Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical weapons: So Far, So Good
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Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical weapons:
So Far, So Good
Key Judgments
The probability of chemical use will increase as Coalition
forces come into contact with the Iraqi army in the KTO and as
Baghdad's situation becomes more desperate.
Factors deterring Iraqi use of chemical weapons have included
fear of retaliation, limited supplies of ammunition, and military
operational considerations.
Background
Iraq×has not yet used its chemical weapons in the Gulf war. All
of the modified SCUDs launched into Israel and Saudi Arabia have
had high explosive warheads.
Iraq made extensive use of chemicals in the war with Iran.
Although early results were uneven, Iraq learned to use chemicals
effectively in both the offense and defense. Iraq is believed to
have evaluated chemical use as an important contributor to the
defeat of the Iranian military. Following the war, Iraq continued
to give priority to chemical agent and weapon production.
Employment of chemical weapons is an integral part of Iraq's
military doctrine.
The allied bombing campaign has severely damaged Iraq's known
chemical production and munitions filling sites. Iraq's ability
to produce additional chemical munitions in the near term has been
drastically reduced.
The location of Iraq's chemical inventory is not known. DIA
believes Iraq retains a significant arsenal of chemical weapons.
Nerve and blister agent can be delivered by weapon systems ranging
from mortars to ballistic missiles. Some nerve agent stocks may
be in a binary configuration to improve storage life.
Although it cannot be confirmed, Iraq probably deployed chemical
munitions with its forces in the KTO so they would be available
for use when required. Continued interdiction of Iraqi supplies
has slowed the flow of materiel to the KTO, but it cannot be
determined if chemical munitions have been affected.
The storage life of Iraq's nerve agent weapons is probably
limited by the poor quality of Iraqi agent. Iraq's nerve agent
contains hydrofluoric acid (HF), which accelerates decomposition
of the nerve agent and attacks the metal shell casing. This
problem would be most severe in weapons filled with unitary
agents. Such weapons will lose much of their lethality after six
weeks from the dote of manufacture, but could still be used
against Coalition forces.
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Chemical Deterrence
The fear of retaliation is one of the reasons that nations have
not used chemicals, even when they had such weapons. Other
factors such as sustainability and political consequences have
been contributing factors. The decision by Iraq not to use
chemical weapons thus far in the war is probably driven by all
these considerations.
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Iraq has promoted its chemical capability and received a great
deal of international attention and notoriety. In April 1990
Saddam Husayn boasted about his 'dual chemical' weapon which he
would use to `burn half of Israel.' Iranian protests about Iraqi
chemical attacks highlighted this capability during the Iran-Iraq
war.
Two factors may be significant in Iraqi non-use of chemicals:
retaliation and sustainability. Israel's policy to retaliate
strongly for any provocation is well established and must be
considered. Baghdad is convinced Israel has nuclear and chemical
weapons which would be used against Iraq.
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Iraq also appreciates that Coalition member states have chemical
and nuclear weapons that it can deliver anywhere in Iraq or the
KTO. This impression has been reinforced by public statements by
Coalition leaders, and has probably led Iraq to conclude the
consequences of any chemical attack would be severe. Further, DIA
assesses that Iraq has only a limited number of chemical warheads
for its SSMs. This would mean that any use of chemicals with SSMs
could not be sustained.
Prospects for Use Against the Coalition
The Coalition bombing campaign has disrupted Iraqi communications,
destroyed chemical weapons plants, negated Iraqi tactical
intelligence capabilities, and diminished delivery means for
chemicals. Destruction of Iraqi ammunition supplies has probably
decreased the chemical ammunition supplies available.
During the Iran-Iraq War, chemical use was initially tightly
controlled by the political leadership in Baghdad. Over time this
was changed as the authority for the use of chemicals was
delegated to Corps commanders. If this practice to maintain tight
political control over the initial use of chemical weapons has
continued, the disruption of normal lines of communications have
made it more difficult for Baghdad to transmit such orders to
units in the KTO.× The Republican Guards still maintain effective
landline communications. However, their location as a strategic
reserve makes their direct use of chemicals early in a ground
assault less likely. Diminished communication capability would
result in less effective coordination of a chemical strike.
The destruction/dispersal of Iraqi air capabilities and the
continuing assault on SCUD launchers has reduced Iraq's ability to
deliver chemicals against deep targets. Without an air
reconnaissance capability, Iraq has very limited means of
determining tactical target locations. Until a Coalition ground
assault begins, there is little military utility for Iraq to
initiate chemical use.
Iraq has a finite number of chemical weapons and practically no
ability to replace expended stocks. This may prompt Iraq to
conserve its chemical ammunition until it can be used to greatest
advantage. The amount of chemical ammunition forward in the KTO
is unknown, but probably is substantial. These stocks possibly
were deployed before the start of the war, and limited
replenishment may have occurred. Most stocks will remain
serviceable for some time, particularly the mustard and binary
nerve weapons. Unitary nerve agent amnunition is believed to be
unstable and DIA estimates the lethality of unitary stocks will be
substantially degraded after 31 March 1991.
Intentions and Factors of Employment
Iraq's leaders almost certainly intend to employ CW if the borders
of Iraq are breached by Coalition ground forces, and if the
viability of the Baath regime is seriously threatened.
Inside the borders of Kuwait, Iraqi considerations will mainly
include how the conduct of the war is proceeding. If Iraq's
forces were about to suffer serious defeat, and/or commanders
received authorization from the leadership, it is quite likely
that CW would be employed in Kuwait.
At the tactical level, Iraqi commanders will base their decisions
on when and where to use chemical weapons on the amount of
intelligence available on the disposition of Coalition forces, and
the degree of success in luring coalition forces into
predetermined kill zones.
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