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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

070296_cia_74916_74916_01.txt
Subject: TASK FORCE BRIEFING
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS THE CIA STATEMENT THAT WAS GIVEN TO
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PERSIAN GULF WAR
VETERANS' ILLNESSES ON 1 MAY 96. IT PROVIDES OUR INTERIM
RESPONSE FROM ONGOING ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION RELATED TO
GULF WAR ILLNESSES.
DR. LASHOF, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, WE ARE PLEASED TO APPEAR
BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO ADDRESS CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF OUR TROOPS TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF. OUR DIRECTOR PLACES AN EMPHASIS ON CIA REVIEWING
ALL AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE AND THOROUGHLY ANALYZING ITS RELEVANCE
TO THIS ISSUE. CIA HAS MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO CONDUCT A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE SINCE THE DECISION WAS
MADE IN MARCH OF LAST YEAR. THIS DECISION WAS BASED ON THE
RISING IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE AND THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR A
THOROUGH STUDY. INDEED, THIS CALL WAS THE SAME ONE THAT INITIATED
THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
TODAY, WE WILL BE COVERING THREE AREAS IN OUR DISCUSSION.
FIRST, WE WILL PRESENT A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CIA'S ROLE IN
DETERMINING WHETHER THERE WAS POSSIBLE CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL AGENT EXPOSURE. IN DOING THIS WE WILL ENDEAVOR TO
CLARIFY THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THIS ISSUE AND DEFINE
FOR YOU THE SCOPE OF OUR CURRENT STUDY.
SECOND, WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME OF OUR PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENTS ON KEY AREAS RELATED TO OUR CURRENT STUDY OF
POSSIBLE TROOP EXPOSURE INCLUDING THE PRESENCE, USE, AND
FALLOUT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENT IN THE KUWAIT THEATER
OF OPERATIONS.
FINALLY, WE WILL CLOSE WITH SOME OF OUR PLANS FOR THE FUTURE ON
THIS ISSUE.
FIRST, LET ME DEFINE CIA'S ROLE. CIA HAS LONG FOLLOWED IRAQ'S
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROGRAMS AS PART OF ITS MISSION TO
ASSESS CW AND BW PROLIFERATION. BEFORE THE GULF WAR, WE
ASSESSED THAT IRAQ HAD A SIGNIFICANT CW AND BW CAPABILITY,
INCLUDING CHEMICALLY ARMED SCUDS, AND HAD USED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS AGAINST IRAN AND ITS OWN
CITIZENS. AFTER THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, WE ASSESSED THAT IRAQ HAD
PROBABLY FORWARD DEPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND WOULD USE
THEM IN A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES. AT THAT TIME, WE ASSESSED
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, PROBABLY FILLED WITH AGENTS ANTHRAX AND
BOTULINUM TOXIN, WOULD BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT.
AT THE START OF THE AIR WAR AND CONTINUING TO THE END OF DESERT
STORM, THE DI'S OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND WEAPONS RESEARCH
ESTABLISHED A 24-HOUR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WATCH OFFICE.
THESE ANALYSTS SCREENED INCOMING INTELLIGENCE FOR EVIDENCE OF
CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USE AND FOLLOWED EVERY SCUD
LAUNCH. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY INITIAL REPORTS OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE, SUBSEQUENT FOLLOW-UP NEVER PROVIDED CONFIRMATION
AND OFTEN YIELDED PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS UNRELATED TO CW. SOON
AFTER THE WAR, WE PUBLISHED ASSESSMENTS CONCLUDING THAT IRAQ HAD
READIED ITS FORCES TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DECIDED TO MOVE
THEM OUT OF THE THEATER PRIOR TO THE WAR, AND THEN NEVER USED
THEM.
WE ARE REVIEWING INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE
HOLDINGS IN PARALLEL WITH DOD'S PERSIAN GULF INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.
OUR STUDY IS A DETAILED INVESTIGATION INTO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION-
-NOT TROOP TESTIMONY, MEDICAL RECORDS, OR OPERATIONAL LOGS--AND
OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE OUR OWN. THE CIA'S EFFORT DOES NOT SEEK TO
DUPLICATE THAT OF DOD; HOWEVER, CIA ANALYSTS DRAW UPON AND
EXAMINE DOD INFORMATION TO CLARIFY INTELLIGENCE, TO OBTAIN LEADS,
AND TO ENSURE A THOROUGH AND COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENT.
CIA AND THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM CONTINUE TO COORDINATE OUR
WORK, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE IN ITS
INTERIM REPORT. WE INFORM THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM OF RELEVANT
INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURES FOR
FOLLOW-UP. LIKEWISE, THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM SHARES RELEVANT
RESULTS THAT AID OUR STUDY. FOR EXAMPLE, WE TOLD THE
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM LAST FALL THAT SOME INCIDENTS FROM VETERANS'
COMPLAINTS INVOLVING BURNING SENSATIONS CORRELATED TO KNOWN
SCUD ATTACKS COULD BE EXPLAINED AS EXPOSURE TO THE LEFTOVER
RED FUMING NITRIC ACID--A COMPONENT OF SCUD PROPELLANT. THE
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN STUDYING THIS AREA
AS MENTIONED AT PAST HEARINGS.
OUR STUDY INVOLVES TWO AREAS: RESEARCH AND FOCUSED
INVESTIGATIONS. WE HAVE REVIEWED THOUSANDS OF INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENTS. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT RELATE TO POSSIBLE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USE, EXPOSURE, OR LOCATION
ARE SCRUTINIZED TO DETERMINE THEIR CREDIBILITY AND WHETHER
FOLLOW-UP IS WARRANTED. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE EXPANDED AND
MORE FULLY DOCUMENTED OUR ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQI CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES AT THE START OF
DESERT STORM. USING THIS RESEARCH BASE, AN INVESTIGATION IS
THEN MADE INTO EACH OF THE KEY AREAS--USE, EXPOSURE, AND
LOCATION--AND SPECIFIC AREAS ARE EXAMINED WHEN POSSIBLE
LEADS ARE FOUND. THIS IS A TEDIOUS BUT NECESSARY PROCESS TO
ASSURE THAT OUR STUDY IS COMPREHENSIVE.
NOW I WILL DISCUSS OUR PRELIMINARY RESULTS.
REGARDING USE: TO DATE, WE HAVE NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT
LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR
RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) WEAPONS.
REGARDING EXPOSURE: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE SOLDIER, WE HAVE
SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD MAKE US CONCLUDE THAT ANYONE WAS
EXPOSED TO CW AGENT AT LEVELS THAT CAUSE EASILY IDENTIFIED
SYMPTOMS. IN THE 1980s, SUCH SYMPTOMS WERE SEEN FREQUENTLY IN
THE IRANIAN VICTIMS OF IRAQI CW USE. MUSTARD USE RESULTED IN LARGE
BLISTERS ON THE VICTIM'S SKIN AND MASS DEATHS WERE SEEN FROM
IRAQI NERVE AGENT USE.
REGARDING EXPOSURE DUE TO FALLOUT: ON THE BASIS OF ALL
AVAILABLE INFORMATION, WE CONCLUDE THAT COALITION BOMBING
RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO FILLED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AT ONLY TWO
FACILITIES--THE MUHAMMADIYAT STORAGE AREA AND THE STORAGE
AREA AT THE AL MUTHANNA CHEMICAL PRODUCTION SITE. WE HAVE
FOUND NO INFORMATION THAT IRAQI CASUALTIES OCCURRED AS A RESULT
OF CW AGENT RELEASE DUE TO BOMBING. THIS IS PROBABLY DUE TO
THE REMOTENESS OF THESE TWO FACILITIES. THE MUHAMMADIYAT
AND AL MUTHANNA SITES ARE BOTH OVER 30 KM FROM THE NEAREST
IRAQI TOWNS AND 60 AND 100 KM RESPECTIVELY TO THE NEAREST
IRAQI TOWNS IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF SAUDI ARABIA. BOTH
FACILITIES WERE OVER 400 KM FROM THE NEAREST POSITION OF
COALITION TROOPS THAT WERE IN SAUDI ARABIA.
IN MOST CASES, THE IRAQIS DID NOT STORE CW OR BW MUNITIONS IN
BUNKERS THAT THEY BELIEVED WE WOULD TARGET. THE IRAQIS STORED
MANY OF THE CW MUNITIONS IN THE OPEN TO PROTECT THEM FROM
COALITION DETECTION AND BOMBING. IN ADDITION, ALL KNOWN CW
AGENT AND PRECURSOR PRODUCTION LINES WERE EITHER INACTIVE OR
HAD BEEN DISMANTLED BY THE START OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN.
AS WE ELABORATED IN THE ATLANTA MEETING, WE ARE UTILIZING
FALLOUT MODELS TO ASCERTAIN THE EXACT NATURE OF THE
CONTAMINATED AREA THAT COULD HAVE RESULTED FROM BOMBING OF
IRAQI CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL FACILITIES. AS PART OF THIS WE WILL
CONTINUE TO ASSESS THE POTENTIAL DOWNWIND HAZARD THAT COULD
HAVE RESULTED FROM THE BOMBING OF MUHAMMADIYAT AND AL
MUTHANNA STORAGE FACILITIES.
REGARDING THE CZECH DETECTIONS: ON THE BASIS OF THE
EQUIPMENT AND DETECTION METHODS USED, WE BELIEVE THE
CZECHS LIKELY DETECTED LOW LEVELS OF NERVE AGENT ON 19
JANUARY 1991 AND FOUND MUSTARD AGENT ON 24 JANUARY. THE
SOURCE OF BOTH THE NERVE AGENT AND THE MUSTARD REMAINS
UNKNOWN. BUNKERS AT AN NASIRIYAH STORAGE DEPOT WERE
THOUGHT TO BE A POTENTIAL SOURCE. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT HAVE
ANY EVIDENCE THAT CW MUNITIONS WERE IN THE BUNKERS BOMBED
ON 17 JANUARY. IN ADDITION, MODELING TO DATE RULES OUT THE
POSSIBILITY THAT ANY FALLOUT FROM THOSE BUNKERS BOMBED ON 17
JANUARY AT AN NASIRIYAH COULD REACH THE CZECH DETECTORS.
REGARDING DEPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MUNITIONS:
WITH ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT WOULD
MAKE US CONCLUDE THAT MUNITIONS WERE DEPLOYED IN THE KUWAIT
THEATER OF OPERATIONS. THE EXCEPTION IS A LARGE REAR AMMUNITION
STORAGE AREA ABOUT 20 KM SOUTHEAST OF AN NASIRIYAH IRAQ--NEAR
THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE KUWAIT THEATER OF OPERATIONS. THE
TALL AL LAHM AMMUNITION STORAGE AREA--CALLED THE KAMISIYAH
STORAGE DEPOT BY IRAQ--WAS FIRST INSPECTED BY THE UN SPECIAL
COMMISSION IN OCTOBER 1991. THEY FOUND CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
INCLUDING 122MM NERVE AGENT ROCKETS AND 155MM MUSTARD
ARTILLERY ROUNDS.
UNSCOM FOUND THE CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN AT LEAST TWO
LOCATIONS. AT A PIT AREA, UNSCOM FOUND SEVERAL HUNDRED
MOSTLY INTACT 122MM ROCKETS CONTAINING NERVE AGENT--
DETECTED BY SAMPLING AND WITH CAMS. THE SECOND LOCATION
WAS 5 KM FROM THE FACILITY; THEY FOUND APPROXIMATELY 6,000
INTACT 155MM ROUNDS CONTAINING MUSTARD AGENT AS INDICATED
BY CAMS. A PROBABLE THIRD LOCATION WAS A SINGLE BUNKER
CALLED BUNKER 73 BY IRAQ THAT CONTAINED 122MM ROCKETS. IRAQ
CLAIMS THE ROCKETS WERE ORIGINALLY FILLED WITH NERVE AGENT.
HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THE ROCKETS
ACTUALLY CONTAINED AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SAMPLING OR
POSITIVE CAM READINGS.
IN MARCH 1992, UNSCOM RETURNED AND DESTROYED ABOUT 500
NERVE-AGENT-FILLED ROCKETS AT THE SITE. ELEMENTS OF THE 37TH
ENGINEERING BATTALION ATTACHED TO THE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION
ALSO PERFORMED DEMOLITION OF MUNITIONS AT THIS FACILITY, A YEAR
EARLIER. WE ARE WORKING WITH THE DOD INVESTIGATIVE TEAM TO
RESOLVE WHETHER SARIN-FILLED ROCKETS WERE DESTROYED AT BUNKER
73 AND WHETHER SOME US PERSONNEL COULD HAVE BEEN EXPOSED
TO CHEMICAL AGENT. DETAILS ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOUND BY
UNSCOM AT TALL AL LAHM PROVIDE THE ONLY CREDIBLE INFORMATION
TO DATE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH WEAPONS IN THE THEATER.
REGARDING UNUSUAL AGENTS: WE HAVE LOOKED AT ALL THE
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL AGENTS ATTRIBUTED TO IRAQIS PROGRAMS
AND HAVE FOUND NONE DESIGNED TO CAUSE THE MOST COMMON
LONG-TERM SYMPTOMS EXHIBITED BY ILL GULF WAR VETERANS.
HOWEVER, WE HAVE AN INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF SOME IRAQI
AGENTS. WE INCLUDE WITH OUR SUBMISSION A TABLE OF THE
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS DECLARED BY IRAQ, SYMPTOMS KNOWN TO BE
CAUSED BY THESE AGENTS, AND POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENTIONS FOR USE
OF THESE AGENTS. AS YOU WILL SEE, ALL OF THESE AGENTS WERE
INTENDED TO CAUSE RAPID DEATH OR INCAPACITATION--WITH THE
POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF AFLATOXIN. THE ONLY DOCUMENTED EFFECT
OF AFLATOXIN IN HUMANS IS PRODUCTION OF LIVER CANCER MONTHS TO
YEARS AFTER IT IS INGESTED. EFFECTS OF AEROSOLIZED AFLATOXIN ARE
UNKNOWN. UNSCOM HAS IRAQI STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS THAT
INDICATE THAT ALFATOXIN WAS LOOKED AT FOR ITS LONG TERM
CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS AND THAT TESTING ALSO SHOWED THAT LARGE
CONCENTRATIONS OF IT CAUSED DEATH WITHIN DAYS. WE HAVE NO
INFORMATION THAT WOULD MAKE US CONCLUDE THAT IRAQ USED
AFLATOXIN OR THAT IT WAS RELEASED IN THE ATMOSPHERE DUE TO
BOMBING.
REGARDING RADIOLOALCAL WEAPONS: ALTHOUGH IRAQ CONDUCTED
RESEARCH ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WE ASSESS THEY NEVER
PROGRESSED INTO THE DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE. SMALL QUANTITIES OF
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WERE RELEASED DURING TESTS IN AREAS NORTH
OF BAGHDAD. THESE TESTS TOOK PLACE TWO YEARS BEFORE THE GULF
WAR, AND ANY RADIOACTIVITY FROM THOSE TESTS WOULD HAVE
DECAYED AWAY BY THAT TIME. IN ADDITION, IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES
BOMBED DURING THE GULF WAR PRODUCED ONLY MINIMAL
CONTAMINATION NORTH OF THE KUWAIT THEATER OF OPERATIONS, WITH
NO RELEASES DETECTED BEYOND THOSE FACILITIES.
WE PLAN TO COMPLETE OUR STUDY IN THE COMING MONTHS AND
PUBLISH AN OPEN REPORT LATER THIS YEAR. IN THE INTERIM, IF WE FIND
ANY DEFINITIVE INFORMATION POINTING TO CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL
AGENT EXPOSURES OR IMPACTING SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE ISSUE OF
GULF WAR VETERAN'S ILLNESSES, WE WILL WORK WITH THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE TO ANNOUNCE THOSE FINDINGS.
ORGANISMS IRAQ HAS ADMITTED TO INCLUDING IN ITS BW PROGRUN
AGENT
BACILLUS ANTHRACIS
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
CAUSATIVE AGENT FOR THE DISEASE
ANTHRAX. NORMALLY A ZOONOTIC
DISEASE OF GOATS, CATTLE, SHEEP AND
HORSES. ALL HUMAN POPULATIONS
SUSCEPTIBLE; TRANMISSION
THROUGH SKIN ABRASIONS,
INHALATION OF SPORES OR INGESTION
OF CONTAMINATED MEAT.
DEPENDING ON FORM OF DISEASE,
ONSET IS GRADUAL AND NONSPECIFIC.
INITIAL SYMPTONS OF INHALATION
ANTHRAX INCLUDE FEVER, MALAISE,
NONPRODUCTIVE COUGH, AND MILD
CHEST DISCOMFORT. INITIAL SYMPTONS
OF INHALATION ANTHRAX
ARE OFTEN FOLLOWED BY A SHORT
PERIOD OF IMPROVEMENT FOLLOWED
BY ABRUPT DEVELOPMENT OF SEVERE
RESPIRATORY DISTRESS, DYSPNEA, AND
CYANOSIS. SHOCK AND DEATH
USUALLY FOLLOW WITHIN 24-36
HOURS AFTER ONSET OF RESPIRATORY
DISTRESS.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ HAS ADMITTED TO RESEARCHING,
PRODUCING, AND WEAPONIZING
ANTHRAX FOR BW PURPOSES IN
AERIAL BOMBS AND MISSILE
WARHEADS.
AGENT
BOTULINUM TOXIN
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
NEUROTOXIN PRODUCED BY BACILLUS
CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM.
PRODUCES SIMILIAR EFFECTS WHEN
INHALED OR INGESTED, ALTHOUGH THE
TIME COURSE MAY VARY DEPENDING
ON ROUTE OF EXPOSURE AND DOSE
RECEIVED. TOXIN BLOCKS
NEUROTRANSMISSION. ONSET OF
SYMPTOMS CAN OCCUR WITHIN 24
HOURS TO SEVERAL DAYS. SYMPTOMS
INCLUDE BULBAR PALSIES AND
BLURRED VISION. SKELETAL MUSCLE
PARALYSIS FOLLOWS WITH A
SYMMETRICAL DESCENDING AND
PROGRESSIVE WEAKNESS THAT MAY
CULMINATE IN RESPIRATORY FAILURE.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ HAS ADMITTED TO RESEARCHING,
PRODUCING, AND WEAPONIZING
BOTULINUM TOXIN IN AERIAL BOMBS
AND MISSILE WARHEADS.
AGENT
AFLATOXIN B1
AFLATOXINS ARE COMMONLY
PRODUCED BY FUNGAL-CONTAMINATED
FOOD GRAINS. IRAQ PRODUCED
AFLATOXINS FROM FUNGUS
ASPERGILLUS. AFLATOXIN IS KNOWN
TO CAUSE LIVER CANCER BUT NO ACUTE
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS HAVE YET BEEN
DETERMINED.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ HAS ADMITTED TO RESEARCHING,
PRODUCING, AND WEAPONIZING
AFLATOXIN IN AERIAL BOMBS AND
MISSILE WARHEADS.
AGENT
RICIN
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
RICIN IS A POTENT TOXIN DERIVED
FROM THE BEANS OF THE CASTOR
PLANT; IT ACTS BY PROHIBITING CELL
PROTEIN SYNTHESIS. PATHOGENIC
EFFECTS OCCUR WHEN TOXIN IS EITHER
INHALED OR INGESTED. SIGNS AND
SYMPTOMS AFTER AEROSOL EXPOSURE
DEPEND ON THE DOSED INHALED.
HUMAN LETHALITY DATA AFTER
AERSOL EXPOSURE HAVE NOT BEEN
DESCRIBED, BUT ANIMAL DATA
SUGGEST SEVERE INFLAMMATION OF
THE RESPIRATORY TRACT, INTERSTITIAL
PNEUMONIA, AND ALVEOLAR EDEMA.
TIME TO DEATH IN ANIMALS IS DOSE
DEPENDENT AND HAS OCCURRED IN
18-72 HOURS. INGESTION CAUSES
SEVERE GASTROINTESTINAL SYMPTOMS,
VASCULAR COLLAPSE, AND DEATH
DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT OF RICIN
INGESTED.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ RESEARCHED RICIN, PRODUCED
IT AND CONDUCTED WEAPONS TRIALS.
THOSE TRIALS WERE CONSIDERED A
FAILURE, ACCORDING TO THE IRAQIS
AND NO FURTHER WORK WAS DONE.
AGENT
ROTAVIRUS
ROTAVIRUS CAUSES ACUTE VIRAL
GASTROENTERITIS, DIARRHEA,
DEHYDRATION AND DEATH IN YOUNG
CHILDREN.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
ROTAVIRUS WOULD ACT AS AN
INCAPACITATING AGENT. IRAQ
RESEARCHED AND TESTED ROTAVIRUS,
BUT ABANDONED ITS PROGRAM.
AGENT
ENTEROVIRUS 70
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
CAUSES HEMORRHAGIC
CONJUNCTIVITIS, AN ACUTE, HIGHLY
CONTAGIOUS SELF-LIMITED DISEASE OF
THE EYE. CHARACTERIZED BY SUDDEN
ONSET OF PAIN, PHOTOPHOBIA
CONJUNCTIVITIS, SWELLING OF THE
EYELIDS. AND SUBCONJUNCTIVAL
HEMORRHAGES.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ RESEARCH HEMORRHAGIC
CONJUNCTIVITIS, BUT REPORTEDLY
ABANDONED THE PROGRAM.
AGENT
CAMEL POX
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
CAUSES FEVER AND SKIN RASH IN
CAMELS
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ RESEARCH CAMEL POX BUT
REPORTEDLY ABANDONED THE
PROGRAM. CAMEL POX RARELY
INFECTS HUMAN, BUT COULD
POSSIBLY SERVE AS A RESEARCH
MODEL FOR SMALLPOX.
AGENT
WHEAT RUST
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
PRODUCES A BLACK GROWTH ON
WHEAT AND OTHER CEREAL GRAINS;
CONTAMINATED GRAIN CANNOT BE
USED AS FOODSTUFF.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ RESEARCHED AND PRODUCED
LARGE QUANTITIES OF WHEAT RUST,
CONTAMINATED GRAIN, AND
HARVESTED IT AS A POSSIBLE
ECONOMIC WEAPON. HOWEVER, THE
PROGRAM WAS REPORTEDLY
ABANDONED IN 1990 AND THE
CONTAMINATED GRAIN WAS
DESTROYED.
AGENT
YELLOW FEVER VIRUS
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
AN ACUTE INFECTIOUS VIRAL DISEASE
OF SHORT DURATION AND VARYING
SEVERITY. MILD CASES ARE
CHARACTERIZED BY SUDDEN ONSET,
FEVER, CHILLS, HEADACHE, BACKACHE,
GENERALIZED MUSCLE PAIN, NAUSEA,
AND VOMITING. AS DISEASE
PROGRESSES, HEMORRHAGIC
SYMPTOMS CAN DEVELOP. DURING
EPIDEMICS DEATH RATES CAN EXCEED
50%.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ CONDUCTED RESEARCH ON THE
VIRUS AS PART OF ITS BW PROGRAM.
AGENT
CRIMEAN-CONGO HEMORRHAGIC
FEVER VIRUS
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
CAUSE CRIMEAN-CONGO
HEMORRHAGIC FEVER. ONSET
INCLUDES FEVER, MYALGIA, AND
CONJUNCTIVAL INFECTION. SHOCK,
GENERALIZED MUCOUS MEMBRANE
HEMORRHAGE, AND MULTIPLE ORGAN
SYSTEM FAILURE GENERALLY FOLLOW.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ CONDUCTED RESEARCH ON THE
VIRUS AS PART OF ITS BW PROGRAM.
AGENT
TRICOTHECENE MYCOTOXINS (T-2
AND DAS)
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
TRICOTHECENE MYCOTOXINS PRODUCE
NAUSEA, VOMITING, DIARRHEA, AND
SKIN IRRITATION AND CAN BE
ABSORBED THROUGH THE SKIN.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ RESEARCHED TRICOTHECENES FOR
BW PURPOSES.
AGENT
CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS
PATHOGENIC EFFECTS
CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS PRODUCE
A DISEASE KNOWN AS GAS GANGRENE,
WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY THE
PRODUCTION OF TOXIN WITHIN
WOUNDED TISSUE. THE TOXIN
DESTROYS THE TISSUES, CAUSING
SUDDEN AND SEVERE PAIN.
ACCOMPANYING SYSTEMIC DISEASE
CAN INCLUDE LOW GRADE FEVER,
TACHYCARDIA, HYPOTENSION AND
RENAL FAILURE.
POSSIBLE IRAQI INTENT
IRAQ RESEARCHED CLOSTRIDIUM
PERFRINGENS FOR BW PURPOSES.
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