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110296_cia_61884_61884_01.txt
Subject: IRAQI ARMY CHEMICAL WEAPONS DOCTRINE; IRANIAN USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQI TROOPS
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
DEC 94 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUMMARY: THIS REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION ON THE CHEMICAL WARFARE
DOCTRINE OF THE IRAQ ARMY INCLUDING DECISION MAKING AUTHORITIES
CAPABLE OF ORDERING THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW); EXAMPLES OF
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN IRAQ USED CW'S; DOCTRINE FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS
IN A CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA; CW DELIVERY SYSTEMS; LENGTH OF
TIME ATTACKING IRAQI GROUND UNITS WAITED PRIOR TO ENTERING A
CW-CONTAMINATED AREA; CONTAMINATED AREA MARKING METHOD;
DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES; AND
OPERATIONS OF SPECIAL CHEMICAL UNITS. INCLUDED IS LIMITED IRAQI
INFORMATION ON IRANIAN CW USE DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.
TEXT: 1. AS            1991, THE IRAQI ARMY HAD NO CLEARLY
DEFINED DOCTRINE WHICH SPECIFIED UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES CHEMICAL
WEAPONS (CW) WOULD BE USED IN EITHER DEFENSIVE OR OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS.
2. THE IRAQI ARMY DID HAVE DOCTRINE WHICH ADDRESSED HOW TO
DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON TARGET AND HOW TO OPERATE IN A
CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENT. IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE
AMONG IRAQI GROUND FORCES THAT SOME TYPE OF CW, I.E. AN
UNIDENTIFIED NERVE AGENT, WAS USED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND
AGAINST THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ IN 1991. IRAQI ARMY CW
DOCTRINE EVOLVED THROUGH LESSONS LEARNED FROM ACTUAL USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
3. PRIOR TO A PLANNED OFFENSIVE USE OF CW, A DETACHMENT FROM
A SPECIAL CHEMICAL UNIT BASED IN BAGHDAD WOULD COME TO THE FRONT.
                  IT WAS COMMON.
KNOWLEDGE IN THE IRAQI ARMOR BRANCH THAT THE IRAQI CW INVENTORY
COULD BE DELIVERED BY FOUR PRIMARY MEANS: AIRCRAFT, ARTILLERY
SHELLS, CHEMICAL MINES, AND TANK MAIN GUN AMMUNITION THE
CHEMICAL DETACHMENT MEASURED WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION AND INFORMED
THE ATTACKING UNITS OF THE EXACT TIME THEY COULD PROCEED INTO THE
CONTAMINATED AREA AFTER THE ATTACK.          COMMENT: THIS UNIT
MAY ALSO HAVE INFORMED THE UNIT DELIVERING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF
FAVORABLE WIND DIRECTIONE
4. AFTER THE TARGET AREA WAS STRUCK WITH CHEMICAL MUNITIONS,
THE CHEMICAL DETACHMENT CONTINUED TO MONITOR WIND SPEED AND
DIRECTION. IN ADDITION, THE DETACHMENT HAD SOME TYPE OF EQUIPMENT
WITH THE CAPABILITY OF MONITORING CHEMICAL CONCENTRATION IN THE
AIR. THE ATTACKING UNITS WERE REQUIRED TO WAIT FOR APPROVAL FROM
THE CHEMICAL DETACHMENT BEFORE ADVANCING. ORDERS TO ADVANCE WERE
ISSUED BETWEEN 20 AND 60 MINUTES AFTER THE CHEMICAL BOMBARDMENT
CEASED IN THE TARGET AREA.
5. TARGET AREAS WHICH THE IRAQI ARMY NEEDED TO OCCUPY OR PASS
THROUGHWERESPECIALLYMARKED. THECHEMICALDETACHMENTADVANCED
INTO THE TARGET AREA FIRST AND MARKED THE CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED
AREA. THEY PLACED AROUND THE ENTIRE CONTAMINATED AREA A 3-INCH OR
4-INCH-WIDE RED TAPE WHICH WAS MARKED WITH AN UNKNOWN CODE SYMBOL
AND A SKULL AND CROSSBONES. TARGET AREAS WHICH THE ARMY DID NOT
NEED TO OCCUPY OR PASS THROUGH WERE STRUCK WITH CW AND LEFT
UNMARKED. WHEN CW WAS USED AGAINST THE KURDS IN 1991, IRAQI
FORCES WOULD BOMB A VILLAGE AND THEN AVOID THE CONTAMINATED AREA.
6. DETACHMENTS FROM THE SPECIAL CHEMICAL UNIT WERE EQUIPPED
WITH UNIDENTIFIED MODEL MERCEDES AND LAND ROVER TRUCKS WITH SOME
TYPE OF ENCLOSED BOX ON THE REAR,
7. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) FOR IRAQI ARMOR UNITS
PRIOR TO ENTERING A CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA CONSISTED OF THE
FOLLOWING:
A. VEHICLES WERE SEALED, I.E., ALL HATCHES AND DOORS, AND
THE ENGINE AIR INTAKE MANIFOLD DOORS ON THE REAR OF THE TANK, WERE
CLOSED. VEHICLE DRIVERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR A DOUBLE CHECK TO
ENSURE THAT EVERYTHING WAS CLOSED PROPERLY.
B. ALL PERSONNEL PUT ON A CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE MASK WITH
HOOD AND AN IRAQI-MADE CHEMICAL PROTECTION SUIT ("ABAIYA'). ALL
PERSONNEL OUTSIDE SEALED VEHICLES WORE PROTECTIVE GLOVES AND
BOOTS
C. ALL VEHICLE DRIVERS WERE INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED
CAUTIOUSLY, TAKING SPECIAL CARE TO AVOID DRIVING OVER ANY UNUSUAL
OBSTACLES WHICH COULD BE UNEXPLODED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. THEY WERE
TO DRIVE SLOWLY THROUGH THE AREA, IN A CIRCUITOUS PATTERN IF
NECESSARY, AVOIDING BUMPS, RUBBLE, ETC.
D. ALL PERSONNEL ENTERING THE CONTAMINATED AREA WERE
INSTRUCTED NOT TO TOUCH ANYTHING.
8. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR IRAQ] UNITS WHICH PASSED
THROUGH OR BRIEFLY OCCUPIED A CONTAMINATED AREA WAS AS FOLLOWS:
A. ALL PERSONNEL WERE REQUIRED TO REPORT TO A SPECIAL
CHEMICAL UNIT AS SOON AS THE MISSION ALLOWED. THIS CHEMICAL UNIT
OPERATED A SHOWER POINT FOR PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION. THE SHOWER
POINT CONSISTED OF ENCLOSED TENTS WITH SHOWER STALLS. EACH SOLDIER
WAS REQUIRED TO STRIP COMPLETELY NAKED, ENTER THE TENT, AND USE A
SHOWER STALL TO BATHE. THE WATER SPRAY IN THE SHOWER STALL WAS
MIXED WITH AN UNKNOWN TYPE OF SOAP OR CHEMICAL.
B. ALL CLOTHING WHICH HAD BEEN WORN IN A CONTAMINATED
AREA WAS REMOVED AND LEFT AT THE SPECIAL CHEMICAL UNIT WHICH WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR DESTROYING OR TRANSPORTING THE CLOTHING TO ANOTHER
LOCATION. NEW CLOTHING WAS ISSUED BY THE SPECIAL CHEMICAL UNIT TO
ALL PERSONNEL AFTER THEY FINISHED THE DECONTAMINATION SHOWER.
C. ALL VEHICLE DRIVERS WERE REQUIRED TO DECONTAMINATE
THEIR VEHICLES PRIOR TO PROCEEDING TO THE SHOWER POINT. SOP
REQUIRED A DRIVER TO DRIVE TO A BODY OF WATER, I. E. A RIVER,
STREAM, OR SMALL POND, WHERE HE WOULD WASH HIS VEHICLE COMPLETELY
BY HAND WEARING PROTECTIVE GLOVES, BOOTS, MASK WITH HOOD, AND
PROTECTIVE SUIT.
D. THESE DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES WERE NOT BEGUN UNTIL
THE TACTICAL SITUATION WAS CLEARLY CONTROLLED BY THE IRAQIS.
1 1. THE IRANIANS ALSO USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IRAQI ARMY DOCTRINE INCORPORATED THE USE OF AIR
RAID SIRENS TO WARN TROOPS OF CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION. THE SIRENS
WERE CONTROLLED BY OBSERVERS FROM THE SPECIAL CHEMICAL UNIT
DETACHMENT WHO DEPLOYED ALONG THE FRONT WITH AN UNKNOWN TYPE OF
CHEMICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT.
END OF MESSAGE
1.5(c)
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