Subject: IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. JAN 91 37. IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM LEADERSHIP IS SEEKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MEET PERCEIVED SECURITY NEEDS AND TO FURTHER REGIONAL AMBITIONS. WE HAVE CONCLUDED, BASED ON BAGHDAD'S ACTIVITIES THAT AN ACTIVE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM EXISTS. IRAQ PROBABLY HAS THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990S WITH INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED FISSILE MATERIAL. 38. SAFEGUARDED ACTIVITIES: IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS HOUSED AT THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER, SOUTH OF BAGHDAD. THIS FACILITY CONSISTS OF 5 MW NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTOR AND RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION LAB, THE 40-70 MW OSIRAK NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTOR BUILDING THE 800 KW ISIS REACTOR, AND ASSOCIATED LABORATORIES SUPPLIED IN THE 1970S. THESE LABORATORIES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO TREAT SOME RADIOACTIVE WASTE, HANDLE AND PERFORM MEASUREMENTS ON IRRADIATED SAMPLES IN THE HIGH ACTIVITY ANALYSIS LAB, PERFORM AT LEAST LABORATORY-SCALE REPROCESSING, AND FABRICATE FUEL ELEMENTS. 39. ACTIVITIES OF CONCERN: SINCE THE BOMBING OF THE OSIRAK REACTOR IN 1981, IRAQ HAS TURNED ITS ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING FISSILE MATERIAL THROUGH URANIUM ENRICHMENT. BETWEEN 1984 AND 1986, THE IRAQIS BUILT THREE NEW LABORATORIES AT TUWAITHA, TWO OF WHICH WE BELIEVE MAY BE USED TO ESTABLISH A LABORATORYSCALE URANIUM ENRICHMENT EFFORT. SINCE LATE 1988, IRAOI-DIRECTED INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS HAVE SOUGHT CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT BY 1989, IRAQ HAD PROBABLY PRODUCED ONE CENTRIFUGE AS A PROTOTYPE, PROBABLY USING DESIGN INFORMATION OBTAINED ILLICITLY 40. BASED ON A VARIETY OF REPORTING SINCE MID-1990,WE BELIEVE IRAQ'S GOAL IS TO DEVELOP AN ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY THAT WOULD USE ABOUT 5000 CENTRIFUGES, CAPABLE OF PRODUCING ABOUT 100-125 KG HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM PER YEAR WITH MODIFIED VERSIONS OF THE CENTRIFUGES. IF IRAQ WERE TO SUCCEED IN PROCURING THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY, WE BELIEVE BAGHDAD COULD CONCEIVABLY OVERCOME ANY ENGINEERING PROBLEMS TO BEGIN INITIAL HEU PRODUCTION BY THE MID-1990S, WITH FULL SCALE PRODUCTION PROBABLY TAKING TILL AT LEAST THE LATE NINETIES. IRAQ' S PURSUIT ABROAD OF THE BASIC COMPONENTS AND SPECIALTY STEELS NECESSARY TO BEGIN BUILDING AN ENRICHMENT C&PABILITY SUGGESTS AN EFFORT STILL DEPENDENT ON WESTERN TECHNOLOGY. 41. IRAQ ALSO HAS AN EXTENSIVE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND HIGH EXPLOSIVE R&D FACILITIES THAT COULD BE USED TO DEVELOP THE NON- NUCLEAR PORTIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVED. HIGH EXPLOSIVE R&D FACILITIES THAT COULD BE INVOLVED IN SUCH WORK INCLUDE AL QA QA AND AL HADRE. END OF MESSAGE 1.5 (c) 65155-65109First Page |Prev Page |Next Page |Src Image
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