SUBJECT: SUBJ: INTERNAL MEMORANDUM ON PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS'
ILLNESSES, 30 MAY 1995
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE: 30-05-95 10:23:18
SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS' ILLNESSES
REF: EMPLOYEE BULLETIN 0003-95, DTD 19 MAY 1995
I. THE FOLLOWING MAY OR MAY NOT BE PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT, BUT IS
FORWARDED IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR AN AGENCY PERSON WITH INFORMATION
THAT MIGHT BEAR ON POSSIBLE CAUSES OF GULF WAR SYNDROME.
2. AN INSPECTION TEAM UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
COMMISSION (UNSCOM)--UNSCOM 29/CHEMICAL DESTRUCTION 1--VISITED IRAQ
23 FEB-22 MAR 92 TO SUPERVISE THE DESTRUCTION OF SARIN-FILLED 122 MM ROCKETS.
THE SITE AT WHICH THE ROCKETS HAD BEEN STORED IS CALLED KHAMISIYAH BY THE
IRAQIS, AND IS KNOWN TO THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS TALL AL LAHM
AMMUNITION STORAGE FACILITY. DURING THEIR PERIOD IN IRAQ, THE IRAQIS TOLD THE
INSPECTION TEAM THAT MUCH OF THE DESTRUCTION AT THE KHAMISIYAH SITE HAD
BEEN CAUSED BY COALITION FORCES WHO HAD OCCUPIED THE SITE
, BUT THE INSPECTORS THOUGHT IRAQ MIGHT SIMPLY HAVE GATHERED THE
ROCKETS HERE AND ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THEM THEMSELVES. UNSCOM
REQUESTED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE US ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
ANY COALFILCH FORCES WHO HAD BEEN IN THAT AREA.
THE
CABLE ON THIS TEAM'S ACTIVITIES NOTED THAT THE TEAM "...REQUESTED DETAILS
PERTAINING TO COALITION FORCES' ACTIVITIES AT THIS SITE: WHO WAS THERE;
WHEN WERE THEY THERE; HOW LONG DID THEY STAY; WHAT ACTIONS WERE
TAKEN; ETC."
3. A DOD INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT-IIR 6 021 0099 92/CHEMICAL ROCKET
DESTRUCTION IN KHAMISIYAH--PROVIDED DETAILS OF THE TEAM'S DESTRUCTION
ACTIVITY AND PROVIDED COORDINATES FOR THE KHAMISIYAH FACILITY AND THE
NEARBY DESTRUCTION SITES. THE IIR ALSO FORWARDED A SKETCH MAP AND AN
ANNOTATED MAP EXTRACT DEPICTING THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE DESTRUCTION SITES.
4. IN MID-MAY, I PREPARED A REQUEST TO DOD FOR THE INFORMATION DESIRED BY
UNSCOM. DOD NEVER RESPONDED TO THE REQUEST. I HAVE SEARCHED WITHOUT SUCCESS
THROUGH MY OWN AND
THE OFFICE'S FILES FOR A COPY OF THIS REQUEST TO DOD. ·
5. PRIOR TO MAY 1991, I HAD
SERVED AS SENIOR ANALYST WITH THE CURRENT ANALYSIS BRANCH OF THE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER (JIC) IN THE PENTAGON. AS ALL ARE AWARE, THE THREAT
OF IRAQI USE OF CW OR BW WEAPONS WAS A HIGH PRIORITY DURING THE
PREPARATIONS FOR AND THE CONDUCT OF DESERT STORM. IN MY CAPACITY IN THE JIC,
I NEVER CAME ACROSS A SINGLE INSTANCE OF PROVEN CW OR BW USE OR DISCOVERY
ANYWHERE IN THE ACTIVE THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
6. I HAVE BEEN CONNECTED CONTINUOUSLY WITH THIS ACTIVITY SINCE MAY 91
COPIES OF THE TWO REPORTS CITED ABOVE ARE AVAILABLE FROM ME IF THEY
MIGHT BE OF USE TO YOU.
1.5(C)
94784:94784
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