Collateral Damage From Air Raid On Chemical Warfare (CW) Plant
Filename:09-91a
09-91, NO. 2
Week ending 1 March 1991
AFMIC WEEKLY MEDICAL
INTELLIGENCE WIRE
IRAQ: Collateral Damage From Air Raid On
Chemical Warfare (CW) Plant
In a open source news release, a Egyptian physician claimed that
100 guards at a CW plant in Baghdad became ill "immediately"
following a coalition air raid on the facility. Reportedly, the
patients "sustained injuries of the lungs, the circulatory ad
intestinal systems." The guards were brought to an undisclosed
hospital, where half of them died despite medical efforts. The
Egyptian physician stated that attempts to"disinfect the hospital
were unsuccessful and the infection was spreading in Baghdad."
Additionally, the physician said that disease incidence was
significantly increasing ("assuming a massive character, to the
point of a epidemic") in cities where other air raids had targeted
chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities.
Comment: The news release attempts to correlate both the sudden
illness/deaths of the guards and the spread of disease among
civilians with coalition targeting of CBW facilities. However,
until the report is independently confirmed, this incident should
not be interpreted as a consequence of contamination resulting
from coalition targeting of CBW facilities.
Although the facility is described as a CW plant, the symptoms
described are not consistent with chemical warfare agents. For
example, chemical agents such as mustard produce severe injuries
to the eyes and skin, and nerve gases produce obvious neurologic
symptoms. Furthmore, chemical warfare agents are not contagious.
An immediate onset of "disease" is consistent with a toxin
agent. We have assessed that Iraq has weaponized botulinurn toxin
and suspect that they have developed Staphylococcal enterotoxin
and Clostridium Perfringens toxin. A massive dose of a toxin such
as Staphylococcal enterotoxin B is somewhat consistent with the
general symptomology ad cannot be ruled out as a possible cause
of the "disease." However, the extremely limited clinical
information ("injuries of the lungs, culatory system and
intestinal systems") also could suggest an infectious agent such
as Bacillus athracis if the "immediate" (meaning virtualiy no
delay) onset of symptoms is analytically disregarded. The
background information and general symptomology are not fully
consistent with
any single biological warfare (BW) agent believed to be possessed
by Iraq. Efforts have been made to obtain further details of the
alleged incident to determine the identity of the possible agent
or
agents.
09-91, NO. 2
Without further verification of the hospital and cause of
illnesses in the facility, the reference to unsuccessful attempts
to disinfect the hospital may reflect problems in controlling
nosocomial infections. Nosocomial infections, which generally
involve stt-ains of microorganisms that are resistant to
disinfectants and antibiotics, pose problems in all hospitals.
However, these infections are more diliilcult to control in less
developed countries, particularly in hospitals with poor
sanitation and housekeeping practices.
Prior to 16 January 1991, the Iraqi government broadcast several
public civil defense preparation statements. The language used in
some of the public health statements wouuld allow the
government to blame increases of endemic diseases
(that are not biological warfare candidates) on military conflict
and potentially on contarination by agents released as a result of
damage inflicted by coalition forces on CBW facilities. The
reported increased incidence of diseases in cities where
CBW facilities were targeted most likely is due to increased
occurrence of endemic diseases attributable to degradation of
norinal preventive medicine, waste disposal, water purification
and
distribution, electricity, and decreased ability to control
disease outbreaks. It is unlikely that CBW contamination of
civilian casualties would "spread" throughout the community over a
period of
time. BW casualties resulting from primary exposure generally are
not contagious, and the agent infrequently would be secondarily
transmitted to another person.
Because of the current worldwide attention associated with the
possibility of CBW agent use in the Gulf region, ABC believes that
significantly more detailed reporting would result if the above
scenario actually transpired. This viewpoint is supported by a
recent DlA assessment which concluded that there have been no
confirmed reports of collateral contamination as a result of
coalition air strikes on biological and chemical research,
production, or storage facilities.
[ (b)(6) ]
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