Subject: CW USE IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. COUNTRY: IRAQ/IRAN SUBJ: IRAQI STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR DOI: 1986-1988 DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IRAQI FORCES APPEARED TO HAVE NO SOPHISTICATED STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THE IRAQIS DID EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS UNDER TWO TYPES OF CIRCUMSTANCES: TO REPEL IRANIAN FORCES AFTER IRGC UNITS HAD MADE IMPORTANT ADVANCES AGAINST IRAQI FORCES OR INTO IRAQI TERRITORY, AND TO PREPARE AN AREA FOR AN IRAQI OFFENSIVE. BY THE END OF THE WAR, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREQUENTLY, AND IRAQ'S USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS LIMITED ONLY BY WIND AND WEATHER CONDITIONS AND THE ABILITY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL MUNITIONS ON TARGET. 2. AFTER IRAN HAD CAPTURED TERRAIN OR APPEARED TO BE MAKING AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE IRAQ WOULD SATURATE THE AREA WITH CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. THIS WAS DONE WITH LITTLE APPARENT REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF IRAQ'S OWN TROOPS WHO WERE IN OR NEAR THE CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA. FOLLOWING A CHEMICAL ATTACK, IRAQ NORMALLY INITIATED IMMEDIATE CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO RETAKE CAPTURED AREAS. 3. SIMILARLY, IRAQI OFFENSIVES WERE FREQUENTLY PRECEDED BY AN IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACK IN THE AREA TO BE ASSAULTED BY IRAQI FORCES. THE PURPOSE, WOULD BE TO "SOFTEN" THE AREA FOR A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WHICH WOULD FOLLOW SHORTLY AFTER THE INITIAL CHEMICAL PREPARATION. FOLLOWING THE CHEMICAL ATTACK, IRAQI FORCES WOULD WAIT FOR FAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS AND FOR THE EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS TO DIMINISH BEFORE MOVING INTO A CHEMICAL CONTAMINATED AREA. USUALLY A PERIOD OF BETWEEN 30 MINUTES AND ONE HOUR WAS NEEDED BEFORE A CHEMICAL CONTAMINATED AREA BECAME SAFE FOR IRAQI FORCES TO ENTER. IRAQI FORCES WERE WELL EQUIPPED WITH BOTH PROTECTIVE MASKS AND CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE OVERGARMENTS. TO TAKE NOTHING AWAY FROM THE RUTHLESSNESS OF THE IRAQIS, IRAQ'S RELATIVE DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF ITS OWN TROOPS IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS MAY HAVE BEEN PARTLY BASED ON IRAQ'S ASSUMPTION THAT ITS OWN UNITS WOULD BE ABLE TO DON PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD PROTECT THEM FROM THE EFFECTS OF TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS. REGARDLESS OF IRAQ'S RATIONALE, LARGE NUMBERS OF IRAQ'S OWN TROOPS WERE KILLED OR INJURED DURING IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACKS. 4. THE PRINCIPAL LIMITATIONS TO IRAQ'S USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN A GIVEN BATTLEFIELD SITUATION WERE UNFAVORABLE WIND AND WEATHER CONDITIONS AND IRAQ'S ABILITY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL MUNITIONS ON TARGET. IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING ALL SEASONS OF THE YEAR. THE ONLY WEATHER CONDITION WHICH PREVENTED IRAQ FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS RAIN WHICH DISSIPATED THE EFFECT OF THE CHEMICAL AGENTS, BUT WAS UNUSUAL IN THE ARID REGION WHERE MUCH OF THE WAR WAS FOUGHT. IF IRAQI VILLAGES OR FORCES LAY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE WIND AND COULD BE EFFECTED BY AN IRAQI ATTACK ON A NEARBY AREA, IRAQI FORCES WOULD WAIT FOR THE WIND TO DIMINISH OR CHANGE DIRECTION BEFORE LAUNCHING A CHEMICAL ATTACK. 5. IRAQ USED MORTARS, ARTILLERY, HELICOPTERS AND FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT TO DELIVER CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. ONE LIMITATION ON IRAQ'S USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS THE DISTANCE OF ATTACKING IRAQI FORCES FROM AREAS TO BE ATTACKED AND WHETHER THOSE UNITS POSSESSED THE EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF IRANIAN FORCES WERE OUT OF MORTAR RANGE AND ARTILLERY WAS UNAVAILABLE, IRAQI FORCES WERE UNABLE TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. 6. WHEN IRAQ FIRST BEGAN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS CIRCA 1985-1986, THEIR USE WAS UNUSUAL AND SPORADIC. GRADUALLY, CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE USED MORE OFTEN AND BY THE END OF THE WAR CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE USED COMMONLY. DURING THE LATTER STAGES OF THE WAR, IRAQ APPARENTLY USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHENEVER IT WAS CONSIDERED TACTICALLY APPROPRIATE IRAQ WAS NOT AT ALL CONSTRAINED IN ITS USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND THE FACT THAT THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL NORMS WAS NOT A FACTOR IN IRAQ'S BATTLEFIELD DECISION MAKING PROCESS TO EMPLOY THEM. END OF MESSAGE 1.5 (c) 63704:63704First Page |Prev Page |Next Page |Src Image
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