[ (b)(2) ], Iraqi Chemical Threat Reassessment
Filename:0407pgf.91
[ (b)(2) ]
17 FEB 1991 0830 SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]
PREPARED BY: [ (b)(6) ]
FM: DIA/OICC
TO: ARCENT
INFO: CENTCOM
Subject: [ (b)(2) ], Iraqi Chemical Threat Reassessment
1. Iraq still retains a credible capability to employ chemical
weapons against ARCENT. While Iraq's capabilIty to deliver
chemical munitions by aircraft has been severely degraded, SCUD-B
and artillery delivery have not been significantly impacted.
2. DIA continues to assess Iraq to possess a limited number of CW
warheads for their SCUDs to include extended range SCUDs. There
is no indication that the capability of Iraq to use these SRBMs to
deliver chemical munitions has been significantly degraded.
Coalition air superiority, however, has likely limited Iraq's
overall SRBM employment by restricting firing times. The previous
assessment remains that Iraq's intention is to withhold SCUD-B's
employment until the ground war starts.
3. We have begun to consider with increased concern the
possibility of SCUD-B (300 km variety) launches from south central
Iraq into massed troop concentrations along the border. These
missiles would be more accurate and carry more agent (approx 550
kg) and therefore may have limited success against military point
targets. We reiterate the point that we assess Iraq to have
limited CW warheads and thus could not sustain Cw attacks with
SCUD missiles.
4. We assess that by 31 March most Iraqi unitary nerve agent will
have degraded beyond usefulness. Blister agents will degrade but
at a rate which will not affect there usefulness in the near term.
The known production capability has been degraded by 75%.
5. We assess the Iraqis to have weaponized binary Cw nerve agents
but that the majority of their agent remains unitary. [ (b)(1)
sec 1.3(a)(4) ] assesses that the majority of agent is binary.
Both [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] and DIA agree that neither
assessment can be defended conclusively.
6. Coalition air strikes against the LOCs have not degraded the
transportation system enough to affect the movement of Iraqi
chemical munitions assets.
7. The majority of bunkers at airfields associated with chemical
munitions have been either destroyed or severely damaged. The
listing below is the bomb damage assessment regarding these
airfield facilities as of 16 Feb 91:
TARGET NAME / BE NO. TARGET DESCRIPTION STATUS
Tallil Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed-I5
Feb 91
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Al Jarrah Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Both Bunkers
Destroyed
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
H-2 Afld 3 Storage Bunkers 1 Destroyed,
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 1 severely
damaged, 1
undamaged
14 Feb 91
H-3 Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed- 9
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Feb 91
K-2 Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Severe
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Damage-10 Feb
91
Al Taqqadum Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Moderate
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Damage- 4 Feb
91
Mosul Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed-
28 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Jan 91
Kirkuk Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed-
15 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Feb 91
8. Most of the airfields in southern and southeastern Iraq,
including airfields in Kuwait, have suffered significant damage to
runways and operational support facilities. Although the Iraqis
have demonstrated energetic rapid runway repair efforts, the
overall effect of the MCF airstrikes has largely constrained
Iraq's capability to stage and sustain sortie generation against
Coalition Forces.
9. Coalition destruction of aircraft, Iraqi aircraft in Iran, and
the wide dispersal of remaining aircraft will significantly
degrade Iraq's capability to conduct chemical warfare. The
concentration of bombing on aircraft shelters near the FEBA has
probably destroyed a great number of the ground attack aircraft
capable of employing CW munitions noted deployed to southern Iraq
and Kuwait before the outbreak of hostilities. Therefore, if CW
munitions are to be used, the remaining aircraft will have to come
from more distant bases This will increase the probability of
their detection and destruction by coalition aircraft well before
they reach the battlefront.
10. It is currently believed that Iraqi aircraft now in Iran will
probably not be launched from Iranian airbases (though the
possibility cannot be discounted). This further degrades Iraqi
air force CW capabilities. The dispersal of Iraqi aircraft, given
the current degradation of Iraqi C3 capabilities, will difficult
for the IZAF to employ CW munitions in a coherent or coordinated
manner. However, the current state of the IZAF does not preclude
the possibility of a successful "leak through' of aircraft should
the Iraqis attempt to conduct an attack using air defense
saturation techniques.
11. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
12. Initial release authority for all chemical weapons
(illegible)ably remains with Saddam Husayn, at least in the sense
that Saddam has determined and approved the situations in which
chemical munitions may be used. Sadam probably does retain
greater control over aircraft and SSM weapons with chemical
delivery capability, not so much because these have a particular
importance in chemical warfare, but because these delivery systems
are by their nature be better controlled from the center than can
fast changing ground operations.
13. We assess that chemical release authority for aircraft
remains with Saddam Husayn, and that he is still capable of
communicating his orders to use chemicals to his commanders.
Unlike ground forces at the front, to which chemical use authority
devolves to below-corps levels, a chemical-laden air force must be
tightly controlled to ensure they never have the opportunity to
bomb Saddam.
14. Even though chemical munitions in the past have been kept at
the corps level and delivered under close supervision to the
firing units for a particular firing mission, there are several
defector reports that chemical munitions have already been
delivered to divisional artillery units. This would make sense
given the differences in the present situation from that which
existed during the Iran-Iraq War. In all likelihood, chemical
munitions have already been delivered to those firing units
assigned chemical firing missions. These units will probably be
given two different contingencies under which they can fire
chemical munitions. In a prepared fire, units will fire only
those types of rounds which the corps fire plan requires.
However, if the division is under threat of being overrun, the
division commander has probably been given authority to use any
means, including chemical munitions to defend his unit. Despite
coalition emphasis on degrading Iraqi artillery, there are still
more than enough artillery tubes and MRLs available to all
divisions and Corps to fire a high priority chemical delivery
mission.
15. [ (b)(2) ]
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