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Backgrounder: Impediments to National Reconciliation in Iraq

Council on Foreign Relations

Author: Lionel Beehner, Staff Writer
January 5, 2007

Introduction

National reconciliation between Iraq’s ethno-religious communities is seen as a necessary precursor to stemming the country’s sectarian violence. But its prospects look bleak. The trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, which was originally billed as an exercise in reconciliation, instead only inflamed sectarian tensions. Iraq’s factions also remain deadlocked over the distribution of oil revenues, issues of federalism, and the ethnic makeup of the Iraqi government. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s cabinet is seen by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs as a puppet-state of Shiite militias, which by extension are seen as puppets of Tehran. Unless efforts at national reconciliation can convince Iraqi Sunnis to buy into a power-sharing agreement, experts expect a continuation of the current levels of internecine violence.

What efforts at national reconciliation in Iraq have been made in the past?

Maliki announced a national reconciliation plan early last summer that contained a number of components, including an offer of amnesty to insurgents not guilty of targeting civilians; a reversal of de-Baathification laws that barred low-ranking former Baathists from reentering public life; a national reconciliation conference that includes all of Iraq’s warring parties; and a promise to purge key ministries (most notably the interior ministry) of officials affiliated with Shiite militias. A few of the plan’s components—de-Baathification, amnesty, a conference—were implemented but nothing of substance materialized.

Why have previous efforts at national reconciliation failed?

Experts point to a number of factors:

• Maliki remains beholden to powerful behind-the-scenes actors like Muqtada al-Sadr, an anti-U.S. cleric, and other powerful Shiite leaders, none of whom want national reconciliation with Iraq’s Sunni minorities. “They still think they can defeat the insurgency with the help of either the Americans or Iran,” says Joost Hiltermann, Middle East project director of the International Crisis Group.

Read the rest of this article on the cfr.org website.

Copyright 2007 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.