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070296_cia_70086_70086_01.txt
Subject: IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR,
1990-91
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR,
1990-91
IN
ADDITION TO LAUNCHING SCUD MISSILES, IRAQ TRIED TO PROVOKE COALITION GROUND
OPERATIONS BY SETTING KUWAITI OIL WELLS ON FIRE AND BY CREATING A LARGE OIL
SLICK IN THE PERSIAN GULF THAT THREATENED SAUDI WATER DESALINATION FACILI-
TIES.
IRAQ'S POLITICAL STRATEGY. TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEIVED
INTERNAL WEAKNESSES AND DIVISIONS IN THE COALITION,
BAGHDAD CONCENTRATED ITS DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA
EFFORTS ON SEVERAL THEMES. IRAQ DECRIED THE COALITION
EFFORT AS AN ISRAELI-INSPIRED PLOT TO DESTROY THE LARGEST
AND MOST POWERFUL ARAB ARMED FORCES AND THREATENED
TO STRIKE ISRAEL. BELIEVING ARAB MEMBERS OF THE
COALITION WOULD FIND HOSTILITIES WITH BAGHDAD UNPAL-
ATABLE WHILE IRAQ WAS FIGHTING ISRAEL. BAGHDAD ALSO
HIGHLIGHTED THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE OIL-RICH GULF
STATES THAT HAD JOINED THE COALITION AND THE POOR ARAB
STATES THAT SUPPORTED SADDAM, PORTRAYING THE CONFLICT
AS A STRUGGLE BETWEEN "GREEDY " OIL SHAYKHS AND
IMPOVERISHED ARAB MASSES. IRAQ THREATENED TO ATTACK
THE SAUDI OILFIELDS, TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AGAINST COALITION FORCES AND ISRAEL, TO CONDUCT SABO-
TAGE AND TERRORIST ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND
TO DESTROY KUWAIT AND ITS OIL INDUSTRY IN THE "MOTHER
OF ALL BATTLES" TO DRIVE HOME IRAQI DETERMINATION TO
HOLD KUWAIT AND TO TERRIFY WESTERN AND ARAB PUBLICS.
FINALLY, SADDAM USED THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO
NEGOTIATE A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT TO BUY TIME AND
DIVIDE THE COALITION, HOPING THAT, AS LONG AS HE HELD OUT
THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE COALITION WOULD NOT BE
ABLE TO AGREE TO FORCIBLY EVICT IRAQ FROM KUWAIT.
THE "SADDAM LINE"
 IRAQI FORCES BUILT          FORTIFI-
CATIONS ALONG THE SAUDI BORDER
CALLED THE "SADDAM
LINE" BY US TROOPS, THESE DEFENSES,
CONSISTED
OF OBSTACLES
FLAME TRENCHES. THE FLAME
TRENCHES WERE LONG DITCHES FILLED WITH OIL THAT THE
IRAQIS INTENDED TO IGNITE TO HINDER A COALITION ASSAULT,
READYING THE STRATEGIC FORCES
AT LEAST INITIALLY, BAGHDAD PROBABLY BELIEVED ITS UN-
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY COULD HAVE A SIMILARLY STRONG
IMPACT IN A WAR WITH THE COALITION FOR KUWAIT AS IT HAD
IN THE WAR WITH IRAN. CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PLAYED A KEY ROLE
IN IRAQ'S OFFENSIVES IN 1988. IRAQI ATTACKS ON
IRANIAN CITIES WITH          MISSILES
-TERRIFIED IRANIAN CITIZENS
ALREADY WEARY OF THE LONG, COSTLY WAR. IRAQ PROBABLY
ASSESSED THAT BOTH WEAPONS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO TEH-
RAN'S DECISION TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE. AS A RESULT,
BAGHDAD CAME TO LOOK ON ITS UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES AS
IMPORTANT INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY AND ROUTINE COMPO-
NENTS OF ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS
IRAQ'S UNCONVENTIONAL ARSENAL
BEFORE THE GULF WAR, IRAQ POSSESSED AN IMPRESSIVE
ARRAY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND EXTENSIVE COM-
BAT EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND
BALLISTIC MISSILES. 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN 1990, IRAQ HAD THE LARGEST
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND
COULD PRODUCE          THE
BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENTS SARIN AND
GF. THE IRAQIS HAD EMPLOYED THESE AGENTS AGAINST
IRAN IN ARTILLERY SHELLS, ROCKETS, AERIAL BOMBS, AND
OTHER MUNITIONS. IRAQ ALSO PRODUCED BINARY CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS AND WARHEADS FOR ITS SCUD MISSILES
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. BAGHDAD HAD ONE OF THE MOST
AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
IN THE WORLD AND PROBABLY COULD FIELD AN OPERATIONS
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. WE BELIEVE IRAQ HAD
THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE LARGE QUANTITIES OF BOTULI-
NUM TOXIN, CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS, AND ANTHRAX
IRAQ PROBABLV FILLED SOME MUNITIONS WITH
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
BALLISTIC MISSILES. BEFORE THE GULF WAR, IRAQ HAD A
LARGE FORCE OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES CONSISTING
MAINLY OF DOMESTICALLY MODIFIED VARIANTS OF THE
SOVIET SCUD.
CHEMICAL WARFARE. IRAQI
PREPARATIONS TO FIGHT IN A CHEMICAL WARFARE
ENVIRONMENT:
ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
WERE TRANSPORTED
-TO          SOUTHERN IRAQ.
ACTIVITY
AT          BUNKERS
SUSPECTED OF STORING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION SITES IN THE
KUWAIT THEATER
IN OUR JUDGMENT, SADDAM READIED HIS FORCES TO USE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ONLY TO REVERSE HIMSELF LATE IN THE
FALL. IRAQI ACTIVITY BETWEEN THE INVASION OF KUWAIT AND
THE BEGINNING OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND TRACES
OF CHEMICAL AGENT DISCOVERED BY COALITION MILITARY
PERSONNEL AFTER THE WAR INDICATE IRAQ INITIALLY MOVED
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS TO THE KUWAIT THEATER AFTER THE
INVASION. REPORTING          INDI-
CATES THESE STOCKS PROBABLY WERE MAINTAINED IN SPECIAL
AMMUNITION BUNKERS. UNDER IRAQI DOCTRINE BAGHDAD
WOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS TO COMBAT
UNITS UNTIL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE BATTLE. THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS APPARENTLY WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE THEATER
LATE IN THE FALL.
WE NOW BELIEVE SADDAM DECIDED TO WITHDRAW HIS
CHEMICAL ORDNANCE FROM THE KUWAIT THEATER BECAUSE
HE CONCLUDED THE POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF CHEMICAL WAR-
FARE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHERS.
WE BELIEVE SADDAM DECIDED THE ADVANTAGE HIS
FORCES WOULD ACCRUE FROM CHEMICAL WARFARE WAS NOT
WORTH THE GAMBLE OF THE UNITED STATES OR UNITED
KINGDOM RETALIATING WITH ATTACKS BAGHDAD COULD NEI-
THER MATCH NOR ABSORB. SIMILAR CONSIDERATE PROBA-
BLY INFLUENCED SADDAM'S DECISION NOT TO USE
CHEMICAL-FILLED SCUD MISSILES
AGAINST ISRAEL.
THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN PLAN
ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE US AIR FORCE,
THE PLAN FOR THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN ENVISIONED
FOUR DISTINCT PHASES. DURING THE INITIAL PHASE, COALI-
TION AIRFORCES WOULD CONCENTRATE ON GAINING AIR
SUPERIORITY OVER IRAQ AND DESTROYING IRAQS STRATEGIC
CAPABILITY, INCLUDING ITS MISSILE, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,
AND CHEMICAL WARFARE FACITILIES. PHASE TWO WOULD
SHIFT THE BRUNT OF AIR OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESSING IRAQI
AIR DEFENSES PROTECTING THE KUWAIT THEATER. DURING
PHASE THREE, TARGETS IN IRAQ WOULD CONTINUE TO BE
STRUCK AND AIR DEFENSES ATTACKED AS NEEDED, BUT THE
FOCUS WOULD INCREASINGLY BE ON ATTACKING IRAQI GROUND
FORCES IN THE KUWAIT THEATER TO SOFTEN THEM  UP FOR THE
GROUND OFFENSIVE THAT WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY INTENSIVE
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION IN PHASE
FOUR.
THE SCUD CAMPAIGN PROVED TO BE A DISAPPOINTMENT
IRAQ BECAUSE IT SUCCEEDED ONLY IN DIVERTING COALITION
SORTIES FROM MORE LUCRATIVE TARGETS. OF GREATEST IMPOR-
TANCE, THE SCUD ATTACKS FAILED TO BRING ISRAEL INTO THE
CONFLICT. DESPITE THE TERROR CREATED BY THE SCUDS, THEIR
LIMITED PAYLOAD AND POOR ACCURACY CAUSED ONLY SLIGHT
DAMAGE.
CREATING AN ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE. IRAQ'S FIRST EF-
FORTS TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF THE WAR WERE TO PUT
KUWAIT'S OIL PRODUCTION AND SAUDI WATER DESALINATIO
AT RISK. ON 22 JANUARY, IRAQ IGNITED THE FIRST KUWAITI
OIL WELLS. INITIALLY, ONLY A SMALL NUMBER WERE SET
ABLAZE. IRAQ HELD BACK UNTIL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE COALITION GROUND OFFENSIVE TO
IGNITE THE REST. THREE DAYS LATER IRAQ BEGAN PUMPING
KUWAITI OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF, CREATING AN OIL SLICK
THAT COVERED THOUSANDS OF SQUARE MILES. IRAQ CONTIN-
UED TO DUMP OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF UNTIL 27 JANUARY
WHEN COALITION STRIKE AIRCRAFT INTERRUPTED THE FLOW BY
DESTROYING THE MAIN MIXING MANIFOLD OF THE KUWAITI
OIL SYSTEMS
WE BELIEVE IRAQ'S INTENTION IN BOTH CASES WAS TO GOAD
THE COALITION TO ACCELERATE THE TIMETABLE FOR THE
GROUND WAR. SADDAM PROBABLY BELIEVED THESE MOVES
WOULD PUT SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE COALI-
TION LEADERSHIP TO TRY TO RETAKE KUWAIT IMMEDIATELY TO
PREVENT FURTHER DESTRUCTION OF THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS
AND TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT TO THE SAUDI DESALINATION
SYSTEM. BOTH ACTIONS WERE PROBABLY IMPROVISED IN
RESPONSE TO THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE WAR.
DESTRUCTION OF THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS
SADDAM'S PRINCIPAL
MOTIVE IN DESTROYING THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS WAS TO
ENSURE THAT THE COALITION RECAPTURED NOTHING OF VALUE
IN KUWAIT. IN ADDITION TO THIS SCORCHED EARTH POLICY,
IRAQ'S GENERALS SAW TACTICAL VALUE IN IGNITING THE OIL
WELLS AS PART OF THEIR RESPONSE TO A COALITION GROUND
OFFENSIVE. THEY HOPED THAT THE SMOKE WOULD INHIBIT
THE OPERATION OF COALITION AIRFORCES AND THAT THE
BURNING WELLS WOULD SERVE AS OBSTACLES TO THE MOVE-
MENT OF COALITION GROUNDFORCES. AFTER IGNITING A SMALL
NUMBER OF KUWAITI OIL WELLS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE
START OF THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN, IRAQ REFRAINED
FROM FURTHER DESTRUCTION AND WAITED FOR THE GROUND
WAR
IRAQ BEGAN IGNITING
ADDITIONAL KUWAITI OIL WELLS IN MID-FEBRUARY. WE
BELIEVE THIS MOVE WAS ANOTHER EFFORT TO TRY TO MITIGATE
THE IMPACT OF THE AIR WAR. BAGHDAD PROBABLY HOPED
THE SMOKE OF THE FIRES WOULD CONCEAL MUCH OF KUWAIT
AND HINDER COALITION AIRSTRIKES AGAINST IRAQI FORCES
THERE          IRAQ EMPLOYED
SIMILAR METHODS AT STRATEGIC FACILITIES IN CENTRAL IRAQ,
SMOKE GENERATORS NEAR INSTALLATIONS TO PRE-
VENT A PILOT FROM SEEING-AND THEREFORE TARGETING-
THE SITE
BAGHDAD RADIO BROADCAST THAT
THE "MOTHER OF ALL BATTLES" HAD BEGUN. IN RESPONSE,
IRAQI FORCES IN THE KUWAIT THEATER DILIGENTLY
SET ABOUT BLOWING UP KUWAITI
OILFIELDS. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OILFIELDS WAS  ACCOM-
PLISHED WITH ASTONISHING EFFICIENCY-OVER 85 PERCENT
OF KUWAIT'S WELLS WERE DAMAGED. NEVERTHELESS, IT
PROVED OF LITTLE MILITARY VALUE, COALITION AIRCRAFT
CONTINUED TO OPERATE THROUGHOUT THE THEATER, AND THE
BURNING OIL WELLS DID NOT HAMPER THE ADVANCE OF
COALITION GROUND FORCES.
9 AUGUST      AN IRAQI ENVOY          ANNOUNCES IRAQ WILL USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IF
 ATTACKED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ISRAEL.
JANUARY     IRAQ BEGINS TO DESTROY OIL WELLS IN KUWAIT.
JANUARY     IRAQ BEGINS DUMPING KUWAITI OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF,
1.5(C)
70086:70086
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