Subject: EFFECTS OF DESERT STORM ON IRAQ Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. FEB 91 DIRECTOR 518089 THE EFFECTS OF OPERATION DESERT STORM ON IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AS OF FEBRUARY1991 WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ'S SHORT-TERM OPTION FOR A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BUT NOT NECESSARILY ELIMINATED BY OPERATION DESERT STORM' THE SHORT-TERM OPTION LINGERS BECAUSE OF REMAINING FACILITIES AT THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER AND UNCERTAINTY OVER THE EXACT STATUS OF THE SAFEGUARD FUEL. -- WE BELIEVE IT IS MOST LIKELY THAT IRAQ'S SAFEGUARDED HIGHLY ENRICHED RESEARCH REACTOR FUELS WERE IN THE REACTORS AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL OPERATION DESERT STORM RAIDS. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT RULE OUT THAT IRAQ MOVED THESE FUELS PRIOR TO THE RAIDS ON TUWAITHA. WHILE BOTH OF IRAQ'S KNOWN RESEARCH REACTORS PROBABLY SUSTAINED MAJOR DAMAGE TO CRITICAL COMPONENTS SUCH AS CONTROL AND COOLING EQUIPMENT, THEIR FUELS COULD STILL BE RECOVERABLE' RADIATION CONTAMINATION AT TUWAITHA THE BOMBING OF THE REACTORS AT THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER PROBABLY WOULD HAVE RESULTED ONLY IN LIMITED LOCAL RADIATION CONTAMINATION--ASSUMING THE FUELS WERE IN THE REACTOR PRIOR TO THE ATTACK. ON THE BASIS OF RESEARCH REACTOR TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, THERE IS PROBABLY LITTLE, IF ANY, SIGNIFICANT RADIATION CONTAMINATION OUTSIDE OF A FEW KILOMETERS FROM TUWAITHA. RADIATION CONTAMINATION AT TUWAITHA WOULD COME LARGELY FROM THE POTENTIAL DISPERSAL OF THE IRT REACTOR FUEL BECAUSE THE FUEL IS ALMOST CERTAINLY BURIED UNDER RUBBLE. IN THE MOST SEVERE CASE--WHICH WE DON'T BELIEVE HAS OCCURRED--THEM REACTOR WOULD HAVE BEEN OPERATING BEFORE THE ATTACK AND THE FUEL AND OTHER CORE MATERIALS WOULD HAVE TAKEN A DIRECT HIT. THEN, THROUGH A MOST UNFAVORABLE CHAIN OF EVENTS, THESE MATERIALS WOULD BE SCATTERED AROUND TUWAITHA AND SOMEHOW FORCED TO BURN' RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES COULD THEN ESCAPE THE BERMED CONFINES OF TUWAITHA TO CONTAMINATE A FEW SQUARE KILOMETERS OF AREA DOWN WIND. ADVERSE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES FROM THE BOMBING OF THE REACTOR WOULD ALSO BE LIMITED TO THE AREA' IN THE WORST-CASE DISPERSAL OF RADIOACTIVITY JUST DESCRIBED, SCIENTIST SPECIALIZING IN REACTOR SAFETY ESTIMATED THAT THE RADIATION DOSE WOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN I REM INTERNALLY AND 0.3 REM EXTERNALLY AT A DISTANCE OF 100 METERS FROM THE REACTOR IF PERSONNEL DID NOT LINGER IN LEAVING THE AREA. ((NOTE: THE REM IS A UNIT OF THE EFFECTS OF RADIATION. SPECIFICALLY, THE REM IS NUMERICALLY EQUAL TO THE ABSORBED DOSE OF RADIATION MULTIPLIED BY SOME FACTOR THAT SCALES THE EFFECT OF THE RADIATION. TEN REM PER HOUR IS APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION TIMES GREATER THAN NATURAL BACKGROUND RADIATION AND MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND TIMES GREATER THAN NORMALLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS IN A U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. A TOTAL DOSE OF 600 REM WOULD HAVE A 50 PERCENT PROBABILITY OF BEING FATAL, ALTHOUGH SUCH DOSES ARE NOT TRIVIAL, THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO CREATE SUCH CONTAMINATION ARE NOT VERY LIKELY TO HAVE OCCURRED. IN ANY CASE, THE POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASED FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE REACTORS IS MINISCULE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. IT IS POSSIBLE, THAT BOTH REACTORS WERE DAMAGED TO THE EXTENT THAT IRRADIATED FUELS MIGHT BE EXPOSED. IF THE REACTOR WERE TO SUFFER A DIRECT HIT, ITS BRITTLE FUEL ELEMENTS COULD BE SHATTERED AND DISPERSED, POTENTIALLY PRODUCING INITIAL RADIATION LEVELS OF THOUSANDS OF REM/HOUR IN VERY CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE FUEL. IF THE FUEL WAS DISPERSED OVER AN AREA OF ABOUT 100 SQUARE METERS, DOSE RATES OF 100 REM/HOUR COULD EXIST. THESE DOSE RATES WOULD DECLINE WITH TIME; ROUGHLY, BY A FACTOR OF FOUR AFTER TWO MONTHS. ALTERNATIVELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE IRRADIATED FUEL COULD BE INTACT WITHIN THE REMNANTS OF THE BUILDING, POSING LITTLE OR NO RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD' END OF MESSAGE 1.5 (c) 65139-65101First Page |Prev Page |Next Page |Src Image
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