Subject: SUBJ: CIA RELAYS CONCERNS ABOUT UNMARKED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS, 6 MARCH 1991 Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. 061923Z MAR 91 DIRECTOR 551818 TO: IMMEDIATE JILE/SAUDI FROM: DI SUBJECT: PROPOSED TDY REF: A. B. DIRECTOR 545985 ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPHS 2, 6, AND 7. 1. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT ARMY TEAM ANALYSTS WERE TO ACCOMPANY HAS BEEN CANCELLED. ANALYSTS STILL HAVE URGENT NEED FOR THE SAKE OF FUTURE ANALYTICAL REQUIREMENTS TO VISIT ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FACILITIES WHILE THEY REMAIN UNDER COALITION CONTROL: A. AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STORAGE EAST 3200N 4500E B. AD DIWANIYAH AMMO STORAGE SW 3157N 4454E C. AN NASIRIYAH AMMO STORAGE SW 3058N 4611E D. ASH SHUAYBAH AMMO STORAGE NE 3029N 4739E E. TALLIL AIRFIELD 3056N 4605E 2. URGENTLY REQUEST THAT JILE/SAUDI DETERMINE IF ANY OF THE ABOVE IRAQI FACILITIES WILL STILL BE IN COALITION HANDS IN THE NEXT 60 HOURS. 3. HIGH LEVEL POLICYMAKERS WANT IMMEDIATE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON PRESENCE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN THE KTO. THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, WHILE FACILITIES ARE STILL IN COALITION CONTROL, ARE A PERIOD OF GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT COULD ANSWER THESE INQUIRIES. PRESENCE OF ANALYSTS WILL ENSURE THAT POLICYMAKERS' QUESTIONS ARE ADDRESSED. 4. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN EPW REPORTS THAT IRAQ'S CHEMlCAL MUNITIONS HAVE COLORED BANDS OTHER MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION, OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE MUNITIONS IRAQ USED IN ITS WAR WITH IRAN INDICATES THAT THE IRAQIS DID NOT/NOT MARK THEIR CHEMICALLY FILLED MUNITIONS. WE BELIEVE THE EPW REPORTS ON MARKINGS MAY REFLECT TRAINING CLASSES ON CHEMICAL MUNITIONS USING SOVIET EXAMPLES. OUR EXPERTS ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE SPECIFIC TYPES OF MUNITIONS THAT IRAQ FILLED WITH CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IF PERSONNEL IN THE KTO ARE NOT AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY, OPPORTUNITIES TO SUCCESSFULLY IDENTIFY CHEMICALLY FILLED MUNITIONS MAY BE MISSED. WHEN CACHES OF UNMARKED MUNITIONS ARE DESTROYED, THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT INDIVIDUALS COULD BE EXPOSED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. IF ANY CW AGENTS ARE DETECTED, EXPERTS WILL PROVIDE REAL-TIME GUIDANCE ON TYPES OF AGENTS KNOWN OR SUSPECTED OF BEING IN THE IRAQ ARSENAL. 5. PRESENCE OF EXPERTS WILL ALSO ENSURE THAT ANY DOCUMENTS, MATERIALS, OR INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM EPWS OR CAPTURED AREAS CAN BE REVIEWED IN REAL-TIME FOR CW RELEVANCE. OUR EXPERTS CAN ALSO HELP FOCUS DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS AND COLLECTION EFFORTS. 6. REQUEST JILE/SAUDI IMMEDIATELY PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON RECENT REPORTING INDICATING THAT A US SOLDIER HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO BLISTER AGENTS. WHEN REPORTING OF THIS TYPE SHOWS UP, HIGH LEVEL CONSUMERS--THE PRESIDENT, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AND MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL--DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT. WITHOUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS, OUR EXPERTS ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF SUCH REPORTS. INITIAL ASSESSMENTS THAT WE ARE UNSURE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE REPORTS CAN ONLY KEEP THESE CONSUMERS AT BAY, FOR A SHORT TIME. 7. REQUEST THAT JILE/SAUDI DIRECTLY APPROACH CENTCOM CCJ2 AND ASK FOR IMMEDIATE COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR ANALYSTS. ANALYSTS ARE READY FOR IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE WHEN COUNTRY CLEARANCE RECEIVED. 1.5(c) 74543:65158
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