061896_cia_62758_62758_01.txt

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Subject: IRAQI CW AND BW
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
SEP 90
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
KEY JUDGEMENTS
IRAQ HAS SUBSTANTIAL CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES THAT, AS
DEMONSTATED IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, IT IS PREPARED TO USE. IRAQ ALSO
HAS SOME BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BUT HAS NEVER USED THEM IN COMBAT.
IN COMBAT WITH US AND ALLIED FORCES
CHEMICAL WEAPONS:
X--THE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IRAQI FORCES GAINED IN USING
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN WOULD BE APPLIED AGAINST US AND ALLIED
FORCES.
X--IRAQ'S FORCES WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO USE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN ANY DEFENSIVE SITUATION IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT WHERE THEY WERE
BEING PUSHED BACK BY AN ALLIED OFFENSIVE.
X--THEY WOULD BE HIGHLY LIKELY TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTO SAUDI ARABIA.
X--ONCE THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEGUN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AGAINST ALLIED FORCES, WE ANTICIPATE THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO USE
THEIR ENTIRE CHEMICAL ARSENAL, INCLUDING MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL
WARHEADS.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:
X--BECAUSE IRAQ HAS NEVER USED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WE HAVE
LITTLE TO GO ON REGARDING HOW OR WHETHER SADDAM WOULD USE THESE
WEAPONS AGAINST US AND ALLIED FORCES. HE PROBABLY CONSIDERS THEM TO
BE WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT, PERCEIVING A GREATER RISK OF
RETALIATION.
X--ALTHOUGH MORE TOXIC THAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS, BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS HAVE LESS UTILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD BECAUSE THEIR EFFECTS
DO NOT MATERIALIZE FOR DAYS. THUS, WE JUDGE IRAQ WOULD BE UNLIKELY
TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGAINST US OR ALLIED FORCES ON THE
BATTLEFIELD.
IN THE CURRENT, NONCOMBAT SITUATION:
X--THE IRAQIS ARE NOT LIKELY TO USE EITHER CHEMICAL OR
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OVERTLY.
X--IF THE TRADE EMBARGO BEGINS TO CAUSE MAJOR DISRUPTIONS,
HOWEVER, SADDAM CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE MORE OR LESS EXPLICIT
THREATS TO USE CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TO RETALIATE AGAINST
THOSE RESPONSIBLE.
X--IF IRAQ'S CONDITION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE, THE
POSSIBILITY THAT SADDAM WOULD ORDER COVERT CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL
WEAPON ATTACKS AGAINST US OR OTHER ALLIED TARGETS WOULD INCREASE.
X--SPECIAL FORCES OR OTHER AGENTS COULD COVERTLY DELIVER
CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TO SELECTED TARGETS IN ALMOST ANY
COUNTRY.
LIKELIHOOD OF WARNING
SADDAM
HUSAYN, WHO PERSONALLY CONTROLS THE RELEASE OF BOTH KINDS OF
WEAPONS, WOULD USE SECURE MEANS TO ORDER THEIR USE.
THIS INFORMATION IS
DISCUSSION
AFTER NEARLY TWO DECADES OF WORK, IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED THE MOST
EXTENSIVE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CW AND BW) PROGRAMS IN
THE THIRD WORLD
IRAQ USED TACTICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS EXTENSIVELY IN ITS WAR WITH
IRAN. BEGINNING WITH SMALL-SCALE AND RATHER INEFFECTUAL EFFORTS, BY
THE END OF THE WAR IRAQ HAD DEVELOPED A LARGE, ROBUST, AND
SOPHISTICATED CW CAPABILITY THAT WAS FULLY INTEGRATED INTO ITS
MILITARY SYSTEM. IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT IF NOT
DECISIVE ROLE IN THE CLIMACTIC BATTLES IN THE SPRING OF 1988 THAT
FINALLY FORCED IRAN TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE. REPORTEDLY, THE IRAQI
HIGH COMMAND HAD COME TO CONSIDER CHEMICAL AGENTS AS AMONG ITS MOST
EFFECTIVE WEAPONS AGAINST IRANIAN GROUND ATTACKS.
IRAQ ALSO HAS AN AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM. BUT AS FAR AS WE KNOW THE IRAQIS DID NOT USE BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS IN THE WAR WITH IRAN. SINCE THE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS IN IRAQ'S
INVENTORY DO NOT IMMEDIATELY INCAPACITATE THE VICTIM, THEY ARE MORE
SUITABLE FOR STRATEGIC USE THAN FOR TACTICAL, BATTLEFIELD USE.
IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED AND COMBAT TESTED A WIDE VARIETY OF TACTICAL
CHEMICAL WEAPON DELIVERY MEANS, CHIEFLY ARTILLERY SHELLS, ROCKETS,
AND BOMBS                 IRAQ HAS ALSO PRODUCED SOME BALLISTIC
MISSILE WARHEADS WITH CHEMICAL AND POSSIBLY BIOLOGICAL AGENT FILLS,
BUT THESE STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED IN COMBAT.
IRAQ BEGAN DEVELOPING CW AND BW CAPABILITIES AND BALLISTIC
MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS TO DETER ANY ATTACK BY ISRAEL,
BUT THE WAR WITH IRAN TAUGHT SADDAM HUSAYN THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AT
LEAST, ARE TOO USEFUL TO RESERVE FOR DETERRENCE ONLY.
SADDAM NOW VIEWS THEM AS A VALUABLE COMPLEMENT TO HIS LARGE
CONVENTIONAL ARSENAL.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
WHILE IRAQ FIRST COVETED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE LATE 1960S,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) BEGAN IN EARNEST IN 1972.
BY THE END OF THE WAR,
WHICH IRAQ'S INCREASINGLY HEAVY USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS HELPED TO
BRING ABOUT, THE IRAQIS HAD ESTABLISHED A SIZABLE AND SOPHISTICATED
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR R&D, PRODUCTION, TESTING, AND STORAGE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS
THE 1988 CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN DID NOT DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE
OF IRAQ'S CW PROGRAM, BUT IT DID SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE PROGRAM'S
FOCUS. THE DEMANDS OF THE WAR HAD NECESSITATED LARGE-SCALE
PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE, PRODUCTION
VIRTUALLY STOPPED. THEY WERE NOT NEEDED FOR ANY PROJECTED IMMEDIATE
USE, AND THE SHORT SHELF LIFE, PARTICULARLY OF SARIN, PREVENTED
STOCKPILING FOR FUTURE NEEDS. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER,
CONTINUED UNABATED.
TYPES OF AGENTS. DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IRAQ USED SEVERAL
THOUSAND TONS OF MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENT SARIN AGAINST IRAN
(MORE THAN TWICE AS MUCH MUSTARD AS SARIN). THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT
IRAQ ALSO USED LESSER AMOUNTS OF THE NERVE AGENTS TABUN AND GF, AS
WELL AS THE RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS. IN EARLY 1984, APPARENTLY ON AN
EXPERIMENTAL BASIS, IRAQ ALSO USED DUSTY MUSTARD--A FINE POWDER
IMPREGNATED WITH MUSTARD AGENT,
IRAQ CAN PRODUCE ANY OR ALL OF
THESE AGENTS--AND PROBABLY ALSO OTHER STANDARD AGENTS, SUCH AS
HYDROGEN CYANIDE AND PHOSGENE OXIME
IRAQ IS MAKING A HIGH-PRIORITY EFFORT TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE
ADDITIONAL CW AGENTS, INCLUDING AGENTS THAT INDUCE VOMITING, THE
NERVE AGENTS SOMAN AND VX--WHICH ARE BOTH MUCH MORE TOXIC AND
PERSISTENT THAN SARIN--AND CROWN ETHERS, WHICH ARE NOT ONLY TOXIC IN
THEMSELVES BUT ALSO CAN BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER AGENTS
PROBABLY, THEY HAVE ALREADY PRODUCED
AND WEAPONIZED SMALL QUANTITIES, OF VX. IN ADDITION TO LETHAL AGENTS,
THEY USED VOMITING AGENTS AGAINST REBELLIOUS KURDS IN 1988.
QUANTITIES OF AGENTS. ((AS A ROUGH ESTIMATE, UNDER OPTIMUM
CONDITIONS, l TON OF PERSISTENT NERVE AGENT WILL KILL ROUGHLY HALF
THE UNPROTECTED PERSONS IN AN OPEN AREA OF 2 OR 3 SQUARE KILMETERS.
IN THE SPRING OF 1990, THE IRAQIS RESUMED
PRODUCTION OF SARIN AND MUSTARD. THEY COULD HAVE PRODUCED ABOUT 300
TONS OF EACH BY THE TIME PRODUCTION REPORTEDLY STOPPED IN LATE JULY.
UPON RESUMPTION THE IRAQIS COULD ADD TO THIS INVENTORY AT THE RATE
OF 6 TO 1 0 TONS PER DAY. THE 600 TONS OF NEW AGENT PLUS PROBABLE
STOCKS OF LEFTOVER MUSTARD WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN IRAQI FORCES
FOR ABOUT A WEEK AT AN INTENSE COMBAT EXPENDITURE RATE SUCH AS THAT
EMPLOYED BY IRAQ DURING THE 30-HOUR BATTLE OF AL FAW IN APRIL 1988.
IT WOULD ALSO BE MORE THAN ENOUGH TO EQUIP HUNDREDS OF MISSILES WITH
CHEMICAL WARHEADS
IN AN EFFORT TO LENGTHEN THE SHELF LIFE OF ITS CHEMICAL AGENTS,
IRAQ HAS BEEN WORKING TO IMPROVE THE PURITY OF ITS PRECURSOR
CHEMICALS. IRAQ HAS PROBABLY ALSO PRODUCED BINARY MUNITIONS WHICH,
BECAUSE FINAL MIXING DOES NOT OCCUR UNTIL JUST BEFORE USE, WOULD
HAVE A LONGER STORAGE LIFE THAN UNITARY MUNITIONS AND BE SAFER TO
HANDLE, AS WELL. A DISADVANTAGE IS THAT BINARY MUNITIONS DELIVER
SOMEWHAT LESS AGENT THAN THE SAME SIZE UNITARY MUNITIONS
TACTICAL WEAPONIZATION.          IN ANTICIPATION OF
HOSTILITIES, IRAQ HAS WEAPONIZED MOST OF ITS CHEMICAL AGENT
STOCKPILE. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS WERE
GENERALLY WEAPONIZED AND USED SOON AFTER PRODUCTION
THE IRAQIS CAN DELIVER CHEMICAL AGENTS IN A VARIETY OF WAYS.
DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, THEY MADE EXTENSIVE USE OF 250-KILOGRAM
AERIAL BOMBS, 90-MILLIMETER (90-MM) AIR-TO-GROUND ROCKETS, AND
HELICOPTER-MOUNTED AERIAL SPRAY DEVICES. THEY ALSO HAD I- TO 3-
KILOGRAM CHEMICAL ROUNDS FOR 82-MM AND 120-MM MORTARS AND 122-MM,
130-MM, 152-MM, AND 155-MM HOWITZERS, AS WELL AS 8-KILOGRAM CHEMICAL
WARHEADS FOR 122-MM ROCKETS.
A VARIETY OF OTHER WEAPONS, INCLUDING FROG ROCKETS AND AIR-TO-
SURFACE MISSILES, COULD BE USED TO DELIVER CHEMICAL AGENTS,
NEVERTHELESS, IRAQ HAS THE TECHNOLOGY AND EXPERTISE TO PRODUCE
EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL AGENT PAYLOADS FOR THEM.
DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. IRAQ PRODUCES INDIGENOUSLY MOST OF THE
ITEMS REQUIRED FOR PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL AGENTS. IN FACT IT
EXPORTS PROTECTIVE MASKS, FILTERS, SUITS, BOOTS, AND GLOVES. THE
QUALITY OF SOME OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS POOR, HOWEVER, AND IRAQ IMPORTS
BETTER EQUIPMENT FROM FOREIGN SOURCES
IRAQI FORCES UNDERSTAND WELL THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CW PROTECTION,
IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO PROPERLY MAINTAIN PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT.
SINCE THE END OF THE WAR WITH IRAN, THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO TRAIN FOR
OPERATIONS IN A CW ENVIRONMENT
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, THOUGH GENERALLY SLOWER ACTING, ARE USUALLY
ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE MORE TOXIC THAN THE MOST TOXIC CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
THEREFORE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE
MOST EFFECTIVE WOULD DIFFER CONSIDERABLY FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
WOULD CALL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE
MORE USEFUL AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS, SUCH AS CITIES, THAN AGAINST
BATTLEFIELD TARGETS
IRAQ HAS NOT, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, EVER USED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF SUBSTANTIAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE
EFFORTS OF IRAQ TO ACQUIRE EQUIPMENT AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
ABROAD, WE BELIEVE IT HAS NOW DEVELOPED AND STOCKPILED BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS
TYPES OF AGENTS. SINCE 1989, IRAQ HAS BEEN PRODUCING TWO
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS: BOTULINUM TOXIN AND ANTHRAX. THE IRAQIS ARE
PROBABLY TRYING TO DEVELOP OTHER TOXINS AND LIVE AGENTS:
X--BOTULINUM IS A TOXIN THAT ATTACKS THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. A FEW
MILLIONTHS OF A GRAM IS A LETHAL DOSE. SYMPTOMS USUALLY DO NOT OCCUR
FOR AT LEAST 12 HOURS AFTER EXPOSURE, WITH DEATH OCCURRING PERHAPS
DAYS LATER. BOTULINUM TOXIN DEGRADES WITHIN HOURS IN SUNLIGHT.
X--ANTHRAX WOULD BE DISPERSED AS SPORES, WHICH CAUSE PULMONARY
FAILURE SOME DAYS AFTER INHALATION. ANTHRAX SPORES ARE HARDY AND CAN
REMAIN VIABLE IN THE SOIL FOR YEARS.
X--BOTH OF THESE SUBSTANCES OCCUR NATURALLY, ALTHOUGH ONLY
RARELY; THUS, ISOLATED DEATHS CAUSED BY BOTULINUM TOXIN OR ANTHRAX
SPORES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE IMMEDIATELY ATTRIBUTED TO A BW
ATTACK
THE BOTULINUM TOXIN IS PROBABLY BEING PRODUCED AT A VACCINE
PLANT          IN A
WESTERN SUBURB OF BAGHDAD. THE ANTHRAX IS PROBABLY BEING PRODUCED AT
A BW FACILITY AT SALMAN PAK OR TAJI. THE IRAQIS MAY BE USING THE
FERMENTERS          TO
PRODUCE THE ANTHRAX SPORES.
QUANTITIES OF AGENTS
IRAQ HAS THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE ENOUGH OF
EITHER EACH DAY TO LETHALLY CONTAMINATE HUNDREDS OF SQUARE
KILOMETERS OF TERRITORY. IN OTHER WORDS, IRAQ COULD EASILY AND
QUICKLY PRODUCE ENOUGH ANTHRAX SPORES AND BOTULINUM TOXIN TO SATISFY
ANY CONCEIVABLE DEMAND
BECAUSE OF THE MUCH GREATER TOXICITY OF BW AGENTS
COMPARED WITH CW AGENTS, ONLY SMALL AMOUNTS WOULD BE NEEDED TO
ACHIEVE ENORMOUS IMPACT
TACTICAL WEAPONIZATION. IRAQ HAS AVAILABLE A NUMBER OF TACTICAL
WEAPON SYSTEMS THAT COULD BE ADAPTED FOR USE WITH BIOLOGICAL AGENTS,
INCLUDING MOST OF THOSE ADAPTED FOR USE WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS.
SINCE IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS HAVE NEVER BEEN COMBAT TESTED,
THE IRAQIS MAY HARBOR SOME DOUBTS ABOUT HOW WELL THEY WILL WORK--
ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING HOW LONG IT TOOK THEM TO LEARN TO USE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS EFFECTIVELY. THIS MIGHT NOT PREVENT THEM FROM USING
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, HOWEVER. IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, IRAQ TESTED MANY
OF ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. MOREOVER, SOME OF THE
LESSONS THE IRAQIS LEARNED IN PERFECTING THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AS WELL
DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. VACCINES ARE AVAILABLE THAT PROVIDE
SUBSTANTIAL PROTECTION AGAINST BOTH BOTULINUM TOXIN AND ANTHRAX
SPORES
STRATEGIC WEAPONIZATION
AIRCRAFT. IRAQ HAS MIRAGE, BADGER, AND FENCER AIRCRAFT THAT
COULD ACCURATELY DELIVER CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL PAYLOADS OVER LONG
DISTANCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MIRAGE COULD DELIVER SEVERAL 250-
KILOGRAM BOMBS A FEW HUNDRED KILOMETERS. USE OF THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD
BE AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION AGAINST LIGHTLY DEFENDED TARGETS, BUT THE
IRAQIS WOULD ANTICIPATE A HIGH ATTRITION RATE AMONG AIRCRAFT
ATTACKING TARGETS DEFENDED BY US OR OTHER AIRCRAFT AND
GROUND AND SHIP-BASED ANTIAIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
BALLISTIC MISSILES. IRAQ'S PRIMARY STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE ITS
SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES. WE ESTIMATE IRAQ HAS ABOUT 700 SCUD-
TYPE MISSILES; IT COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLY MORE. SEVERAL HUNDRED OF
THESE--THE AL HUSAYN AND AL ABBAS MISSILES--ARE INDIGENOUSLY
MODIFIED SCUDS DESIGNED TO DELIVER LIGHTER WARHEADS TO TARGETS AT
GREATER DISTANCES THAN THE 300-KILOMETER LIMIT OF STANDARD SCUDS:
X--WE ARE CERTAIN THAT IRAQ HAS SOME CHEMICAL WARHEADS,
X--WE ALSO THINK IT LIKELY THAT IRAQ PLANS TO DEVELOP
BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS FOR THESE MISSILES, IF IT HAS NOT DONE SO
ALREADY
THE AL ABBAS, THE LONGEST RANGE MODIFIED SCUD, COULD DELIVER
COMPARATIVELY SMALL QUANTITIES OF AGENT (ON THE ORDER OF 85
KILOGRAMS) AN ESTIMATED 735 KILOMETERS. THE OTHER SCUD-TYPE MISSILES
COULD DELIVER PROPORTIONATELY LARGER QUANTITIES TO CLOSER TARGETS.
ABOUT HALF A SQUARE KILOMETER.
CITIES AND OTHER AREA TARGETS SUCH AS AIRFIELDS AND LARGE
INDUSTRIAL OR MILITARY FACILITIES ARE THE MOST LIKELY TARGETS FOR
IRAQ'S MODIFIED SCUDS, BECAUSE THEIR POOR ACCURACY MAKES THEM
UNSUITABLE FOR USE AGAINST POINT TARGETS. IF LAUNCHED FROM IRAQ'S
WESTERN DESERT, SUCH MISSILES COULD REACH lSRAEL AND PARTS OF EGYPT.
IF LAUNCHED FROM SOUTHERN IRAQ OR KUWAIT, SUCH MISSILES COULD REACH
AS FAR SOUTH AS RIYADH AND QATAR
THE OBJECTIVE OF ATTACKING CITIES WOULD BE TO CAUSE CASUALTIES
AND PANIC AMONG CIVILIANS. UNDER OPTIMUM CIRCUMSTANCES, A NERVE
AGENT WARHEAD COULD CAUSE MANY HUNDREDS AND POSSIBLY EVEN THOUSANDS
OF IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES, INCLUDING A LARGE NUMBER OF NEARLY
IMMEDIATE FATALITIES. THE FATALITY COUNT FROM A BIOLOGICAL WEAPON
WOULD BE MUCH HIGHER, ALTHOUGH THE FULL EFFECTS WOULD NOT BE FELT
FOR SOME DAYS. THE LACK OF ACCURACY OF IRAQ'S SCUDS WOULD NOT REDUCE
THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT, SINCE NO ONE IN A TARGET COMMUNITY WOULD
FEEL SAFE
THE OBJECTIVE OF ATTACKING AN AIRFIELD, ON THE OTHER HAND,
WOULD NOT BE TO CAUSE CASUALTIES SO MUCH AS TO PUT ITS DEFENSES OUT
OF COMMISSION. WHILE A CHEMICAL WEAPON ATTACK WOULD PROBABLY NOT
CLOSE A MILITARILY PREPARED AIRPORT FOR MORE THAN A FEW HOURS,
SADDAM MIGHT CALCULATE THAT WOULD BE LONG ENOUGH FOR IRAQI AIRCRAFT
TO ATTACK THE AIRPORT WITH MORE ACCURATE WEAPONS THAT COULD CAUSE
GREATER AND MORE LASTING DAMAGE
IRAQ HAS LITTLE OR NO EXPERIENCE IN DELIVERING BIOLOGICAL OR
CHEMICAL AGENTS VIA MISSILE. DURING THE WAR, IRAQ LAUNCHED HUNDREDS
OF SCUD MISSILES TOWARD IRAN, BUT AS FAR AS WE KNOW ALL OF THEM HAD
HIGH-EXPLOSIVE WARHEADS
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMBAT EXPERIENCE 
THE IRAQIS DO NOT KNOW FOR SURE HOW EFFECTIVE THE CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS ON THEIR MISSILES WOULD BE. THAT MIGHT NOT
MATTER TOO MUCH TO SADDAM IF CHEMICAL WARHEADS ARE USED. BUT, FACING
ADVERSARIES WITH STRONG RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES, SADDAM WOULD
PROBABLY NOT EMPLOY BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS UNLESS HE WAS CONFIDENT THEY
WOULD WORK WELL--OR WAS IN SUCH DESPERATE STRAITS THAT HE DID NOT
CARE WHETHER THEY WORKED OR NOT.
UNCONVENTIONAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IRAQ COULD ATTACK TARGETS OUT
OF RANGE OF EVEN ITS MISSILES BY USING SPECIAL FORCES, CIVILIAN
GOVERNMENT AGENTS, OR FOREIGN TERRORISTS TO HAND-DELIVER BIOLOGICAL
OR CHEMICAL AGENTS CLANDESTINELY. EVEN IN REGIONS WITHIN RANGE OF
IRAQ'S BOMBERS AND MISSILES, THAT MIGHT BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO
ATTACK SPECIFIC SITES WITH SUCH WEAPONS. IT WOULD BE AN ESPECIALLY
ATTRACTIVE OPTION IF IRAQ WISHED TO CONDUCT SUCH AN ATTACK WITHOUT
OFFICIALLY ACKNOWLEDGING AUTHORSHIP
IN THE PAST, IRAQI "DIPLOMATS" HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY
IMPLICATED IN LETHAL ACTS OF TERRORISM, ALTHOUGH MOSTLY DIRECTED
AGAINST IRAQI CITIZENS ABROAD. EVEN BEFORE IT INVADED KUWAIT,
BAGHDAD HAD BEEN CULTIVATING A  NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN TERRORIST
GROUPS, INCLUDING SEVERAL--SUCH AS THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION AND
THE PFLP GENERAL COMMAND--WITH OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES IN NUMEROUS
COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE. ALREADY, SOME OF THESE TERRORIST
GROUPS HAVE PUBLICLY VOLUNTEERED TO ATTACK US TARGETS ON BEHALF OF
IRAQ. TO BE SURE,THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS YET THAT THEY COULD
OR WOULD USE CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
THERE IS AMPLE AND PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE
INCORPORATED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN BOTH STRATEGIC AND
TACTICAL WAR PLANNING.
WE DOUBT SADDAM WOULD HAVE DIRECTED THAT
SUCH WEAPONS BE DEVELOPED WITHOUT INTENDING TO USE THEM IN CERTAIN
CONTINGENCIES
SADDAM PERSONALLY DECIDES UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND
EXTENT BW AND CW WEAPONS ARE USED. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, ONCE HE
HAD AUTHORIZED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN A SPECIFIC CAMPAIGN OR
BATTLE, THE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE WHEN AND HOW SUCH WEAPONS WOULD
ACTUALLY BE EMPLOYED WAS DELEGATED TO THE ARMY COMMANDERS. BY 1986,
CORPS COMMANDERS HAD THIS AUTHORITY. THE IRAQIS WOULD PROBABLY DO
THE SAME IN ANY FUTURE MAJOR CONFLICT
SADDAM IS UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE OF THE ESCALATORY POTENTIAL OF
USING CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGAINST AN ADVERSARY CAPABLE OF
ESCALATION, SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES. HE WOULD CERTAINLY WEIGH THE
POTENTIAL UTILITY OF ANY USE OF SUCH WEAPONS AGAINST THE RISK OF
RETALIATION IN KIND--OR WORSE. IN MAKING HIS CALCULATIONS, SADDAM
WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING IN MIND:
CHEMICAL  BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS  WEAPONS
TACTICAL  UTILITY HIGH    LOW
STRATEGIC UTILITY  MODERATE   HIGH
RISK OF SEVERE     HIGH    VERY HIGH
RETALIATION
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. SADDAM EVIDENTLY BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED
STATES HAS BOTH A CHEMICAL AND A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE THEATER.
BUT WE DOUBT THAT WOULD DETER HIM FROM EMPLOYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
A MAJOR CONFLICT WITH THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE
WE JUDGE THAT
SADDAM VALUES THE FORCE-MULTIPLICATION CAPABILITY OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS TOO HIGHLY TO FORGO THEIR USE IN ANY IMPORTANT COMBAT
SITUATION WHERE USING THEM WOULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL TACTICAL
BENEFITS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE ESTIMATE THAT:
X--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO USE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN ANY DEFENSIVE SITUATION IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT WHERE THEY WERE
BEING PUSHED BACK BY AN ALLIED OFFENSIVE
X--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE HIGHLY LIKELY TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTO TERRITORY DEFENDED BY THE
UNITED STATES AND ALLIED FORCES.
X--ONCE THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEGUN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AGAINST ALLIED FORCES, WE ANTICIPATE THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO USE
THEIR ENTIRE CHEMICAL ARSENAL, INCLUDING MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL
WARHEADS.
X--SPECIAL FORCES OR OTHER AGENTS COULD ALSO HAND-DELIVER
CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO SELECTED TARGETS IN ALMOST ANY COUNTRY.
DURING THEIR WAR WITH IRAN, THE IRAQIS LEARNED TO USE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN WAYS THAT MAXIMIZED THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. FOR EXAMPLE,
THEY DISSEMINATED CHEMICAL AGENTS IN THE MORNING RATHER THAN LATER
IN THE DAY, 
TYPICALLY, THE IRAQIS WOULD DEPOSIT PERSISTENT MUSTARD
AGENT IN AN IRANIAN FORCE'S REAR AREA AND THEN BOMBARD THE
FRONTLINES WITH NONPERSISTENT BUT HIGHLY LETHAL SARIN. THE PANIC-
STRICKEN IRANIAN SOLDIERS FLEEING TO THE REAR WOULD RUN RIGHT INTO
THE MUSTARD.
IN ADDITION TO BATTLEFIELD EMPLOYMENT FOR ANTIPERSONNEL AND
AREA-DENIAL PURPOSES, TARGETS DEEP IN THE REAR SUCH AS LOGISTIC
STOCKPILES, PORTS, AND AIRFIELDS WOULD ALSO BE ATTACKED. AIRFIELDS,
IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BE CONSIDERED CRITICAL TARGETS BECAUSE OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF US AND ALLIED AIR POWER. AGAINST AN AIRFIELD, CHEMICAL
WEAPONS COULD BEST BE USED TO SUPPRESS DEFENSES LONG ENOUGH FOR
IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO CARRY OUT STRIKES WITH HIGH-EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS.
OCCASIONAL HARASSING ATTACKS COULD BE CONDUCTED AGAINST A WIDE RANGE
OF TARGETS TO KEEP ENEMY FORCES JUMPY AND DEMORALIZED. WE DO NOT
BELIEVE THE IRAQIS COULD EFFECTIVELY CONDUCT EITHER BW OR CW ATTACKS
AGAINST BLOCKADING NAVAL SHIPS. BUT THEY MIGHT TRY ANYWAY
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
WE JUDGE THAT SADDAM HUSAYN UNDERSTANDS THAT USING
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ON ANY SUBSTANTIAL SCALE ENTAILS A MUCH MORE
SERIOUS RISK OF MASSIVE RATALIATION THAN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE, SADDAM REGARDS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRIMARILY
AS DETERRENTS AND DOOMSDAY WEAPONS.
AS A RESULT, WE JUDGE THAT SADDAM WOULD REFRAIN FROM USING
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS UNTIL HE PERCEIVED HIS SITUATION TO BE DESPERATE-
-SUCH AS IF HE WERE BEING SEVERELY PRESSED BY ALLIED MILITARY
ADVANCES OR THE GROWING IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.
SADDAM WOULD PROBABLY PRECEDE ANY USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WITH
MORE OR LESS EXPLICIT THREATS TO TRY TO ACHIEVE HIS GOALS SHORT OF
ACTUAL USE AND THE ATTENDANT RISK OF RETALIATION. IF HIS THREATS
WERE NOT HEEDED, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE SADDAM MIGHT ORDER A BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE ATTACK--PROBABLY DELIVERED CLANDESTINELY BY A TERRORIST
AGAINST A REGIONAL TARGET, SO AS TO PRESERVE PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY.
BEYOND THIS, IF SADDAM BELIEVED HIS POSITION WERE CONTINUING TO
DETERIORATE, HE MIGHT AUTHORIZE ADDITIONAL BW ATTACKS AGAINST
TARGETS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD
SADDAM MIGHT ORDER BW MISSILE STRIKES WHETHER HE HOPED THEY
WOULD REVERSE HIS FORTUNES OR HAD ALREADY CONCLUDED HIS CAUSE WAS
HOPELESS. IN THE LATTER CASE, HE WOULD WANT TO TAKE AS MANY OF HIS
ENEMIES WITH HIM AS HE COULD.
DOES IRAQ HAVE RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS?
IN ADDITION TO CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, IRAQ MAY HAVE RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THAT COULD BE
DELIVERED EITHER BY AIR OR MISSILE:
X--IN 1988, IRAQ REPORTEDLY TESTED AN AIR-DROPPED BOMB THAT
CONTAINED RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS BUT WAS NOT AN ATOMIC BOMB
RESULTS OF THE TEST WERE SENT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.
THE IRAQIS COULD HAVE OBTAINED SOME RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM
OPERATION OF THEIR RESEARCH REACTORS. 
THE IRAQIS MAY PLAN TO DISPERSE THIS MATERIAL USING A
CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE CHARGE
WE DOUBT THAT THE AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AVAILABLE IS
ENOUGH TO PRODUCE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WEAPON. IF IRAQ HAS A
RADIATION WEAPON, IT PROBABLY WOULD BE USED AS A LAST RESORT, WITH
THE INTENTION OF CAUSING PANIC IN A CITY. ITS DETONATION WOULD BE
UNLIKELY TO CAUSE WIDESPREAD RADIATION SICKNESS BUT WOULD REQUIRE AN
EXPENSIVE CLEANUP.
INDICATIONS AND WARNING
THE INDICATIONS
WHETHER IRAQI FORCES WERE PREPARED TO USE SUCH
WEAPONS WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN. THEY ARE READY NOW. THE AUTHORIZATION
TO PROCEED WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD PROBABLY BE CONVEYED BY
SECURE MEANS
SIMILARLY, THE IRAQIS COULD ATTACK US FORCES OR OTHER TARGETS
WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
IRAQ'S PAST USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
IN THE WAR WITH IRAN
BETWEEN 1983 AND 1988, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON A SCALE
NOT SEEN SINCE WORLD WAR 1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE ATTACKS WAS
MINIMAL AT FIRST BUT INCREASED GRADUALLY AS IRAQ GAINED EXPERIENCE
IN CW AND DEVELOPED NEW AGENTS, WEAPONS, AND TACTICS
ON 17 MARCH 1984 IRAQ USED THE NERVE
AGENT TABUN AGAINST IRAN, EARNING THE DUBIOUS HONOR OF BEING THE
FIRST NATION TO USE NERVE AGENTS IN BATTLE. CHEMICAL WEAPONS HELPED
BRING THE WAR TO A FAIRLY SUDDEN CONCLUSION IN 1988, WHEN IRAQ
INCORPORATED MASSED NERVE AGENT STRIKES INTO A SERIES OF HIGHLY
SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVES
IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN CAN BE DIVIDED INTO
THREE DISTINCT PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE, WHICH CONTINUED UNTIL 1986,
INVOLVED THE USE OF CW AGENTS IN A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ROLE, TO
DISRUPT OR HALT IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. IN A TRANSITION PHASE LASTING
FROM LATE 1986 TO EARLY 1988, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PREEMPTIVELY AGAINST STAGING AREAS PRIOR TO IRANIAN OFFENSIVES,
WHILE CONTINUING TO RELY ON CW TO DISRUPT THESE OFFENSIVES. FINALLY,
AND MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, IRAQ USED MASSED NERVE AGENT STRIKES AS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF ITS WELL-ORCHESTRATED OFFENSIVES IN THE SPRING AND
SUMMER OF 1988. THE SUCCESS OF THESE OFFENSIVES PROMPTED IRAN TO
ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE IN AUGUST 1988
WE ASSESS THAT IRAQ DECIDED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS A FORCE
MULTIPLIER TO COMPENSATE FOR IRAN'S MANPOWER ADVANTAGE. IRAQ'S USE
OF CW HELPED TO MINIMIZE IRAQI PERSONNEL AND TERRITORIAL LOSSES BY
STALLING IRANIAN HUMAN WAVE ATTACKS. IRAQI CW USE WAS ENHANCED BY
THE LIMITED IRANIAN CW PROTECTIVE CAPABILITY AND IRAN'S INABILITY TO
RETALIATE IN KIND ON ANY APPRECIABLE SCALE.
AS THE WAR PROGRESSED, THE IRAQIS BECAME MUCH MORE PROFICIENT
IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THAT ONE REASON FOR THIS
WAS THE DELEGATION OF CW RELEASE AUTHORITY TO IRAQI CORPS COMMANDERS
IN 1986. THIS PERMITTED BETTER INTEGRATION OF CW INTO BATTLEFIELD
PLANNING. BEFORE 1986, SADDAM HUSAYN PERSONALLY CONTROLLED THE
RELEASE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
DURING THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR, IRAQ MADE HEAVY USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS.
THE REGIME USED BOTH 
LETHAL AND NONLETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AGAINST IRAQI KURDS IN LATE
AUGUST 1988
END OF MESSAGE
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