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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

062596_cia_73885_73885_01.txt
Subject: STATUS OF IRAQ'S WMD FACILITIES
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
THE STATUS OF IRAQ'S FACILITIES
TO PRODUCE WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: A PRELIMINARY
POSTWAR ASSESSMENT
A REFERENCE AID
CONTENTS
SUMMARY   iii
SCOPE NOTE  vii
INTRODUCTION  1
IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY  1
IRAQ  BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY  17
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM  27
SCOPE NOTE
THIS REFERENCE AID SHOWS THE STATUS OF IRAQ'S OVERALL INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY
TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
SYSTEMS.
IRAQ'S ROAD TO RECONSTRUCTION OF SUCH MILITARY PROGRAMS
WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN WITH THE FORMIDABLE TASK OF RECONSTRUCTING A SUBSTAN-
TIAL PORTION OF ITS OWN CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE (SUCH AS ELECTRIC POWER, OIL
PRODUCTION, AND TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS). THIS PAPER WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED
BY OTHER, MORE COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSES THAT WILL ASSESS LONG-TERM PROSPECTS
FOR IRAQ'S NUCLEAR, CW/BW,          PROGRAMS.
THE STATUS OF IRAQS FACILITIES
TO PRODUCE WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: A PRELIMINARY
POSTWAR ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
MOST OF IRAQ'S PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR WEAPONS
MASS DESTRUCTION AND MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED
FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO EQUIP THESE FACILITIES WERE
DAMAGED EXTENSIVELY BY COALITION AIRSTRIKE,
DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF PRODUCTION AT
EACH FACILITY, HOWEVER, THE SAME AMOUNT OF EXTERNAL
DAMAGE MIGHT CAUSE VASTLY DIFFERENT DEGREES OF DAM-
AGE TO OVERALL PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES.
IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WAREFARE CAPABILITY
COALITION AIRSTRIKES HAVE SEVERELY REDUCED IRAQ'S ABILI-
TY TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) AGENTS, AND ITS
EFFORTS TO BECOME TOTALLY INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN SUP-
PLIERS FOR ITS CW PROGRAM HAVE BE DELAYED INDEFI-
NITELY,
THE CW AGENT PRODUCTION BUILD-
INGS AT THE SAMARRA' SITE HAVE BEEN DAMAGED OR
DESTROYED.
THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS FILLING AREA AT SAMMARRA' HAS ALSO
BEEN DESTROYED:
SEVERAL POSSIBLE CW STORAGE BUNKERS HAVE BEEN HEAVI-
LY DAMAGED.
WE ARE NONETHELESS
CONFIDENT THAT IRAQ STILL HAS A VIABLE CW AGENT
STOCKPILE.
IN ADDITION, THERE IS A CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE US
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON THE CURRENT SHELF LIFE OF
IRAQ'S NERVE AGENT STOCKPILE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE
IRAQIS HAD ONLY A TEMPORARY PROBLEM WITH THE STABILITY
(THAT IS, LONG-TERM STORAGE) OF THEIR NERVE-AGENT-FILLED
WEAPONS
IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY
FACILITIES BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH
THE PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) AGENTS WERE
DAMAGED BY AIRSTRIKES. SOME BW RESEARCH AND DEVEL-
OPMENT ACTIVITIES TOOK PLACE AT ONE OF THESE FACILITIES,
COALITION AIRSTRIKES UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE DAMAGED IRAQ'S
BW INFRASTRUCTURE.
THE IRAQIS COULD
PRODUCE THESE AGENTS AT OTHER FACILITIES. IN PARTICULAR,
THE SAMARRA' DRUG INDUSTRIES PLANT,
MOREOVER, IRAQ'S R&D CAPABILITY REMAINS
LARGELY INTACT.
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ'S SHORT-TERM OPTION 1 FOR A NUCLE-
 AR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY DAMAGED,
BUT NOT COMPLETELY ELIMINATED. THE SHORT-TERM OPTION
CANNOT BE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED BECAUSE TWO REMAIN-
ING FACILITIES AT THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR RESEARCH CEN-
TER ARE POTENTIALLY CAPABLE OF RECOVERING HIGHLY EN-
RICHED URANIUM FROM RESEARCH REACTOR FUELS.
IRAQ'S SAFEGUARDED HIGHLY ENRICHED RE-
SEARCH REACTOR FUELS PROBABLY WERE IN THE TWO REACTORS
THAT WERE EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED AT THE TIME OF THE
INITIAL RAIDS.
THE PRECISE EFFECTS OF AIRSTRIKES ON IRAQ'S LONG-TERM
WEAPONS PROGRAM ARE UNKNOWN
DAMAGE
TO IRAQ'S TUWAITHA NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER AND
OTHER NUCLCAR-ASSOCIATED FACILITIES PROBABLY HAS SET
BACK IRAQ'S LONG-TERM NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM BY
SEVERAL YEARS. THIS SETBACK HAS PROBABLY BEEN LENGTH-
ENED BY DAMAGE INFLICTED TO IRAQ'S SCIENTIFIC AND
INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE, INCLUDING ANY LOSS OF KEY
IRAQI SCIENTISTS.
1 IN THE SHORT TERM, IRAQ MIGHT DIVERT HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
REACTOR FUELS (MONITORED UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS) FROM CIVILIAN
PROGRAMS TO A CRASH EFFORT TO DEVELOP ONE OR TWO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES. IRAQ'S LONG-TERM PROGRAM RELIES ON DEVELOPING THE INFRA-
STRUCTURE TO PRODUCE FISSILE MATERIALS.
1.5(C)
73885:73885
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