Subject: IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON
REQUEST.
DIRECTOR 618424
WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQIÆS LEADERSHIP STILL JUDGES A NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CAPABILITY TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MEET THEIR SECURITY
NEEDS AND TO FURTHER REGIONAL AMBITIONS, DESPITE BAGHDAD'S
NPT COMMITMENT. FURTHERMORE BASED ON BAGHDAD'S ACTIVITIES,
ESPECIALLY ITS COVERT
WE BELIEVE THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM EXISTED PRIOR TO
THE GULF WAR. OUR PREWAR ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF IRAQ'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM CONSIDERED TWO SCENARIOS IN WHICH BAGHDAD
COULD HAVE PRODUCED A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OR WEAPON NAMELY:
-- PRODUCING A CRUDE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE: WE
ASSESSED THAT IT WOULD TAKE IRAQ SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR--AND
PROBABLY LONGER-TO DEVELOP ONE OR TWO CRUDE NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USING SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM
THE START OF A CRASH PROGRAM. SUCH DEVICES WOULD PROBABLY
HAVE BEEN OF QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY AND -WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN DELIVERABLE BY MISSILE OR COMBAT AIRCRAFT. (NOTE
THE DISTINCTION MADE BETWEEN A NUCLEAR WEAPON-WHICH CAN BE
DELIVERABLE BY TACTICAL AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE--AND A NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE--WHICH CAN BE CRUDE AND BULKY. POTENTIALLY, A
CRUDE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE COULD BE DELIVERED BY A TRUCK OR
NONTACTICAL AIRCRAFT.)
-- PRODUCING A NUCLEAR WEAPON: PRIOR TO THE WAR WE ALSO
ASSESSED THAT IRAQ PROBABLY HAD THE COMPETENCE, IF COMBINED
WITH CLANDESTINELY OBTAINED TECHNOLOGY AND CONTINUED FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE, TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON BY THE LATE 1990S
USING INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED FISSILE MATERIAL.
SITE OF TUWAITHA
WE BELIEVE THAT MOST OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS HOUSED AT
THE
LABORATORIES AT TUWAITHA WERE PROBABLY BEING
USED IN A COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT EFFORT.
SETTING BACK THE SHORT-TERM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES OPTION
WE BELIEVE OPERATION DESERT STORM WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL IN
SETTING BACK IRAQ'S NUCLEAR EFFORTS AT TUWAITHA. MOST
SERIOUSLY AFFECTED WAS IRAQ'S SHORT-TERM OPTION FOR A
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD
HAVE INVOLVED EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL AT TUWAITHA. WE ASSESS
THAT THIS OPTION HAS BEEN DELAYED BY AT LEAST SEVERAL MONTHS
FROM OUR EARLIER ESTIMATE NOW THAT MOST OF THE KEY
FACILITIES AT TUWAITHA HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND AT LEAST SOME
FUELS
ARE PROBABLY CONTAMINATED BY DIRT AND DEBRIS.
RELATIVELY INTACT BUILDINGS AT TUWAITHA ARE STILL
POTENTIALLY CAPABLE OF RECOVERING HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
FROM THOSE FUELS.
-- REMAINING BUILDINGS THAT COULD POTENTIALLY SUPPORT
ENRICHED URANIUM RECOVERY OPERATIONS INCLUDE ONE OF TWO
SOVIET-SUPPLIED RADIOISOTOPE LABORATORY BUILDINGS AND THE
ITALIAN-BUILT RADIOCHEMISTRY LABORATORY. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE
LARGELY INTACT, WE BELIEVE THESE BUILDINGS SUSTAINED AT
LEAST SOME COLLATERAL DAMAGE.
ROUGHLY 43 KILOGRAMS OF WEAPONS-USABLE SAFEGUARDED HIGHLY
ENRICHED URANIUM FUELS--LAST ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE NOVEMBER
IAEA INSPECTION-WERE PROBABLY PRESENT IN THE TWO RESEARCH
REACTOR BUILDINGS AT TUWAITHA AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL AIR
RAIDS.
ACTIVITIES IDENTIFIED SINCE FEBRUARY AT THE REACTORS SUGGEST
THAT THE FUELS HAD NOT BEEN MOVED PRIOR TO THE INITIAL
ATTACK. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE ONLY AN INSPECTION OF THE SITE
WOULD CONFIRM THE EXACT STATUS OF THE FUEL.
WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT LEADS US TO BELIEVE IRAQ HAD
PRODUCED AND OPERATED AT LEAST ONE CENTRIFUGE FOR URANIUM
ENRICHMENT, PROBABLY USING THE DESIGN INFORMATION OBTAINED
ILLICITLY IN WESTERN EUROPE. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IRAQ
HAD ESTABLISHED A LABORATORY-SCALE CASCADE DESPITE CONTINUED
EFFORTS TO PROCURE MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND PROTOTYPE
CENTRIFUGE PARTS. THEREFORE, WE CONCLUDE THAT IRAQ HAD
ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT PROGRESSED TO THE POINT WHERE ANY
BUILDINGS--AT TUWAITHA OR OTHER SITES IN IRAQ--WOULD HAVE
BEEN OUTFITTED WITH OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR A FULL-SCALE
URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT.
THE ONLY OTHER CONFIRMED NUCLEAR FACILITY IN IRAQ IS THE AL
QAIM SUPERPHOSPHATE FERTILIZER PLANT, LOCATED NEAR THE
SYRIAN BORDER. BEFORE ITS DESTRUCTION, THE PLANT WAS CAPABLE
OF PRODUCING 70 TO 100 METRIC TONS OF YELLOWCAKE PER YEAR.
SUSPECT NUCLEAR FACILITIES
END OF MESSAGE
1.5(c)
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