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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

110296_cia_72247_72247_05.txt
SUBJECT: PREWAR STATUS OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
(A REFERENCE AID)
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
SUMMARY
AS OF 15 JANUARY 1991, IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION POSED SERIOUS
THREATS TO US FORCES AND INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. IRAQ'S USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES IN ITS WAR WITH IRAN, ITS SUCCESSFUL
DEVELOPMENT OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND ITS PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS GAVE
BAGHDAD CAPABILITIES UNMATCHED IN THE ARAB WORLD.
IRAQ APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT IT NEEDS CHEMICAL WEAPONS BOTH AS A DETERRENT
AND AS A KEY SUPPORT FOR ITS PROFESSED ROLE AS MILITARY "PROTECTOR" OF THE
ARAB WORLD. THE HIGH PRIORITY ENJOYED BY THE CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW)
PROGRAM PROBABLY ALSO REFLECTS IRAQ'S SATISFACTION WITH THE RESULTS OF
MASSIVE NERVE AGENT STRIKES AGAINST IRANIAN FORCE IN 1988 AND SUBSEQUENT
CW USE AGAINST KURDISH INSURGENTS. 
IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM WAS BY FAR THE LARGEST IN THE THIRD WORLD. IRAQ'S
COMBINED PRODUCTION CAPABILITY OF THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE
AGENTS SARIN AND OF-THE PRINCIPAL AGENTS IN ITS ARSCNAL-WAS ABOUT 2,000
TONS PER YEAR. SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN, IRAQ HAS STRESSED DEVELOPMENT 
OF ADVANCED CW AGENTS. IT IS PURSUING PERSISTENT NERVE AGENTS SUCH AS VX
THAT ARC MUCH MORE TOXIC THAN MUSTARD, SARIN, AND GF. IN ADDITION, IRAQ
HAS DEVELOPED BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITH A LONGER SHELF LIFE, ENABLING IT
TO MAINTAIN A SIMBLE STOCKPILE. IN CONCERT WITH DEVELOPING A MORE
SOPHISTICATED CW STOCKPILE, THE IRAQIS AM MAINTAINING A WIDE RANGE OF
BATTLEFIELD-PROVEN CW AGENT DELIVERY OPTIONS, INCLUDING BOMBS, SHELLS, AND
ARTILLERY ROCKETS. WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ ALSO POSSESSES CW AGENT WARHEADS
FOR ITS SCUD AND MODIFIED SCUD BALLISTIC MISSILES.
WE HAVE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT IRAQ IS PREPARED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
IN ANY CONFLICT WITH US FORCES OVER LMQ'S INVASION OR KUWAIT. IRAQ MOST
LIKELY WOULD USE THE NERVE AGENTS SARIN AND GF-POSSIBLY IN BINARY FOM-
IN ARTILLERY ROCKETS AND AERIAL BOMBS AN THE BATTLEFIELD BUT MIGHT ALSO USE
GF AND MUSTARD AGAINST REAR-AREA TARGETS, SUCH AS AIRFIELDS. HOWEVER,
IRAQI WILLINGNESS TO INITIATE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT.
DESPITE PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN'S PRONOUNCEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY,
UNDOUBTC&Y WILL BE TEMPERED IF ITS OPPONENTS POSSESS CREDIBLE CW
CAPABILITIES AND APPEAR WILLING TO RETALIATE IN KIND.
+
BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN, IRAQ'S ADVANCED BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) PROGRAM
WAS THE MOST EXTEMIVE IN THE ARAB WORLD
THE IRAQIS PROBABLY HAVE ALREADY DEPLOYED
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF BIOLOGICALLY FILLED AERIAL BOMBS AND
ARTILLERY ROCKETS. IRAQ IS PROBABLY DEVELOPING BW AGENT WARHEADS FOR ITS
INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED SCUDS. WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ WILL HOLD ITS BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS IN RESERVE AS ARK ESCALATORY OPTION. THE IRAQIS VERY LIKELY ARE
DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL BW AGENTS-PROBABLY INFECTIOUS AGENTS AND ADDITIONAL
TOXINS
IRAQ PROBABLY HAS THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE, WHEN COMBINED WITH CLANDES-
TINELY OBTAINED FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY OR ASSISTANCE, TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR
WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990S USING INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED FISSILE MATERIAL.
OTHER WORST CASE AND MUCH LESS LIKELY SCENARIOS EXIST IN WHICH IRAQ COULD
DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE IN AS LITTLE AS A FEW MONTHS AFTER A DECISION TO
DO SO. THESE SCENARIOS INVOLVE THE USE OF A CLANDESTINE SOURCE OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL-OR THE DIVERSION AND PROCESSING OF
SAFEGUARDED RESEARCH REACTOR FUELS INTO MATERIAL SUITABLE FOR A CRASH
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES PROGRAM.
EVEN THOUGH IRAQ PROBABLY COULD DEVELOP A NUCLEAR DEVICE BEFORE THE END OF
THE DECADE IF ITS NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE REMAINED INTACT, FITTING THE DEVICE
INTO A MISSILE'S WARHEAD WILL NOT BE A SIMPLE TASK.
IRAQ COULD FACE TWO
OR MORE YEARS' DELAY IN FIELDING A NUCLEAR WEAPON.
IRAQ HAS THE MOST ADVANCED BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT
HAS THREE OPERATIONAL MISSILES-THE SOVIET SCUD B AND TWO IRAQI-MODIFIED
SCUD BS CALLED THE AL HUSAYN AND THE AL ABBAS. THE MODIFIED SCUDS ARE
CAPABLE OF REACHING KEY TARGETS SOME 600 TO 700 KM AWAY IN ISRAEL, IRAN,
AND SAUDI ARABIA.
WE BELIEVE THAT CURRENT IRAQI MISSILE PROJECTS WILL BE DIFFICULT TO STOP, SHORT
OF DISMANTLING OR DESTROYING IRAQ'S MISSILE PRODUCTION INFRASTRUCTURE.
1 THE INTERNATIONAL PARIAH STATUS GAINED BY IRAQ SINCE THE
INVASION OF KUWAIT MAY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN SUCH SUPPORT IN THE
FUTURE
PREWAR STATUS OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
BACKGROUND
IRAQ'S CONCERTED CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) EFFORT DURING 
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENABLED IT TO ESTABLISH A SIZABLE AND
SOPHISTICATED INFRASTRUCTURE FOR R&D, PRODUCTION,
TESTING, ADN STORAGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
BY THE WAR'S END, IRAQ WAS ABLE TO ANNUALLY 
PRODUCE ABOUT 1,000 TONS EACH OF BLISTER AND NERVE
AGENTS. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAD LITTLE DIFFICULTY OBTAINING
THE RAW MATERIALS IT NEEDED TO SUPPORT SUCH PRODUCTION, 
IT BEGAN DEVELOPING AN INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR
PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AFTER THE UNITED STATES AND
OTHER WESTERN NATIONS BEGAN CONTROLLING SALES OF KEY
PRECURSOR CHEMICALS.
THE 1998 CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN DID NOT DIMINISH THE 
IMPORTANCE OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM, BUT IT DID SIGNIFI-
CANTLY ALTER THE PROGRAM'S FOCUS. THE DEMANDS OF THE 
WAR REQUIRED THAT IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM DEDICATE
MUCH OF ITS RESOURCES TO LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE, HOWEVER, PRODUC-
TION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITH A LIMITED SHELF LIFE WAS
NO LONGER PRACTICAL OR EVEN NECESSARY, FREEING IRAQ TO
ENHANCE ITS CW EFFORT IN PREPARATION FOR FUTURE
CONFLICTS.
NEW CW AGENTS AND PRODUCTION METHODS
ADVANCED AGENTS
ON THE BASIS OF A VARIETY OF REPORTING, WE BELIEVE THAT 
IRAQ HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN A SIZABLE EFFORT TO DEVELOP
AND PRODUCE ADVANCED CW AGENTS
IRAQ HAS ALREADY PRODUCED GF, A MORE PERSISTENT
ANALOG OF SARIN, AND IS SEEKING OTHER ANALOGS SUCH AS
SOMAN. WE BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS PRODUCED AND USED
SOME GF TOWARD THE END OF THE WAR WITH IRAN AND THAT
BINARY GF NOW MAKES UP PART OF IRAQ'S CW ARSENAL.
IRAQI NERVE AGENT RESEARCH APPARENTLY HAS FOCUSED ON
VX AS WELL.
IRAQ ALSO MAY BE RESEARCHING
NONSTANDARD NERVE AGENTS SIMILAR TO VX.
IMPROVED PRODUCTION METHODS 
SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN, THE IRAQIS APPARENTLY
HAVE BEEN OPTIMIZING THEIR CW AGENT PRODUCTION
PROCESSES AND SEARCHING FOR NEW ROUTES OF MANUFAC-
TURE. THE GOALS OF THIS EFFORT PROBABLY ARE TO SIMPLIFY 
THE PRODUCTION OF CW AGENTS, REDUCCE BOTTLENECKS IN
THE PROCESS, AND RELY ON INDGENOUSLY PRODUCED OR
EASILY ACQUIRED RAW MATERIALS.
IRAQ HAS ALSO TRAINED ITS TROOPS TO OPERATE IN A
CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT.
SEVERAL IRAQI COURSES RELATED TO CW DEFENSE, IN
ADDITION TO UNSPECIFIED TRAINING THAT COULD BE EITHER
OFFENSIVE OR PROTECTIVE IN NATURE.
IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
BACKGROUND
IRAQ'S EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE WITH CHEMICAL WEAP-
ONS ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE REINFORCED ITS DESIRE TO 
DEVELOP ADDITIONAL UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. WE
BELIEVE THAT IRAQ VIEWS ITS USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AGAINST IRAN AS A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE OUTCOME OF THE
WAR. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS WERE 
PLEASED WITH THE MINIMAL INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO ITS
USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
FROM A BASE OF A WELL-ESTABLISHED CW PROGRAM, THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IS
THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP THAT A PROLIFERATING NATION USUALLY
TAKES. COUNTRIES AROUND THE GLOBE, INCLUDING IRAQ, 
HAVE CONCLUDED THAT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OFFER MUCH
AND REQUIRE LITTLE:
--BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) AGENTS CAN BE PRODUCED
WITH RELATIVELY SMALL EXPENDITURE OF TIME AND
RESOURCES.
BW AGENTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT
A VARIETY OF INFORMATION LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT
IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED BOTULINUM TOXIN AND ANTHRAX
SPORES AS BW AGENTS. BOTULINUM TOXIN IS NONPERSIS-
TENT, DEGRADING RAPIDLY IN THE ENVIRONMENT. ANTHRAX
SPORES ARE VERY STABLE IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND CAN BE
CONSIDERED PERSISTENT BW AGENTS.
WEAPONIZATION AND USE OF CW AND
BW AGENTS
IRAQ HAS AVAILABLE A WIDE RANGE OF WEAPON SYSTEMS
THAT IT COULD USE TO DELIVER CW AND BW AGENTS. THE
WEAPONS RANGE FROM SIMPLE AERIAL BOMBS AND ARTILLERY
ROCKETS TO BALLISTIC MISSILES.
IRAQ ALSO HAS CHEMICAL
ROUNDS FOR ITS 82-MM AND 120-MM MORTARS AND ITS
122-MM AND 130-MM ARTILLERY. IT ALSO USED 122-MM
ARTILLERY ROCKETS FILED WITH CW AGENTS, PARTICULARLY IN
THE FINAL YEAR OF THE WAR.
ALL THESE MUNITIONS COULD ALSO BE FILLED WITH BW AGENTS
BOMBS AND MUNITIONS
IRAQ HAS HISTORICALLY PURCHASED EMPTY NAPAIM OR
WHITE PHOSPHORUS MUNITIONS THAT IT HAS FILLED WITH CW
AGENTS AND COULD FILL WITH BW AGENTS.
BALLSTIC MISSILES
IRAQ IS DEVELOPING A LONG-RANGE CW AND BW DELIVERY
CAPABILITY TO AUGMENT ITS EXTENSIVE SHORT-RANGE TACTI-
CAL CAPABILITIES. OF GREATEST CONCERN IS IRAQ'S DEVELOP-
MENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS FOR ITS
BALLISTIC MISSILES.' IRAQ PROBABLY WILL DEVELOP AND
MANUFACTURE THESE WARHEADS FOR EACH KIND OF BALLISTIC
MISSILE UNDER DEVELOPMENT
WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED A CHEMICAL WAR-
HEAD FOR ITS SCUDS AND MODIFIED SCUDS.
USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
PAST IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND STATEMENTS BY
IRAQI OFFICIALS JUSTIFYING THE USE OF ANY WEAPON TO
DEFEND THEIR COUNTRY SUGGEST THAT IRAQ WOULD USE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN A CONFLICT. IN
DECEMBER 1990, IRAQI OFFICALS THREATENED TO USE 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE MULTINATIONAL COALITION
FORCES IF FIGHTING BROKE OUT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
BACKGROUND
NOTWITHSTANDING BAGHDAD'S NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERA-
TION TREATY COMMITMENT. WE BELEIVE THAT IRAQI PRESI-
DENT SADDAM HUSAYN JUDGES A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPA-
BILITY TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MEET PERCEIVED SECURITY NEEDS
AND TO FURTHER REGIONAL AMBITIONS.
IRAQ HAS WORKED ON NUCLEAR
WEAPON DESIGN,
HOWEVER, EVEN IF A DEVICE DESIGN DID NOT EXIST
BEFORE THE INVASION KUWAIT, IRAQ COULD GREATLY
ACCELERATE A DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT BY COM-
PROMISING SAFETY, RELIABILITY, EFFICIENCY, YIELD, COM-
PACTNESS, AND RUGGEDNESS. AN EXPEDITED NUCLEAR EX-
PLOSIVE DESIGN, OF EITHER THE GUN-ASSEMBLED OR
IMPLOSION TYPE, COULD BE DEVELOP WITHIN SIX MONTHS
TO A YEAR IF NO MAJOR OBSTACLES WERE ENCOUNTERED.
OUR BELIEF THAT IRAQ HAS NOT YET
COMPLETED A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DESIGN.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
WE BELIVE THAT TACTICAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERA-
TIONS HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO IRAQI MILITARY DOC-
TRINE. IRAQ UTILIZED CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRIMARILY DURING
THE LAST HALF OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, WHICH LED TO
BATTLEFIELD DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ'S CW DOCTRINE. THE
DECISION TO USE CHEMICALS DURING THE WAR, HOWEVER,
WAS UNDOUBTEDLY INFLUENCED BY THE LACK OF A SIGNIFI-
CANT IRANIAN COUNTERCAPABILITY. WE BELIEVE IRAQ WILL
BE LESS LIKELY TO INITIATE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
FUTURE SCENARIOS IF ITS OPPONENT IS ARMED WITH A
CREDIBLE CW CAPABILITY AND APPEARS WILLING TO USE IT.
OF THE MANY CW DELIVERY SYSTEMS AVAILABLE TO IRAQ,
WE BELIEVE THAT ARTILLERY ROCKETS AND AIRCRAFT-DELIVERED
BOMBS ARE THE MOST LIKELY TO BE USED. WE BELIEVE THAT
IRAQ HAS ALREADY PRODUCED A FEW CHEMICAL WARHEADS
FOR ITS CAPABILITY TO STRIKE SAUDI POPULATION CEN-
TERS, AIRFIELDS, AND STAGING AREAS WITH CW AGENTS.
WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ'S EXTENSIVE CW CAPABILITY POSES A
THREAT TO US FORCES AND INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST. IRAQ HAS THE CAPABILITY TO DELEIVER LARGE AMOUNTS
OF CW AGENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND HAS SHOWN A
WILLINGNESS TO DO SO DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. RECENT
RELIABLE REPORTING INDICATES THAT, IN AN INVASION OF
SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE HELD
IN RESERVE AND USED IMMEDIATELY IF IRAQI TROOPS LOSE
MOMENTUM. TARGETS FOR STRATEGIC CW USE REPORTEDLY
WOULD BE DHAHRAN AND RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA, WITH 
EMPHASIS PLACED ON AIRFIEDLS, STAGING AREAS, AND CIVIL-
IAN POPULATIONS. THE TARGETING OF CIVILIANS IS IN LINE
WITH IRAQI THREATS TO "TURN KUWAIT INTO A GRAVEYARD"
IN CASE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION.
RECENT ACTIVITY AT IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION
AND STORGE AREAS STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT IRAQ'S EXPEDI-
TIONARY FORCES HAVE READY ACCESS TO A FAIRLY SIZABLE
CW STOCKPILE.
IN 1988.                 SUCH ACTIVITY 
USUALLY INDICATED IMMINENT USE OF CW BECAUSE IRAQI
NERVE AGENTS HAD A VERY LIMITED SHELF LIFE. HOWEVER,
IRAQ PROBABLY NOW HAS DEVELOPED BINARY NERVE AGENT
WEAPONS WITH A MUCH LONGER SHELF LIFE. AS A RESULT,
IRAQI FORCES PROBABLY NOW CAN MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT
STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND USE THEM AT THEIR
CONVENIENCE.
IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE CW AGENTS IRAQ IS MOST LIKELY TO
USE IN AN INCURSION INTO SAUDI ARABIA ARE SARIN
(PROBABLY IN BINARY MUNITIONS) AND MUSTARD. SARIN 
WOULD BE THE AGENT OF CHOICE FOR TARGETS THAT IRAQ
WANTS TO OCCUPY QUICKLY--INCLUDING OILFIELDS AND OTH-
ER KEY OBJECTIVES--AS WELL AS FOR BATTLEFIELD DEFENSES.
MUSTARD MIGHT BE USED TO PROTECT IRAQI FLANKS AND, 
AGAINST KEY TRANSPORTATION NODES, TO HINDER MOVEMENT
AND RESUPPLY OF OPPOSING FORCES. THE SEMIPERSISTENT 
NERVE AGENT GF COULD BE USED IN PLACE OF SARIN IF THE 
TARGET NEED NOT BE CAPTURED IMMEDIATELY. AGENTS LESS
LIKELY TO BE USED--BUT STILL POTENTIAL THREATS--INCLUDE
THE PERSISTENT NERVE AGENT VX, THE NONPERSISTENT NERVE
AGENT SOMAN, NITROGEN MUSTARD, AND PERHAPS EVEN
NONLETHAL TEAR GAS AND VOMITING AGENTS.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
SADDAM PROBABLY HAS LITTLE FEAR OF THE POLITICAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF USING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. HE HAS THE 
DUBIOUS DISTINCTION OF BEING THE FIRST TO USE NERVE
AGENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND SUCCESSFULLY WEATHERED
THE LIMITED INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THIS USE.
WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAD DEPLOYED A MILITARILY SIGNIFI-
CANT NUMBER OF BOMBS AND ARTILLERY ROCKETS FILLED WITH
BOTULINUM TOXIN AND ANTHRAX BY THE END OF 1990. IN
ADDITION, WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ WILL SOON DEVELOP A BW
WARHEAD FOR ITS INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED SCUDS.
WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAS BEEN DEVELOPING OTHER
BW AGENTS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET IDENTIFIED. LIKELY
CANDIDATES INCLUDE VIRUSES AND ADDITIONAL BACTERIA AND
TOXINS.
WE CANNOT PREDICT A TIME FRAME IN WHICH THEY WOULD
BE READY FOR DEPLOYMENT. WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQ HAS ALREADY DEVELOPED ADDITIONAL
AGENTS.
15     BECAUSE OF THE LARGE AREA OF COVERAGE PROVIDED BY BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS, EVEN A FEW DOZEN WOULD BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT.
END OF MESSAGE
1.5 C
72247-72247

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