Subject: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF FEBRUARY 1991. CONTENTS 5. IRAQ: SADDAM AND OPTIONS FOR SURPRISE A SCUD MOBILE ERECTOR-LAUNCHER. AND SEVERAL OTHER PIECES OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IN A SMALL MILITARY INSTALLATION OF AL QURNAH COMMENT: THIS INSTALLATION PROBABLY SERVES AS A SUPPORT BASE FOR SCUD UNITS OPERATING IN THE AL QURNAH AREA. ALL SCUDS LAUNCHED FROM THIS AREA DURING THE CONFLICT HAVE BEEN TARGETED AT DHAHRAN. DAMAGE TO BW PLANT A MAJOR PORTION OF A VACCINE PLANT IN ABU GHURAYB, WEST OF BAGHDAD, HAS BEEN DESTROYED. THE IRAQIS PROBABLY HAVE USED THIS VACCINE PLANT TO PRODUCE THE BW AGENT BOTULINUM TOXIN. 5. IRAQ: SADDAM AND OPTIONS FOR SUPRISE THE IRAQI PRESS CLAIMS SADDAM STILL HAS SIGNIFICANT SURPRISES IN STORE: THE FOLLOWING SUGGEST WHAT HE MIGHT DO. SADDAM COULD TRY TO BRING TEL AVIV INTO THE CONFLICT BY USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE MAY BE RELUCTANT TO USE THEM. IN PART OUT OF FEAR OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION. AND PROBABLY STILL HOPES A FEW MORE ATTACKS WITH CONVENTIONALLY ARMED SCUDS WILL ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVE. SADDAM COULD ALSO TRY VIOLATING ISRAEL'S LONGSTANDING TRIPWIRE BY MOVING AIR OR GROUND FORCES INTO JORDAN OR TRY MOVING A SCUD LAUNCHER INTO JORDAN . SADDAM ALMOST CERTAINLY ALSO HOPES TO BRING IRAN INTO THE CONFLICT AGAINST THE COALITION. ISRAELI INTERVENTION IS THE EVENT MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THAT END. BUT TO ENSURE SUCCESS HE MIGHT DAMAGE SHIA MUSLIM HOLY SITES AND BLAME COALITION AIR RAIDS. TO RAISE THE COST OF THE WAR TO COALITION MEMBERS IMMEDIATELY, IRAQ MIGHT TRY TO EXPAND THE GROUND WAR WITH LARGER ATTACKS. POSSIBLY MULTIDIVISIONAL IN SIZE. OR USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST RIYADH OR DHAHRAN IN THE HOPE OF CAUSING PANIC IN SAUDI CITIES. HE ALSO MIGHT INTENSIFY THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AGAINST US AND COALITION ASSETS. OR TRY TO ASSASSINATE COALITION LEADERS, OR ATTACK TURKEY FOR ITS SUPPORT TO THE COALITION. SADDAM ALMOST CERTAINLY VALUES THE SURVIVAL OF HIS REGIME ABOVE ALL: HE HAS NOT YET SEEN IT IN JEOPARDY. BUT IF HE DOES HE MIGHT REQUEST A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE. HE COULD CLAIM HIS WEEKS OF RES ISTANCE AS A VICTORY FOR ALL ARABS AND THEN TRY TO PROLONG WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS. ALTERNATIVELY, HE MIGHT ANNOUNCE OR CONDUCT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. LEAVING THIRD-RATE UNITS TO CONTINUE A GROUND CAMPAIGN FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THE IRAOI PRESIDENT APPEARS LEAST LIKELY TO MAKE A SURPRISE MOVE IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA. HE PROBABLY WILL NOT AGREE TO A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT UNLESS HE SUFFERS A CATASTROPHIC MILITARY LOSS. BAGHDAD ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL CONTINUE TO USE ITS REMAINING DIPLOMATIC. BA'TH PARTY, AND OTHER PROPAGANDA ASSETS TO ARGUE THAT COALITION FORLES ARE ATTACKING SHIA MUSLIM HOLY SITES, KILLING CIVILIANS, AND TRYING TO DESTROY IRAQ. SADDAM WILL SEEK TO DRAW THE COALITION INTO A GROUND WAR AND ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL CONTINUE TRYINC TO BRING IRAN AND ISRAEL INTO THE CONFLICT. HE PROBABLY WILL VIEW THE WAR IN TERMS MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY. HOWEVER, INSPIRED BY ANWAR EL SADAT. WHO POLITICALLY "WON" THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR DESPITE MILITARY DEFEAT. IRAQ: REMOTE OPTIONS ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY, SADDAM HUSAYN COULD PURSUE OPTIONS THAT WOULD HAVE A TREMENDOUS IMPACT IF SUCCESSFUL. RUMORS ABOUND THAT HE MAY HAVE SUCH DRAMATIC WEAPONS AS LARGE FUEL-AIR EXPLOSIVES, STOCKS OF AMMONIUM NITRATE EXPLOSIVES. A FUNCTIONING SUPERGUN, OR SS-12 MISSILES. MEASURES WITHIN HIS CAPABILITIES INCLUDE: --DEMONSTRATING NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS. SADDAM HAS THREATENED TO USE HIS ENTIRE ARSENAL AGAINST THE COALITION TO HIGHLIGHT THE COSTS OF A WAR. HE HAS CLAIMED HIS MISSILES CAN CARRY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HE MAY TRY TO DEMONSTRATE STRATEGIC WEAPONS, SUCH AS BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, TO CREATE A LARGE EXPLOSION AND CLAIM IT WAS NUCLEAR. OR TO SAY HE HAS USED THE FISSILE MATERIAL FROM TUWAITHA FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPON. --FIRING MISSILES HE MIGHT HAVE POSITIONED IN SUDAN, MAURITANIA, OR YEMEN AT COALITION MEMBERS. --BLOCKING OR MINING A MARITIME CHOKEPOINT SUCH AS THE SUEZ 1.5(c) 68157:68157First Page |Prev Page |Next Page |Src Image
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