AFMIC WEEKLY WIRE 14-91 (U)
Filename:84531291
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 31291
GENDATE: 950623
NNNN
TEXT:
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX285 MCN = 91100/33954 TOR = 911001924
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0145 1001924-RUEALGX.
ZNY
HEADER P 101924Z APR 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 081900Z APR 91
FM DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD //AFMIC-ZA//
TO RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON THREE
RULYSCC/COMSERVRON TWO
RULYSCC/COMSERVRON FOUR
RULYSCC/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RULYSCC/MSSG ELEVEN
RHIPAAA/USCENTCOM FWD HQS //J2/SG//
RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT //SG//
RUDCHAA/ARCENT FWD //MD//
RUDCAAA/CDR7THTRANSGP //AFFG-C-S2//
RUCLEUA/CDRUSASC FT RUCKER AL //CSSC-ZM//
RUEBMDA/CDR6THINFDIV(L) FT WAINWRIGHT AK //APVR-SG//
RUCIWMA/CDRTACOM WARREN MI //AMSTA-SF//
RUCLBFA/CDRIII CORPS FT HOOD TX //AFZF-GS-CMD//
RUWTATA/CDR807THMEDBDE SEAGOVILLE TX //AFKB-GC-CT-HS//
RUKGNPA/EODTEU TWO FT STORY VA //03//
RUKGNPA/CDR11THTRANSBN FT STORY VA //AFFG-I-S2//
RUEHEY/USDAO CAIRO EG
RUFLBJA/CDRJLD VICENZA IT
RUCLBFA/CDR1STCAVDIV FT HOOD TX //G2/CM&D//
RHIBHAC/CDR24THINFDIV FWD //CM&D/G2//
RHIBHAA/CDR101STABNDIVAASLT FWD //CM&D/G2//
RHIIMAA/VMA THREE ONE ONE //S2//
RUDPTOC/XVIII ABN CORPS INTEL CEN FT BRAGG NC
RHIPAAA/USCINCENT //CCJ2//
RULYSCC/COMPHIBGRU THREE ATF
RHCULRA/USAFHOSP LITTLE ROCK AFB AR //SGAX//
RUVRBGA/TAG MS JACKSON MS //MS-DOT-O/213TH MED BDE//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC //USDP-GLOBAL//
RUKGNEC/USACMH WASHINGTON DC //DAMH-RAO//
RUEDFHA/439MAW WESTOVER AFB MA //SGPM//
RULSMCA/MARCORINTCEN QUANTICO VA
RHFQAAA/58MAS ALCC RAMSTEIN AB GE //CC//
RHFQZAF/316AD CLINIC RAMSTEIN AB GE //SGAX/SGPM//
RHFQZAF/609USAFCONTHOSP ZWEIBRUCKEN AB GE //SG//
RUFLAEA/7241ABG CLINIC IZMIR TU //SGPM//
RULYSCC/CG V MEF CSSE //HSSU//
RHCGSRA/CG FOURTH FSSG //4OPS//
RHQIIEG/TWO FOUR MEU //MED//
RHBTLHA/USS TARAWA
AIG 6623
AIG 12630
AIG 8598
RUEORDA/TCC FT DETRICK MD
INFO RULYSCC/CTF SIX THREE
RUEORDA/XMT USAFHOSP LITTLE ROCK AFB AR //SGQ//
RUEORDA/CDR2DARMDIV FT HOOD TX //AFZF-SC-MG//
RUEORDA/CDRVIICORPS MOEHRINGEN GE //AETSSU//
RUEORDA/USAFHOSP HELLENIKON AB GR //MIO//
RUKRATB/DET 3 625MASG HELLENIKON AB GR
RUEORDA/COMUSNAVLOGSUPFOR //N4/N9//
BT
SECTION 001 OF 002
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY SUBJ: AFMIC WEEKLY WIRE 14-91 (U)
1. GENERAL
(U) THIS MESSAGE CONSISTS OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND GENERAL
MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE. IT IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A TIMELY SUMMARY
OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS. THE REMARKS ARE
PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO REVISION AND DO NOT NECESSARILY
REPRESENT AN AGREED DOD POSITION.
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)
A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) THREAT AGAINST U.S. FORCES AND
IRAQI CIVILIANS (U)
B. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
C. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
D. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
3. INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS (U)
A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE BW) THREAT AGAINST U.S.
FORCES AND IRAQI CIVILIANS (U)
PRIOR TO OPERATION DESERT STORM, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ASSESSED THAT IRAQ HAD A MATURE BW PROGRAM, WITH ANTHRAX AND
BOTULINUM TOXIN HAVING REACHED THE WEAPONIZATION STAGE BY DECEMBER
1990. ALTHOUGH MANY DETAILS OF THE PROGRAM WERE KNOWN, [
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF BULK AND
WEAPONIZED STOCKPILES AVAILABLE TO THE IRAQIS. SUBSEQUENT
COALITION BOMBING OF IDENTIFIED IRAQI BW FACILITIES SERIOUSLY
DAMAGED IRAQ'S CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE, WEAPONIZE, AND STORE
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. HOWEVER, NUMEROUS UNVERIFIED REPORTS HAVE
ALLEGED THAT IRAQ EITHER HAD PLANNED REDUNDANCY IN THE SYSTEM BY
ESTABLISHING BACK-UP BW FACILITIES OR WAS ABLE TO MOVE PRODUCTION
CAPABILITIES AND STOCKPILES TO ALTERNATE SITES PRIOR TO OR DURING
HOSTILITIES. TO DATE, NONE OF THESE ALLEGED FACILITIES HAVE BEEN
LOCATED. FURTHERMORE, NO BIOLOGICAL AGENTS WERE USED AGAINST
COALITION FORCES DURING HOSTILITIES, AND NO BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS
WERE FOUND IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS. POSSIBLE REASONS
FOR IRAQ'S FAILURE TO USE BW WERE (1) FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES BW
USE MIGHT ENGENDER, SUCH AS POSSIBLE RETALIATION BY COALITION
FORCES WITH THEIR OWN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, (2) DIFFICULTY
IN MOVING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TO THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, (3)
INAPPROPRIATE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR BW USE, (4)
DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S BW USE CAPABILITY BY ALLIED BOMBING, (5)
LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE WEAPONS, OR (6) AN INABILITY TO ACTUALLY
WEAPONIZE THE AGENTS IN THE FIRST PLACE. WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ
RETAINS A VESTIGIAL CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE AND DELIVER BW AGENTS.
HOWEVER, WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ IS UNLIKELY TO USE BW AGAINST U.S.
FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA BECAUSE SADDAM HUSSEIN PERCEIVES THAT
TO DO SO WOULD INITIATE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES AND PROVIDE THE
COALITION A REASON TO FORCIBLY REMOVE HIM FROM POWER. IN ADDITION,
IRAQ'S CAPABILITY TO TRANSPORT AND USE BW AGENTS, IF ANY STILL
EXIST, IS SERIOUSLY DEGRADED. ALTHOUGH WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ IS
UNLIKELY TO USE BW AGAINST REBEL FORCES AND CIVILIANS IN IRAQ,
SADDAM IS MORE LIKELY TO USE BW AGAINST REBEL FORCES IN IRAQ THAN
AGAINST COALITION FORCES BECAUSE HE MAY BELIEVE THAT USE WITHIN
THE COUNTRY WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROVE.[ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ]
[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ][ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ]
4. [ (b)(2) ]
5. [ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ]
BT
#0146
INFODATE: 0
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
