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24 March 2006

Saddam Hussein Feared Uprising More Than U.S. Forces

Interviews, papers depict regime cut off from military, political realities

By Jacquelyn S. Porth
Washington File Staff Writer

Washington -- Former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was more afraid of an internal uprising in 2003 and 2004 than invasion by coalition forces, according to a report released March 24 by the U.S. military.

The report, drawing on interviews with former senior Iraqi leaders and captured documents, shows the true nature of a closed regime and how Saddam Hussein loyalists were afraid to speak the truth or carry out military orders for fear of retribution.

Army Brigadier General Anthony Cuculo told Pentagon reporters that the study is “a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein’s leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process.”  He said the report is “a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drove our opponent’s decisions” during “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

The U.S. Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, published “The Iraqi Perspectives Project” after two years of work.  Cuculo, who directs the command’s Joint Center for Operational Analysis, said that more than 100 interviews and more than a half-million documents offer rare access and a unique opportunity to learn lessons about Iraqi tactics and strategy.

Cuculo said this is the first research effort of this size and scale to try to understand the key military decisions of an adversary since World War II, when the United States reviewed German and Japanese documents.

The report’s authors did not interview Saddam Hussein because he had not yet been captured, but Cuculo and senior researcher Kevin Woods both said they wished they had his input.

But they did learn that:

• Saddam Hussein believed mistakenly that the United States was averse to taking military casualties;

• The former Iraqi leader required his leaders to watch his favorite movie, Black Hawk Down (2001), about U.S. military problems encountered during a special forces operation in Somalia in 1993;

• Hussein was misled and believed that the Iraqi Army had defeated the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division in 2003;

• United Nations sanctions eroded Iraqi military capabilities;

• Iraqi military problems were compounded by the compartmentalization of information inside the dictatorship; and

• Iraqis interviewed said they were not aware of any existing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, although a significant number conceded that it was possible that such munitions could exist without their knowledge.

Although much of what the Iraqis deluded themselves into believing may seem absurd to a Western military thinker, Cuculo said it is valuable for U.S. professional soldiers to view the distortion through the Iraqis’ eyes, and the report is being used now as a teaching document.

The report (PDF, 230 pages) is available on the Joint Forces Command Web site.

(The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)