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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

cia_65540_65540_01.txt
Subject: IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES    
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence    
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN    
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN    
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF    
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON    
REQUEST.
DIRECTOR 618424 
WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQI∆S LEADERSHIP STILL JUDGES A NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS CAPABILITY TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MEET THEIR SECURITY 
NEEDS AND TO FURTHER REGIONAL AMBITIONS, DESPITE BAGHDAD'S 
NPT COMMITMENT. FURTHERMORE BASED ON BAGHDAD'S ACTIVITIES, 
ESPECIALLY ITS COVERT 
WE BELIEVE THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM EXISTED PRIOR TO 
THE GULF WAR.  OUR PREWAR ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF IRAQ'S 
NUCLEAR PROGRAM CONSIDERED TWO SCENARIOS IN WHICH BAGHDAD 
COULD HAVE PRODUCED A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OR WEAPON NAMELY:  
-- PRODUCING A CRUDE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE:               WE 
ASSESSED THAT IT WOULD TAKE IRAQ SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR--AND 
PROBABLY LONGER-TO DEVELOP ONE OR TWO CRUDE NUCLEAR 
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USING SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM 
THE START OF A CRASH PROGRAM.  SUCH DEVICES WOULD PROBABLY 
HAVE BEEN OF QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY AND -WOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN DELIVERABLE BY MISSILE OR COMBAT AIRCRAFT. (NOTE 
THE DISTINCTION MADE BETWEEN A NUCLEAR WEAPON-WHICH CAN BE 
DELIVERABLE BY TACTICAL AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE--AND A NUCLEAR 
EXPLOSIVE--WHICH CAN BE CRUDE AND BULKY.  POTENTIALLY, A 
CRUDE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE COULD BE DELIVERED BY A TRUCK OR 
NONTACTICAL AIRCRAFT.) 
-- PRODUCING A NUCLEAR WEAPON: PRIOR TO THE WAR WE ALSO 
ASSESSED THAT IRAQ PROBABLY HAD THE COMPETENCE, IF COMBINED 
WITH CLANDESTINELY OBTAINED TECHNOLOGY AND CONTINUED FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE, TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990S 
USING INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED FISSILE MATERIAL. 
        SITE OF TUWAITHA 
WE BELIEVE THAT MOST OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS HOUSED AT 
THE
LABORATORIES AT TUWAITHA                 WERE PROBABLY BEING 
USED IN A COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT EFFORT. 
SETTING BACK THE SHORT-TERM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES OPTION 
WE BELIEVE OPERATION DESERT STORM WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL IN 
SETTING BACK IRAQ'S NUCLEAR EFFORTS AT TUWAITHA.  MOST 
SERIOUSLY AFFECTED WAS IRAQ'S SHORT-TERM OPTION FOR A 
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD 
HAVE INVOLVED EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL AT TUWAITHA.  WE ASSESS 
THAT THIS OPTION HAS BEEN DELAYED BY AT LEAST SEVERAL MONTHS 
FROM OUR EARLIER ESTIMATE NOW THAT MOST OF THE KEY 
FACILITIES AT TUWAITHA HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND AT LEAST SOME 
FUELS 
ARE PROBABLY CONTAMINATED BY DIRT AND DEBRIS. 
 
 
RELATIVELY INTACT BUILDINGS AT TUWAITHA ARE STILL 
POTENTIALLY CAPABLE OF RECOVERING HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM 
FROM THOSE FUELS. 
-- REMAINING BUILDINGS THAT COULD POTENTIALLY SUPPORT 
ENRICHED URANIUM RECOVERY OPERATIONS INCLUDE ONE OF TWO 
SOVIET-SUPPLIED RADIOISOTOPE LABORATORY BUILDINGS AND THE 
ITALIAN-BUILT RADIOCHEMISTRY LABORATORY.  ALTHOUGH THEY ARE 
LARGELY INTACT, WE BELIEVE THESE BUILDINGS SUSTAINED AT 
LEAST SOME COLLATERAL DAMAGE.
ROUGHLY 43 KILOGRAMS OF WEAPONS-USABLE SAFEGUARDED HIGHLY 
ENRICHED URANIUM FUELS--LAST ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE NOVEMBER 
IAEA INSPECTION-WERE PROBABLY PRESENT IN THE TWO RESEARCH 
REACTOR BUILDINGS AT TUWAITHA AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL AIR 
RAIDS. 
ACTIVITIES IDENTIFIED SINCE FEBRUARY AT THE REACTORS SUGGEST 
THAT THE FUELS HAD NOT BEEN MOVED PRIOR TO THE INITIAL 
ATTACK.  HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE ONLY AN INSPECTION OF THE SITE 
WOULD CONFIRM THE EXACT STATUS OF THE FUEL.
WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT LEADS US TO BELIEVE IRAQ HAD 
PRODUCED AND OPERATED AT LEAST ONE CENTRIFUGE FOR URANIUM 
ENRICHMENT, PROBABLY USING THE DESIGN INFORMATION OBTAINED 
ILLICITLY IN WESTERN EUROPE. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IRAQ 
HAD ESTABLISHED A LABORATORY-SCALE CASCADE DESPITE CONTINUED 
EFFORTS TO PROCURE MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND PROTOTYPE 
CENTRIFUGE PARTS.  THEREFORE, WE CONCLUDE THAT IRAQ HAD 
ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT PROGRESSED TO THE POINT WHERE ANY 
BUILDINGS--AT TUWAITHA OR OTHER SITES IN IRAQ--WOULD HAVE 
BEEN OUTFITTED WITH OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR A FULL-SCALE 
URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT. 
THE ONLY OTHER CONFIRMED NUCLEAR FACILITY IN IRAQ IS THE AL 
QAIM SUPERPHOSPHATE FERTILIZER PLANT, LOCATED NEAR THE 
SYRIAN BORDER. BEFORE ITS DESTRUCTION, THE PLANT WAS CAPABLE 
OF PRODUCING 70 TO 100 METRIC TONS OF YELLOWCAKE PER YEAR. 
SUSPECT NUCLEAR FACILITIES
END OF MESSAGE 
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