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IIR 2 340 0353 91/IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (U).
Filename:23400353.91r
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 21843
GENDATE:         950504
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TEXT:            
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX489 MCN = 91041/05180 TOR = 910411144
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CONTROLS
FSTC INTELOPS PASS TO [   (b)(6)   ]
SERIAL: (U) IIR 2 340 0353 91.
COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR), SOVIET UNION (UR), INDIA (IN).
SECTION 001 OF 002
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY SUBJ: IIR 2 340 0353 91/IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (U).
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED 
- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DOI: (U) 851200.
REQS: (U) T-8C2-2650-01-90; T-8C1-1600-07-90;
M-5AX-1620-03-90; G-AIF-1620-01-90; G-AIF-1620-02-90;
G-AIF-1620-03-90; S-AIF-D6885.
SOURCE: [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ][   (b)(7)(D)   ]
SUMMARY:        ONLY NERVE, MUSTARD, AND TEAR AGENTS WERE USED IN
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. AIRCRAFT DELIVERED NERVE AND BLISTER AGENTS,
AND MORTARS DELIVERED TEAR AGENTS. PRIORITY FOR CHEMICAL
TARGETTING WAS HEADQUARTERS, THE MAIN RESERVES, ARTILLERY UNITS,
MANEUVER TROOPS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE.
TEXT: 1.        SOURCE REITERATED THAT [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   
] KNEW OF ON4Y THREE TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS USED IN THE 
IRAN-IRAQ WAR. THESE WERE LETHAL INCAPACITATING AGENTS WHICH 
SOURCE FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS BEING NERVE AGENTS WHICH INCLUDED 
TABUN AND SARIN; BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD; AND A TEAR AGENT 
IDENTIFIED AS CS. (FLD CMT--SOURCE LATER SAID THE TEAR AGENT WAS 
CHLOROACETOPHENONE WHICH IS KNOWN AS CN IN THE U.S.) THE NERVE 
AGENTS USED WERE NONPERSISTENT BUT SOURCE BE4IEVED THE IRAQIS WERE 
WORKING TO DEVE4OP A MORE PERSISTENT NERVE AGENT. SOURCE DID NOT 
KNOW OF ANY AGENTS DESIGNED TO PENETRATE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING OR 
PROTECTIVE MASKS OR ANY PSYCHOLOGICALLY ACTIVE TYPES OF AGENTS.
2.        DELIVERY--AIRCRAFT WERE THE PRIMARY MEANS FOR DELIVERING
NERVE AND DLISTER AGENTS WHILE MORTARS WERE USED FOR DELIVERING
CN. SOURCE WAS NOT CERTAIN IF 122MM MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS
(MRL'S) OR OTHER MRL'S WERE USED FOR CHEMICAL DELIVERY, BUT WAS
SURE THE FROG SYSTEM WAS NOT USED TO DELIVER CHEMICALS. SOURCE
BELIEVED THE IRAQIS WOULD DEVELOP A CHEMICAL WARHEAD FOR SCUD-TYPE
MISSILES BECAUSE OF THEIR LONGER RANGE AND MORE STRATEGIC NATURE 
QN
THE BATTLEFIELD. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY ANTITANK WEAPONS
(RECOILLESS RIFLE OR RPG) OR LAND MINES WITH CHEMICALS. NO
CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH BARRIERS SUCH AS
BARQED WIRE OR DITCHES; NAPALM WAS USED IN THIS CASE. (FLD
COMMENT--THIS WAS INTERPRETED AS USE IN THE FLAME/FOUGASSE SENSE.)
SOURCE HAD NO INFORMATION ON DESCRIPTIONS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS OR
MARKINGS ON THEM. IRAQI PERSONNEL WERE NOT GIVEN THIS INFORMATIOM
TO ENABLE THEM TO RECOGNIZE OR DEAL WITH DUD IRAQI CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS; THEY WERE ONLY TOLD THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD USE
CHEMICALS.
3.        STORAGE--SOURCE HAD NO INFORMATION ON STORAGE OF
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS OTHER THAN TO MENTION THAT SOME CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS MAY HAVE BEEN STORED IN THE BASRAH //3030NO4747E// AREA.
WHEN THE MUNITIONS WERE NEEDED BY THE ARTILLERY THEY WERE
PROVIDED. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS RECAUSE THIS WAS A
MATTER FOR THE CHEMICAL SPECIA4ISTS. CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WERE
TRANSPORTER IN REGULAR TRANSPORT TRUCKS DELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN OR YUGOSLAVIAN MANUFACTURE. WEAPOMS WERE
ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIAL CHEMICAL PERSONNEL AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE
PERSONNEL DURING TRANSPORT. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT STORAGE
OF CONVENTIONAL HIGH EXPLOSIVE MUNITIONS EXCEPT THAT THEY WERE
STORED IN UNDERGROUND AND/OR EARTH-COVEREO DEPOTS WITH LOCAL
DEFENSE PROVIDED BY ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL OR TROOPS IN THE
AREA. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT FUSES/DETONATORS WOULD BE STORED
SEPARATELY FROM THE MUNITIONS THEMSELVES. AGAIN, THIS WAS AN AREA
LEFT TO THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.
4.        CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE GEAR--SOURCE DESCRIBED IRAQI
PROTECTIVE MASKS AS HAVING A HOSE AND CANNISTER. COMMANDERS' MASKS
WERE FITTED WITH A COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY. (FLD CMT--THESE
DESCRIPTIONS FIT THOSE OF STANDARD SOVIET MASKS, THE SHLEM AND K
MASKS.) PERSONNEL ALSO HAVE SOVIET-TYPE SUITS. WHEM ASKED ABOUT
ANY WEAKNESSES IN THE IRAQI CW CAPABILITY SOURCE SAID THEIR ONLY
WEAKNESS WAS THE LEVEL OF TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN MANEUVER UNITS.
THESE PERSONNEL WERE NOT WELL-TRAINED. PERSONNEL IN CHEMICAL
DEFENSE UNITS WERE WELL-TRAINED.
5.        DECONTAMINATION SITES--IRAQI DECONTAMINATION SITES WERE
SELECTED BY CHEMICAL SPECIALISTS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF COMMAND. THE
PRIORITY OF PERSONNEL TO BE PROCESSED WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS
(BEGINNING WITH THE HIGHEST) HEADQUARTERS, THE MAIN RESERVES 
(WHICH
SOURCE BELIEVED ARE CRITICAL IN A BATTLE), ARTILLERY UNITS,
MANEUVER TROOPS, AND FINALLY ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS. SOURCE ALSO
NOTED THAT THIS COULD BE THE SAME ORDER OF PRIORITY THE IRAQIS
WOULD PLACE ON TARGETS THEY WANTED TO ATTACK WITH CHEMICALS.
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF DECONTAMINATION SITES INCLUDED THE
ESTIMATE OF WHERE THE ENEMY MIGHT EMPLOY CHEMICALS, WEATHER
CONDITIONS, AND WHERE PERSONNEL COULD BE BEST PROTECTED.
DECONTAMINATION SITES INCLUDED EQUIPMENT AND SPECIALISTS FOR
DECONTAMINIATION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT OF THE AFFECTED UNITS.
SITES NEARER THE TROOPS (FRONT) WOULD HAVE A LESSER CAPABILITY 
THAN
SITES FURTHER TO THE REAR. ENGINEERS PROVIDED WATER AND SOME
SUPPORT IN DIGGING PROTECTIVE AND DRAINAGE TRENCHES. SOURCE DID
NOT KNOW OF DECONTAMINATION SITES BEING LOCATED WITH OR NEAR
ARTILLERY BATTERIES WHEN THESE UNITS FIRED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS.
6.        DECONTAMINATION MARKING--CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED AREAS
WERE MARKED WITH YELLOW FLAGS. CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS
USED R-106 RADIOS.
7.        CHEMICAL WARFARE TRAINING--MANY OF THE IRAQI CHEMICAL
ADVISORS HAD BEEN TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION. STAFF OFFICERS AND
SENIOR COMMANDERS WHO ATTENDED THE IRAQI STAFF COLLEGE AND 
RECEIVED
A MASTERS DEGREE IN MILITARY SCIENCE RECEIVED INSTRUCTION IN
CHEMICAL WARFARE.
8.        OPERATIONS ORDERS--A SECTION ON THE CHEMICAL THREAT IS
NORMALLY INCLUDED IN THE BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS ORDERS. THIS
SECTION WAS USUALLY OMITTED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR BECAUSE THE
IRANIANS WERE NOT PERCEIVED TO HAVE A CV THREAT. SOURCE BELIEVED
THAT THIS SECTION WOULD BE USED IN THE CURRENT SITUATION BECAUSE
SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQI COMMANDERS WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER A U.S.
NUCLEAR AND CHEMICA4 THREAT.
9.        CHEMICAL PRODUCTION--SOURCE HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT
IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS CAME FROM THE SOVIET UNION. WHEN QUERIED ON
THIS SOURCE SAID THIS MAY HAVE BEEN THE CASE EARLY ON BUT TME
IRAQIS HAD BEGUN PRODUCING THEIR OWN AGENTS BY 1985. WHILE IN
INDIA IN 1986, SOURCE KNEW THAT THE IRAQI MILITARY ATTACHE HAD
TALKED WITH AN INDIAN PROFESSOR ABOUT DEVELOPING CHEMICAL AGENTS.
10.        IMPRISONMENT OF HEAD OF CHEMICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENT
AND ACCUISITION--THE HEAD OF CHEMICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENT AND
ACQUISITION, GENERAL NAZAR, HAD BEEN SENTENCED TO JAIL RECENTLY
(SOMETIME BEFORE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT) ACCORDING TO INFORMATION
SOURCE RECEIVED AFTER LEAVING IRAQ. NAZAR WAS TO HAVE SERVED A TWO
YEAR SENTENCE BUT WAS RELEASED AFTER SIX MONTHS. THE REASON FOR
THE JAIL SENTENCE IS NOT KNOWN. NAZAR, WHO HAD STUDIED IN BOTH THE
UNITED STATES AND IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HAD SERVED AS A CHIEF
ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND TO SADDAM HUSSEIN , REPORTEDLY
THEN RETIRED. THE POSITION AS HEAD OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE
DEPARTMENT, I.E. THE HEAD OF CHEMICAL TROOPS, IS SEPARATE FROM THE
HEAD OF DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION.
COMMENTS: 1.        [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
2. (U) QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THIS IIR SHOULD BE
FORWARDED TO CDR 513TH MI BDE FT MONMOUTH NJ//IAM-C-OSD//. POC IS
[   (b)(6)   ]DSN 992-6042/5680/5682/0590, COMMERCIAL (908)
532-6042/5680/5682/0590.
//IPSP: PT 1600; PGW2650//.
//COMSOBJ: 141; 211//.
ADMIN PROJ: (U) 290700.
INSTR: (U) US NO.
PREP: (U) 2-60001.
ACQ: (U) 910121.
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED
 



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