Subject: IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAMS Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. FEB 91 DIRECTOR 491746 SUBJECT: IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN NOVEMBER, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT: -- WE BELIEVE IT WOULD TAKE IRAQ SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR-- AND PROBABLY LONGER--TO DEVELOP ONE OR TWO CRUDE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USING SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM THE START OF A CRASH PROGRAM. SUCH DEVICES WOULD BE OF QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY AND WOULD NOT BE DELIVERABLE BY MISSILE OR COMBAT AIRCRAFT. (NOTE THE DISTINCTION MADE BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPON--WHICH CAN BE DELIVERABLE BY TACTICAL AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE--AND A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE--WHICH CAN BE CRUDE AND BULKY. POTENTIALLY, A CRUDE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE COULD BE DELIVERED BY A TRUCK OR NON-TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.) -- IN THE ABSENCE OF A CRASH PROGRAM, WE BELIEVE IRAQ HAS THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE, IF COMBINED WITH CLANDESTINELY OBTAINED TECHNOLOGY AND CONTINUED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990S USING INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED FISSILE MATERIAL. CURRENTLY, WE ASSESS IRAQ'S SHORT-TERM OPTION FOR A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY IS SEVERELY DAMAGED BUT NOT UNCONDITIONALLY ELIMINATED BY OPERATION DESERT STORM. THE REACTORS AT THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER WHICH HELD THE FUELS APPLICABLE TO A CRASH EFFORT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE REACTOR FUELS, UNLESS MOVED TO SAFETY BEFOREHAND, ARE PROBABLY BURIED OR DESTROYED. WITHOUT THIS POTENTIAL SOURCE OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR A CRASH EFFORT, BAGHDAD WOULD HAVE TO RESORT TO A CLANDESTINE SOURCE OF FISSILE MATERIAL FURTHERMORE, KEY FACILITIES AT TUWAITHA THAT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN USED IN A CRASH EFFORT MAY BE DAMAGED OR ABANDONED AS A RESULT OF DESERT STORM OPERATIONS. IN THE SHORT TERM, IRAQ MAY ATTEMPT TO SIMULATE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION BY UTILIZING MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS AND/OR A RADIOACTIVE DISPERSAL DEVICE. SUCH AN IRAQI EXPLOSIVE RADIOLOGICAL DEVICE WOULD NOT BE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WEAPON. IT WOULD CREATE NO SPECIAL BLAST EFFECT, AND IT COULD NOT CAUSE WIDESPREAD RADIATION SICKNESS. THERE COULD, HOWEVER, BE A SUBSTANTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. RADIATION CONTAMINATION AT TUWAITHA THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IRT AND ISIS REACTORS AT THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER HAS PROBABLY ONLY RESULTED IN LIMITED LOCAL RADIATION CONTAMINATION DAMAGE AND RESEARCH REACTOR TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, THERE IS PROBABLY NO RADIATION CONTAMINATION OUTSIDE OF A FEW KILOMETERS FROM TUWAITHA--ASSUMING THE FUELS WERE NOT REMOVED PRIOR TO THE ATTACK. THE RADIATION CONTAMINATION AT TUWAITHA WOULD COME LARGELY FROM DISPERSAL OF THE IRT REACTOR FUEL BECAUSE THE ISIS REACTOR FUEL IS ALMOST CERTAINLY BURIED UNDER RUBBLE. IN THE MOST SEVERE CASE--WHICH WE DON'T BELIEVE HAS OCCURRED-- THE IRT REACTOR WOULD HAVE BEEN OPERATING BEFORE THE ATTACK AND THE FUEL AND OTHER CORE MATERIALS WOULD HAVE TAKEN A DIRECT HIT. THEN, THROUGH A MOST UNFAVORABLE CHAIN OF EVENTS, THESE MATERIALS WOULD BE SCATTERED AROUND TUWAITHA AND SOMEHOW FORCED TO BURN. RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES WOULD THEN ESCAPE THE BERMED CONFINES OF TUWAITHA TO CONTAMINATE A FEW SQUARE KILOMETERS OF AREA DOWN WIND. ANY ADVERSE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES FROM THE BOMBING OF THE REACTOR WOULD ALSO PROBABLY BE LIMITED TO THE AREA. IN THE WORST CASE OF DISPERSAL OF RADIOACTIVITY JUST DESCRIBED, ESTIMATED THAT THE RADIATION DOSE WOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN 1 REM INTERNALLY AND 0.3 REM EXTERNALLY AT A DISTANCE OF 100 METERS FROM THE REACTOR. WHILE SUCH DOSES ARE NOT TRIVIAL, THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO CREATE SUCH CONTAMINATION ARE NOT VERY LIKELY TO HAVE OCCURRED. IN ANY CASE, THE POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASED FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE REACTORS IS MINISCULE IN COMPARISON TO THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. END OF MESSAGE 1.5(C) 65268:65268First Page |Prev Page |Next Page |Src Image
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