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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

070396_cia_75021_75021_01.txt
Subject: IRAQ'S FOREIGN DEPENDENCY IN DEV
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
IRAQ:  FOREIGN DEPENDENCY
IN DEVELOPING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
IRAQ:  FOREIGN DEPENDENCY
IN DEVELOPING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
KEY JUDGMENTS
INFORMATION AVAILABLE
AS OF          JANUARY 1991
WAS USED IN THIS REPORT.
IRAQ HAS DEPENDED ON EXTENSIVE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOP THE MOST
ADVANCED ARSENAL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE ARAB WORLD.
WITHOUT SUCH ASSISTANCE, BAGHDAD WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE
AND DEPLOY THE RANGE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THAT IT WIELDS
TODAY, NOR WOULD IT POSSESS THE INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY TO FIELD MISSILE
DELIVERY SYSTEMS WITH RANGE AND PAYLOAD CAPABILITIES THAT COULD THREATEN
MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST.
ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ'S UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS HAS COME FROM WEST
EUROPEAN FIRMS, BAGHDAD ALSO VIEWS THIRD WORLD FIRMS AS POTENTIAL
TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS AND MAY TURN TO THEM INCREASINGLY-
-IF WESTERN SOURCES ARE CUT OFF
WE BELIEVE THE CURRENT UN-SPONSORED EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ IS PROVING
EFFECTIVE IN STEMMING THE FLOW OF FOREIGN GOODS TO IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROGRAMS. BAGHDAD, HOWEVER, IS NOT GIVING UP.
IF THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT PERSIAN GULF CRISIS RESULTS IN THE DISMANTLING
OF IRAQI FACILITIES THAT SUPPORT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, WE BELIEVE
BAGHDAD'S CAPABILITY TO RESEARCH, DEVELOP, TEST, AND PRODUCE MANY OF THESE
WEAPONS WOULD BE SET BACK BY AT LEAST TWO TO FIVE YEARS-PROBABLY LONGER IF
DISMANTLING INCLUDED PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION. MOREOVER, IRAQ WOULD NOT BE
ABLE TO REGAIN ITS PRESENT CAPABILITIES WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) FACILITIES WOULD BE
EXCEPTIONS BECAUSE A CW INFRASTRUCTURE COULD STILL BE INTEGRATED INTO IRAQ'S
LEGITIMATE PESTICIDE PRODUCTION PROGRAM, AND ANY REMAINING VACCINE OR
PHARMACEUTICAL PLANTS COULD MANUFACTURE BW AGENTS
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AN IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT COULD BE IMPEDED MOST
EFFECTIVELY BY A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS (SIMILAR TO US-SOVIET INF INSPECTIONS AND COCOM PRELICENSE
AND POSTSHIPMENT CHECKS) AND DISSOLUTION OF BAGHDAD'S COVERT PROCUREMENT
NETWORK. TO BE EFFECTIVE, ANY SUCH AGREEMENT ALSO WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE
MEASURES TO INHIBIT THE RECONSTITUTION OF IRAQ'S PROCUREMENT NETWORK, SUCH
AS REQUIRING ALL IRAQI FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITIES/ORGANIZATIONS TO BE REGISTERED
WITH AN INTERNATIONAL GROUP AND APERIODICALLY INSPECTED.
IRAQ: FOREIGN DEPENDENCY
IN DEVELOPING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
CURRENT CAPABILITIES
IRAQ'S PROGRAMS TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION ARE THE MOST ADVANCED IN THE ARAB
WORLD. BAGHDAD HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED A CAPABILI-
TY TO PRODUCE AND USE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAP-
ONS AND IS DEVELOPING AN ARSENAL OF MISSILE DELIVERY
SYSTEMS WITH RANGE AND PAYLOAD CAPABILITIES THAT
COULD THREATEN MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST. ALTHOUGH WE
BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAS NO NUCLEAR WEAPON TODAY,
WE
BELIEVE IT COULD PRODUCE A WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990s.
CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM: BECOMING SELF-SUFFICIENT 
AND DEADLY
BEFORE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT ON 2 AUGUST 1990, THE
IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM, BY FAR THE
LARGEST IN THE THIRD WORLD, WAS RAPIDLY BECOMING SELF-
SUFFICIENT. SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN, IRAQ HAS
STRESSED DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED CW AGENTS AND
DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IT IS PURSUING PERSISTENT NERVE AGENTS
SUCH AS VX THAT ARE MUCH MORE TOXIC THAN THE BLISTER
AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENT SARIN-THE PRINCI-
PAL AGENTS NOW IN IRAQ'S ARSENAL. IN ADDITION, IRAQ
PROBABLY HAS DEVELOPED BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITH
A LONGER SHELF LIFE, ENABLING IT TO MAINTAIN A SIZABLE
STOCKPILE. IN CONCERT WITH DEVELOPING A MORE SOPHISTI-
CATED CW STOCKPILE, THE IRAQIS ARE MAINTAINING A WIDE
RANGE OF BATTLEFIELD-PROVEN DELIVERY OPTIONS, INCLUDING
BOMBS, SHELLS, ARTILLERY ROCKETS, AND BALLISTIC MISSILES.
WITHOUT THE UN-SPONSORED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, IRAQ
PROBABLY COULD HAVE COMPLETED,          ENOUGH
ADDITIONAL PRECURSOR CHEMICAL FACILITIES TO DOUBLE ITS
CW AGENT PRODUCTION CAPACITY.1 THE ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS HAVE INTERRUPTED THIS SCHEDULE INDEFINITELY, BUT
IRAQ STILL MAINTAINS A FORMIDABLE ARSENAL OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AND THE PRODUCTION FACILITIES TO INCREASE IT
1WITH OPTIMUM USE OF ITS CW FACILITIES, IRAQ PROBABLY
WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ANNUALLY PRODUCE ABOUT 4,000 TON OF NERVE
AND BLISTER AGENTS COMBINED-TWICE THE 2,000 TONS PER YEAR IT WAS
PRODUCING AT THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR-WITHOUT HAVING TO WORRY
ABOUT FOREIGN EMBARGOES OF MOST ESSENTIAL PRECURSORS.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM: SADDAM'S
ACE IN THE HOLE
IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, (BW) PROGRAM
IS THE MOST EXTENSIVE IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE BW
PROGRAM IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF IRAQ'S HIGH-PRIORITY
DRIVE TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF
UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES.
WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAS
BEEN PRODUCING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ANTHRAX SPORES AND
BOTULINUM TOXIN.          THE IRAQIS VERY LIKELY ARE
DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL BW AGENTS-PROBABLY INFEC-
TIOUS AGENTS AND ADDITIONAL TOXINS-
IRAQ
PLANS TO PUT BOTULINUM TOXIN INTO CLUSTER BOMBS AND
WILL EVENTUALLY USE BW AGENTS TO FILL WARHEADS FOR
THEIR INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED SCUD MISSILES.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS: CREDIBLE MEANS
OF DELIVERY
IRAQ POSSESSES TWO OPERATIONAL MISSILES-IRAQI-MODI-
FIED SOVIET SCUD Bs CALLED THE AL HUSAYN AND THE AL
ABBAS-CAPABLE OF REACHING TEL AVIV OR TEHRAN,
TARGETS SOME 600 KM AWAY. IRAQ ALSO IS SEEKING AN
INDIGENOUS MISSILE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AND IS WELL
UNDER WAY IN DEVELOPING AT LEAST FIVE OTHER MISSILES
CAPABLE OF GREATER RANGES AND PAYLOAD
WE JUDGE THAT, IN ADDITION TO HIGH-EXPLOSIVE WAR-
HEADS, IRAQ WILL DEVELOP AND MANUFACTURE CHEMICAL
AND POSSIBLY BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS FOR ALL OF ITS MISSILE
SYSTEMS. INDEED, IT MAY ALREADY POSSESS A CHEMICAL
WARHEAD FOR ITS MODIFIED SCUDS. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOG-
ICAL WARHEADS ARE MORE COST EFFECTIVE, RESULT IN GREATER
NUMBERS OF HUMAN CASUALTIES, PROVIDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL
EDGE, AND MAKE THE MISSILE A MORE EFFECTIVE DETERRENT.
WE ALSO JUDGE THAT, WITH CONSIDERABLE FOREIGN ASSIS-
TANCE, IRAQ MAY BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WARHEAD
HOWEVER, THIS WILL NOT BE A SIMPLE
TASK. THERE ARE PROBLEMS WITH WEAPONIZATION
THAT, IF NOT READILY
SOLVED, COULD ADD YEARS TO DEVELOPMENT TIME.
NUCLEAR PROGRAM: A MILITARY ORIENTATION
THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM HAS
EXISTED SINCE AT LEAST THE LATE 1980s.
BAGHDAD'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
HAS THE TECHNICAL COMPE-
TENCE TO DEVELOP
A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990s
WITH INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED FISSILE MATERIAL
OTHER WORST CASE AND MUCH LESS LIKELY SCENARIOS EXIST
IN WHICH BAGHDAD COULD DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
DEVICE IN AS LITTLE AS SEVERAL MONTHS AFTER A DECISION TO
DO SO. THESE LATTER SCENARIOS INVOLVE THE USE OF A
CLANDESTINE SOURCE OF FISSILE MATERIAL OR THE DIVERSION
AND PROCESSING OF SAFEGUARDED RESEARCH REACTOR FUELS
INTO MATERIAL SUITABLE FOR A CRASH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
PROGRAM. HOWEVER, WE JUDGE THAT BOTH OF THESE
SCENARIOS ARE VERY UNLIKELY.
WE CONTINUE TO ESTIMATE THAT IF IRAQ INDIGENOUSLY
PRODUCED HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU)
IT COULD PRODUCE A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE
LATE 1990s. TO PRODUCE HEU, HOWEVER, BAGHDAD
WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE CONTINUED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
OR TECHNOLOGY.
FOREIGN CW ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE
HOWEVER, IRAQ'S ONCE NEAR-
TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN EXPERTISE AND MATERIALS
HAS DECLINED MARKEDLY SINCE THE EARLY 1980s AS THE
IRAQIS GAINED CW EXPERIENCE AND EMBARKED ON AN
INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR PRODUCTION EFFORT.
WEST EUROPEAN FIRMS HAVE PROVIDED CRITICAL ASSISTANCE
TO IRAQ BY CONSTRUCTING KEY CW FACILITIES AND PROCUR-
ING EQUIPMENT AND PRECURSOR CHEMICALS
FOREIGN BW ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN CRITICAL
WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING EQUIPMENT AND TRAIN-
ING HAS BEEN CRITICAL TO IRAQ'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AN
OFFENSIVE BW CAPABILITY.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE
WESTERN FIRMS WERE UNAWARE OF THE END USE OF THE
TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT.
WE HAVE BEEN
ABLE TO CONFIRM IRAQ'S DEVELOPMENT OF TWO OF THE
AGENTS          -BOTULINUM TOXIN AND ANTHRAX.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT: A COMMITMENT
TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY
IRAQ HAS MADE INDIGENOUS MISSILE PRODUCTION ONE OF ITS
HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, IRAQ WANTS TO
DEMONSTRATE TO ITS ALLIES AND ENEMIES THAT IT HAS
OPERATIONAL MISSILES WITH RANGES SUFFICIENT TO THREATEN
MIDDLE EASTERN CITIES. BAGHDAD PROBABLY BELIEVES THIS
CAPABILITY WOULD          ESTABLISH
IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A MILITARY
POWER AND A TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED NATION. SECOND,
BAGHDAD WANTS TO END ITS DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN
SUPPORT-BOTH FOR OPERATIONAL MISSILES AND RELATED
TECHNOLOGY. ONLY BY BUILDING ITS OWN MISSILE R&D
INFRASTRUCTURE OF PEOPLE AND FACILITIES CAN IRAQ WEAN
ITSELF FROM THIS DEPENDENCE.
IRAQ ALSO VIEWS OTHER THIRD WORLD MISSILE DEVELOPERS
AS POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS AND MAY TURN TO
THEM INCREASINGLY IF WESTERN SOURCES ARE CUT OFF.
SUPPLIERS NECESSARY FOR SENSITIVE NUCLEAR RESEARCH
BAGHDAD HAS DEMONSTRATED AGGRESSIVE
TECHNIQUES TO ACQUIRE CONTROLLED NUCLEAR-RELATED
MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGIES
IRAQ IS SEEKING NOT ONLY THE COMPONENTS OF NUCLEAR-
WEAPONS-RELATED EQUIPMENT, BUT ALSO THE CAPABILITY TO
PRODUCE THOSE COMPONENTS.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT UN-SPONSORED EMBARGO
AGAINST IRAQ IS PROVING EFFECTIVE IN STEMMING THE FLOW
OF FOREIGN GOODS TO IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS.
BAGHDAD, HOWEVER, IS NOT GIVING UP.
POTENTIAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION
IF IRAQ'S FACILITIES FOR DEVELOPING AND PRODUCING WEAP
ONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WERE DISMANTLED AND/OR DE-
STROYED, IRAQ WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REGAIN ITS PRESENT
CAPABILITY WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. THE
SMALL INDUSTRIAL BASE FROM WHICH IRAQ WOULD BE 
STARTING, COMBINED WITH ITS LIMITED INVESTMENT CAPITAL
AND RELATIVELY SMALL CADRE OF HIGHLY SKILLED PERSONNEL,
WOULD PREVENT RAPID RECONSTRUCTION OF MOST OF ITS
STRATEGIC WEAPONS FACILITIES. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE FACILITIES WOULD BE EXCEPTIONS. ANY REMAINING
VACCINE OR PHARMACEUTICAL PLANTS COULD MANUFACTURE
BW AGENTS.4 A CW INFRASTRUCTURE COULD STILL BE
INTEGRATED INTO IRAQ'S LEGITIMATE PESTICIDE PRODUCTION
PROGRAM; IRAQ COULD EVEN LEGITIMATELY IMPORT OR MAIN-
TAIN PRODUCTION OF SEVERAL KEY CW AGENT PRECURSORS
USED TO MAKE PESTICIDES
4 BIOLOGICAL AGENTS WERE ONCE SLOW AND EXPENSIVE TO MAKE AND HAD
TO BE PRODUCED UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS. TODAY, HOWEVER, MANY
OF THESE AGENTS ARE CHEAP AND EASY TO PRODUCE WITH LITTLE MORE
EQUIPMENT THAN WOULD TYPICALLY BE FOUND IN AN INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL
OR BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE TIME REQUIRED TO PRODUCE FISSILE
MATERIAL WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE PACING ELEMENT OF
AN IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.
THE REMOVAL OF IRAQ'S RESEARCH
REACTOR FUEL AND RESTRICTING IMPORTS OF SUCH FUEL OF
OBTAINING A CLANDESTINE SOURCE OF MATERIAL WOULD
GREATLY DIMINISH ANY POTENTIAL SURPRISE SCENARIO FOR A
SHORT-TERM IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.
OUTLOOK
WE BELIEVE THAT CURRENT PROSPECTS ARE GOOD FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THAT BUILDS ON EXISTING MECH-
ANISMS TO CONTROL IRAQ'S FUTURE ACCESS TO MATERIALS,
EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DE-
STRUCTION. ALTHOUGH EMERGING INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIERS
PROBABLY WILL BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT ANY AGREEMENT THAT
INHIBITS THEIR EXPORTS, MATURE SUPPLIERS PROBABLY WILL
BE ANXIOUS TO PREVENT A RERUN OF THE DIFFICULT (AND IN
SOME CASES EMBARRASSING) SITUATION THEY NOW FACE-A
POSSIBLE MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH A STATE THAT HAS
DEVELOPED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WITH FOREIGN-
BOUGHT EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY.
1.5 (C)
75021-76021
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