Analysis: Legal Quandaries in Iraq
Council on Foreign Relations
August 29, 2006
Prepared by: Lionel Beehner
As much as paving roads and rebuilding schools and hospitals, the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq requires strengthening the country's wobbly legal foundations and establishing the rule of law. In fact, the Fourth Geneva Convention obligates the United States, as the occupying power, to do just that.
Shortly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) essentially decreed that Iraqi law, barring a few exceptions, would be the law of the land. For criminal matters, the primary body of law drawn from was the Iraqi Criminal Code of 1971. But establishing a system of independent judges and undoing the corrupt legal system in place under Saddam has proven difficult, not least because of the poor security and rising sectarian conflict outside of Iraq's courtrooms.
To overcome these obstacles, Robert Perito of the U.S. Institute of Peace proposed in April 2003 the creation of a U.S.-led civilian reserve team, numbering up to 3,000 members and composed of police, legal prosecutors, and judges. The plan was based on post-conflict operations in the Balkans. "[P]eacekeeping missions need to arrive with a law-and-order kit made up of trained police, judges and prosecutors, and a set of draconian security laws," Bernard Kouchner, senior UN official in Kosovo, told the Washington Post back in 2000. But as Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor document in their book Cobra II, no "stability force" was ordered to Iraq. "Congress has not provided the money," Perito told CFR.org.
Read the rest of this article on the cfr.org website.
Copyright 2006 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.
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