cia_65329_61727_01.txt

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Subject: IRAQI CW     
Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence     
TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN     
REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN     
TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF     
THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON     
REQUEST. 
DIRECTOR 511343
COUNTRY: IRAQ
SUBJ: 1. IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND
         ORGANIZATION
      2. IRAQI CAPABILITY TO CONCEAL ITS NUCLEAR REACTOR
SUMMARY: AS OF 1989, IRAQ'S PRIMARY OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS MANUFACTURING CENTER WAS LOCATED IN SAMARRA
CHEMICALS AVAILABLE FOR WEAPONS INCLUDE KHARDAL, CYANIDE, 
LUISIDE, AND PHOSGENE.  IRAQI FORCES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO 
DEPLOY THESE WEAPONS FROM MISSILES, AIRCRAFT AND ARTILLERY 
THE ARMY'S STRATEGY FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE 
IRAN-IRAQ WAR WAS TO DETER AND REVERSE A DECISIVE AND STRONG 
GROUND OFFENSIVE BY THE ENEMY.
ALL OF IRAQ'S ARMY HAD SOME CHEMICAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY, 
INCLUDING SOVIET GAS MASKS, PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND 
EQUIPMENT USED TO DETECT, ANALYZE, AND MEASURE THE SEVERITY 
OF CHEMICAL ATTACKS.
THE MILITARY ALSO HAD A "SMOKE OFFICE" THAT WAS CHARGED WITH
CONCEALING IRAQ'S NUCLEAR REACTORS IN EVENT OF AIR ATTACK.
TEXT: 1. AS OF 1989, IRAQ'S PRIMARY OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY WAS LOCATED IN SAMARRA, 
IRAQ, OVER 3,000 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE SAID 
TO HAVE BEEN WORKING THERE DURING THE LATE 1980'S.
IRAQI FORCES HAD THE FOLLOWING CHEMICALS IN ITS OFFENSIVE 
STOCKS: KHARDAL, CYANIDE, LUISIDE, AND PHOSGENE.                  
LUISIDE IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL TO THE BLISTER AGENT 
LEWISITE.) THE IRAQI MILITARY HAD THE CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY 
THESE CHEMICALS THROUGH SEVERAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS; VIA 
MISSILES, AIRCRAFT BOMBS, AND ARMY 155 MILLIMETER (MM) AND 
175 MM SHELLS. 
AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE DURING THE PERIOD 1986-1987, AFTER ONE 
OF IRANÆS MAJOR OFFENSIVES IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB, THE 
DECISION TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS MADE AT THE BATTLEFIELD 
COMMAND LEVEL.  THE ARMY'S GENERAL STRATEGY FOR CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS USE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WAS TO DETER AND REVERSE A 
DECISIVE AND STRONG GROUND OFFENSIVE BY THE ENEMY.
3. DURING THE PERIOD UP TO 1989, LARGE CIVILIAN-TYPE
TRUCKS, WITH PLASTIC COVERS, WERE USED TO TRANSPORT CHEMICAL
WEAPONS SHELLS AND BOMBS TO THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE REAR 
ECHELONS IN CASE THEY WERE NEEDED IN BATTLE.  THESE WEAPONS 
WERE TRANSPORTED FROM UNKNOWN STOCKPILE DEPOTS BY CHEMICAL 
SECURITY TROOPS THAT WORE MILITARY UNIFORMS WITHOUT 
MARKINGS.  IN ADDITION TO THE MAIN STOCKPILE, THE AIR FORCE 
ALSO HAD AT LEAST ONE SMALL STOCKPILE OF ITS OWN (NOT MORE 
THAN 20-30 CHEMICAL BOMBS).  THE SECURITY TROOPS REFERRED TO 
THESE WEAPONS ONLY AS "SPECIAL BOMBS." THE HANDLING OF THESE 
WEAPONS WAS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT SINCE MANY OF THEM 
LEAKED.  THESE LEAKS WERE THE CAUSE OF A NUMBER OF DANGEROUS 
ACCIDENTS WHICH EXPOSED THE TROOPS TO THE CHEMICALS.  
EXPOSURES RESULTED IN BURNS, BLISTERS AND OOZING SORES.  
CHEMICAL DEFENSE UNITS WERE REQUIRED TO CLEANSE AND TREAT 
THE BURNED SOLDIERS.
KHURSHAD HAD REPLACED HANI MUHAMMAD SHAYIB, WHO RETIRED FROM 
HIS POSITION AS VICE MINISTER IN THE LATE 1980'S.  KHURSHAD 
WAS ORIGINALLY EDUCATED IN THE U.S. VICE MINISTER KHURSHAD 
HAD COMMAND AUTHORITY OVER EACH MILITARY SERVICE'S HEAD OF 
CHEMISTRY DEFENSE, AND THE ARMY, AIR FORCE, AND NAVY ALL HAD 
CHEMICAL DEFENSE HIERARCHIES.  THE ARMY'S MANAGER FOR 
CHEMICAL DEFENSE  (ASSOCIATED WITH UNIT NUMBER 5122) WAS 
BASED IN THE HEAD OFFICE OF CHEMISTRY DEFENSE.  IN ADDITION 
TO HAVING AUTHORITY OVER EACH MILITARY BRANCH'S MANAGER FOR 
CHEMISTRY DEFENSE, THE MAIN OFFICE ALSO MANAGED A CHEMISTRY 
DEFENSE WEAPONS LAB AND EACH SERVICE'S CHEMISTRY DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY.  THE HEAD OFFICE CHEMISTRY LAB CONDUCTED CHEMICAL 
DEFENSE EXPERIMENTS DEVOTED TO IMPROVING DEFENSES AGAINST 
CHEMICAL ATTACK.  IT EMPLOYED OVER 500 PEOPLE AND WAS 
LOCATED ABOUT 30 KILOMETERS WEST OF BAGHDAD JUST SOUTH OF 
JORDAN ROAD (NFI). 
5. IN 1989, EVERY UNIT IN IRAQÆS ARMY HAD SOME CHEMICAL 
DEFENSE CAPABILITY.
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