited. The
following estimates the influence of several factors which may
have been the basis for a decision not to use chemical weapons
(CW).
Factor Major Factors Other Factors
Leadership Miscalculations X
Speed of Coalition Advance X
Denial of C3I X
Retaliation X
Destruction of Production X
Retention of High Level Control X
Attritted Delivery Capability X
Interdiction of Supply Routes X
Poor Weather X
Destruction of Storage X
3 . DISCUSSION
(U) Leadership Miscalculations
The most likely reason CW were not used during the war was
that they were not available. To date, we have no evidence
that CW were deployed to the KTO. Reasons for this were
fundamental miscalculations by the Iraqi leadership regarding
how the coalition would prosecute the war, and how effectively
the Iraqis would respond. Expecting the coalition forces to
fight like the Iranians, it appears the Iraqis felt they would
have days or even weeks to move CW into the KTO once the war
began. Given the above, it is likely the Iraqis miscalculated
coalition speed of advance, the degree to which their air
force and artillery assets would be attritted, and the degree
to which their ability to resupply would be degraded.
(U) Speed of Coalition Advance
The speed and violence of the coalition advance, which
reached its objectives deep inside Iraq in only four days, was
a major factor in precluding chemical use. Iraqi forces were
constantly off balance, and coalition air supremacy made
effective concentration of artillery for use against coalition
ground forces virtually impossible.
Iraq never took the military initiative during the DESERT
STORM operation, and was constantly on the defensive.
Coalition forces prevented Iraq from repeating the success it
had enjoyed with CW during the Iran-Iraq War.
(U) Denial of C3I
Iraq's C3 system was heavily damaged by coalition bombing. In
addition, Iraqi commanders could not control their forces in
part because of a complete failure of their intelligence
system to evaluate the developing situation. The immediate
establishment of allied air superiority denied Iraq
information on the disposition of coalition forces, making
fire planning practically impossible. The limited information
available may have resulted in a decision not to disperse
chemicals within theater until the ground battle began and
coalition force dispositions became better defined.
(U) Retaliation
Iraq likely believed that both Israel and the coalition had
chemical and nuclear weapons, and would use them if provoked.
Iraq quickly realized that these weapons could be delivered
anywhere in Iraq. This impression was reinforced by public
statements by allied and Israeli leaders, and probably led
Iraq to conclude the consequences of any chemical attack would
be severe.
(U) Destructlon of Productlon
Destruction of Iraqi CW production likely had a significant
effect on a decision not to use chemicals. The chemicals made
earlier by Iraq may have deteriorated in storage, or Iraq may
have miscalculated that their defenses would allow them time
to produce and deploy chemicals later in the conflict. The
loss of their production facilities would have prevented their
making agent as needed, which was their practice during the
Iran-Iraq war.
(U) Retention of High-Level Control
It is also likely that Saddam Husayn retained personal control
of CW during the war, in order to allow a more complete
evaluation of the military situation. However, the speed of
the ground offensive, together with C3 problems, may have made
this retention a significant factor, since release of
chemicals would then have been more complicated and slower. It
could be that mistrust of any units but Republican Guard
forces was a factor in this high level retention.
(U) Other Factors
Other factors that inhibited Iraq's use of CW included
attrition of their delivery capability, interdiction of
supplies, weather, and destruction of storage. The coalition
air campaign eliminated Iraq's preferred means of chemical
delivery, its air force, and made timely supply of ammunition
impossible. The air campaign also destroyed all known and
suspect CW storage in Iraq. During the brief ground campaign,
the weather was unfavorable for chemical use.
Prepared by: [ (b)(6) ]
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