Use of Radioactive Material in SCUD Warhead
Filename:002bk.91d
DIA/DT-IA
19 Feb 91
Background Paper for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
SUBJECT: Use of Radioactive Material in SCUD Warhead
1. PURPOSE: To provide an assessment of the likelihood and
effect of Iraqi use of radioactive material in SCUD warhead.
2. POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:
a. Likelihood of Use: Iraq has the potential to develop
and use a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) based on placing
radioactive material in a SCUD warhead. There is no hard evidence
that this is being done, but Iraq has made many claims about
having surprise weapons. Iraq's leadership almost certainly
intends to use all available weaponry at its disposal if the
viability of the Saddam-led Baath regime is threatened. This
situation would
pertain if Saddam were to be removed and succeeded by other
members of the Revolutionary Command Council, as well. DIA also
considers it likely that if Iraq's borders are breached by
coalition ground forces that this event too, would cross Iraq's
threshold for employing nonconventional weapons. Iraq's
leaders are reasonably well-informed on U.S. nuclear and chemical
capabilities. A U.S. threat of retaliation is unlikely to deter
Iraq. Inside the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO), Iraq would
probably employ nonconventional weapons, like the RDD, if its
forces were about to suffer a significant and serious defeat.
b. Availability of Radioactive Material: Iraq has four
sources of radioactive materials: spent reactor fuel, commercially
produced and purchased radioisotopes (i.e., Cobalt SO for medical
uses), Iraqi made radioisotopes, and low level radioactive waste
from laboratory and medical procedures. Little is known about the
total inventory of Iraqi radioactive material, but the last two
sources would probably be very low activity or short lived
medical/experimental isotopes, and the overall inventory is
assessed to be quite small.
c. Area Contaminated: Area of contamination is a
complex question that varies with:
(1) Weight of warhead (and therefore range of SCUD):
Determines amount of material spread.
(2) Ratio of explosive weight to radioactive
material weight: More explosive means wider dispersion pattern,
but less active material carried.
(3) Height of burst: The higher the burst, the
wider the pattern.
(4) Particle size of contaminant: Larger
particles travel farther (In the absence of wind effects), but are
easier to find and remove. If the goal is to produce a heavy
concentration to greatly restrict access, then the area of
contamination will necessarily be smaller than if the goal is
to spread material out as much as possible as a weapon of
psychological terror (if not actual danger) against civilian
populations.
d. Delivery Scenarios: Iraq could deliver its
radioactive material in three forms: liquid solution, mechanically
chopped (pre-loading) small pellets, and large, crude chunks.
Iraq has not demonstrated nor is assessed to have either a liquid
filled warhead or an airburst fuse, however, there are three
potential delivery scenarios: maximum pellet/chunk dispersion
using largest possible high explosive warhead (short range, less
than 300 km); pellet/chunk dispersion using less energetic warhead
(longer range, 300-600 km); and low airburst liquid or powder wind
driven dispersion in the manner of chemical agents. Pellet (or
chunk) dispersion would be very uneven, with discrete pieces
scattered or Imbedded throughout the area. Ground burst could
scatter pieces to approximately the same maximum distances as
airburst, but far more fragments would be contained much closer
(several hundred meters) to the point of impact. Liquid or powder
dispersion provides more uniform, difficult to remove coverage.
Processing of material into liquid, powder, or pellet form could
be difficult and dangerous to operators. High activity warheads
could be very dangerous to handling and launch crews. Airburst
could be caused by SCUD Intercept.
(1) Maximum dispersal is only available at short
ranges due to weight of high explosive required and could
contaminate a 3 mile diameter circle (based on DNA calculations),
but at a fairly low level of contamination.
(2) Liquid dispersal in the same manner as for
chemical agents could result in a contaminated area of several
square miles, with hazard dropping off rapidly with distance from
explosion.
(3) Less energetic pellet/chunk dispersion for
longer range warhead, would most likely result in a contaminated
area about 900 feet in diameter. some larger pieces could be
thrown several thousand feet.
(4) Ground burst would produce contamination over
several hundred meter radius, although some larger pieces may be
thrown several thousand feet.
3. EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS:
a. In no case is an RDD expected to be militarily
significant. U.S. forces in the theater have equipment and
training for operations in a nuclear environment, an environment
that an RDD does not even approach. U.S. NBC protective clothing
cannot prevent soldiers from receiving radiation doses in a
contaminated environment, but does shield against some radiation
types and prevents direct skin and lung contact. This, coupled
with proper radiation monitoring and exposure time limitations,
provides excellent practical protection.
b. WIthout a detailed knowledge of the Iraqi
radioisotope inventory, the degree of possible contamination is
impossible to predict. Any dispersal pattern will produce small
areas of relatively high contamination, and large areas much less
so. In no circumstance Is an RDD expected to produce an area of
immediate lethality hazard. Washdown and scrapedown of
contaminated surfaces is very' effective in dose reduction.
Proper monitoring and detectIon Is important to preclude long term
exposure in high activity areas. Residual low activity may result
in exposure in excess of the guidelines for long term (months or
years) civilian residence in contaminated areas.
PREPARED BY: [ (b)(6) ] APPROVED BY:
Nuclear Energy Division, 01A
[ (b)(6) ]
DB-8, POL/MIL Cell
VP Task Force
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