10 March 2003
Bush Administration Says Saddam Must Live Up to Disarmament Obligations
(Official says UNSC Resolution 1441 "very clear") (3660) A senior Bush administration official said on March 7 that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 is "very clear" about what is required of the Iraqi regime, and that the March 17 deadline was implemented to "help to accommodate the concerns of some who wanted a deadline." But, the official said, "We believe that when the question is called, you're really only answering one question: has Saddam Hussein done what he agreed to do when he informed the Security Council that he was ready to try, yet again ... to live up to his disarmament obligations?" "I think there is no doubt that he has not," the official said. Asked about the March 17 deadline, the administration official said, "There is not much room for maneuver here because this has been 12 years and we've got to bring this to an end." In response to a question about what happens if the resolution is voted down, the official said then, "the President has made clear that we will still disarm Saddam Hussein." Following is the transcript of the March 7 briefing by a senior administration official: (begin transcript) THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary March 7, 2003 PRESS BRIEFING BY A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL The Roosevelt Room 5:25 P.M. EST SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I'll just take questions. Shoot. QUESTION: Could you walk us through what you expect to happen next week, and when we should expect the vote and what's the scenario if it's voted down, what happens then? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're clearly in the last phases here of diplomacy. The resolution was tabled today -- or an amended resolution, I should say. And I think you can expect that there will be fairly intense diplomacy and discussion over the next several days. And sometime next week, and I really don't -- can't say when, sometime next -- it's not that I can't say because I won't say; I don't think we know precisely when -- we'll call for a vote on the resolution. I think it's very important to actually have a vote, because everybody signed on to 1441, and this is a resolution that says it's time to defend 1441 and the obligations that it placed on Saddam Hussein. And so we think it's important that everybody take that vote. We will see whether we can pass the resolution. We are hopeful that the members of the Security Council are going to exercise their obligations, and it's going to be an intensive effort to persuade people to do that over the next several days. Q: Have you been given private assurances from either China or Russia -- either one or both -- that they will not veto the resolution? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have not been given private assurances of anything. Everybody is still in discussion. These are hard issues for people, clearly, but we believe that when the question is called, you're really only answering one question: Has Saddam Hussein done what he agreed to do when he informed the Security Council that he was ready to try, yet again, in the 17th resolution, to live up to his disarmament obligations? Resolution 1441 is a very clear resolution about what is required of the Iraqi regime. And so when the question is called, it's going to be: Has he filed a full and complete declaration -- and I don't think that there's any doubt that he has not -- and has he cooperated unconditionally, actively, immediately to discharge his disarmament obligations? And I think there is no doubt that he has not. Q: Is there anyone in this building that thinks there's a snowball's chance that Saddam is going to get a March 17th deadline, and suddenly he's going to be a changed man? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, nothing in his history would suggest that he lives up to obligations. As you know, we have thought for some time that the picture was becoming increasingly clear that he does not intend to take the one final opportunity afforded him by the Security Council. But if by March 17th, he has not demonstrated unequivocally that he is disarmed, or has taken that obligation seriously, then I think he will finally be out of final opportunities. Q: Could I follow up on that? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Q: What is the thinking behind this extension, this deadline this week that's been given here? Is it primarily for the allies? Or is there some sense that this might mean that he would come forward? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Both. Frankly, it is to try to help to accommodate the concerns of some who wanted a deadline, who thought a deadline was important. We never really thought that a deadline was necessary because 1441 says, "immediate." And when he started out by lying on his declaration, and deceiving the inspectors, and arranging interviews with people in either -- so that they were wired or in buildings where they could clearly be overheard, and when he wasn't showing us documents that the inspectors need, it was clear to us that he was not meeting the test of immediate and unconditional. Q: Is this the last or final amendment or change that you're going to make to the resolution, or would you consider something even more if they said, maybe this hasn't worked, we'll try something else? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we're still in a diplomatic phase, and we're still interested in people's views. But you'll notice that the amended resolution has certain characteristics. It is not an extension of just more time to the inspections. It does what 1441 did, which is to say again, this is about his compliance, his decision to comply, his decision to do the things that are necessary to show that he is prepared to disarm. So there are certain principles that we are not -- not setting aside here. That's one of them. Secondly, I can just assure you that this is coming to an end in short order. He's had a long time, 12 years, to do this. Q: Two quick ones. First of all, is there any chance, or what's the White House response to the French suggestion that the next Council meeting include or that there be a heads of state meeting? And then secondly, can the deadline -- do you think it will bring any of the undecideds along? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the hope is that it can accommodate some of the concerns that we and the British and Spanish have been hearing from some who thought that this was an important step. So, obviously, we would hope that it makes it easier for people to make the vote. But our view is, frankly, if you voted for 1441 and you're asked, has he complied with 1441, you have to say, no. But again, we're trying to accommodate some of the concerns that have been -- have come up. In terms of another meeting, we've had lots of meetings. There have been many, many meetings over the last 12 years. There have been a lot of meetings since the resolution was passed in November. It's time to get on with this vote. Q: Just one last thing. If the resolution doesn't pass, is the March 17th deadline still operational? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we'll have to see. I think we're still operating on the premise that we'll work as hard as we possibly can to pass the resolution, and we'll see what happens. Q: Can you give us a little sense, in the President's phone calls with world leaders -- he's now spoken to President Putin numerous times; the same with President Fox, and they've promised, with President Putin, at least, to keep in touch. How much is it negotiation versus kind of restating each other's opinions? I mean, picking up, I guess, where Suzanne was asking, are there still other negotiations that can happen that we can further accommodate concerns? Is that something we're looking at? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In any diplomatic process or diplomatic window, you're trying to accommodate people's concerns. And part of this is to try and understand better what people's concerns might be. It's also for the President to make very clear where he stands; to remind people that he cares a great deal about the United Nations and about the Security Council's credibility; to remind people that this has been a long struggle with Saddam Hussein of 12 years, and that he ought not get off the hook again. He always reminds people that he, of course, believes that he has plenty of authority to act, whatever happens in the Security Council, but that -- and he believes that he had that authority long before because of the previous resolutions in the Security Council, but that he went to the Security Council on the September 12th because he values the international community, he values the Security Council. And he reminds people of things like that. But it is always an effort to try to see if there's some way to bridge any remaining differences without doing violence to what are really very important principles now here. Resolution 1441 was very clear; it was a final opportunity. Saddam Hussein has not taken it, and now the Security Council has to act. Q: Going to the 17th, now, isn't it likely that what we'll see is sort of a repeat of what we have seen all along here, that he'll start to offer up more missiles or more chemicals, and by the time we reach the 17th, he'll have bolstered his case that much further? How are you going to keep it from becoming just another situation where you have to extend it again and again? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, obviously, you have to be willing to say that this means complete, unconditional -- he has to have done all the things, if you notice how the resolution is structured, that he should have done over the last three months. And people say, well, this is a short time line to do that. I think he knows where the documents are. It's not as if he has to go and -- go hunting for them. It was, frankly, kind of a joke when he put together commissions to go and find documents. Who are we kidding? When you put together commissions to go and dig up a few parts of a weapon here, or parts of a weapon there, who are we kidding? As Hans Blix himself said, mustard gas isn't marmalade, you're supposed to know what you did with it. The interviews -- who is he kidding that Iraqi citizens are saying, well, I can't do this interview unless I have an Iraqi minder there? When we know from intelligence that he's threatening people if they go and talk. One scientist just actually said, I would tell my other colleagues to take an Iraqi official with them as a witness. As a witness to whom? As a witness, of course, to the Iraqi government. So, yes, I am quite certain he will continue to try to play the game of I'll find a little bit more here, and a little bit more there; I'll offer up a little bit more cooperation because I'm under pressure. That's what he's done for the last 12 years. He believes that this is going to work. But this time, it's not going to work because what the resolution that was amended today really states is that 1441 was a final opportunity, and the final opportunity means final. Q: Two questions. The first is, you may remember on the campaign trail, the President used to tell the story, in a very different situation, but when he ran his first race, and somebody came up to him and said, you never asked for my vote -- has he, or will there be an opportunity in these negotiations with foreign leaders, where he will say, do I have your vote, I need your vote? Or is that just not the way it's done? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he will certainly say, I hope together we can affirm the willingness of the Security Council to enforce its own resolutions, and I need you to do that. He will say that. And I think it's an important thing to say to people. Q: And the follow-up is, on the second resolution and getting everybody to go on record, and calling for a vote no matter what the consequences, when was that decision made? And if it was made all along, why not announce it all along? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it really only became relevant when someplace people started floating that we might not go for a vote. And I don't think that was being floated in Washington, I think it was being floated in other capitals. It became extremely important to let people know that, even though we don't believe that a second resolution was a necessity -- the United States did not believe that a second resolution was a necessity -- when we decided to go for a second resolution, it was not to pull it down so that people didn't have to face up to this choice. Q: Can you describe in a little bit of detail what kind of diplomacy we're going to see in coming days? Will it be by telephone, will there be administration officials, like you or Secretary Powell fanning out other places, or visiting with people who are coming here, face to face negotiations? And secondly, the British have floated the idea of some sort of oil reserve administered by the U.N., to make sure that proceeds from Iraqi oil are -- go where they're supposed to go, and exports continue to go where they're supposed to go. That kind of thing. Do you guys have any views on that? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the most important thing about Iraqi resources, including oil, is that whatever happens, if we do have to go war, we want to protect those resources to the degree that we can, and then we want to make sure that they can be turned to the benefit of the Iraqi people. And that will be fundamentally different than what's been going on with skimmed-off oil proceeds to build presidential palaces and to buy weapons of mass destruction. So, yes, this is a concern. There already is, of course, the U.N., what's called oil-for-food program, but it's really an escrow account from which the Iraqis buy everything. And we'll be discussing with the U.N. how to deal with that. But the most important thing will be to make sure that however those resources are collected and made available, that they're made available to deal with the needs of the Iraqi people. In terms of how the diplomacy will unfold, we'll just have to see. The President, obviously, is going to spend a lot of time on the phone. I suspect that Secretary Powell and I will also spend a lot of time on the telephone. And if necessary, people are more than willing to travel. But we will see if that's necessary. I have a sense that there is -- there is an awful lot of contact going on, and we'll just see. Q: One more question -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll come back to you. I'm not leaving here just yet. (Laughter.) Q: Looking back over the last few months, is there any regret of the way the process was set up? You had to spend a lot of time explaining what you think the inspectors should look like, the way you put it, what inspections look like. There was no firm deadline. Is there a regret of the way it was set up that it's kind of led you to this place where you are right now? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will tell you, there are obviously some who wondered if we should bother with the U.N. and the Security Council and the inspections at all. But the President believed very strongly that Saddam Hussein is an outlaw for many reasons, but he's a unique outlaw because of the multiple abuses of Security Council resolutions that he has committed over the last 12 years. And so this is a U.N. matter. And so it made sense to go back to the United Nations. We recognized the problems with inspections, the challenge for inspectors. And so that's why 1441 was structured in the way that it was. It was not structured for the inspectors -- as it was in 1284 -- to kind of go and hunt and peck around the country and see what they could find. It wasn't structured to be "catch us if you can," which is the way that it had been done in the past, but rather to say, it's now his obligation. It shifted the burden of proof to him to bring this all out into the open in the way that South Africa did. So, no, we don't have any regrets. I think this is important. We've had an opportunity for the world to see who he really is, again to be reminded of who Saddam Hussein is. And we've had an opportunity, interestingly, to bring a lot of countries into this process who might have otherwise not been involved in it. I just mentioned some of the East European countries, for instance. But no, we don't regret it. I think it was the right thing to do. And I believe it will have a successful outcome. And I will say that once this is over, the diplomatic window is over, it will have to be said that the President of the United States did everything that he could to mobilize and unite the Security Council for the purposes of defending its own resolutions. Q: The President said last night he would give -- there would be a warning to journalists, inspectors and others in Iraq before war. Should the March 17th date be construed as that warning, or is that a separate issue? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say that everybody should, as we're moving toward deadlines, obviously watch very -- very carefully. The 17th will be a date by which this has to be done or the U.N. will be closing the diplomatic window. And at that point, obviously, the probability that serious consequences are going to follow for an Iraq that did not carry out its obligations is important. But I wouldn't read any specific time after that into the equation, only to say that the U.N. would then be closing the diplomatic window by the 17th. Q: So that's the end of U.N. diplomacy, as it were, then? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think at that point there certainly isn't going to be any more -- there aren't going to be other chances for him to disarm. Of course, there's always the chance he might leave the country, which would do everybody a favor. Last one. Q: Two questions. One is, some British officials are talking about some diplomatic wiggle room on the 17th, but actually have said the 17th -- but obviously, there's room to negotiate, the 18th or maybe the 20th. Would the U.S. be willing to entertain that kind of -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the room to maneuver is not very great. I don't want to try from here to try to manage what is going to be now an intensive diplomatic process. And I think we have to let the diplomacy play out and to see how we can continue to take people's concerns into consideration. But there is not much room for maneuver here because this has been 12 years and we've got to bring this to an end. Q: When next week the U.S. votes to say Saddam Hussein has missed his final opportunity, as of the 17th of March we are prepared to use force, that will look to the international community like a decision by the U.S. to go to war, is willing to go to war. How does that square with the White House position that the President has not yet taken a decision, and with the President's decision so far not to go to the American people to announce a decision to go to war -- when will he make that move to the American people? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, at the appropriate time, if that is what he has to do. I mean, we're still -- again, we're still in the diplomatic phase. I suppose it's still possible that Saddam Hussein could decide that he's going to fully disarm. Or he could decide that he's going to do everybody a favor and leave the country. But at the appropriate time, if the President decides that he's going to commit force, he will most certainly talk to the American people. Q: Can I just get clarified one thing -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. Q: Jean Cummings' question. You just said the 17th the U.N. closes the diplomatic window. But if the Security Council voted down the resolution prior to the 17th, would you still try to negotiate until then? Or is -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I was asked about the 17th in the context of the resolution. I think we still are working on the premise that we will have the intensive diplomacy, we'll get a vote, and that we will get the vote that need. If that is not the case, then the President has made clear that we will still disarm Saddam Hussein. And we'll have to see how that plays in terms of timing. Q: That theoretically could happen before the 17th? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to see. Okay? Thank you. Q: Thank you. END 5:43 P.M. EST (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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