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Analysis: Badr vs. Sadr in Iraq

Council on Foreign Relations

Updated: March 28, 2008
Author: Greg Bruno

The explosion of intra-sectarian violence (NYT) in Baghdad, Basra, and other Iraqi Shiite strongholds this week has ominous implications for the U.S. and Iraqi governments. The reemergence of fighters loyal to cleric Muqtada al-Sadr threatens to reverse security gains since an additional thirty thousand U.S. soldiers flooded Baghdad in 2007. The uptick in violence also comes as presidential candidates debate the long-term U.S. commitment to Iraq, and the White House contemplates a pause in troop withdrawals (FT). Baghdad, meanwhile, has more immediate concerns. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who ordered the Iraqi-led operation in Basra, faces political peril if he fails, argues Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyst Sumedha Senanayake. Indeed, some experts say the future of Iraq is as dependent on the successful resolution of intra-Shiite fighting as the defeat of Sunni extremist groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Whether Maliki and his beleaguered government have the clout to quell the strife is far from certain. On March 26, the prime minister gave gunmen seventy-two hours to put down their arms (al-Jazeera) and renounce violence; a spokesman for Sadr says the cleric responded by calling for Maliki and Iraqi forces to leave Basra (AP) immediately. Dozens were killed and hundreds wounded in the initial outbreak of fighting. In the end, though, Maliki may prove a powerless mediator. Angry Shiite demonstrators in Baghdad protested the government’s crackdown (NYT). CFR Adjunct Senior Fellow Vali R. Nasr tells CFR.org the true players in the dispute are rival Shiite clerics Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and Sadr. Both control powerful militias, and both command important political blocs in Iraq’s evolving power structure. “Maliki is completely irrelevant” in the dispute in the south, Nasr says.

Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and associated militant wing, the Badr Brigade, have a history of clashes (FT) with Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

Read the rest of this article on the cfr.org website.

Copyright 2008 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.