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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Washington File

05 April 2003

Military Planning Includes Protecting Iraq's Cultural, Religious Heritage

(Army Civil Affairs officer describes measures) (2600)
The U.S. military has integrated measures to identify and protect
sites of religious, cultural, and historical importance in Iraq into
every phase of its planning and operation, according to U.S. Army
civil affairs officers who briefed reporters in Kuwait on April 5.
Protection of cultural and religious sites is part of high-level
planning, all the way down to unit cultural affairs officers who
implement the measures to protect such sites, said Major Christopher
Varhola, a civil affairs reservist who is a cultural anthropologist.
Iraq's religious and cultural heritage is priceless, Varhola said.
"It's beyond rating."
Varhola said that he is in constant contact with the archeological and
anthropological communities to gain assistance and insight. With this
information, "We refine target lists and adjust military plans to
incorporate cultural and archaeological considerations," Varhola said.
As an example, he cited the great care with which the military has
operated near Mosque of Ali in Najaf.
Damage from bombs are only one threat to religious and cultural sites,
Varhola pointed out. Military construction and the threat of looting
are also concerns that the military tries to address in its planning.
"The U.S. military is eager to coordinate with any organization
dedicated to the task of preservation, which transcends military and
operational necessity," Varhola said.
By contrast, the regime of Saddam Hussein has demonstrated an utter
disregard for protecting Iraq's heritage, according to Lieutenant
Colonel John Kuttas. "Obviously we are aware that they will use
schools, and mosques and hospitals and museums. Our biggest concern is
that someone will take advantage of our cultural sensitivity and try
to use that as a weapon."
Varhola recalled how, in the 1991 Gulf War, coalition forces refrained
from attacking combat aircraft parked in the vicinity of the ancient
city of Ur.
When asked about his assessment of the value of the cultural and
religious sites in Iraq, Varhola said, "It is absolutely priceless.
From the smallest excavation from a tiny, tiny village which lead to
agricultural patterns started thousands of years ago to whole social
structures. And we aren't just concerned with ancient Mesopotamia
structures but also those from the Golden Age of Islam, the 800's,
900's up until the medieval period. There are a number of priceless
structures as well. I can emphasize this all day. It's beyond rating."
Following is the transcript of a U.S. Army civil affairs briefing on
protection of Iraq's cultural and religious heritage, held in Kuwait
on April 5:
(begin transcript)
Coalition Press Information Center 
News Briefing 
State of Kuwait
April 5, 2003
The Protection of Cultural and Religions Sites in Iraq
By U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officers,
Lieutenant Colonel John Kuttas and Major Christopher Varhola
Major Varhola:
I am a Major in the United States Army, a civil affairs reservist, and
a cultural anthropologist. I first became acquainted with the complex
nature of this situation in Iraq concerning arts and monuments when I
was a tank platoon leader in 1991 with the 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment.
Our fighting positions were in and around Nasiriyah, which is also in
and around the vicinity of the ancient city of Ur. I personally
observed how Iraqi jets were parked around the ziggurat, obviously so
we would not hit the jets. I personally observed how the Iraqi
military forces moved jet fighters from the nearby Talil airbase to
the immediate proximity of the great ziggurat, which dates to
approximately 2000 BC.
This was purposely done because the Iraqi military knows that we take
extreme measures to protect cultural, religious, and archaeological
sites. This is something that I firmly believe in, and that members of
the U.S. military firmly believe in. This is also in accordance with
the 4th Geneva Convention, as well as with common decency and respect.
In the case of Ur in 1991, for instance, our assessment was that the
long-term damage to world culture was clearly not worth the short-term
military gains that would have been made by destroying the Iraqi jets.
As a result the Iraqi jets were not hit. They were later towed away,
when we took that area, and towed away by tractors and then blown up
in place. Our missiles and our jets intentionally let those jets
survive because we did not want to hit that ziggurat.
That's how I became acquainted with the need for the protection of
monuments, particularly in Iraq, which has literally tens of thousands
of known archaeological sites -- not just the big, known ones, but
also many smaller ones, some dating back more than 10,000 years.
We're here to talk about historical protection and the institutional
measures by which the U.S. Army is taking steps to protect historical
sites. Concerning archaeological preservation, there are multiple
levels. At the highest level, as you may know, Pentagon planners have
worked closely with members of the academic community to identify, not
only locations of concern, but also to identify the kinds of military
activity that might adversely affect these areas.
More than just bombing can cause damage. Digging ditches, in southern
Iraq for instance, or erecting earthworks, can damage the multiple
soil layers that show the temporal and social context of a given site,
so critical to understanding the longer-term cultural and
archaeological significance of the site.
High-level planning is only one part of the equation, obviously. All
high-level planning is useless if there is not a way to get the plans
down to the combat soldiers. Part of what we want to stress here is
that there are institutional mechanisms by which information is
diffused to the combat soldiers on the ground. One mechanism for that
is integrating targeting information, which Lieutenant Colonel Kuttas
will talk to you about.
On the tactical level, Army civil affairs assets work closely with
ground commanders to advise them of archaeological and cultural sites
in their areas of operation. The institutional mechanism for this is
the cultural affairs officer. This is an actual position in civil
affairs, the cultural affairs officer, whose responsibility is to do
the research, on his own and with higher headquarters, so that he is
aware or she is aware of the targets that need to be protected. The
institutional mechanism is the cultural affairs officer present in the
civil affairs units.
A key point of civil affairs is that we are predominantly Reservists.
As such, we capitalize on the civilian career fields of soldiers and
on translate these skills in support of military operations -- in the
case of protected targets, for instance.
I'm a cultural anthropologist. I am not an archaeologist; but, prior
to deployment, and via e-mail now, I am in constant contact with
members of the archaeological and anthropological communities in order
to gain their assistance and insights with refining target lists. The
target lists that Lieutenant Colonel Kuttas will talk about are really
big documents, which are constantly refined. We refine target lists
and adjust military plans to incorporate cultural and archaeological
considerations.
In the cases of both Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, I work
closely with anthropologists and archaeologists from Catholic
University, George Washington University, and the University of
Chicago. I worked with many of them on our Afghanistan operations, as
we put together lists that were incorporated into our overall scope of
operation there for protected targets.
A couple of key points to mention here: how the U.S. Army respects
archaeological and cultural sites and how the Iraqi military uses
these same sites for protection. Consider the recent activities in and
around the Mosque of Ali in Najaf. I cannot speak for the ground
commanders, but I can assure you that, because of civil affairs
soldiers, the ground commanders are aware of the importance of
preserving sites and of not letting short-term military necessity
override that importance.
Another concern is looting -- especially in the absence of law and
order and the economic uncertainty that is inherent to any military
operation of this magnitude. All around Iraq, there are a number of
museums, in particularly the National Museum of Baghdad, that hold
priceless materials. The U.S. Military is eager to coordinate with any
organization dedicated to the task of preservation, which transcends
military and operational necessity.
As far as key organizations, we do not usually comment on which
organizations we work with, but I will say that UNESCO is an important
one. The Swedish "Cultural Heritage Without Borders" is another one
that has the same mandate. I am not saying that we are working with
these people now, but we might well deal with them.
Lt. Col. Kuttas:
I am going to take the piece out of the middle, and try to explain how
we protect the cultural heritage of Iraq. We do all we can to prevent
unnecessary damage. We only target what is a military necessity. We
draw on a wide variety sources to ensure that we don't cause any
unnecessary damage. We always insist on positive identification. We do
not shoot into the dark. We make sure that we know what's out there
with our powers of observation so we know what's on the ground.
I'm not a cultural anthropologist, just a cannoneer; but we use all
the information that people like Chris give us. We put it in our
manual of operations to make sure our targeting information is
extremely accurate and constantly updated. People all the way up the
chain have this information. It's a field document that is refined
continually, and it really does reflect our general sensitivity and
respect for culture.
We've seen Saddam Hussein's thugs taking advantage of our respect for
their culture and hiding in mosques. It doesn't work for him, but it's
not something you're going to see us doing. In the event that we do
have a situation, such as aircraft parked alongside a site, or snipers
in a minaret, the coalition response is going to be measured; it's
going to be proportional. If we do have to take action, it is only
going to be if there is a military necessity and with full respect and
understanding of the cultural and social implications of what we are
doing.
Q: (CBS Radio) What are your particular concerns as troops move into
Baghdad as far as preserving what is there?
A: We are probably more concerned about the actions the Iraqis may
take -- that Saddam Hussein and his thugs might do -- and how he might
take advantage of our respect. We're seeing constantly hospitals used
for military actions and schools being turned into barracks. That's a
major concern for us. Obviously we are aware that they will use
schools, and mosques and hospitals and museums. Our biggest concern is
that someone will take advantage of our cultural sensitivity and try
to use that as a weapon.
Q: What buildings have you helped preserve in Nasiriyah?
A: I'm not going to answer that. It's operational and I really can't
tell you where we have drawn the lines for a no-fire zone because they
will become points for the regime's death squads. But I can tell you
that it is a fairly extensive list that has been vetted by not just
people like me.
Q: You paint a very rosy picture. But what can you say about the
extensive damage done to Saddam Hussein's palaces?
A. I'm not going to comment on things on the ground where we have
control. We are trying to bring down this regime and if this regime
chooses to position itself in front of monuments and artifacts, it's a
real problem. But I can't comment on Najaf because I haven't been
there.
Q: Have you done any counter assessment? Are you planning any
remodeling?
A. We have not received a comprehensive assessment. There will be
Civil Affairs people with all units and the assessment survey will be
forthcoming. As far as reconstruction and renovation, we don't do
that. We are focusing on mitigating military damage. That's our focus.
Renovation is a sensitive issue but that will be something for the
Iraqis to undertake with their academics and experts, perhaps with the
international community of archeologists and academics. The ideal
though is to end the hostilities with as much as possible intact.
Q: Can you explain the process of how you decide what to put on the
list?
Everyone has the information up the chain. Obviously when you are on
the ground you need to know this. The information systems work in our
favor in this respect. Now obviously we don't expect our soldiers to
die while they wait for an answer. The commander in the field is going
to make the final call and analysis whether he wants to put his
soldiers at risk. However, he also understands what is at stake. He's
got a bigger picture than the next two minutes. We haven't seen too
much of this so far. Afghanistan was probably a better example. And as
a result of this kind of information other options were used to bring
about the outcome.
Q: You have good intentions but how can you prevent things from
happening?
A: Yes. We have a process and it's worked on continually. It's not
something we just put on a shelf. It's not just me doing it but
hundreds of people up and down the chain from a cannoneer up to full
colonels. This is a continual process. It's not a one-shot deal. It's
not perfect but if I knew a way to do it better, we would be doing it.
Q: Have there been disagreements between field captains and
higher-ups?
A: I can't really comment on that. In the final analysis it doesn't
come up very often.
Q: Weren't American soldiers trying to going into shrines in Najaf?
A: We don't comment what is on or not on the target list but it is a
fairly safe assumption that tombs of Hussein and tomb and mosque of
Ali are very, very near the top. And general orders prohibit soldiers
from going into mosques.
There are rare exceptions where if we have Muslim soldiers they can
coordinate with the locals for worship purposes but our soldiers do
not go into mosques. And again, without saying what is or is not on
the target list, it's a pretty safe assumption that we recognize the
importance of those shrines and you will not see American soldiers
going in there despite the reports that there have been hostile Iraqi
operating out of those mosques. It's a very tricky situation, which is
why we want to address it. But let me just stress that we hold the
mosque of Hussein in very, very high regard. And we recognize how
important they are. I cannot stress that enough.
Q: Do you have an indication of number of sensitive sites?
A: Thousands.  An unprecedented amount.
Q: Where do you rate Iraq in terms of its archeological treasures?
A: Priceless. It's the cradle of civilization. The source of so much
that we owe our culture to. It is absolutely priceless. From the
smallest excavation from a tiny, tiny village which lead to
agricultural patterns started thousands of years ago to whole social
structures. And we aren't just concerned with ancient Mesopotamia
structures but also those from the Golden Age of Islam, the 800's,
900's up until the medieval period. There are a number of priceless
structures as well. I can emphasize this all day. It's beyond rating.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)



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