Subject: IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM: MORE SELF-RELIANT, MORE DEADLY A RESEARCH PAPER IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM: MORE SELF-RELIANT, MORE DEADLY SUMMARY INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF AUGUST 1990 WAS USED IN THIS REPORT THE IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM, BY FAR THE LARGEST IN THE THIRD WORLD, IS RAPIDLY BECOMING SELF-SUFFICIENT. BY 1993 IRAQ WILL HAVE COMPLET- ED SEVERAL FACILITIES THAT WILL SUPPLY NEARLY ALL OF THE PRECURSOR CHEMICALS NEEDED TO SUPPORT LARGE-SCALE NERVE AGENT PRODUCTION USING RAW MATERIALS ACQUIRED IN THE COUNTRY. WITH OPTIMUM USE OF THEIR CW FACILITIES, THE IRAQIS MAY THEN BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE COMBINED NERVE AND BLISTER AGENT PRODUCTION LEVELS OF ABOUT 4,000 TONS PER YEAR-TWICE THE 2,000 TONS PER YEAR THEY WERE PRODUCING BY THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR-WITHOUT HAVING TO WORRY ABOUT FOREIGN EMBARGOES OF MOST ESSENTIAL PRECURSORS. IN ADDITION, THE APPARENT INTEGRATION OF PESTICIDE PRODUCTION INTO IRAQ'S CW INFRASTRUC- TURE WILL LEND AN AIR OF LEGITIMACY TO THE PROGRAM SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN, IRAQ HAS STRESSED DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED CW AGENTS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IT IS PURSUING PERSISTENT NERVE AGENTS SUCH AS VX THAT ARE MUCH MORE TOXIC THAN THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENT SARIN-THE PRINCIPAL AGENTS NOW IN IRAQ'S ARSENAL. IN ADDITION, IRAQ PROBABLY IS DEVELOPING BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITH A LONGER SHELF LIFE, ENABLING IT TO MAINTAIN A SIZABLE STOCKPILE. IRAQ ALSO IS SI- MULTANEOUSLY DEVELOPING FIVE TYPES OF SHORT- TO INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES THAT MAY BE FITTED WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS. MISSILE-DELIVERED CW AGENTS WILL OFFER IRAQ GREATER STANDOFF CAPABILITY AND DETERRENT VALUE. IN CONCERT WITH DEVELOPING A MORE SOPHISTICATED CW STOCKPILE, THE IRAQIS ARE MAINTAINING A WIDE RANGE OF BATTLEFIELD-PROVEN DELIVERY OPTIONS, INCLUDING BOMBS, SHELLS, AND ARTILLERY ROCKETS. APPARENTLY IRAQ BELIEVES IT NEEDS CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR DETERRENT PUR- POSES- AND AS A KEY WEAPON SUPPORTING ITS PROFESSED ROLE AS MILITARY "PROTECTOR" OF THE ARAB WORLD. IN CONJUNCTION WITH CW, IRAQ ALSO HAS AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN WHICH SELF-SUFFICIENCY IS A PRIMARY GOAL. THE HIGH PRIORITY ENJOYED BY THE CW PROGRAM PROBABLY ALSO REFLECTS IRAQ'S PLEASURE WITH THE RESULTS OF MASSIVE NERVE AGENT STRIKES AGAINST IRANIAN FORCES IN 1988 AND SUBSEQUENT CW USE AGAINST KURDISH INSURGENTS. HOWEVER, IRAQI WILLINGNESS TO INITIATE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE TEMPERED IF ITS OPPONENTS POSSESS CREDIBLE CW CAPABILITIES. THE IRAQI CW PROGRAM POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO US FORCES AND INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IRAQS CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM: MORE SELF-RELIANT, MORE DEADLY FOR EVERY INSECT THERE IS AN INSECTICIDE. LT. GEN. MAHIR ABD AL-RASHID COMMANDER, IRAQI VII CORPS CIRCA 1985 NOW, IRAQ IS IN POSSESSION OF THE BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPON. SADDAM HUSAYN 1990 BACKGROUND AFTER NEARLY TWO DECADES OF WORK, IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED THE MOST EXTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM IN THE THIRD WORLD THE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH IRAN IN 1980 PROVIDED THE IMPETUS FOR IRAQ TO ACCELERATE ITS CW PROGRAM. LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION OF THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD PROBABLY BEGAN AT SAMARRA IN EARLY 1983; BY AUGUST OF THAT YEAR, IRAQ WAS USING THIS AGENT AGAINST IRAN APPENDIX B FOR DETAILS OF IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS) IRAQ'S CONCERTED CW EFFORT DURING THE WAR ENABLED THE IRAQIS TO ESTABLISH A SIZABLE AND SOPHISTICATED INFRASTRUCTURE FOR R&D, PRODUCTION, TESTING, AND STOR- AGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. (SEE APPENDIX C FOR A SUMMARY OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM ORGANIZATION.) BY THE WAR'S END, IRAQ WAS ABLE TO PRODUCE ABOUT 1,000 TONS EACH PER YEAR OF BLISTER AND NERVE AGENTS. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAD LITTLE DIFFICULTY OBTAINING THE RAW MATERIALS IT NEEDED TO SUPPORT SUCH PRODUCTION, IT BEGAN DEVELOP- ING AN INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AFTER THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS BEGAN CONTROLLING SALES OF KEY PRECURSOR CHEMICALS. IRAQ ALSO HAS AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS THAT, IN MANY WAYS, PARALLEL ITS CW EFFORT. AS WITH CW, THE BW AND MISSILE EFFORTS ARE STRIVING FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY. ALSO, ALL THREE HIGH-PRIORITY PROGRAMS PLAY A KEY ROLE IN IRAQI DETER- RENCE AGAINST ISRAEL'S SUPERIOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. THE 1988 CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN DID NOT DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM, BUT IT DID SIGNIFI- CANTLY ALTER THE PROGRAM'S FOCUS. THE DEMANDS OF THE WAR NECESSITATED THAT IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM DEDICATE MUCH OF ITS RESOURCES TO LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE, HOWEVER, PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITH A LIMITED SHELF LIFE WAS NO LONGER PRACTICAL OR EVEN NECESSARY, FREEING IRAQ TO ENHANCE ITS CW EFFORT IN PREPARATION FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS. IRAQ APPARENTLY ALSO IS SEEKING WAYS TO BETTER UTILIZE ITS SEMIDORMANT CW FACILITIES. INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR PRODUCTION-KEY TO ELIMINATING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SUPPLIERS IRAQ IS CONSTRUCTING SEVERAL FACILITIES THAT, WHEN COM- PLETED BY 1993, WILL SUPPLY NEARLY ALL OF IRAQ'S PRECUR- SOR CHEMICAL NEEDS USING INDIGENOUSLY ACQUIRED RAW MATERIALS. IRAQ EMBARKED UPON THIS EFFORT IN THE MID- 1980S, SHORTLY AFTER INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROLS ON KEY PRECURSORS WERE FIRST ENACTED. IF THE PROJECT IS SUCCESSFUL, THE IRAQIS ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL BE ABLE TO PRODUCE SEVERAL G-SERIES NERVE AGENTS (PARTICULARLY SARIN AND ITS DERIVATIVES)-AND PERHAPS MUSTARD AS WELL-WITHOUT NEED FOR IMPORTED CHEMICALS THE HEART OF IRAQ'S PRECURSOR PRODUCTION EFFORT IS THE HABBANIYAH II FACILITY, WHICH INCLUDES A CHLORINE- ALKALINE PLANT AND SEVERAL PROBABLE CW PRECURSOR PRODUCTION LINES IRAQI CW AGENTS USED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENT SARIN (GB) WERE PRODUCED IN LARGE AMOUNTS AT IRAQ'S SAMARRA FACILITY AND USED AGAINST IRAN DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. WE BELIEVE THAT LESSER AMOUNTS OF THE NERVE AGENTS TABUN (GA) AND GF AND RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS WERE USED AS WELL IRAQI MUSTARD ATTACKS SEVERELY STRAINED IRAN'S MEDICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS, DISRUPTED SEVERAL IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. LARGE-SCALE USE OF NERVE AGENTS IN 1988 INFLICTED SIGNIFICANT IRANIAN CASUALTIES AND GREATLY SUPPORTED IRAQI OFFENSIVE OPER- ATIONS NEW CW AGENTS AND PRODUCTION METHODS- DEVELOPING A MORE POTENT ARSENAL ADVANCED AGENTS WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ IS ENGAGED IN A SIZABLE EFFORT TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE ADDITIONAL CW AGENTS. IRAQ IS DEVELOPING OR HAS ALREADY PRODUCED SOME OF THE MORE PERSISTENT ANALOGS OF SARIN, SUCH AS SOMAN GF. WE BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS PRODUCED AND USED SOME GF TOWARD THE END OF THE WAR WITH IRAN. IRAQI NERVE AGENT RESEARCH APPARENTLY HAS FOCUSED ON VX AS WELL. BECAUSE VX IS VERY PERSISTENT AND TOXIC, IT PROBABLY WOULD BE AN OPTIMUM CW AGENT TO PLACE IN A BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD. IRAQ MAY BE INVESTIGATING ENTIRELY NEW CLASSES OF COMPOUNDS FOR USE AS CW AGENTS. IMPROVED PRODUCTION METHODS SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN, THE IRAQIS APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN OPTIMIZING THEIR CW AGENT PRODUCTION PROCESSES AND SEARCHING FOR NEW ROUTES OF MANUFAC- TURE. THE GOALS OF THIS EFFORT PROBABLY ARE TO SIMPLIFY THE PRODUCTION OF CW AGENTS, REDUCE BOTTLENECKS IN THE PROCESS, AND RELY ON INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED OR EASILY ACQUIRED RAW MATERIALS. LONGER SHELF LIFE WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ IS ATTEMPTING TO LENGTHEN THE SHELF LIFE OF ITS CW AGENTS, PARTICULARLY SARIN, SO THAT A SIZABLE CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE CAN BE MAIN- TAINED. DELIVERY SYSTENTS-MAINTAINING A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS BOMBS, SHELLS, AND ROCKETS-TRIED AND TRUE THE IRAQIS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO FILL A VARIETY OF MUNITIONS SYSTEMS WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS. BALLISTIC MISSILES-THE LONG-RANGE OPTION IRAQ IS DEVELOPING A LONG-RANGE CW DELIVERY CAPABILI- TY TO AUGMENT ITS EXTENSIVE SHORT-RANGE TACTICAL CAPA- BILITIES. MOST OBVIOUS, AND PROBABLY OF GREATEST CON- CERN, IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES. IRAQ PROBABLY WILL DEVELOP AND MANUFACTURE CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR EACH KIND OF MISSILE UNDER DEVELOPMENT. THERE ARE CHEAPER WAYS FOR IRAQ TO DELIVER CHEMICAL MUNITIONS THAN A BALLISTIC MISSILE. ARTILLERY AND AIR- CRAFT CAN DO THE JOB AND WITH MORE PRECISION, AT LEAST AT PRESENT. BALLISTIC MISSILES WILL BE THE PREFERRED DELIVERY SYSTEM, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE GREAT- ER STANDOFF CAPABILITY, CANNOT BE EASILY DEFENDED AGAINST, AND OFFER MORE PRESTIGE AND HIGHER DETERRENT VALUE. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAS HAD GREAT SUCCESS USING BALLISTIC MISSILES ARMED WITH CONVENTIONAL HIGH EXPLO- SIVES AGAINST CITIES, THE INACCURACY OF ITS MISSILE SYSTEMS MAKES THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARHEADS VERY ATTRACTIVE. BECAUSE CHEMICAL WARHEADS CAN DISPERSE LETHAL CONCENTRATIONS OVER A LARGER AREA, THEY ARE MORE COST EFFECTIVE, RESULT IN A GREATER NUMBER OF HUMAN CASUALTIES, AND PROVIDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL EDGE. CW PROTECTION AND TRAINING IRAQ GRADUALLY BUILT UP A PROTECTIVE CW CAPABILITY DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, PRIMARILY TO MINIMIZE IRAQI CASUALTIES FROM INADVERTENT EXPOSURE TO ITS OWN CHEMI- CAL ATTACKS. HOWEVER, PROTECTION AGAINST IRANIAN CW ATTACKS BECAME NECESSARY TOWARD THE END OF THE WAR AS IRAN BEGAN LIMITED USE OF ITS VASTLY INFERIOR CHEMI- CAL ARSENAL. IRAQ HAS CONTINUED TO EXPAND ITS PROTEC- TIVE CAPABILITY FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE, PROBABLY WITH THE REALIZATION THAT FUTURE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CONFLICTS AS IN OTHER FACETS OF ITS MILITARY INDUSTRIES, IRAQ HAS CHOSEN TO PRODUCE INDIGENOUSLY A LARGE PORTION OF ITS CW PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS. CW PROTECTIVE MASKS, FILTERS, SUITS, BOOTS, AND GLOVES ARE PRODUCED THERE AND SOLD TO VARIOUS COMPANIES, OFTEN FOR REEXPORT. IRAQ ALSO CONTINUES TO TRAIN ITS TROOPS TO OPERATE IN A CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT. SOME OF THE CW TRAINING IRAQ PROVIDES COVERS OFFEN- SIVE ASPECTS OF CW. DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IRAQ HAS BEEN EXTREMELY ADEPT AT PROCURING THE SERVICES OF FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS TO SUPPORT ITS CW-RELATED ACTIVITIES. HOWEVER, IRAQ'S ONCE NEAR-TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON FOR- EIGN EXPERTISE AND MATERIALS HAS DECLINED MARKEDLY (SINCE THE EARLY 1980s AS IRAQIS GAINED CW EXPERIENCE AND EMBARKED UPON AN INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR PRODUC- TION EFFORT. OUTLOOK-DETERRENCE, SELF-SUFFICIENCY, FIRST-USE CONSIDERATIONS, AND THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES IN OUR JUDGMENT, IRAQ BELIEVES IT NEEDS CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR DETERRENT PURPOSES, THE IRAQIS BELIEVE THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE SUITABLE DETERRENTS AND DEVEL- OPED THIS THEME IN AN EARLY 1990 PRESS CAMPAIGN. CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPING NEW OR IMPROVED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS-SUCH AS LONGER RANGE SURFACE-TO- SURFACE MISSILES AND THE "BIG GUN" LONG-RANGE ARTIL- LERY PROJECT-PROBABLY IS TIED TO IRAQ'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE THE LETHALITY AND RANGE OF ITS CHEMICAL THREAT. WE JUDGE THAT TACTICAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERA- TIONS HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO IRAQI MILITARY DOC- TRINE. IRAQ UTILIZED CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRIMARILY DURING THE LAST HALF OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, WHICH LED TO BATTLEFIELD DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ'S CW DOCTRINE. THE DECISION TO USE CHEMICALS DURING THE WAR, HOWEVER, WAS UNDOUBTEDLY INFLUENCED BY THE LACK OF A SIGNIFI- CANT IRANIAN COUNTERCAPABILITY. WE BELIEVE IRAQ WILL BE LESS LIKELY TO INITIATE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN FUTURE SCENARIOS IF ITS OPPONENT IS ARMED WITH A CREDIBLE CW CAPABILITY. WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ'S EXTENSIVE CW CAPABILITY POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO US FORCES AND INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IRAQ HAS THE CAPABILITY TO DELIVER LARGE AMOUNTS OF CW AGENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO DO SO DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR THE TARGETING OF CIVILIANS IS IN LINE WITH IRAQI THREATS TO "TURN KUWAIT INTO A GRAVEYARD" IN CASE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION. HOWEVER, IRAQ MAY BY NOW HAVE DEVELOPED BINARY SARIN WEAPONS WITH A MUCH LONGER SHELF LIFE. AS A RESULT, IRAQI FORCES PROBABLY NOW CAN MAINTAIN SIGNIFI- CANT STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND USE THEM AT ITS CONVENIENCE. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE CW AGENTS IRAQ IS MOST LIKELY TO USE IN AN INCURSION INTO SAUDI ARABIA ARE SARIN (PROBABLY IN BINARY MUNITIONS) AND MUSTARD. SARIN WOULD BE THE AGENT OF CHOICE FOR TARGETS THAT IRAQ WANTS TO OCCUPY QUICKLY-INCLUDING OILFIELDS AND OTH- ER KEY OBJECTIVES-AS WELL AS ON BATTLEFIELD DEFENSES. MUSTARD MIGHT BE USED TO PROTECT IRAQI FLANKS AND, AGAINST KEY TRANSPORTATION NODES, TO HINDER MOVEMENT AND RESUPPLY OF OPPOSING FORCES. THE SEMIPERSISTENT NERVE AGENT GF COULD BE USED IN PLACE OF SARIN IF THE TARGET NEED NOT BE CAPTURED IMMEDIATELY. AGENTS LESS LIKELY TO BE USED-BUT STILL POTENTIAL THREATS-INCLUDE THE NERVE AGENTS VX AND SOMAN, NITROGEN MUSTARD, AND PERHAPS EVEN NONLETHAL TEAR GAS AND VOMITING AGENTS. OF THE MANY CW DELIVERY SYSTEMS AVAILABLE TO IRAQ, WE BELIEVE THAT ARTILLERY ROCKETS AND AIRCRAFT-DELIVERED BOMBS ARE THE MOST LIKELY TO BE USED BY IRAQ. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IRAQ HAS ALREADY PRODUCED A FEW CHEMI- CAL WARHEADS FOR ITS SCUD-TYPE MISSILES; IF IT HAS INDEED DONE SO, IRAQ WOULD GREATLY INCREASE ITS CAPA- BILITY TO STRIKE SAUDI POPULATION CENTERS, AIRFIELDS, AND STAGING AREAS WITH CW AGENTS. APPENDIX B IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IRAN-IRAQ WAR THE MOST VISIBLE ASPECT OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM HAS BEEN THE WIDESPREAD USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN. BETWEEN 1983 AND 1988, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON A SCALE NOT SEEN SINCE WORLD WAR I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE ATTACKS WAS MINIMAL AT FIRST BUT INCREASED GRADUALLY AS IRAQ GAINED EXPERIENCE IN CW AND DEVELOPED NEW AGENTS, WEAPONS, AND TACTICS. CHEMICAL WEAPONS HELPED BRING THE WAR TO A FAIRLY SUDDEN CONCLUSION IN 1988, WHEN IRAQ INCORPORATED MASSED NERVE AGENT STRIKES INTO A SERIES OF HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVES. IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE DISTINCT PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE, WHICH CONTINUED UNTIL 1986, INVOLVED THE USE OF CW AGENTS IN A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ROLE, TO DISRUPT OR HALT IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. IN A TRANSITIONARY PHASE LASTING FROM LATE 1986 TO EARLY 1988, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS PREEMPTIVELY AGAINST STAGING AREAS PRIOR TO IRANIAN OFFENSIVES, WHILE CONTINUING TO RELY ON CW TO DISRUPT THESE OFFENSIVES. FINALLY, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT- LY, IRAQ USED MASSED NERVE AGENT STRIKES AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS WELL-ORCHESTRATED OFFENSIVES IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1988. THE SUCCESS OF THESE OFFENSIVES PROMPTED IRAN TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE IN AUGUST 1988. WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ DECIDED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER, TO COMPENSATE FOR IRAN'S MAN- POWER ADVANTAGE. IRAQ'S USE OF CW HELPED TO MINI- MIZE IRAQI PERSONNEL AND LAND LOSSES BY STALLING IRANIAN HUMAN WAVE ATTACKS. IRAQI CW USE WAS ENHANCED BY THE LIMITED IRANIAN CW PROTECTIVE CAPA- BILITY AND IRAN'S INABILITY TO RETALIATE IN KIND ON ANY APPRECIABLE SCALE. DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR, IRAQ'S USE OF CW AGENTS WAS OFTEN INEFFECTIVE. MANY OF THESE EARLY PROBLEMS CAN PROBABLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO POOR IRAQI CW EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES. IN SOME CASES THE IRAQIS WOULD USE AGENTS UNDER UNSUITABLE WEATHER CONDI- TIONS, SUCH AS WHEN THE WIND WAS BLOWING TOWARD THEIR OWN TROOPS. IN THE CASE OF AERIAL CW BOMBS, IRAQI PILOTS WOULD RELEASE CHEMICAL MUNITIONS FROM ALTI- TUDES TOO HIGH TO PERMIT ACCURATE, CONCENTRATED STRIKES. AS THE WAR PROGRESSED, THE IRAQIS BECAME MUCH MORE PROFICIENT IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THAT ONE CONTRIBUTING REASON FOR THIS WAS THE DELEGA- TION OF CW RELEASE AUTHORITY TO IRAQI CORPS-LEVEL COMMANDERS IN 1986. THIS PERMITTED BETTER INTEGRA- TION OF CW INTO BATTLEFIELD PLANNING. BEFORE 1986, RELEASE FOR CW WAS HELD AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE IRAQI GOVEMMENT. IN 1988 IRAQ BEGAN TO FULLY INTEGRATE CW INTO ITS SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVES. IN THE BATTLES OF AL FAW, FISH LAKE, AND MAJNOON ISLANDS DURING THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR, IRAQ MADE HEAVY USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE APRIL 1988 BATTLE TO RECAPTURE THE AL FAW PENINSULA, WE ESTIMATE THAT THE IRAQIS USED WELL OVER 100 TONS OF CW AGENT THE SUDDENNESS AND SEVERITY OF THIS ATTACK DISRUPTED IRANIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL, DECIMATED KEY UNITS, AND THREW THE IRANIAN DEFENDERS INTO DISARRAY. THE RESULTING VICTORY TOOK ONLY 30 HOURS, WHICH SURPRISED EVEN THE IRAQI MILITARY PLANNERS. SUBSEQUENT OFFEN- SIVE WERE PRECEDED BY MASSED CHEMICAL ATTACKS AND MET WITH SIMILIAR SUCCESS. KURDISH INSURGENCY IRAQ USED BOTH LETHAL AND NONLETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AGAINST KURDISH INSURGENTS IN LATE AUGUST 1988. HOWEVER, NO CASES OF EXPOSURE TO THESE AGENTS WERE IDENTIFIED AMONG THE KURDISH REFUGEES THAT FLED TO TURKEY. CLAIMING TO HAVE WITNESSED IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACKS LED US TO BELIEVE THAT MANY OF THESE KURDS WERE EXPOSED TO NONLETHAL IRRITANT OR VOMITING AGENTS. APPENDIX C CW PROGRAM ORGANIZATION MAJ. GEN. HUSAYN KAMIL AL-MAJID, HEAD OF THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND MILITARY INDUS- TRIALIZATION (MIMI-THE SENIOR ORGANIZATION TO WHICH MOST OF IRAQ'S MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OSTENSIBLY BE- LONG-PROBABLY IS FAMILIAR WITH MOST ASPECTS OF THE CW PROGRAM, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT MIMI SERVES NO DIRECT ROLE IN THE PROGRAM, APPENDIX D CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND FIELD EMPLOYMENT IN GENERAL, THE AMOUNT OF CW AGENT DELIVERED DETER- MINES THE EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION AND THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES. THE NUMBER OF RESULTANT CASU- ALTIES DEPENDS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE CONTAM- INATED AREA, LENGTH OF WARNING, DEGREE OF PROTECTION, AND PERSISTENCY AND TOXICITY OF THE AGENT USED. THE PERSISTENCY OF A SPECIFIC AGENT (LENGTH OF TIME IT REMAINS EFFECTIVE) VARIES, DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF MUNITION USED AND THE WEATHER CONDITIONS. FOR EXAM- PLE, THE PERSISTENCY OF SARIN UNDER HOT, WINDY CONDI- TIONS IS MUCH LESS THAN ONE HOUR; THE PERSISTENCY OF MUSTARD OR VX MAY BE SEVERAL DAYS TO WEEKS UNDER COOL, CALM CONDITIONS. IN ALL CASES, GIVEN SUBLETHAL DOSES OF AN AGENT, INCAPACITATION WILL OCCUR TO VARYING DEGREES. BLISTER AGENTS BLISTER AGENTS ARE PRIMARILY USED TO CAUSE MEDICAL CASUALTIES. THESE AGENTS MAY ALSO BE USED TO RESTRICT USE OF TERRAIN, TO SLOW MOVEMENTS, AND TO HAMPER USE OF MATERIEL AND INSTALLATIONS. BLISTER AGENTS AFFECT THE EYES AND LUNGS AND BLISTER THE SKIN. SULFUR MUSTARD, NITROGEN MUSTARD, AND LEWISITE ARE EXAMPLES OF BLISTER AGENTS. MOST BLISTER AGENTS ARE INSIDIOUS IN ACTION; THERE IS LITTLE OR NO PAIN AT THE TIME OF EXPOSURE EXCEPT WITH LEWISITE, WHICH CAUSES IMMEDIATE PAIN ON CONTACT. MUSTARD IS PREFERRED OVER LEWISITE BECAUSE LEWISITE HYDROLYZES VERY RAPIDLY UPON EXPOSURE TO ATMOSPHERIC MOISTURE TO FORM A NONVOLATILE SOLID. THIS CONVERSION LOWERS THE VAPOR HAZARD FROM CONTAMINATED TERRAIN AND DECREASES THE PENETRATION OF THE AGENT THROUGH CLOTHING. LEWISITE IS LESS PERSISTENT THAN IS MUSTARD; HOWEVER, THE PERSISTENCY OF BOTH IS LIMITED UNDER HUMID CONDITIONS. BLOOD AGENTS BLOOD AGENTS ARE ABSORBED INTO THE BODY PRIMARILY BY BREATHING. THEY PREVENT THE NORMAL UTILIZATION OF OXYGEN BY THE CELLS AND CAUSE RAPID DAMAGE TO BODY TISSUES. BLOOD AGENTS SUCH AS HYDROGEN CYANIDE (AC) AND EYANOGEN CHLORIDE (CK) ARE HIGHLY VOLATILE AND IN THE GASEOUS STATE DISSIPATE RAPIDLY IN AIR-GENERALLY WITHIN MINUTES. BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH VOLATILITY, THESE AGENTS ARE MOST EFFECTIVE WHEN SURPRISE CAN BE ACHIEVED AGAINST TROOPS WHO DO NOT HAVE MASKS OR WHO ARE POORLY TRAINED IN MASK DISCIPLINE. IN ADDITION, BLOOD AGENTS ARE IDEALLY SUITED FOR USE ON TERRAIN THAT THE USER HOPES TO OCCUPY WITHIN A SHORT TIME. BLOOD CHOKING AGENTS CHOKING AGENTS ARE THE OLDEST CW AGENTS. THIS CLASS OF AGENTS INCLUDES CHLORINE AND PHOSGENE, BOTH OF WHICH WERE USED IN WORLD WAR I. IN SUFFICIENT CONCENTRATIONS, THEIR CORROSIVE EFFECT ON THE RESPIRA- TORY SYSTEM RESULTS IN PULMONARY EDEMA, FILLING THE LUNGS WITH FLUID AND CHOKING THE VICTIM. PHOSGENE IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN CHLORINE BECAUSE IT IS SLOWLY HYDROLYZED BY THE WATER IN THE LINING OF THE LUNGS, FORMING HYDROCHLORIC ACID, WHICH READILY DESTROYS THE TISSUE. THESE AGENTS ARE HEAVY GASES THAT REMAIN NEAR GROUND LEVEL AND TEND TO FILL DEPRESSIONS SUCH AS FOXHOLES AND TRENCHES. BECAUSE THEY ARE GASES, THEY ARE NONPERSIS- TENT AND DISSIPATE RAPIDLY, EVEN IN A SLIGHT BREEZE. AS A RESULT, THESE ARE AMONG THE LEAST EFFECTIVE TRADITIONAL CW AGENTS. THEY ARE USEFUL FOR CREATING A SHORT-TERM RESPIRATORY HAZARD ON TERRAIN THAT IS TO BE QUICKLY OCCUPIED. NERVE AGENTS NERVE AGENTS, INCLUDING TABUN (GA), SARIN (GB), SO- MAN (GD) AND VX, ARE MEMBERS OF A CLASS OF COMPOUNDS THAT ARE MORE TOXIC AND QUICKER ACTING THAN IS MUSTARD. THEY ARE ORGANOPHOSPHORUS COM- POUNDS THAT INHIBIT ACTION OF THE ENZYME CHOLINESTER- ASE. IN SUFFICIENT CONCENTRATION, THE ULTIMATE EFFECT OF THESE AGENTS IS PARALYSIS OF THE RESPIRATORY MUSCULA- TURE AND SUBSEQUENT DEATH. NERVE AGENTS ACT RAPIDLY (WITHIN SECONDS OF EXPOSURE) AND MAY BE ABSORBED THROUGH THE SKIN OR THROUGH THE RESPIRATORY TRACT. EXPOSURE TO A LETHAL DOSE MAY CAUSE DEATH IN LESS THAN 15 MINUTES. THEY ARE STORED IN MUNITIONS AS LIQUIDS AND ARE GENERALLY DISSEMINATED AS AEROSOLS. TRADITIONAL NERVE AGENTS FALL INTO TWO MAIN CLASSES: G- SERIES AND V-SCRIES. THE G-SERIES CONSISTS OF GA, GB, GD, GE, GF, GH, AND A NUMBER OF SIMILAR EXPERI- MENTAL AGENTS. THESE AGENTS, PARTICULARLY GA AND GB, TEND TO BE LESS PERSISTENT THAN THEIR V-SERIES COUNTERPARTS AND CONSEQUENTLY PRESENT LESS OF A SKIN HAZARD. THESE LESS PERSISTENT AGENTS ARE USED TO CAUSE IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES AND TO CREATE A SHORT-TERM RESPI- RATORY HAZARD ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE MORE PERSISTENT AND GENERALLY MORE TOXIC V-AGENTS, INCLUDING VE, VG, VM, VS, VX, AND RELATED EXPERIMENTAL AGENTS, PRE- SENT A GREATER SKIN HAZARD AND ARE USED TO CREATE LONG- TERM CONTAMINATION OF TERRITORY. PSYCHOCHEMICALS PSYCHOCHEMICALS, ALSO CONSIDERED INCAPACITANTS, IN- CLUDE HALLUCINOGENIC COMPOUNDS SUCH AS LYSERGIC ACID DIETHYLAMIDE (LSD), 3-QUINUCLIDINYL BENZILATE (BZ), AND BENACTYZINE. THESE AGENTS ALTER THE NERVOUS SYS- TEM, THEREBY CAUSING VISUAL AND AURAL HALLUCINATIONS, A SENSE OF UNREALITY, AND CHANGES IN THE THOUGHT PROCESSES AND BEHAVIOR. PSYCHOCHEMICALS ARE GENERAL- LY CHARACTERIZED BY A SLIGHTLY DELAYED ONSET OF SYMP- TOMS AND BY PERSISTENCE OF SYMPTOMS FOR A PERIOD GREATLY EXCEEDING EXPOSURE TIME. THE ADVANTAGE OF PSYCHOCHCMICALS IS THEIR ABILITY TO INACTIVATE BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD WITH ESSENTIALLY NO FATALITIES. THUS, THEIR USE MAY PROVE ADVANTAGEOUS IN AREAS WITH FRIENDLY POPULATIONS. ONE DRAWBACK, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE EFFECTS OF MANY OF THESE AGENTS ARE UNPREDICTABLE, RANGING FROM OVERWHELMING FEAR AND PANIC TO EXTREME BELLIGERENCE IN WHICH EXPOSED PERSONNEL ATTACK WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR PERSONAL SAFETY. TEAR GAS AGENTS TEAR GAS AGENTS FALL UNDER THE BROADER CATEGORY OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS. THEY ARE NOT CONSIDERED BY THE US GOVERNMENT TO BE CW AGENTS BECAUSE THEY ARE NONLETHAL IN ALL BUT THE HIGHEST CONCENTRATIONS. EXAM- PLES OF THIS TYPE OF AGENT INCLUDE ORTHOCHLOROBENZYLI- DENE MALONONITRILE (CS), CHLOROACETOPHENONE (CN), CHLOROPICRIN (PS), AND BROMOBENZYL CYANIDE (BBC). THESE AGENTS ARE HIGHLY IRRITATING, PARTICULARLY TO THE EYES AND RESPIRATORY TRACT, AND CAUSE EXTREME DISCOM- FORT. SYMPTOMS OCCUR ALMOST IMMEDIATELY UPON EXPO- SURE AND GENERALLY DISAPPEAR SHORTLY A EXPOSURE CEASES. IN MILITARY SITUATIONS, TEAR GAS AGENTS ARE USED TO TEMPORARILY REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY PERSON- NEL. IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS, THEY CAN BE USED TO PENE- TRATE FORTIFIED POSITIONS AND FLUSH OUT THE ENEMY. ALSO, THESE AGENTS ARE USEFUL FOR DISRUPTING HUMAN WAVE ASSAULTS BY BREAKING UP FORMATIONS AND DESTROYING THE MOMENTUM OF THE ATTACK. BECAUSE TEAR GAS AGENTS ARE NONLETHAL, THEY CAN BE USED NEAR FRIENDLY TROOPS WITHOUT RISKING CASUALTIES; THUS, THEIR USE IS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN WITH CONVENTIONAL CW AGENTS. VOMITING AGENTS VOMITING AGENTS ARE OFTEN CONSIDERED TO BE RIOT CONTROL AGENTS BECAUSE, UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS, THEY CAUSE GREAT DISCOMFORT BUT RARELY SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH. CHARACTERISTIC AGENTS INCLUDE ADAMSITE (DW AND DIPHENYL CHLOROARSINE (DA). IN ADDITION TO CAUS- ING VOMITING, THESE ARSENIC-BASED AGENTS MAY ALSO IRRITATE THE EYES AND RESPIRATORY SYSTEM. THE ACTION OF VOMITING AGENTS MAY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PUT ON, OR CONTINUE WEARING, A PROTECTIVE MASK. THEY MAY ALSO BE USED BY THEM- SELVES IN PROXIMITY TO FRIENDLY TROOPS AND IN OTHER SITUATIONS WELL-SUITED FOR TEAR GAS AGENTS. 1.5 (C) 73909:73909First Page |Prev Page |Next Page |Src Image
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