The Largest Security-Cleared Career Network for Defense and Intelligence Jobs - JOIN NOW

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

070296_cia_73909_73909_01.txt
Subject: IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE
PROGRAM: MORE SELF-RELIANT,
MORE DEADLY
A RESEARCH PAPER
IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE
PROGRAM: MORE SELF-RELIANT,
MORE DEADLY
SUMMARY
INFORMATION AVAILABLE
AS OF          AUGUST 1990 
WAS USED IN THIS REPORT
THE IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM, BY FAR THE LARGEST IN THE THIRD
WORLD, IS RAPIDLY BECOMING SELF-SUFFICIENT. BY 1993 IRAQ WILL HAVE COMPLET-
ED SEVERAL FACILITIES THAT WILL SUPPLY NEARLY ALL OF THE PRECURSOR CHEMICALS
NEEDED TO SUPPORT LARGE-SCALE NERVE AGENT PRODUCTION USING RAW MATERIALS
ACQUIRED IN THE COUNTRY. WITH OPTIMUM USE OF THEIR CW FACILITIES, THE
IRAQIS MAY THEN BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE COMBINED NERVE AND BLISTER AGENT
PRODUCTION LEVELS OF ABOUT 4,000 TONS PER YEAR-TWICE THE 2,000 TONS PER
YEAR THEY WERE PRODUCING BY THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR-WITHOUT HAVING
TO WORRY ABOUT FOREIGN EMBARGOES OF MOST ESSENTIAL PRECURSORS. IN ADDITION,
THE APPARENT INTEGRATION OF PESTICIDE PRODUCTION INTO IRAQ'S CW INFRASTRUC-
TURE WILL LEND AN AIR OF LEGITIMACY TO THE PROGRAM
SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN, IRAQ HAS STRESSED DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED
CW AGENTS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IT IS PURSUING PERSISTENT NERVE AGENTS
SUCH AS VX THAT ARE MUCH MORE TOXIC THAN THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND
THE NERVE AGENT SARIN-THE PRINCIPAL AGENTS NOW IN IRAQ'S ARSENAL. IN
ADDITION, IRAQ PROBABLY IS DEVELOPING BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITH A
LONGER SHELF LIFE, ENABLING IT TO MAINTAIN A SIZABLE STOCKPILE. IRAQ ALSO IS SI-
MULTANEOUSLY DEVELOPING FIVE TYPES OF SHORT- TO INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC
MISSILES THAT MAY BE FITTED WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS. MISSILE-DELIVERED CW
AGENTS WILL OFFER IRAQ GREATER STANDOFF CAPABILITY AND DETERRENT VALUE. IN
CONCERT WITH DEVELOPING A MORE SOPHISTICATED CW STOCKPILE, THE IRAQIS ARE
MAINTAINING A WIDE RANGE OF BATTLEFIELD-PROVEN DELIVERY OPTIONS, INCLUDING
BOMBS, SHELLS, AND ARTILLERY ROCKETS.
APPARENTLY IRAQ BELIEVES IT NEEDS CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR DETERRENT PUR-
POSES-          AND AS A KEY WEAPON
SUPPORTING ITS PROFESSED ROLE AS MILITARY "PROTECTOR" OF THE ARAB WORLD. IN
CONJUNCTION WITH CW, IRAQ ALSO HAS AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN WHICH SELF-SUFFICIENCY IS A
PRIMARY GOAL. THE HIGH PRIORITY ENJOYED BY THE CW PROGRAM PROBABLY ALSO
REFLECTS IRAQ'S PLEASURE WITH THE RESULTS OF MASSIVE NERVE AGENT STRIKES
AGAINST IRANIAN FORCES IN 1988 AND SUBSEQUENT CW USE AGAINST KURDISH
INSURGENTS. HOWEVER, IRAQI WILLINGNESS TO INITIATE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE TEMPERED IF ITS OPPONENTS POSSESS
CREDIBLE CW CAPABILITIES.
THE IRAQI CW PROGRAM POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO US FORCES AND INTERESTS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
IRAQS CHEMICAL WARFARE
PROGRAM: MORE SELF-RELIANT,
MORE DEADLY
FOR EVERY INSECT THERE IS AN INSECTICIDE.
LT. GEN. MAHIR ABD AL-RASHID
COMMANDER, IRAQI VII CORPS
CIRCA 1985
NOW, IRAQ IS IN POSSESSION OF THE BINARY CHEMICAL
WEAPON.
SADDAM HUSAYN
1990
BACKGROUND
AFTER NEARLY TWO DECADES OF WORK, IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED
THE MOST EXTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM IN
THE THIRD WORLD
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH IRAN IN 
1980 PROVIDED THE IMPETUS FOR IRAQ TO ACCELERATE ITS
CW PROGRAM. LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION OF THE BLISTER
AGENT MUSTARD PROBABLY BEGAN AT SAMARRA IN EARLY
1983; BY AUGUST OF THAT YEAR, IRAQ WAS USING THIS
AGENT AGAINST IRAN
APPENDIX B FOR
DETAILS OF IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS)
IRAQ'S CONCERTED CW EFFORT DURING THE WAR ENABLED
THE IRAQIS TO ESTABLISH A SIZABLE AND SOPHISTICATED
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR R&D, PRODUCTION, TESTING, AND STOR-
AGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. (SEE APPENDIX C FOR A
SUMMARY OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM ORGANIZATION.) BY THE
WAR'S END, IRAQ WAS ABLE TO PRODUCE ABOUT 1,000 TONS
EACH PER YEAR OF BLISTER AND NERVE AGENTS. ALTHOUGH
IRAQ HAD LITTLE DIFFICULTY OBTAINING THE RAW MATERIALS IT
NEEDED TO SUPPORT SUCH PRODUCTION, IT BEGAN DEVELOP-
ING AN INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR PRODUCTION CAPABILITY
AFTER THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS
BEGAN CONTROLLING SALES OF KEY PRECURSOR CHEMICALS.
IRAQ ALSO HAS AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) AND
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS THAT, IN MANY WAYS, PARALLEL
ITS CW EFFORT. AS WITH CW, THE BW AND MISSILE
EFFORTS ARE STRIVING FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY. ALSO, ALL THREE
HIGH-PRIORITY PROGRAMS PLAY A KEY ROLE IN IRAQI DETER-
RENCE AGAINST ISRAEL'S          SUPERIOR
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY.
THE 1988 CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN DID NOT DIMINISH THE
IMPORTANCE OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM, BUT IT DID SIGNIFI-
CANTLY ALTER THE PROGRAM'S FOCUS. THE DEMANDS OF THE
WAR NECESSITATED THAT IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM DEDICATE
MUCH OF ITS RESOURCES TO LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE, HOWEVER,
PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITH A LIMITED SHELF
LIFE WAS NO LONGER PRACTICAL OR EVEN NECESSARY, FREEING
IRAQ TO ENHANCE ITS CW EFFORT IN PREPARATION FOR
FUTURE CONFLICTS. IRAQ APPARENTLY ALSO IS SEEKING WAYS
TO BETTER UTILIZE ITS SEMIDORMANT CW FACILITIES.
INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR PRODUCTION-KEY TO
ELIMINATING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
IRAQ IS CONSTRUCTING SEVERAL FACILITIES THAT, WHEN COM-
PLETED BY 1993, WILL SUPPLY NEARLY ALL OF IRAQ'S PRECUR-
SOR CHEMICAL NEEDS USING INDIGENOUSLY ACQUIRED RAW
MATERIALS. IRAQ EMBARKED UPON THIS EFFORT IN THE MID-
1980S, SHORTLY AFTER INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROLS ON
KEY PRECURSORS WERE FIRST ENACTED. IF THE PROJECT IS
SUCCESSFUL, THE IRAQIS ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL BE ABLE TO
PRODUCE SEVERAL G-SERIES NERVE AGENTS (PARTICULARLY
SARIN AND ITS DERIVATIVES)-AND PERHAPS MUSTARD AS
WELL-WITHOUT NEED FOR IMPORTED CHEMICALS
THE HEART OF IRAQ'S PRECURSOR PRODUCTION EFFORT IS THE
HABBANIYAH II FACILITY, WHICH INCLUDES A CHLORINE-
ALKALINE PLANT AND SEVERAL PROBABLE CW PRECURSOR
PRODUCTION LINES
IRAQI CW AGENTS USED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENT SARIN
(GB) WERE PRODUCED IN LARGE AMOUNTS AT IRAQ'S
SAMARRA FACILITY AND USED AGAINST IRAN DURING THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR. WE BELIEVE THAT LESSER AMOUNTS OF THE
NERVE AGENTS TABUN (GA) AND GF AND RIOT CONTROL
AGENT CS WERE USED AS WELL IRAQI MUSTARD ATTACKS
SEVERELY STRAINED IRAN'S MEDICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND,
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS,
DISRUPTED SEVERAL IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. LARGE-SCALE USE
OF NERVE AGENTS IN 1988 INFLICTED SIGNIFICANT IRANIAN
CASUALTIES AND GREATLY SUPPORTED IRAQI OFFENSIVE OPER-
ATIONS
NEW CW AGENTS AND PRODUCTION METHODS-
DEVELOPING A MORE POTENT ARSENAL
ADVANCED AGENTS
WE BELIEVE THAT
IRAQ IS ENGAGED IN A SIZABLE EFFORT TO DEVELOP AND
PRODUCE ADDITIONAL CW AGENTS.
IRAQ IS DEVELOPING OR HAS ALREADY PRODUCED SOME OF THE
MORE PERSISTENT ANALOGS OF SARIN, SUCH AS SOMAN
GF. WE BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS PRODUCED AND USED
SOME GF TOWARD THE END OF THE WAR WITH IRAN.
IRAQI NERVE AGENT RESEARCH APPARENTLY HAS FOCUSED ON 
VX AS WELL.
BECAUSE VX IS VERY PERSISTENT AND TOXIC, IT
PROBABLY WOULD BE AN OPTIMUM CW AGENT TO PLACE IN
A BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD.
IRAQ MAY BE INVESTIGATING ENTIRELY NEW CLASSES OF
COMPOUNDS FOR USE AS CW AGENTS.
IMPROVED PRODUCTION METHODS
SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN, THE IRAQIS APPARENTLY
HAVE BEEN OPTIMIZING THEIR CW AGENT PRODUCTION
PROCESSES AND SEARCHING FOR NEW ROUTES OF MANUFAC-
TURE. THE GOALS OF THIS EFFORT PROBABLY ARE TO SIMPLIFY
THE PRODUCTION OF CW AGENTS, REDUCE BOTTLENECKS IN
THE PROCESS, AND RELY ON INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED OR
EASILY ACQUIRED RAW MATERIALS.
LONGER SHELF LIFE
WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ IS ATTEMPTING TO LENGTHEN THE
SHELF LIFE OF ITS CW AGENTS, PARTICULARLY SARIN, SO THAT A
SIZABLE CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE CAN BE MAIN-
TAINED.
DELIVERY SYSTENTS-MAINTAINING A
WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS
BOMBS, SHELLS, AND ROCKETS-TRIED AND TRUE
THE IRAQIS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO FILL A VARIETY OF
MUNITIONS SYSTEMS WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS.
BALLISTIC MISSILES-THE LONG-RANGE OPTION
IRAQ IS DEVELOPING A LONG-RANGE CW DELIVERY CAPABILI-
TY TO AUGMENT ITS EXTENSIVE SHORT-RANGE TACTICAL CAPA-
BILITIES. MOST OBVIOUS, AND PROBABLY OF GREATEST CON-
CERN, IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR
BALLISTIC MISSILES. IRAQ PROBABLY WILL DEVELOP AND
MANUFACTURE CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR EACH KIND OF
MISSILE UNDER DEVELOPMENT.
THERE ARE CHEAPER WAYS FOR IRAQ TO DELIVER CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS THAN A BALLISTIC MISSILE. ARTILLERY AND AIR-
CRAFT CAN DO THE JOB AND WITH MORE PRECISION, AT LEAST
AT PRESENT. BALLISTIC MISSILES WILL BE THE PREFERRED
DELIVERY SYSTEM, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE GREAT-
ER STANDOFF CAPABILITY, CANNOT BE EASILY DEFENDED
AGAINST, AND OFFER MORE PRESTIGE AND HIGHER DETERRENT
VALUE. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAS HAD GREAT SUCCESS USING
BALLISTIC MISSILES ARMED WITH CONVENTIONAL HIGH EXPLO-
SIVES AGAINST CITIES, THE INACCURACY OF ITS MISSILE
SYSTEMS MAKES THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARHEADS VERY
ATTRACTIVE. BECAUSE CHEMICAL WARHEADS CAN DISPERSE
LETHAL CONCENTRATIONS OVER A LARGER AREA, THEY ARE MORE
COST EFFECTIVE, RESULT IN A GREATER NUMBER OF HUMAN
CASUALTIES, AND PROVIDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL EDGE. 
CW PROTECTION AND TRAINING
IRAQ GRADUALLY BUILT UP A PROTECTIVE CW CAPABILITY
DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, PRIMARILY TO MINIMIZE IRAQI
CASUALTIES FROM INADVERTENT EXPOSURE TO ITS OWN CHEMI-
CAL ATTACKS. HOWEVER, PROTECTION AGAINST IRANIAN CW
ATTACKS BECAME NECESSARY TOWARD THE END OF THE WAR
AS IRAN BEGAN LIMITED USE OF ITS VASTLY INFERIOR CHEMI-
CAL ARSENAL. IRAQ HAS CONTINUED TO EXPAND ITS PROTEC-
TIVE CAPABILITY FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE, PROBABLY WITH
THE REALIZATION THAT FUTURE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
CONFLICTS
AS IN OTHER FACETS OF ITS MILITARY INDUSTRIES, IRAQ HAS
CHOSEN TO PRODUCE INDIGENOUSLY A LARGE PORTION OF ITS
CW PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS.
CW PROTECTIVE MASKS, FILTERS, SUITS,
BOOTS, AND GLOVES ARE PRODUCED THERE AND SOLD TO
VARIOUS COMPANIES, OFTEN FOR REEXPORT.
IRAQ ALSO CONTINUES TO TRAIN ITS TROOPS TO OPERATE IN A
CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT.
SOME OF THE CW TRAINING IRAQ PROVIDES COVERS OFFEN-
SIVE ASPECTS OF CW.
DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
IRAQ HAS BEEN EXTREMELY ADEPT AT PROCURING THE
SERVICES OF FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS TO SUPPORT ITS
CW-RELATED ACTIVITIES.
HOWEVER, IRAQ'S ONCE NEAR-TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON FOR-
EIGN EXPERTISE AND MATERIALS HAS DECLINED MARKEDLY
(SINCE THE EARLY 1980s AS IRAQIS GAINED CW EXPERIENCE
AND EMBARKED UPON AN INDIGENOUS PRECURSOR PRODUC-
TION EFFORT.
OUTLOOK-DETERRENCE, SELF-SUFFICIENCY, FIRST-USE
CONSIDERATIONS, AND THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
IN OUR JUDGMENT, IRAQ BELIEVES IT NEEDS CHEMICAL
WEAPONS FOR DETERRENT PURPOSES,
THE
IRAQIS BELIEVE THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE SUITABLE
DETERRENTS          AND DEVEL-
OPED THIS THEME IN AN EARLY 1990 PRESS CAMPAIGN.
CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPING NEW OR IMPROVED
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS-SUCH AS LONGER RANGE SURFACE-TO-
SURFACE MISSILES AND THE "BIG GUN" LONG-RANGE ARTIL-
LERY PROJECT-PROBABLY IS TIED TO IRAQ'S DESIRE TO
IMPROVE THE LETHALITY AND RANGE OF ITS CHEMICAL THREAT.
WE JUDGE THAT TACTICAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERA-
TIONS HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO IRAQI MILITARY DOC-
TRINE. IRAQ UTILIZED CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRIMARILY DURING
THE LAST HALF OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, WHICH LED TO
BATTLEFIELD DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ'S CW DOCTRINE. THE 
DECISION TO USE CHEMICALS DURING THE WAR, HOWEVER,
WAS UNDOUBTEDLY INFLUENCED BY THE LACK OF A SIGNIFI-
CANT IRANIAN COUNTERCAPABILITY. WE BELIEVE IRAQ WILL
BE LESS LIKELY TO INITIATE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
FUTURE SCENARIOS IF ITS OPPONENT IS ARMED WITH A
CREDIBLE CW CAPABILITY.
WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ'S EXTENSIVE CW CAPABILITY POSES A
SERIOUS THREAT TO US FORCES AND INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST. IRAQ HAS THE CAPABILITY TO DELIVER LARGE AMOUNTS
OF CW AGENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND HAS SHOWN A
WILLINGNESS TO DO SO DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
THE TARGETING OF CIVILIANS IS IN LINE WITH IRAQI THREATS
TO "TURN KUWAIT INTO A GRAVEYARD" IN CASE OF FOREIGN
INTERVENTION.
HOWEVER, IRAQ MAY BY NOW HAVE DEVELOPED BINARY
SARIN WEAPONS WITH A MUCH LONGER SHELF LIFE. AS A
RESULT, IRAQI FORCES PROBABLY NOW CAN MAINTAIN SIGNIFI-
CANT STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND USE THEM AT ITS
CONVENIENCE.
IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE CW AGENTS IRAQ IS MOST LIKELY TO
USE IN AN INCURSION INTO SAUDI ARABIA ARE SARIN
(PROBABLY IN BINARY MUNITIONS) AND MUSTARD. SARIN
WOULD BE THE AGENT OF CHOICE FOR TARGETS THAT IRAQ
WANTS TO OCCUPY QUICKLY-INCLUDING OILFIELDS AND OTH-
ER KEY OBJECTIVES-AS WELL AS ON BATTLEFIELD DEFENSES.
MUSTARD MIGHT BE USED TO PROTECT IRAQI FLANKS AND,
AGAINST KEY TRANSPORTATION NODES, TO HINDER MOVEMENT
AND RESUPPLY OF OPPOSING FORCES. THE SEMIPERSISTENT
NERVE AGENT GF COULD BE USED IN PLACE OF SARIN IF THE
TARGET NEED NOT BE CAPTURED IMMEDIATELY. AGENTS LESS
LIKELY TO BE USED-BUT STILL POTENTIAL THREATS-INCLUDE
THE NERVE AGENTS VX AND SOMAN, NITROGEN MUSTARD,
AND PERHAPS EVEN NONLETHAL TEAR GAS AND VOMITING
AGENTS.
OF THE MANY CW DELIVERY SYSTEMS AVAILABLE TO IRAQ,
WE BELIEVE THAT ARTILLERY ROCKETS AND AIRCRAFT-DELIVERED
BOMBS ARE THE MOST LIKELY TO BE USED BY IRAQ. IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT IRAQ HAS ALREADY PRODUCED A FEW CHEMI-
CAL WARHEADS FOR ITS SCUD-TYPE MISSILES; IF IT HAS
INDEED DONE SO, IRAQ WOULD GREATLY INCREASE ITS CAPA-
BILITY TO STRIKE SAUDI POPULATION CENTERS, AIRFIELDS, AND
STAGING AREAS WITH CW AGENTS.
APPENDIX B
IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
IRAN-IRAQ WAR
THE MOST VISIBLE ASPECT OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM HAS
BEEN THE WIDESPREAD USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST
IRAN. BETWEEN 1983 AND 1988, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ON A SCALE NOT SEEN SINCE WORLD WAR I. THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE ATTACKS WAS MINIMAL AT FIRST BUT
INCREASED GRADUALLY AS IRAQ GAINED EXPERIENCE IN CW
AND DEVELOPED NEW AGENTS, WEAPONS, AND TACTICS.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS HELPED
BRING THE WAR TO A FAIRLY SUDDEN CONCLUSION IN 1988,
WHEN IRAQ INCORPORATED MASSED NERVE AGENT STRIKES
INTO A SERIES OF HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVES.
IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN CAN BE
DIVIDED INTO THREE DISTINCT PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE,
WHICH CONTINUED UNTIL 1986, INVOLVED THE USE OF CW 
AGENTS IN A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ROLE, TO DISRUPT OR HALT
IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. IN A TRANSITIONARY PHASE LASTING
FROM LATE 1986 TO EARLY 1988, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PREEMPTIVELY AGAINST STAGING AREAS PRIOR TO
IRANIAN OFFENSIVES, WHILE CONTINUING TO RELY ON CW TO 
DISRUPT THESE OFFENSIVES. FINALLY, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT-
LY, IRAQ USED MASSED NERVE AGENT STRIKES AS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF ITS WELL-ORCHESTRATED OFFENSIVES IN THE SPRING
AND SUMMER OF 1988. THE SUCCESS OF THESE OFFENSIVES
PROMPTED IRAN TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE IN AUGUST 1988.
WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ DECIDED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER, TO COMPENSATE FOR IRAN'S MAN-
POWER ADVANTAGE. IRAQ'S USE OF CW HELPED TO MINI-
MIZE IRAQI PERSONNEL AND LAND LOSSES BY STALLING
IRANIAN HUMAN WAVE ATTACKS. IRAQI CW USE WAS
ENHANCED BY THE LIMITED IRANIAN CW PROTECTIVE CAPA-
BILITY AND IRAN'S INABILITY TO RETALIATE IN KIND ON ANY
APPRECIABLE SCALE.
DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR, IRAQ'S USE OF CW
AGENTS WAS OFTEN INEFFECTIVE. MANY OF THESE EARLY
PROBLEMS CAN PROBABLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO POOR IRAQI CW
EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES. IN SOME CASES THE IRAQIS
WOULD USE AGENTS UNDER UNSUITABLE WEATHER CONDI-
TIONS, SUCH AS WHEN THE WIND WAS BLOWING TOWARD THEIR
OWN TROOPS. IN THE CASE OF AERIAL CW BOMBS, IRAQI
PILOTS WOULD RELEASE CHEMICAL MUNITIONS FROM ALTI-
TUDES TOO HIGH TO PERMIT ACCURATE, CONCENTRATED
STRIKES.
AS THE WAR PROGRESSED, THE IRAQIS BECAME MUCH MORE
PROFICIENT IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE
THAT ONE CONTRIBUTING REASON FOR THIS WAS THE DELEGA-
TION OF CW RELEASE AUTHORITY TO IRAQI CORPS-LEVEL
COMMANDERS IN 1986. THIS PERMITTED BETTER INTEGRA-
TION OF CW INTO BATTLEFIELD PLANNING. BEFORE 1986,
RELEASE FOR CW WAS HELD AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE
IRAQI GOVEMMENT.
IN 1988 IRAQ BEGAN TO FULLY INTEGRATE CW INTO ITS
SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVES. IN THE BATTLES OF AL FAW, FISH
LAKE, AND MAJNOON ISLANDS DURING THE FINAL MONTHS OF
THE WAR, IRAQ MADE HEAVY USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE APRIL 1988 BATTLE TO RECAPTURE THE
AL FAW PENINSULA, WE ESTIMATE THAT THE IRAQIS USED
WELL OVER 100 TONS OF CW AGENT
THE SUDDENNESS AND SEVERITY OF THIS ATTACK DISRUPTED
IRANIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL, DECIMATED KEY UNITS,
AND THREW THE IRANIAN DEFENDERS INTO DISARRAY. THE
RESULTING VICTORY TOOK ONLY 30 HOURS, WHICH SURPRISED
EVEN THE IRAQI MILITARY PLANNERS. SUBSEQUENT OFFEN-
SIVE WERE PRECEDED BY MASSED CHEMICAL ATTACKS AND
MET WITH SIMILIAR SUCCESS.
KURDISH INSURGENCY
IRAQ USED
BOTH LETHAL AND NONLETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AGAINST
KURDISH INSURGENTS IN LATE AUGUST 1988.
HOWEVER, NO CASES OF EXPOSURE TO THESE AGENTS WERE
IDENTIFIED AMONG THE KURDISH REFUGEES THAT FLED TO
TURKEY.          CLAIMING
TO HAVE WITNESSED IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACKS LED US TO
BELIEVE THAT MANY OF THESE KURDS WERE EXPOSED TO
NONLETHAL IRRITANT OR VOMITING AGENTS.
APPENDIX C
CW PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
MAJ. GEN. HUSAYN KAMIL AL-MAJID,
HEAD OF THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND MILITARY INDUS-
TRIALIZATION (MIMI-THE SENIOR ORGANIZATION TO WHICH
MOST OF IRAQ'S MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OSTENSIBLY BE-
LONG-PROBABLY IS FAMILIAR WITH MOST ASPECTS OF THE
CW PROGRAM, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT MIMI SERVES NO
DIRECT ROLE IN THE PROGRAM,
APPENDIX D
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
AND FIELD EMPLOYMENT
IN GENERAL, THE AMOUNT OF CW AGENT DELIVERED DETER-
MINES THE EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION AND THE NUMBER OF
CASUALTIES.
THE NUMBER OF RESULTANT CASU-
ALTIES DEPENDS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE CONTAM- 
INATED AREA, LENGTH OF WARNING, DEGREE OF PROTECTION,
AND PERSISTENCY AND TOXICITY OF THE AGENT USED. THE
PERSISTENCY OF A SPECIFIC AGENT (LENGTH OF TIME IT
REMAINS EFFECTIVE) VARIES, DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF
MUNITION USED AND THE WEATHER CONDITIONS. FOR EXAM-
PLE, THE PERSISTENCY OF SARIN UNDER HOT, WINDY CONDI-
TIONS IS MUCH LESS THAN ONE HOUR; THE PERSISTENCY OF
MUSTARD OR VX MAY BE SEVERAL DAYS TO WEEKS UNDER
COOL, CALM CONDITIONS. IN ALL CASES, GIVEN SUBLETHAL
DOSES OF AN AGENT, INCAPACITATION WILL OCCUR TO VARYING
DEGREES.
BLISTER AGENTS
BLISTER AGENTS ARE PRIMARILY USED TO CAUSE MEDICAL
CASUALTIES. THESE AGENTS MAY ALSO BE USED TO RESTRICT
USE OF TERRAIN, TO SLOW MOVEMENTS, AND TO HAMPER USE
OF MATERIEL AND INSTALLATIONS. BLISTER AGENTS AFFECT THE
EYES AND LUNGS AND BLISTER THE SKIN. SULFUR MUSTARD,
NITROGEN MUSTARD, AND LEWISITE ARE EXAMPLES OF BLISTER
AGENTS. MOST BLISTER AGENTS ARE INSIDIOUS IN ACTION;
THERE IS LITTLE OR NO PAIN AT THE TIME OF EXPOSURE EXCEPT
WITH LEWISITE, WHICH CAUSES IMMEDIATE PAIN ON
CONTACT.
MUSTARD IS PREFERRED OVER LEWISITE BECAUSE LEWISITE
HYDROLYZES VERY RAPIDLY UPON EXPOSURE TO ATMOSPHERIC
MOISTURE TO FORM A NONVOLATILE SOLID. THIS CONVERSION
LOWERS THE VAPOR HAZARD FROM CONTAMINATED TERRAIN
AND DECREASES THE PENETRATION OF THE AGENT THROUGH
CLOTHING. LEWISITE IS LESS PERSISTENT THAN IS MUSTARD; 
HOWEVER, THE PERSISTENCY OF BOTH IS LIMITED UNDER
HUMID CONDITIONS.
BLOOD AGENTS 
BLOOD AGENTS ARE ABSORBED INTO THE BODY PRIMARILY BY
BREATHING. THEY PREVENT THE NORMAL UTILIZATION OF
OXYGEN BY THE CELLS AND CAUSE RAPID DAMAGE TO BODY
TISSUES. BLOOD AGENTS SUCH AS HYDROGEN CYANIDE (AC)
AND EYANOGEN CHLORIDE (CK) ARE HIGHLY VOLATILE AND IN
THE GASEOUS STATE DISSIPATE RAPIDLY IN AIR-GENERALLY
WITHIN MINUTES. BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH VOLATILITY, THESE
AGENTS ARE MOST EFFECTIVE WHEN SURPRISE CAN BE
ACHIEVED AGAINST TROOPS WHO DO NOT HAVE MASKS OR WHO
ARE POORLY TRAINED IN MASK DISCIPLINE. IN ADDITION,
BLOOD AGENTS ARE IDEALLY SUITED FOR USE ON TERRAIN THAT
THE USER HOPES TO OCCUPY WITHIN A SHORT TIME. BLOOD
CHOKING AGENTS
CHOKING AGENTS ARE THE OLDEST CW AGENTS. THIS CLASS
OF AGENTS INCLUDES CHLORINE AND PHOSGENE, BOTH OF
WHICH WERE USED IN WORLD WAR I. IN SUFFICIENT
CONCENTRATIONS, THEIR CORROSIVE EFFECT ON THE RESPIRA-
TORY SYSTEM RESULTS IN PULMONARY EDEMA, FILLING THE
LUNGS WITH FLUID AND CHOKING THE VICTIM. PHOSGENE IS
MORE EFFECTIVE THAN CHLORINE BECAUSE IT IS SLOWLY
HYDROLYZED BY THE WATER IN THE LINING OF THE LUNGS,
FORMING HYDROCHLORIC ACID, WHICH READILY DESTROYS THE
TISSUE.
THESE AGENTS ARE HEAVY GASES THAT REMAIN NEAR GROUND
LEVEL AND TEND TO FILL DEPRESSIONS SUCH AS FOXHOLES AND
TRENCHES. BECAUSE THEY ARE GASES, THEY ARE NONPERSIS-
TENT AND DISSIPATE RAPIDLY, EVEN IN A SLIGHT BREEZE. AS A
RESULT, THESE ARE AMONG THE LEAST EFFECTIVE TRADITIONAL
CW AGENTS. THEY ARE USEFUL FOR CREATING A SHORT-TERM
RESPIRATORY HAZARD ON TERRAIN THAT IS TO BE QUICKLY
OCCUPIED.
NERVE AGENTS
NERVE AGENTS, INCLUDING TABUN (GA), SARIN (GB), SO-
MAN (GD) AND VX, ARE MEMBERS OF A CLASS OF
COMPOUNDS THAT ARE MORE TOXIC AND QUICKER ACTING
THAN IS MUSTARD. THEY ARE ORGANOPHOSPHORUS COM-
POUNDS THAT INHIBIT ACTION OF THE ENZYME CHOLINESTER-
ASE. IN SUFFICIENT CONCENTRATION, THE ULTIMATE EFFECT OF
THESE AGENTS IS PARALYSIS OF THE RESPIRATORY MUSCULA-
TURE AND SUBSEQUENT DEATH.
NERVE AGENTS ACT RAPIDLY (WITHIN SECONDS OF EXPOSURE)
AND MAY BE ABSORBED THROUGH THE SKIN OR THROUGH THE
RESPIRATORY TRACT. EXPOSURE TO A LETHAL DOSE MAY CAUSE
DEATH IN LESS THAN 15 MINUTES. THEY ARE STORED IN 
MUNITIONS AS LIQUIDS AND ARE GENERALLY DISSEMINATED AS
AEROSOLS.
TRADITIONAL NERVE AGENTS FALL INTO TWO MAIN CLASSES: G- 
SERIES AND V-SCRIES. THE G-SERIES CONSISTS OF GA, GB,
GD, GE, GF, GH, AND A NUMBER OF SIMILAR EXPERI-
MENTAL AGENTS. THESE AGENTS, PARTICULARLY GA AND
GB, TEND TO BE LESS PERSISTENT THAN THEIR V-SERIES
COUNTERPARTS AND CONSEQUENTLY PRESENT LESS OF A SKIN
HAZARD. THESE LESS PERSISTENT AGENTS ARE USED TO CAUSE
IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES AND TO CREATE A SHORT-TERM RESPI- 
RATORY HAZARD ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE MORE PERSISTENT
AND GENERALLY MORE TOXIC V-AGENTS, INCLUDING VE, VG,
VM, VS, VX, AND RELATED EXPERIMENTAL AGENTS, PRE-
SENT A GREATER SKIN HAZARD AND ARE USED TO CREATE LONG-
TERM CONTAMINATION OF TERRITORY.
PSYCHOCHEMICALS
PSYCHOCHEMICALS, ALSO CONSIDERED INCAPACITANTS, IN-
CLUDE HALLUCINOGENIC COMPOUNDS SUCH AS LYSERGIC ACID
DIETHYLAMIDE (LSD), 3-QUINUCLIDINYL BENZILATE (BZ),
AND BENACTYZINE. THESE AGENTS ALTER THE NERVOUS SYS-
TEM, THEREBY CAUSING VISUAL AND AURAL HALLUCINATIONS,
A SENSE OF UNREALITY, AND CHANGES IN THE THOUGHT
PROCESSES AND BEHAVIOR. PSYCHOCHEMICALS ARE GENERAL-
LY CHARACTERIZED BY A SLIGHTLY DELAYED ONSET OF SYMP-
TOMS AND BY PERSISTENCE OF SYMPTOMS FOR A PERIOD
GREATLY EXCEEDING EXPOSURE TIME.
THE ADVANTAGE OF PSYCHOCHCMICALS IS THEIR ABILITY TO
INACTIVATE BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR A
RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD WITH ESSENTIALLY NO FATALITIES.
THUS, THEIR USE MAY PROVE ADVANTAGEOUS IN AREAS WITH
FRIENDLY POPULATIONS. ONE DRAWBACK, HOWEVER, IS THAT
THE EFFECTS OF MANY OF THESE AGENTS ARE UNPREDICTABLE,
RANGING FROM OVERWHELMING FEAR AND PANIC TO EXTREME
BELLIGERENCE IN WHICH EXPOSED PERSONNEL ATTACK WITH
LITTLE REGARD FOR PERSONAL SAFETY.
TEAR GAS AGENTS
TEAR GAS AGENTS FALL UNDER THE BROADER CATEGORY OF RIOT
CONTROL AGENTS. THEY ARE NOT CONSIDERED BY THE US
GOVERNMENT TO BE CW AGENTS BECAUSE THEY ARE
NONLETHAL IN ALL BUT THE HIGHEST CONCENTRATIONS. EXAM-
PLES OF THIS TYPE OF AGENT INCLUDE ORTHOCHLOROBENZYLI-
DENE MALONONITRILE (CS), CHLOROACETOPHENONE (CN),
CHLOROPICRIN (PS), AND BROMOBENZYL CYANIDE (BBC).
THESE AGENTS ARE HIGHLY IRRITATING, PARTICULARLY TO THE
EYES AND RESPIRATORY TRACT, AND CAUSE EXTREME DISCOM-
FORT. SYMPTOMS OCCUR ALMOST IMMEDIATELY UPON EXPO-
SURE AND GENERALLY DISAPPEAR SHORTLY A EXPOSURE
CEASES.
IN MILITARY SITUATIONS, TEAR GAS AGENTS ARE USED TO
TEMPORARILY REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY PERSON-
NEL. IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS, THEY CAN BE USED TO PENE-
TRATE FORTIFIED POSITIONS AND FLUSH OUT THE ENEMY. ALSO,
THESE AGENTS ARE USEFUL FOR DISRUPTING HUMAN WAVE
ASSAULTS BY BREAKING UP FORMATIONS AND DESTROYING THE
MOMENTUM OF THE ATTACK. BECAUSE TEAR GAS AGENTS ARE
NONLETHAL, THEY CAN BE USED NEAR FRIENDLY TROOPS
WITHOUT RISKING CASUALTIES; THUS, THEIR USE IS MORE
FLEXIBLE THAN WITH CONVENTIONAL CW AGENTS.
VOMITING AGENTS
VOMITING AGENTS ARE OFTEN CONSIDERED TO BE RIOT
CONTROL AGENTS BECAUSE, UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS, THEY
CAUSE GREAT DISCOMFORT BUT RARELY SERIOUS INJURY OR
DEATH. CHARACTERISTIC AGENTS INCLUDE ADAMSITE (DW
AND DIPHENYL CHLOROARSINE (DA). IN ADDITION TO CAUS-
ING VOMITING, THESE ARSENIC-BASED AGENTS MAY ALSO
IRRITATE THE EYES AND RESPIRATORY SYSTEM.
THE ACTION OF VOMITING AGENTS MAY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE
TO PUT ON, OR CONTINUE WEARING, A PROTECTIVE MASK.
THEY MAY ALSO BE USED BY THEM-
SELVES IN PROXIMITY TO FRIENDLY TROOPS AND IN OTHER
SITUATIONS WELL-SUITED FOR TEAR GAS AGENTS.
1.5 (C)
73909:73909
First Page |Prev Page |Next Page |Src Image




NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list