IRAQI CHEMICAL CAPABILITIES [ (b)(2) ] (U) REF:
[ (b)(2) ]
Filename:0156pgv.91d
[ (b)(2) ]
FEB 91 2030 [ (b)(6) ]
FROM: NMIST DIA
[ (b)(2) ]
SUBJ: IRAQI CHEMICAL CAPABILITIES [ (b)(2) ] (U)
REF: [ (b)(2) ]
DIA BELIEVES THAT IRAQ'S NERVE AGENT STOCKS WILL BE
USELESS AFTER 31 MARCH 1991. THIS IS BASED ON THE EXPECTED
DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S DINING CHEMICAL AGENT AND PRECURSOR
PRODUCTION PLANTS AT SAMARRA× AND HABBANIYAH. AT PRESENT, SOME OF
THESE PLANTS HAVE NOT BEEN DESTROYED AND MAY STILL BE PRODUCING
AGENT.
ASSUMING THE PLANTS ARE DESTROYED BY MID-FEBRUARY, ALL
UNITARY NERVE AGENT STOCKS SHOULD BE UNSERVICEABLE BY THE END OF
MARCH. THE AGENT IS ASSESSED TO BE POOR QUALITY, RESULTING FROM
LOW PURITY DUE TO P00R IRAQI CHEMICAL ENGINEERING PRACTICES.
IRAQ COULD RETAIN CHEMICAL WEAPONS AFTER THE 31 MARCH DATE,
WITH NERVE AGENT IN A BINARY CONFIGURATION AND UNITARY MUSTARD.
DIA ASSESSES THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF BINARY HAS BEN LIMITED THUS
FAR, AND THAT THE MUSTARD IS ALSO LOW IN PURITY.
SOME OF IRAQ'S NERVE AGENT STOCKS, MADE DURING DECEMBER 1990
AND EARLY JANUARY 1991, ARE PROBABLY ALREADY BECOMING UNUSABLE,
LEAVING IRAQ WITH A "USE-IT-OR-LOSE-IT" PROBLEM.
IRAQ HAS ONLY LIMITED MEANS AVAILABLE TO DELIVER CHEMICALS AT
PRESENT, HOWEVER.
THE MUNITIONS THEY HAVE AVAILABLE FOR REACHING ALLIED FORCES
NOW ARE LIMITED TO AERIAL BOMBS AND MISSILE WARHEADS. THE NUMBER
OF MISSILE WARHEADS IS ASSESSED TO BE LIMITED, SO THAT CHEMICAL
USE COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED BY THIS TYPE OF DELIVERY. THE LIMITED
PAYLOAD AND ACCURACY OF IRAQI MISSILES MAKES THEM
SUITABLE ONLY FOR TERRORIST, RATHER THAN MILITARY USE. ALLIED AIR
SUPREMACY MAKES THE DELIVERY OF CHEMICAL AGENTS BY IRAQ 'S AIR
FORCE AN UNCERTAIN PROSPECT AT BEST.
WITHOUT HAVING CONTACT WITH ALLIED FORCES, IRAQ'S ARTILLERY
AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS CANNOT DELIVER CHEMICALS EFFECTIVELY
SINCE THE LOCATION OF ALLIED FORCES IS UNKNOWN.
THUS FAR, IRAQ HAS CALCULATED THAT THE BENEFITS OF USING
CHEMICALS ARE INADEQUATE. IRAQ WILL RETAIN A SIGNIFICANT CHEMICAL
CAPABILITY WHICH MAY WELL BE USED TO STOP AN ALLIED ATTACK ON
THEIR PREPARED POSITIONS IN SOUTHERN KUWAIT.
IN REPLY TO SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED IN THIS INQUIRY, THE SIZE
OF THE IRAQI STOCKPILE IS NOT KNOWN WITH CERTAINTY. BASED ON
THEIR PRODUCTION RATES AND PAST PRACTICE, THEY COULD HAVE A
STOCKPILE OF 300 TO 1000 AGENT TONS OF ALL TYPES OF AGENTS. BY 15
FEBRUARY SOME OF IRAQ'S NERVE AGENT STOCKS WILL BE UNUSABLE, BUT
MUSTARD AND POSSIBLY BLOOD AGENT STOCKS WILL REMAIN VIABLE FOR
MONTHS. COMPLETE DETERIORATION OF UNITARY NERVE AGENT STOCKS IS
EXPECTED BY 31 MARCH. SOME DELIVERY OF NERVE AGENT COULD STILL BE
POSSIBLE AFTER THAT TIME USING THE LIMITED BINARY STOCKPILE IRAQ
IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE.
COMMANDERS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR CHEMICAL ATTACKS AT ANY
TIME. IF IRAQ IS ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY TARGET ALLIED FORCES,
CHEMICAL ATTACKS USING ALL AGENTS IN THE IRAQI INVENTORY COULD
OCCUR THROUGH THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY. NERVE AGENT DELIVERY
CAPABILITY WILL BE CURTAINED BUT NOT ELIMINATED IN LATE FEBRUARY
AND EARLY MARCH. BY THE END OF MARCH, ALL OF IRAQ'S UNITARY NERVE
AGENT STOCKS ARE EXPECTED TO BECOME USELESS.
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