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BRIEFING BY US AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER. TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 2007

Multi-National Force-Iraq

BRIEFING BY US AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER.

LOCATION: COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, Iraq.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 2007.

AMB. CROCKER: Thanks but I don't have any remarks. I didn't write anything.

Then we can go straight to questions if you prefer. Mr. First of the Associated Press you have the seat of honor.

Q Yeah. What kind of, I know you don't want to talk specifically about your report because it's not your report yet. But what kind of thoughts do you have in mind for those who will quarry you about the lack of progress on political benchmarks?

AMB. CROCKER: Well you're right not to quarry me because there is no report because I haven't written it, because this is Iraq and uh you know, lord knows what landscape will look like by then including on the benchmark question. Cause as you know, the political leadership of the country has been meeting on a daily basis over the last three or four days or carrying on with that so. Even that is an evolving situation. I think there are a number of things to look at.

You know, first and most obviously the progress on national level issues has been extremely disappointing and frustrating to all concerned. To us, to Iraqis, to the Iraqi leadership itself. So that's, you know, that's one.

A second point, I've said on a number of occasions, is with respect to the legislative benchmarks these are complicated issues, complicated legislatively, complicated politically, and some of them get at existential issues, declassification reform on the relationship between the Center and the provinces, states rights if you will. These are not issues easily resolved in any society. And we're not in our own and here where they are dealt with in the shadow of a huge national trauma that to some degree is ongoing, it helps gives this some perspective why this is hard to do.

I guess a third point I'd make, having been here five months now, the sense I've got is that these benchmarks are important. There is no question, important as a measure for us, important in their own terms but they don't tell the whole story about Iraq. And I am of the view to some extent that failure to meet any of them does not mean the definitive failure of the state or the society. Conversely to make them all would not by any means mean that they've turned the corner and it's a sun dappled upland from here on in with peace and harmony and background music. It's just a lot more complex than that.

Another point I'd make is that there are kind of, if you will, mini benchmarks where things are happening. We all know about Anbar. We've seen that phenomenon in different forms move through different parts of the country. It's not just a security issue obviously. I mean it's the steps these tribes, communities, individuals are taking are rooted in a political context and you gotta keep an eye on that too. So that's kind of where I am on benchmarks.

Thank you.

Q Ambassador do you think that the Iraqi leadership has to be given what they have got [inaudible] to do whatever they would have done by now, to do the right kind of [inaudible] they want to create kind of reconciliation which should have been done by now? Do you think they got- they had decent time by now they should have shown something?

AMB. CROCKER: It's a great question. The whole premise of course of the surge was to provide, to bring levels of violence down and keep them down so that there would be the time and space for political leadership to get on with the business of national reconciliation. And that first part of it clearly is happening. You still have spectacular car bomb attacks like Sinjar but the overall level of sectarian killing, particularly in Baghdad, has come down.

Now, does that mean that the opportunity is now been presented to leadership and they missed it? Or are missing it. Again, keeping in mind my first point about a sense of frustration here, I would suggest that it's gonna take- before you get meaningful reconciliation that's felt not just among leaders although that's an essentially step but it is really felt down through society, that's going to take time. You know, I've been around these last couple of months in a number of neighborhoods including some that I was in in 2003 like Mansur and up where we were on Saturday in Gazaliah. You know, what's happened over the last couple of years is stunning to me and what's happened to kind of middle class, upper middle class neighborhoods the violence, the population shifts, the displacement, the you know tens of thousands of Iraqis that have been killed. You're just not going to overcome that in a few weeks or indeed in a few months. You're not. Uh, I think you can start to build a situation starting again at a national level with security conditions in place that prevent an immediate resurgence of violence but I think it's gonna take a fair amount of time to overcome the damage that's been done to trust in confidence among the Iraqis after what they've been through bearing in mind that the levels of trust and confidence were not exactly extremely high when this started in 2003 based on again the legacy of thirty-five years of how Saddam ran the place and the climate of fear and mistrust that he created. So, it's a long answer but it's a hugely complex issue that to achieve reconciliation that's more than say the passage of a law or a leadership statement but that's felt deeply through the society is going to be a very long-term undertaking.

Q Mr. Ambassador do you feel Prime Minister Maliki is able to achieve reconciliation and what do you make of Senator Levin's comments yesterday suggesting that if you cannot do so in the next few days, he should - the parliament should vote to replace him although that seems unlikely if they don't have an absolute majority?

AMB. CROCKER: We have supported the prime minister's government since its inception. We continue to support it as it makes serious efforts to achieve national reconciliation and deliver effective governance to the people of Iraq. It's not just an issue of the prime minister. It's the whole government that has to perform here. We do expect results as do the Iraqi people and our support is not a blank check. We need to see results. At the same time, again just as I was saying you know we know it's not easy. But we do think they've got a national obligation to apply themselves in every way they can and I think that's what they're trying to do now again on these two levels. You have national reconciliation but also just being a government to the people of Iraq. And you see it probably more than I do I mean when you're out around town, there is not a strong sense anywhere really of the central government being present and active in just making conditions of life better. They gotta do more of that too.

Q What do you make of Senator Levin's comments?

AMB. CROCKER: Senator Levin is one of our most respected Senators and we got a tradition where our lawmakers have the right to characterize their views anyway they want. I've just characterized mine.

Q Ambassador it's just the violence here is changing, morphing for a couple of years to the south. You know it's the gangland style stuff and large ability gains have been great. The tribes are starting to compete. There is a provincial national, it seems that the violence is becoming more political in nature. It's maybe less directed at the U.S., and it's many- and may you can describe what you see as the roots of the violence now and how it's changing once again it seems.

AMB. CROCKER: Well with respect Anbar, I mean the, you know we saw that when we were out there. It's not just that violence has diminished. It's dropped right off the map. You know, tribal societies are complex. It certainly is out there. But I've been struck by the way the tribes seem to be accommodating each other. In the conference last week that brought everybody literally under one tent, was an indication to me that at this point at least the rivalries that are there are certainly under control. The south, as you say, is interesting. This is an area that is not colored or clouded by significant sectarian conflict. It's not effected by kind of the global terrorist threat that al-Qaeda represents. It's fairly homogenous in terms of the communities and yet there is a lot of violence. Is it political violence?. As you kind of commented, there is a lot of mafia style stuff going on that suggests that, you know, maybe it's competition for resources and just street power more than it is a conflict of ideas or ideologies in some respects. I think particularly in Basra you may be seeing that.

That said, there obviously is political violence and the killing of the two governors inside of two weeks clearly is worrisome. I don't know, I don't have the facts or the details on what happened down there in the case of the assassinations. But again, IEDs planned along routes where somebody knew they were going to be going suggest that a fair amount of effort went into setting these things up.

And I think you've gotta worry over what Iranians may be doing down there. Again, I'm careful here not to draw a direct linkage cause I don't know who did this, but we do know the Iranians have been very much in the IED and EFP business against us and against Iraqi forces. The fact that we have arrested the Lebanese Hizballah trainer and have had many long conversations with the head of the secret cells, so called of the Jaish al Mahdi, who has gone on at length about Iranian connections has to leave you with the issue out there, is Iran intending a Lebanization or a Hezbollahzation of parts of the south. So in addition to whatever issues you've got again just of criminally driven violence, you cannot rule out the possibility of an overlay of not just politically directed violence but politically directed violence with outside support.

Q Were the bombs that killed the two governors EFP's.

AMB. CROCKER: They were IEDs.

They were IEDs. That's what they reported.

AMB. CROCKER: Right. That's my understanding.

Q I'm not sure. On that, similar to that issue you've mentioned the Anbar model has something that's spreading through a lot of different areas of Iraq, mostly Sunni areas. Is there a way being considered to apply this to Shia of mixed areas? What's the equivalent in communities that have perhaps been [inaudible] Sunnis but has had Mahdi control?

AMB. CROCKER: My understanding is that you are seeing some of this in the south. And I believe that Prime Minister Maliki has been involved in outreach to some of the Shia tribes in the south. I'm not enough of an expert on tribal structures here to really be able to say to you whether southern tribal society resembles western Sunni tribal society to the extent that you're gonna see kind of a parallel development. The south hasn't got al-Qaeda. So I don't know where it'll go but I do understand that there is something going on down there that does involve the tribes.

Another dimension to that question of course and what you say about Jaish al Mahdi particularly in more urban areas whether it's in Baghdad or in the cities of the south where Jaish al Mahdi maybe ensconced and whether there is the, any indication of a backlash against that similar to a Sunni tribal backlash against al-Qaeda. The answer is I don't know. If that is out there, I'm not aware of it.

Q Ambassador Gordon Brown with something a little fresher. It's a very domestic question for you. When you [inaudible] streets in the south do you think the British are accomplishing their mission or are they being [inaudible] driven out by the [inaudible]?

AMB. CROCKER: Well Brittian has been a strong ally in Iraq since before the beginning as Brittian is elsewhere in the world. I've come from Pakistan and had a chance to again see that alliance at work in Afghanistan. So we are very appreciative of what Brittian has brought to the fight here and elsewhere.

In the south, I believe it is now three of the four provinces where Brittian has had responsibilities have now gone to Provincial-Iraqi control, Basra being the fourth. I don't know what London's thinking is exactly on Basra in that respect but I'm confident that the British will be looking at conditions before taking any steps to move to Provincial-Iraqi control in Basra. Basra is a challenge. There's no question. And like a lot of things, it's a challenge that the Iraqis increasingly have to step up to. There is the status of the governor and there is the status of the Iraqi security forces. The Iraqis, as you know, have sent down a new commander. They've established a Basra Operation Center. They've sent down a new police commander and, you know, we hope this initiative is going to lead to a difference because there are some pretty major problems in terns of security if Basra. But again, I have every confidence that Brittian is going to be looking hard and close at conditions before moving along a road to Provincial-Iraqi control.

Q Sir I was going Mr. Ambassador you mentioned that sectarians and violence had calmed down during the surge and certainly in terms of [inaudible] visit and especially around the Sunni areas. [inaudible] there's still no change in terms of the sectarian agenda of [inaudible] government in terms of fighting. While they have managed to force contracts like garbage collection, they actually have Americans literally [inaudible] under the barrel of a gun forcing them to go into those areas and do those particular jobs. So it would seem that the presence of the U.S. Forces has prevented the movement of [inaudible] and in all the very complex allegiances and [inaudible] with [inaudible] but go to the intent of the Iraqi government, what the leadership talks the talk and says the right things. But we've actually seen in terms of [inaudible]economies in certain areas, gas stations, if there is any kind of improvement from random research it's purely been American based, i.e., it's funded by American sub money and American soldiers have forced it on the local Iraqis security forces. So it's hard to see the way through. Where has the intent of the Iraqi government really changed? And what is your contingency plan? When General [inaudible] left here the last thing he did was to call a meeting where he called all his officers together and asked if the Iraqi government's vision of Iraq is not matched how is it, i.e., the [inaudible] reconciled something like the democratic form of government what is our contingency plan?. We know it's being thought about but we see no evidence of a nonsectarian agenda in lots of different areas. I was just wondering how you see a way through that?

AMB. CROCKER: Again, a pretty important and complicated set of issues. First, it comes back to the discussion on national reconciliation. That is a critical need and a formidable challenge all at the same time because of this violence. Bit it's what the government and the people are ultimately going to have to do if the state and the society are going to function in peace and security. So the importance I don't think can be overstated. And the converse of that is, there are problems. I've been in many of the same neighborhoods and you can see it. But there are some other things out there too. I have yet, maybe it's just bad trip planning by my staff but I have yet to be in a neighborhood anywhere in Baghdad, including Shia neighborhoods where the services were working. And I have had,

[inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: Yeah I haven't been up to Kadamiyah.

[inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: But I've seen in others where it's not and I've actually talked to supporters or members of major Shia parties and one case who said, you know, I hate to have to say this but it was better under Saddam. In terms, again, of just quality of life. So to a certain extent, I think you probably gotta to look to be sure that is this sectarian intent or is it incapacity to deliver much of anything anywhere. I think that's part of it.

In terms of what the government's intentions are, I think that ultimately obviously has to be measured by what they do. But its interesting to me, you know, that this government has gone ahead and authorized the recruitment of hundreds, 1,700 or so young men in the Abu Ghraib area. And clearly some of these have got backgrounds in militia and insurgent groups. But they're moving into training now and onto the government payroll. And that's, you know, this is not for Anbar. This is getting closed to mixed areas. And the engagement of the government, some of you were in Amiriyah where they're working with that group there and then of course we were together on Saturday where Dr. Safa was having his encounter with the Gazaliah guards.

So I would say this is an open issue. As I look at things like that, I do not see anything that causes me to conclude nope this is pure sectarianism. It's Shia versus Sunni and the government's on one side of it. I don't see that. That doesn't mean I see the opposite either, a full scale effort to start to re-harmonize this country and I guess that's again, it comes back to the criticality of the national reconciliation challenge. But again, you're just not gonna go overnight or over a week or over months in neighborhoods or nationally to hands across the divide. It just isn't gonna happen.

Q [inaudible] you say there are sign of progress in the surge and it solely is to use American soldiers as [inaudible] so that the government can start making progress. At what point do you think that government has made no progress and because any time soon it [inaudible] without making Prime Minister Maliki [inaudible]? Other people of government responsible for a few. [inaudible] not benchmarks, not [inaudible] meaningless. But everyone [inaudible] Anbar [inaudible]? The whole city has become [inaudible] Shia's and outside you got that [inaudible], the vast majority is Sunnis. [inaudible] we can say [inaudible]. What are the real details, not exactly [inaudible] but what does the government have to do to make provincial [inaudible] and whose [inaudible] whose holding it up?

AMB. CROCKER: Provincial elections is actually an interesting phenomenon. As I discussed this with the different parties in communities, I find a distinct lack of enthusiasm for provincial elections on the part of virtually everyone.

Q [inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: Well you know -

Hurray for the status quo.

AMB. CROCKER: You know, uh yeah it's kind of interesting. The uh ...

Q [inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: Um, well, yeah again, I'm not sure many of these guys are gonna win popularity contests.

Q [inaudible] they're trying to clean up the minister of interior, but it's still corrupt. [inaudible].

U.S. military [inaudible] weapons when they go into the interior of ministry.

AMB. CROCKER: Well the, yeah, ....

Q [inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: At the ministry of interior or you know deputy ministers of oil and so forth. Yeah there is no question that the ministry of interior and it's, you know, its various agencies are deeply problematic. Uh, that's why I would say it's what it's all national police brigade commanders have now been fired and almost all battalion commanders have been changed. Uh, indicative of a pretty far ranching problem in the national police. Also presumably indicative of a certain degree of aware of it and readiness to do something about it. I mean, we'll have to see what happens. I mean there's another issue there too which is again in my conversations, and you've had yours is that um, however impartial, fair, and capable the national police were to become their image is such in Sunni areas that I think It's, you know it would be years before they would be accepted as upholders of the law or looked at as anything more than a threat. So there's that perception issue as well.

There is a corruption issue, as you point out, which is endemic and which again a lot of the leadership acknowledges. You know there are god knows a lot of things that need to be fixed. Um, um, to me this seems with the application of will and abilities to be a situation in which it can be fixed. Not all of it. Not all of it at once. And probably not a lot of it very quickly but I think its fixable. And again the effort on the national police level suggests that and we'll see where it goes. But that it can be done. The ministry of interior, I think, needs significant work, shall we say, throughout and a lot more is gonna have to be done. I mean if you want to go through the long to-do list, I think there are a lot of people out there that need to be called to account for what they've done in the past if people are going to believe that there is some check on what will be done in the future.

Q [inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: Well we're at a stage now where it's pressing for change and again seeing them make some of those changes. And you know we are gonna keep at it. I think a lot of Iraqi people are making their views known. And we'll see what happens. I mean, the what ifs, I don't know.

Q So you have no intentions of [inaudible] if the Maliki government fails to deliver?

AMB. CROCKER: I think that's a different proposition. In a parliamentary system, no government is forever. You know, I made clear our position on the Maliki government. I think it's a government that is clearly aware of the challenges it faces. That is why it is working now to try to come to agreement on some of these things. You talk to a lot of the ministers too. There is a lot of frustration there with things they can't get done. And you gotta add to the list of the issues capacity. I mean it's uh it isn't only or all sectarianism or mal-intent. It's having the structures, the people, the procedures that actually deliver things and that's gotta be developed too. Um, at a certain point, there will be a different government here. How, when, under what circumstances that will happen, I don't know. But this is an open society. It is a democratic society. If governments don't perform at a certain point, I think you're gonna be seeing new governments.

Who hasn't had a.... Yeah? Keep talking. I'm moving on coffee here.

Q I wondering if you've had conversations directly with Maliki about all these frustrations you just described and if you could describe for us how those conversations have gone.

AMB. CROCKER: No. [room bursts out in laughter], Except to say it is a fair surmise I do see him pretty regularly and I wouldn't fail to tell him things that I'm telling you.

I think he is an individual who genuinely wants to make things better in this country. And he is very frustrated himself on occasions. You know the way the political system is structured with, you know, the closed list electoral system which really leaves individual representatives not terribly accountable to their constituency, and it also leaves block leaders with tremendous weight in both the formation of a government and in the way government works so that individual ministers are more influenced by political block leaders than they are say by the prime minister. So, while a lot of people are frustrated with Maliki, Maliki in turn is pretty frustrated. And I think it is important to bear in mind some of these structural issues as you, you know, as you look at governments that, prime minister has failed or his individual ministers have failed. Yeah there is a lot of failure out there but there are some- in addition to everything they wrestle with, there are systemic problems in there that make it pretty hard to govern effectively even if all of the security issues weren't there.

Q Why not change that system. Why not find a way to breakup the [inaudible]?

AMB. CROCKER: You know, people around here spend a lot of time thinking about that. That for the next election, for example, I hear a lot of people involved in politics saying we can't do closed lists again. Either it's no list or it's an open list. You know, it's up to the Iraqis to choose their system but I think We've all seen the limitations of a closed list system. And a change is very much under discussion. That's one of the issues incidentally that is under discussion on provincial elections of having provincial elections conducted on a different basis.

Q I'm interested in hearing your characterization of the ongoing meetings of the top five government leaders that were happening all last week because as far as I could tell after five days or so, those meetings were no closer to reconciliation and no closer to getting the Sunnis back in government than we were when those first meetings started while inching closer and closer to [inaudible] to the report and etcetera.

AMB. CROCKER: Well again maybe I've been here long enough now that you find silver linings where maybe you shouldn't. But I'd say the fact that the five of them have come together and continue to come together on a daily basis and I gather they're getting together again this afternoon, suggests to me that first a seriousness of purpose and then second again the ability to sit in a room with people who have very different views and conduct discussions on major issues without the lid popping off. There is also I guess a parallel set of discussions on a broader basis. You've got the five and then you've got the political council for national security. So you're bringing in the Sadarist Fadillah as well. So I don't draw any conclusions at this point for five days of discussions and no great pronouncements. If the process is going on, that in itself I find encouraging. Obviously what really counts is what they produce at the end of it and I don't know what that I'll be. I've been in touch, you know, with everybody. Obviously differences of view on ways forward but I've been struck by a broadly shared sense that it is really time to get something done and not just because of the September report and the Americans. Because the country needs some actions taken by it's leadership. So again, none of it matters much unless this leads to results. But the fact that they seem to seriously engaged in trying to find those results, I take as provisionally encouraging.

Q What is your opinion on Muqtada Sadar as someone you would have to deal with on a political level? It seems that he's been positioning himself pretty well in the last few months to take some kind of political role if the time comes. Is this somebody you're willing to sit across the table with like you are now and talk?

AMB. CROCKER: The resemblance wasn't immediately clear to me. The Sadar Movement is part of the political process. They have deputies in parliament and they had ministers in government and indeed we dealt with both. Before they gave up their ministries, we had advisors in ministers were Sadarist who were running the ministry. So, yes we'll deal with him and his movement as parts of the political process. It's when you get farther out there into Jaish al Mahdi and then elements of the Jaish al Mahdi it becomes a different story. But certainly Sadar as a political leader and his elected deputies as members of the parliament we'll deal with them. Sadar himself, I guess he'd have to be in Iraq and it seems to us he's been spending a lot of time in Iran lately which is a little bit interesting to me given the history of the Sadar movement which you know under his father in the 90's kind of defined itself as a nationalist and Arab movement in distinction both to the west and to Iran. So, I kind of wonder what his apparent prolonged tenure in Iran does to his grassroots popularity.

Q Ambassador are you comfortable with or aware of fact that the police station [inaudible] Sadar City were paid 100,000 dollars a month for two Sadarist movements [inaudible] to that and employ 108 men who [inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: No I wasn't aware of it. And uh we'll certainly look into that. 180 Jaish al Mahdi ?

108 Mahdi army guards [inaudible] and were paid 2,000 dollars a month [inaudible] Sadar City on a commission waiting to build a police station and basically [inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: First I've heard that.

Q What is the sort of what is the clock ticking on leaders that you said is putting pressure on them has become now the prospect of a collapse of the government in the sense that the prime minister can't manage the ministers and the ministers can't manage their employees to actually effect anything in real life in the cities, in the provinces and that sort of thing?

AMB. CROCKER: It's...

Q I mean is that the pressure on them now? I mean you have half the ministries technically vacant. You've mentioned how neighborhoods across the board aren't getting services. Is that what their, what's impressing them with the need to do something?

AMB. CROCKER: I think it's all of it. I mean, you know, talking to some of the line ministers a tremendous sense of frustration over the inability to make services work. You know, I don't mean to single people out but the minister of electricity is a very frustrated individual. Just trying to make a Baghdad grid function that has been torn up to the extent it has. So it's political frustration, it's frustration to deliver what they're there to deliver. It's all of these things I think coming together and building up over time. And again I've heard from just about every significant political leader that they've got to find a way to make government work in Iraq. And that, I don't find very many people out there who say it's all right. There's really nothing to worry about. I don't think it's that, it's not that people don't get it. It's the fixes are hard to do.

Q How important do you think it is to have the Sunnis back in the government? It seems there's a couple of parties that they're talking to including the Salvation Council in Anbar is possibly coming in instead of the [inaudible]. How important is it to have that participation and what do you think those eleven demands might be narrowed down to that could actually return the authority to the government?

AMB. CROCKER: I think it is very important that all of Iraq's major communities be part of the governance of this country. That doesn't mean there may not be a period such as now in which you've got the Sunnis or most of the Sunni ministers effectively out. But over time Iraq has to represent all of its main communities in decision making. Now, does that mean only Towafook (sp) can do it?. I think not. I think it means communities in this case, the Sunni communities. So, whether there are other representatives or not ready to step forward, whether they would bee seen as broadly representative I don't know. That's something will just have to play out. Does it mean ministers in the cabinet? Maybe. Maybe not. Cause again the current situation, Towafook (sp) ministers are out but Tarko Hasakmi (sp) continues in his role as vice president and very much a part of the ongoing discussions. And in deed one of the elements of that discussion as I understand it, is formalizing what the Iraqis call the "three plus one mechanism", the president and two vice presidents and the prime minister as a consultative and decision making body on strategic issues. You then have Sunni, Shia, Kurd in this group of four. So, that might be a means by which Sunni representation is achieved even if you didn't have Sunni ministers for a time in government. And in terms of what form a deal would take if there was a deal with Towafook, I have no idea. But, ...

Q Have they narrowed down their eleven demands to say the detainees. That seems to be a sort of symbolic point...

AMB. CROCKER: I think they are very much focused on detainees and as you saw last week, you know the two vice presidents Hashimi and Abd-al-Mahdi went out to Rusafa, a very visible thing there. So yeah I think detainees is important. And that's, you know, coming back to one of your points. That's important period. It's not important just as an element in a political deal. It's important in how this state evolves. How detainees are treated and it's something that's very important to us because again I was here under Saddam and uh you know have a sense of what happened to detainees in that period. It is very important that the post Saddam Iraq state have a policy and a practice of dealing with detainees that is very , very different indeed. So I think they're- I'm glad they're focused on that.

Q We have really one last question. Everybody points to Anbar as a success [inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: I thought I would just throw that out there, see how..

Q [inaudible] sectarian solutions and [inaudible] reconciliation [inaudible]

AMB. CROCKER: That's a very important point and I certainly did not intend in any way to describe what's happened in Anbar as national reconciliation. I mean to the contrary, I mean the national reconciliation as well as reconciliation going down through society is the critical need. What has happened in Anbar is important. It's clearly positive. It is probably an essential prerequisite for reconciliation but it isn't reconciliation. Reconciliation will, I gather that Shahaab(sp) Satar(sp) in Baghdad now having meetings at the federal government level. And there is to be an Anbar forum in early September in which the deputy prime minister takes out the key line ministers, sits down with Anbar representatives and talks about what the state can and should do in Anbar. That's heading towards actual reconciliation. In the uh between the provincial level and the Center and in the south, I don't want to leave with you a misimpression. I don't think at all it's the same phenomenon as dramatic, as far reaching, in fact I know it's not as what you've seen in Anbar. Just all I was saying is I believe there are discussions underway between government representatives and tribal figures in the south.

In terms of what's going on elsewhere, the linkage between those who may have taken up arms against the state of against the MNF and now are turning against al-Qaeda among the Sunnis, a critical element there is their linkage back to the state. And that's been something we've been very much engaged in. But as people come forward to us, we then talk to central government so that the linkages then go from these groups to the central government. That's a form of reconciliation to that I think is absolutely vital so that you don't have a situation in which you've effectively got just militias under different names out there. They become elements of the security structure. And I just would make a final point on that because if you look at the fairly awful experiment with the national police so far, as a national police force, this notion of local policing I think maybe strategically important. That neighborhoods needs to be patrolled and security upheld by people from those neighborhoods or towns or whatever. That the national policing idea does not seemed to have worked terribly well, at least for a big chunk of the population that this pattern that has developed may turn into a broader more methodically effort to kind of change the way law enforcement is done here. And that's the way it works in our societies and you know what we've seen so far suggests it could very well work here as well. I think again that it isn't reconciliation per se but it's neighborhoods feeling safe and that's pretty important too.

I think that takes us to the 5-0 mark. Quick last one?

Q [inaudible].

AMB. CROCKER: Yeah, well you know in pluralistic politics personalities play a role and I'm not- I'm commenting generally. Not specifically. But uh, you know, you see this all the time in the states where across party lines and sometimes within parties there are people whose personalities just- now again though uh all five of these individuals have been spending a lot of time together over this last week. And they're doing it. Again it depends on what they produce at the end as to whether it's- what the significance is. But whatever personal strains there may be they're managing to get around the same table for a number of hours a day.

Thank you very much.

AMB. CROCKER: Nice to see there are some people who aren't taking August off.

END.