Subject: CW USE IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR CONTENTS KEY JUDGMENTS............................................................................ DISCUSSION .................................................................................... BATTLEFIELD USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ....................... IRAQ ..................................................................................................... BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ................................. STRATEGIC RESULTS ............................................................................................................ IMPLICATIONS-DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL-OF THE CHEMICAL WAR ..................................................................................................................... IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES ...................................................................... IMPLICATIONS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS ................... IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY..................................................................... MEDICAL HANDLING OF CHEMICAL CASUALTIES ............................................................................................................................ KEY JUDGMENTS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS HAVE BEEN PART OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR SINCE THE EARLY 1980s. CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BECOME A REGULAR AND RECURRING TACTIC IN THE CONFLICT AND ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE. WE BELIEVE BOTH STATES HAVE ASSESSED THAT SELECTIVE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAN AUGMENT CONVENTIONAL ARSENALS, ATTAIN SHORT-TERM OBJEC- TIVES, INFLUENCE CERTAIN COMBAT SITUATIONS, AND SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE ENEMY CASUALTIES. BAGHDAD APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN TACTICALLY EFFECTIVE OR EVEN DECISIVE IN A LIMITED CONTEXT, BUT CHEMICAL WARFARE HAS NOT PROVIDED A STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE OR ADVANTAGE. AS LONG AS IRAQ CONTINUE TO EMPLOY CHEMICALS PRIMARILY IN A DEFENSIVE ROLE, WILL GAIN A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE BASED PURELY ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IRAQ HAS EMPLOYED SUCH WEAPONS SINCE AUGUST 1983, AND 1984 THE NERVE AGENT TABUN WAS USED FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE IRAQIS HAVE ADOPTED A DRY/DUSTY FORM OF MUSTARD THAT AFFECTS PERSONNEL RAPIDLY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN PIVOTAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF THE AND IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS. WHILE WESTERN EXPORT CONTROLS INITIALLY RAISED THE COST AND SLOWED THE PROGRAMS SO BECOME ADEPT AT CIRCUMVENT- ING THESE CONTROL AND ALTERING THE PRODUCTION PROCESSES. THEIR DRIVE FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND INDIGENOUS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION CAPABILI- TY WILL MAKE THEM LESS DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN SUPPORT AND LESS SUSCEPTI- BLE TO EXTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE DISCUSSION 1. EXAMINES THE DEGREE TO WHICH CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) IN THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE AND DISCUSSES THE FACTORS DRIVING DECISIONS TO DEVELOP AND USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IT APPEARS THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE A ROLE ON THE MIDDLE EASTERN BATTLEFIELD, AND THE REPORT ADDRESSES REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AS WELL AS POLITICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS THAT COULD AFFECT US INTERESTS 2. IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE DEVELOPED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND HAVE EMPLOYED THEM IN THEIR CONFLICT SINCE THE EARLY 1980S. IRAQ BEGAN TO DEVELOP ITS CW CAPABILITY IN THE EARLY 1970s WHILE IRAN BEGAN ITS PROGRAM AS A RESPOND TO IRAQI BATTLEFIELD USE. BAGHDAD USED RIOT CONTROL AGENTS (RCA)1 IN THE MID-1970s AGAINST DISSIDENT KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ. HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN GAVE ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO THE IRAQI CW PROGRAM IN THE EARLY 1980s, AND SINCE 1983, IRAN HAS USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS EVERY YEAR IN ITS WAR WITH IRAN. 3. OVERALL, WE BELIEVE THE FREQUENCY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE, INITIALLY CONSTRAINED BY AVAILABILITY, HAS INCREASED WHILE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BAGHDAD'S CW EMPLOYMENT IN MAJOR BATTLES IS IMPROVING. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN'S INITIAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY DECISION TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MADE IN AN EFFORT TO COMPENSATE FOR IRAQ'S LIMITED MILITARY MANPOWER POOL. IRAQ WAS ABLE TO USE CW TO MINIMIZE PERSONNEL AND TERRITORIAL LOSSES BY STALLING OR PREVENTING IRANIAN HUMAN WAVE ATTACKS AND BECAUSE IRAN HAD ONLY LIMITED CW PROTECTIVE CAPABILI- TIES AND COULD NOT RETALIATE IN KIND. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAS NOT ACHIEVED ITS STRATEGIC MILITARY AND POLITICAL GOAL OF ENDING THE WAR, CW HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN HELPING IRAQ ACHIEVE ITS TACTICAL BATTLEFIELD OBJECTIVES. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE IRAQIS PERCEIVE CHEMICAL WEAP- ONS TO BE AN EFFECTIVE COMPLEMENT TO THEIR CONVENTION- AL ARSENAL. 1 THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT RECOGNIZE RIOT CONTROL AGENTS SUCH AS TEAR GAS, CS, OR CN AS CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. BATTLEFIELD USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CW HAS BE- COME A RECURRING EVENT IN THE WAR. ALTHOUGH IRAQ DENIES THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND CONTENDS THAT THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL (OF WHICH BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN ARE SIGNATORIES) DOES NOT PROHIBIT CHEMICAL WEAPON USE ON ONE'S OWN TERRITORY, MANY OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED IN IRANIAN TERRI- TORY. IN THOSE ATTACKS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN USED PRIMARILY IN A DEFENSIVE ROLE 2 IN RESPONSE TO MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVES AND HAVE INVOLVED A VARIETY OF DELIVERY MEANS. REPORTING INDICATES THAT IRANIAN REAR AREA SUPPORT TROOPS OCCASIONALLY SUSTAIN LARGE NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES BECAUSE THEY ARE LESS PREPARED AND EQUIPPED TO COPE WITH CHEMICAL ATTACKS. IN THIS REGARD, REAR AREA CHEMICAL ATTACKS MAY BE A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR IRAQ. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT IRAQI CW ATTACKS MAY BE EVOLVING TO INCLUDE PREEMPTIVEUSES.3 IF IRAN WERE TO THREATEN IRAQI PERCEIVED STRATEGIC POSITIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ MIGHT AUTHORIZE MASSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOY- MENTS, AS IMPLIED BY IRAQI POLITICIANS 2 IRAQ HAS USED BOTH LETHAL AND NONLETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS, PRIMAR- ILY IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND COUNTERATTACKS. IT PREFERS TO USE THE RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS WHEN IRAQI TROOPS ARE IN PROXIMITY TO IRANIANS. THE GOAL OF CS USE BY BAGHDAD IS TO FORCE IRANIAN TROOP TO DON PROTECTIVE GEAR, THUS HAMPERING OPERATIONS. EVEN IF THIS DOES NOT HALT AN IRANIAN ADVANCE, IT AT LEAST DISRUPTS THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT IRAQI TROOPS TO PULL BACK-PERMITTING THE USE OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AND CAUSING IRANIAN CASUALTIES. 6. BEGINNING IN 1982 THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF RCA USE BY IRAQ AGAINST IRANIAN FORCES. SINCE THEN, THE TYPES AND LETHALITY OF CHEMICALS USED BY IRAQ HAS INCREASED, FROM RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS TO MUSTARD AGENT IN 1983 AND TO THE FIRST BATTLEFIELD USE OF A NERVE AGENT (TABUN) AGAINST IRANIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IT APPEARS THAT EARLY ATTACKS WERE LIMITED TO USING A FEW ARTILLERY SHELLS, MORTAR ROUNDS, OR AIRCRAFT-DELIVERED MUNITIONS. MANY TYPES OF CW AGENTS AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS ARE NOW BEING USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD 7. IRAQ APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME MORE COMPETENT IN ITS CAPABILITY TO INTEGRATE CHEMICALS INTO ITS CONVEN- TIONAL BATTLE STRATEGY. AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BECOME MORE AVAILABLE AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL- LY EMPLOYED, IRAQI POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AP- PEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED THEM AS A TACTICALLY USEFUL AND EFFECTIVE WEAPON. WE BELIEVE THAT CHEMICAL MUNI- TIONS, IN A FEW CASES, HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIFIC BATTLES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE KARBALA VIII CAMPAIGN OF APRIL 1987 THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, COMBINED WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS, PROVED EFFECTIVE. IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE KURDS IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO SUBDUE THE KURDISH POPULATION INSIDE IRAQ, ALONG THE TRIBORDER AREA WITH IRAN AND TURKEY, IS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM THE USE OF CHEMICALS AGAINST ANOTHER COUNTRY. THE IRAQIS HAVE PRIMARILY USED RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND POSSIBLY, IN SOME CASES, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE KURDS TO MINIMIZE THE DIVERSION OF TROOPS FROM MORE CRITICAL FRONTS AND THE LOSSES THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN INACCESSIBLE AREAS THAT FAVOR GUERRILLA FORCES. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS ONCE AGAIN INTENSI- FIED IN EARLY 1987 AS IRAQ ATTEMPTED TO SECURE THE NORTHERN BORDER AREAS WITH TURKEY AND IRAN. SINCE APRIL 1987, A MILITARY CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN WAGED TO ERADICATE VILLAGE BASES OF SUPPORT FOR KURDISH GUERRILLA GROUPS. TO MINIMIZE LOSSES OF MEN AND MATERIEL, IRAQI TROOPS HAVE USED RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND POSSIBLY CHEMI- CAL WEAPONS REPEATEDLY WHEN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HAVE NOT SUFFICED TO SUBDUE VILLAGERS BEFORE RAZING THEIR DWELLINGS SADDAM HUSAYN REPORTEDLY GAVE THE DIRECTION OF THIS CAMPAIGN TO ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID, DIRECTOR OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND SADDAM'S COUSIN, WHO DEVISED A "SCORCHED EARTH" POLICY TO ELIMINATE DISSIDENT KURDISH ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRAQ. THE POLICY, CARRIED OUT BETWEEN APRIL AND JULY 1987, AND APPARENTLY RESUMED IN OCTOBER 1987, HAS SPURRED THE DESERTION OF MANY LOYALIST KURDS AND PRIVATE CRITICISM FROM SENIOR IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY FIGURES. EVEN THE FIGUREHEAD VICE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ, A KURD, HAS REFUSED TO SUPPORT THE POLICY-A DARING DEFIANCE OF SADDAM HUSAYN'S AUTHORITY. THE TYPES AND LETHALITY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AVAIL- ABLE TO BOTH SIDES HAVE INCREASED IN RECENT MONTHS, AND THE FIGHTING IN NORTHEASTERN IRAQ DEMONSTRATES THAT NEITHER HAS BACKED OFF FROM EMPLOYING THEM EVEN AGAINST KURDISH POPULATION CENTERS. 8. UNTIL 1986, RELEASE AUTHORITY FOR CHEMICAL WEAP- ONS IN IRAQ WAS HELD AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF DECISION- MAKING, PERHAPS EXCLUSIVELY BY PRESIDENT HUSAYN. THIS WAS PROBABLY TO ENSURE CONTROL OF A LIMITED STOCKPILE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND TO GUARANTEE THAT SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO COUNTER LARGE IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. BAGHDAD MAY ALSO HAVE BELIEVED THAT TIGHT CONTROL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO DENY THAT IRAQI FORCES HAD EMPLOYED CW. IN 1986, CW RELEASE AUTHORITY WAS DELEGATED TO CORPS- LEVE COMMANDERS AS THE RESULT OF IRAQI LOSSES DURING THE AL FAW AND MEBRAN CAMPAIGNS AND AFTER THE MILITARY APPARENTLY CONVINCED PRESIDENT HUSAYN TO CHANGE RELEASE AUTHORITY FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO PERMIT BETTER INTEGRATION OF CW INTO BATTLE PLANS. CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOW APPEAR TO BE AN IMPORTANT ADJUNCT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF TACTICAL OBJECTIVES. 9. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE IRAQIS PERCEIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO BE AN EFFECTIVE COMPLEMENT TO THEIR CONVENTIONAL ARSENAL. OVERALL, WE BELIEVE THE FREQUEN- CY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE-PROBABLY CONSTRAINED ONLY BY AVAILABILITY-HAS INCREASED, AND THE EFFECTIVE- NESS OF BAGHDAD'S CW EMPLOYMENT IN MAJOR BATTLES IS IMPROVING. 10. CONSTRAINTS ON IRAQI USE. BY DENYING ITS USE OF CW, IRAQ HAS SHOWN SOME CONCERN FOR INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES. BAGHDAD'S MAIN CONCERN HAS BEEN THAT ANY PUBLIC OUTCRY WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN NECESSARY CONVENTIONAL WAR MATERIELS AS WELL AS NECESSARY CW MATERIALS. ALTHOUGH LIMITED INTERNA- TIONAL REACTION HAS THUS FAR NOT DETERRED IRAQ'S CHEMI- CAL EMPLOYMENT, NO POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS CONSTRAINTS SEEM TO BEAR SERIOUSLY ON HUSAYN'S DECISION TO EMPLOY CW. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PRESSURE-UNITED NATIONS CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTIONS, DEMARCHES, AND EXPORT CONTROLS-HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE IN STOPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CW PROGRAM OR CONTINUED BATTLE- FIELD USE. BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 13. FACED WITH SUPERIOR NUMBERS OF IRANIAN SOLDIERS IN A WAR OF ATTRITION, IRAQ ELECTED IN 1982 TO USE THE RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS IN CONJUNCTION WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, HOPING TO SOLVE ITS MILITARY DILEMMA. IRAQ'S EARLY USES OF MUSTARD AND TABUN IN 1983 AND 1984 WERE PROBABLY MILITARILY INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF POOR EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES AND UNSUITABLE WEATHER CON- DITIONS. IN SOME CASES, IRAQI PILOTS RELEASED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS FROM TOO HIGH ATTITUDES AND RARELY DELIVERED ENOUGH AGENT AT ONE TIME TO BE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE. IN OTHER CASES, CHEMICAL BOMBS WERE RELEASED TOO LOW FOR THEIR FUZES TO FUNCTION. IRAN THUS OBTAINED NUMEROUS IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTACT AND SCORED A MAJOR PROPAGANDA VICTORY BY PUBLICIZING THIS EVIDENCE ALSO, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN DAMP CONDITONS-PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHERN BORDER AREA- WHEN THE WIND WAS BLOWING TOWARD ITS OWN TROOPS AND IN DAYLIGHT. WHENEVER THE IRAQIS USED GOOD DELIVERY TECHNIQUES, WEATHER CONDITIONS AND TERRAIN WERE FAVORABLE, AND THE IRANI- ANS WERE NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARED OR TRAINED, THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE. 15. AS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, CHEMICAL WEAPONS WILL SOMETIMES ALLOW TACTICAL ADVANTAGE, BUT ARE UNLIKELY TO AFFECT THE WAR STRATEGICALLY. BAGHDAD, THUS FAR, HAS NOT SHOWN THE INTENTION TO COMMIT THE FULL CW RESOURCES NECESSARY TO GAIN A TRUE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE. AS LONG AS BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ CONTINUE TO EMPLOY CHEMI- CALS IN PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, NEITHER NATION WILL GAIN A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE, BASED PURELY ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, A CONCENTRATED USE OF CHEMICALS BY EITHER SIDE MAY CREATE A TACTICAL ADVAN- TAGE IN A LOCALIZED SITUATION. WE SHOULD ALSO EXPECT TO OBSERVE THE INTRODUCTION OF MORE LETHAL AGENTS SUCH AS VX IMPLICATIONS-DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL-OF THE CHEMICAL WAR 16. THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL HAS NOT BEEN AN EFFECTIVE IMPEDIMENT TO THE SPREAD AND USE OF SUCH WEAPONS IN THE REGION. WE BELIEVE THE PERCEIVED SUCCESSES OF SUCH WEAPONS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ BATTLEFIELD, COUPLED WITH THE LACK OF MEANINGFUL INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS OR CONDEMNATIONS, MAY SUGGEST TO THIRD WORLD STATES THAT THEY CAN ACQUIRE A CW CAPABILITY AS A DETERRENT OR A MILITARY FORCE MULTIPLIER. PROLIFERATION IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS BEEN TIED PRIMARILY TO THE AVAILABILITY OF TECHNOLOGIES-MOSTLY FROM WESTERN EU- ROPE. THE HIGH PROFITS FROM THE SALE OF TECHNOLOGY AND PRECURSOR CHEMICALS, AS WELL AS THE DIFFICULTY OF REGU- LATING DUAL-USE MATERIEL, HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STEPS TO STOP PROLIFERATION AND WEAPONIZATION. THE INCREASING NUMBER OF NATIONS THAT POSSESS CHEMICAL CAPABILITIES SUGGESTS THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE BEING INTEGRATED INTO THEIR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ARSENALS. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 17. AS MORE NATIONS ACQUIRE A CHEMICAL CAPABILITY, MILITARY AND PEACEKEEPING FORCES MUST EXPECT THE THREAT OF EITHER INTENTIONAL OR INADVERTENT EXPOSURE TO CHEMICAL ATTACK. THE PROLIFERATION OF CW PROGRAMS INDICATES A WIDENING THREAT FROM AN INCREASING NUMBER OF CHEMI- CAL AGENTS. THE UNITED STATES MUST EXPECT TO FACE A VARIETY OF AGENTS-NOT ONLY THOSE THAT ARE EXPECTED TO BE USED ON THE NATO BATTLEFIELD, BUT OTHERS SUCH AS THOSE USED BY IRAQ4 THE USE OF "STANDARD" CW AGENTS AND AGENTS IN DIFFERENT FORMS SUCH AS THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR HAS CREATED UNEXPECTED VULNERABILITIES, SUCH AS: -THE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF SEVERAL AGENTS DURING ANY ATTACK, AND CASUALTY TREATMENT. 4 EXAMPLES OF EXPECTED WARSAW PACT AGENTS ARE GB, GD, HD VX, AND L; EXAMPLES OF MIDDLE EAST AGENTS ARE GA, HN, CG, AND CK. -DECONTAMINATION OF TABUN CAN LEAD TO LIBERATION OF DANGEROUS CYANIDE COMPOUNDS. OBSERVATIONS FROM THE CHEMICAL WAR - CW TACTICAL DELIVERY METHODS HAVE IMPROVED WITH EXPERIENCE. - CW HAS BEEN LOCALLY EFFECTIVE IN SOME INSTANCE. ITS EFFECT HAS BEEN MAXIMIZED WHEN SURPRISE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AGAINST UNPREPARED TROOPS. - CW CAN CONTRIBUTE TO TACTICAL SUCCESSES AS ONE COMPONENT OF AN INTEGRATED FIREPLAN. - CW HAS BEEN USED LARGELY IN THE DEFENSE ROLE. -CW AGENT HAS BEEN USED AS AN AREA DENIAL WEAPON. -CW, INEPTLY EMPLOYED, HAS NOT PROVED TO BE A PANACEA TO MAKE UP FOR OTHER WEAKNESSES. NON- CHEMICAL TACTICAL WEAKNESS SUCH AS FAILURE TO MAXIMIZE ADVANTAGES AND INEFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL AIRPOWER CARRY OVER INTO EMPLOYMENT OF CW. -CW EMPLOYMENT SHORTCOMINGS HAVE INCLUDED USE OF INADEQUATE CONCENTRATIONS IN RELATION TO RE- QUIRED AREA COVERAGE, ENEMY TROOP NUMBERS, WEATHER AND TERRAIN, INEFFECTIVE DELIVERY, AND FAILURE TO INTEGRATE CW PROPERLY WITH THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER. ANNEX B IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY THE DEVELOP- MENT OF ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY BEGAN IN THE EARLY TO MID-1970s, WELL BEFORE ITS WAR WITH IRAN. IN THE EARLY TO MID-1970s RIOT CONTROL AGENTS WERE EM- PLOYED TO SUBDUE DISSIDENT KURDISH ACTIVITY IN NORTH- ERN IRAQ. THE HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN IN THE EARLY 1980s GAVE ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO THE CHEMICAL PROGRAM. THE INITIAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY DECISION TO EMPLOY CHEMI- CAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MADE IN AN EFFORT TO MINIMIZE PERSONNEL (BAGHDAD'S CRITICAL RESOURCE) AND MATERIAL LOSSES. BAGHDAD APPARENTLY BELIEVED THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IN COMBINATION WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WOULD BE USEFUL IN DEFEATING OR STALLING IRANIAN ATTACKS. PRODUCTION IRAQ NOW POSSESSES THE LARGEST CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION CAPABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAS THE CAPACITY TO INCREASE ITS STOCKPILE SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. THE PRINCIPAL AGENTS BEING PRODUCED AT IRAQ'S CW PRODUCTION FACILITY NEAR SAMARRA ARE THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENTS TABUN AND SARIN. THE RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS IS ALSO PRODUCED THERE. IN ADDITION, IRAQ APPEARS TO BE PRODUCING AT LEAST SMALL QUANTITIES OF THE NERVE AGENT VX AND RESEARCHING THE PRODUCTION OF THE PSYCHOCHEMICAL BZ. BESIDES ITS PRIMARY CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES NEAR SAMARRA' AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITY AT SALMAN PAK, THREE PROBABLE NEW CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE AL HABBANIYAH AREA OF IRAQ. BAGHDAD MAY BE TRYING TO ESTABLISH REDUNDANCY IN ITS SYSTEM, MAKING IT LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST ITS CHEMICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF AGENT AVAILABLE FOR USE IN THE WAR BEFORE THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN, THE LACK OF URGENCY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM ALLOWED IRAQ TIME TO PLACE STUDENTS IN SELECT- ED SCHOOLS ABROAD, WITH THE GOAL OF DEVELOPING A POOL OF TECHNICALLY COMPETENT SCIENTISTS. IN 1979, HOWEVER, IRAQ STILL LACKED INDIGENOUS TECHNICAL EXPERTISE FOR THE PRODUCTION OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS. THIS NECESSITATED BAGHDAD'S RELYING HEAVILY ON FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AS WELL AS FOR MATERIALS. AS OF LATE 1987, IRAQ WAS STILL RELYING ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO BUILD, MAINTAIN, AND SUPPLY MATERIALS FOR ITS FUTURE AND EXISTING CHEMICAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES. WE ESTI- MATE THAT ITS TECHNICAL MANPOWER AND ENGINEERING SHORTFALLS WILL BE OVERCOME WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR TO SIX YEARS EMBARGOES ON PRECURSOR CHEMICALS HAVE NOT STOPPED IRAQ'S PROGRAM-ONLY SLOWED THE PACE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. THEY HAVE INCREASED THE COST OF THE PROGRAM AND INTENSIFIED BAGHDAD'S SEARCH FOR ADDI- TIONAL PERCURSOR SOURCES, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY, AS WELL AS STIMULATING IRAQ'S EFFORTS TO INTERNALLY PRO- DUCE PRECURSOR CHEMICALS. DESPITE NUMEROUS WESTERN EXPORT CONTROLS, ACCELERATION OF THE IRAQI PROGRAM HAS BEEN MADE POSSIBLE THE IRAQI PROGRAM WILL BE SELF-SUPPORTING VIRTUALLY INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN EMBARGOES AND OUT- SIDE INTERVENTION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. WEAPONS DELIVERY IRAQ HAS DELIVERED ITS CHEMICAL AGENTS IN 250 AND 500-KG BOMBS, AERIAL SPRAY APPARATUS, AND, TO A LESSER DEGREE, IN 90-MILLIMETER AIR-TO-GROUND ROCKETS. MEDICAL HANDLING OF CHEMICAL CASUALTIES CHEMICAL CASUALTIES REQUIRE NOT ONLY TRANSPORTATION BUT, IN SOME CASES, LABOR-INTENSIVE HOSPITAL CARE. IN SOME BATTLES THE CHEMICAL CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN IN THE THOUSANDS, WHICH HAS OVERWHELMED THE MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND CAUSED SECONDARY CONTAMINATION CASUALTIES AMONG THE TRANSPORTATION AND MEDICAL STAFFS. IRAQ'S MEDICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY TESTED. WE BELIEVE THAT NEITHER COUNTRY'S MEDICAL LOGISTIC CAPABILI- TY COULD MANAGE A LARGE NUMBER OF CHEMICAL CASUALTIES OVER A SUSTAINED PERIOD. THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN MAINLY FROM MUSTARD AGENTS IN BOTH LIQUID AND DUSTY FORMS. THE LATTER TYPE IS FINELY GROUND (0.1 TO 10.0 MICRONS) SILICA IMPREGNATED WITH MUSTARD AGENT. THE TWO FORMS DIFFER WITH RESPECT TO THE NATURE OF SKIN INJURY, THE INTENSITY OF LUNG INJURIES, AND THE LATENT PERIOD WITH THE DUSTY FORM BEING MORE EFFECTIVE. THE LATENT PERIOD CAN BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT AFFECTS THE TIME A SOLDIER CAN CONTINUE TO FIGHT BEFORE THE EFFECT OF THE AGENT BECOMES DEBILITATING. DUSTY MUSTARD CAN AFFECT SOLDIERS WITHIN AS FEW AS 15 MINUTES, WHILE THE LIQUID OR VAPOR MUSTARD MAY NOT HAVE AN EFFECT FOR FOUR TO SIX HOURS. 1.5(C) 72566:72566First Page |Prev Page |Next Page |Src Image
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
