Chemical and Biological Warfare in DESERT STORM? [U]
Filename:0402pgf.94
Defense Intelligence Report
April 1994
PC-33-94
Chemical and Biological Warfare in DESERT STORM? [U]
Key Judgments
Responding to recent Publicity regarding the many unexplained
medical problems suffered by Gulf War veterans, DIA assesses that
exposure to chemical or biological agents is not the cause of
"Gulf War Syndrome."
[ (b)(2) ]
Background
Many veterans returned from Gulf War deployments reporting
medical problems that collectively have come to be known as "Gulf
War Syndrome" or "mystery illness." Symptoms range from fatigue.
joint pain, and memory loss to bleeding gums, rashes, and
lymphoma. Recently, these cases received a great deal of publicity
from Congress and the media. Based largely on misinformation and
misunderstanding, exposure to chemical or biological agents was
speculated to be the cause of the mystery illness. This report
details the basis for DIA's assessment that no chemical or
biological weapons were used during DESERT STORM/SHIELD and,
therefore, are not the cause of the Gulf War mystery illness.
Details
There were no indications and warnings (I&W) of imminent
chemical warfare use during DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
The Iraqis operated in this way to overcome a short shelf life
problem - because of low agent purity levels - they had with their
nerve agent. This I&W of imminent use of chemical warfare did not
occur during the Gulf War.
Figure 1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
Ten Iraqi [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] POWs unanimously
stated that, in their opinion, there was no intent to use chemical
and biological warfare (CBW) against the Coalition. Their
reasoning included the fear of massive retaliation, possibly with
nuclear weapons, and the belief that the Coalition was far better
prepared than Iraq to fight in a CBW environment.
Immediately after the war, a massive effort to collect and
destroy remaining Iraqi equipment throughout Kuwait and occupied
Iraq began. Not one chemical or biological munition, nor any bulk
agent, has been found in occupied Iraq or Kuwait. Moreover, the
primary U.S. contractor for unexploded ordnance removal in Kuwait
stated recently that, to date, the company had discovered and
removed over 15,000 tons of all types of ordnance - including
350,000 mines - and has found no CBW weapons. Nor have any of its
employees experienced Gulf War syndrome symptoms.
During the entire Persian Gulf crisis, not one person,
military or civilian, was treated, hospitalized, or died as a
result of CBW exposure. If CBW had been used, even on a limited
basis, this most certainly would not have been the case. An Army
private who received the Bronze Star and Purple Heart after
experiencing burns while searching bunkers is the only known
injury with symptoms similar to CBW exposure. Advanced laboratory
analysis of his flak jacket, shirt, and the swab used to clean his
wound, as well as subsequent urinalysis, indicate conclusively,
however, that the burns did not result from contact with chemical
agent but from some other corrosive substance.
There were no confirmed chemical or biological agents
detected during the entire crisis. Standard operating procedure to
determine the presence of chemical weapons requires a two-step
process - detection and confirmation. Automatic detectors alert
troops by sounding alarms. Because the equipment is very sensitive
by design, false alarms are often registered. A conservative
estimate of the number of false alarms during the Gulf War crisis
would number in the hundreds, if not thousands. Despite this large
number of supposed detections, the second step, confirmation,
using equipment and techniques available at the platoon level,
never resulted in a single confirmation. Only the highly
publicized Czechoslovak reports of chemical agent detection on 19
and 24 January 1991 appear credible. The U.S. Department of
Defense cannot independently verify the Czechoslovak detections,
but does accept the Czechoslovak report as valid [ (b)(1) sec
1.3(a)(4) ]. At the time, the Czechoslovaks reported extremely
low, unharmful levels of agent in very localized areas near Hafar
Al Batin and King Khalid Military City. According to the
Czechoslovaks the nerve agent detected on 19 January was present
for less than 40 minutes. Somewhat suspiciously, no other units in
the area detected nerve agent.
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)
In addition to all the unconfirmed detections registered as
false alarms, a variety of soil, liquid, and air samples suspected
of containing chemical agents were analyzed at state-of-the-art
labs in the United States and United Kingdom. These samples were
taken before, during, and after the war from suspected "hot" areas
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. The results from all samples
tested were negative. Likewise, air samples checking for the
presence of biological agents were continuously taken and analyzed
at state-of-the-art labs. As with the chemical agent samples, all
tests for biological agents were negative.
A popular theory suggests the cause of the mystery illness to
be long-term exposure of U.S. troops to low (undetectable) levels
of chemical agent. This, however, is impossible. The law of
diffusion states that any gas or liquid naturally moves from an
area of greater concentration to one of lesser concentration.
Consequently, if in one area or time the concentration of chemical
agent is low - as in the Czechoslovak detection - at some other
area or time, the concentration must have been high. Therefore,
other detections would be expected nearby, possibly resulting in
casualties. This did not happen, even though other units were in
contiguous areas. More to the point, the only possible explanation
for long-term, low-level exposure below detection range is the
deliberate, continuous release of very small amounts of agent
throughout the area where troops are to be exposed. This scenario
would contaminate much of the Saudi Arabian peninsula rather than
localize effects. Had this been the case, the mystery illness
would have been reported by veterans stationed throughout Saudi
Arabia and Saudi Arabian civilians would have experienced and
reported symptoms. The facts simply do not support this theory.
Although it is another popular theory, the Czechoslovak
detection did not result from chemical agents released from bombed
Iraqi targets. Under ideal conditions, models indicate that 80
tons of nerve agent would need to be instantaneously released from
the closest bombed CBW target (An Nasiriyah, 140 miles north of
Hafar Al Batin) to register at the low levels detected by the
Czechoslovaks. An 80-ton release of nerve agent in Iraq would have
resulted in an area of certain death or casualty that covers
hundreds of square miles. Detection equipment throughout the area
would have been triggered, and additional confirmations would have
been expected - neither happened. In addition to the law of
diffusion, weather conditions further argue against this
possibility. The winds at the time were in the wrong direction
from the southeast and it rained throughout the region the day
before the Czechoslovak detection. Even a release caused by a bomb
from Coalition aircraft striking a secondary target (perhaps an
unknown CW storage site or convoy near the border) must still obey
the law of diffusion. People nearby would die or become
casualties, detection alarms would sound, and confirmations would
be made. As stated before, this simply did not happen.
Figure 3. General Map of Area Showing Locations of and Dates of
Interest. The worst cases of Gulf War Syndrome have been reported
by members of a Navy construction battalion unit stationed in Al
Jubayl.
Comment
Ironically, the real intelligence mystery of this story (if
the Czechoslovak detections are accepted as valid) is the source
of the agent detected. The low concentration and short duration of
the detection, the extremely localized area affected, the
meteorological conditions, the absence of other detections by
other units nearby, the topography of the area, and the fact that
no military action took place anywhere near the area all suggest a
deliberate single release of a very small amount of agent. At
this juncture, the best explanation of the agent's presence is a
possible live-agent test [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
This report contains information as of 29 March 1994. [
b.2. ] [ (b)(6) ],
[ (b)(2) ].
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