Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=03/28/2003

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01286

TITLE=IRAQ'S FINAL CHANCE?

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: A "further final chance" for Iraq to disarm? Next, On the Line.

[music]

Host: The United States, Britain and Spain are calling on the United Nations Security Council to make good its Resolution 1441. That resolution promised serious consequences if Iraq failed to disarm. U-S officials have presented evidence to the U-N demonstrating that the regime of Saddam Hussein is in material breach of U-N demands. "The Iraqi regime is not disarming as required by last Fall's unanimous vote of the Security Council," President George W. Bush said. "One way or another," he said, "Saddam Hussein will be disarmed." Laying the diplomatic groundwork for disarming Iraq, the U-S, Britain and Spain have introduced to the Security Council a new draft resolution stating that Iraq is not in compliance with 1441. Laying the military groundwork for disarming Iraq, the U-S and its allies continue to pour forces into the region. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that these preparations have left Iraq "two weeks or so" to disarm. Will the U-N lend its weight to the conclusion that Iraq must be disarmed by force? I'll ask my guests: Joshua Muravchik, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; and joining us by telephone, Peter Beinart, editor of the New Republic magazine. Welcome and thanks for joining us today.

Joshua Muravchik, what are the U.S., Britain, and Spain trying to do at the U-N right now?

Muravchik: I think the essence of the resolution that's being introduced is a kind of final affirmation that Iraq has been in violation of its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions and under the cease-fire that Iraq itself signed in order to end the war in 1991.

Host: Now, is there anything in the previous resolutions that says who is to be the arbiter or final arbiter of whether Iraq is complying with those resolutions?

Muravchik: No, that was left vague and it was the U.S. position that there was no need for a further resolution. But I think that President Bush feels that his main allies in this, especially Prime Minister Tony Blair, are under a lot of pressure from public opinion in their countries, and that it will strengthen their hand if we can get an additional Security Council resolution saying that Iraq is not in compliance.

Host: Peter Beinart, are you there by phone?

Beinart: Yes.

Host: Hi. How are you doing?

Beinart: Well. Thanks.

Host: What is particularly in this resolution that the U.S., Britain, and Spain have put forward to the Security Council?

Beinart: Well, the important thing is that it declares Iraq in material breach, and what everyone understands is that that's diplomatic language for authorization to go to war. And the real question is, would countries like France and Russia and China rather go along with this, so they can at least have some role in shaping this war and the outcome? Or would they oppose it and take the chance that maybe this ever could be derailed?

Host: What are your senses at this point of the likelihood that the resolution will go through as is?

Beinart: I think that, my guess is that, there is at least a fifty percent chance that the U.S. could get abstentions from Russia, China, and France. My hunch is that Russia is a critical factor here. I think they can get China to go along. And I think Russia -- something could probably be negotiated with Russia. And if that were the case, I think, France wouldn't want to be out there with the sole veto. So my suspicion is that, at the end of day, what you might get is a very kind of strange situation where you had a majority of countries voting yes, a couple of them voting no -- like Syria and Germany -- and the U.S. and Britain voting yes, and then maybe three abstentions. Which would be a situation where the United States could claim it has Security Council backing. But opponents of the war would say, well, this is a very strange kind of Security Council backing when three of five [permanent members] abstain.

Host: Let me play for you a bit of tape of Colin Powell recently in Tokyo, in which he talked about the evidence of this before the U-N at this point. Let's go to this tape.

[U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, February 23, 2003]

"The evidence is there. The evidence is clear. The evidence has been there for these past dozen years, and especially we have evidence up to 1998 when they threw out the inspectors. And so, it is not enough any longer to say, 'We don't want to take action because we don't see enough evidence or more evidence.' It is time to take action."

[end of Powell tape]

Host: Josh Muravchik, is the debate at the U-N at all over whether there actually is or is not evidence at this point that Saddam Hussein is material breach of U-N Resolution 1441 and previous resolutions?

Muravchik: I don't think the debate is over evidence at all. I think that's just a pretext. The point is, from all of these resolutions, and from the cease-fire agreement of 1991, that Iraq is supposed to step up and disclose all of its weapons and cooperate in getting rid of them. And no one can seriously say that they're not sure whether or not Iraq has done this. Iraq has violently, flagrantly defied the inspection system, the Security Council and so on all along. That's really not in question at all among serious people, among the honest people. What's in question is that there are any number of states in the Security Council that simply don't want war for whatever reasons, either because they identify with Iraq, or because they don't want -- I think in the case of France, the main goal is just to thwart U.S. policy whatever it is and wherever it is. Because, the main French goal is to feel bigger in comparison to the United States. And it is based on the French resentment that France is so weak in comparison to the United States.

Host: Peter Beinart, do you agree that the evidence per se is not the issue?

Beinart: I think that's basically right. I think this really has much more to do with bigger disagreements, as Joshua pointed out, particularly about the question of whether -- this war represents both an affirmation and an extension of American power in the post-Cold War world, in which there is only superpower. I think that is really larger issue of framing a lot of this. The countries that are opposed to this are worried about the extension of American power further into a new region of the world which traditionally hasn't been a basis of American power. I think that's really a lot of what this is about. And those countries essentially want to try to do anything to deal with Iraq which does not to lead to Iraq becoming a satellite state of the United States. Much of this debate is really not about Iraq as much as it is about American power.

Host: Joshua Muravchik, is then the debate at the U-N at this point more how to contain the U.S. than how to contain Iraq?

Muravchik: I think not just debate at the U-N, but whole debate is about -- I quite agree with Peter -- it's about American power and those who fear it. That's the reason why we're at the U-N in the first place. That is, for a long time, no one had taken the U-N terribly seriously as a body to adjudicate important disputes. But the demand for working through the U-N began to be voiced with increasing emphasis in Europe in the mid-1990s by states that wanted to constrain American power. And they came up with this platform that said they're opposed to any use of force without a mandate by the Security Council. This was actually first aired, this position, during some of the discussions about the possibility of NATO expansion, which was also seen as an expansion of American power. And the odd thing about this is that the U.N. Charter itself does not require U.N. Security Council authorization for all possible uses of force. It very clearly acknowledges that there are other bases in international law for the lawful use of force that are not predicated on a U.N. Security Council resolution.

Host: Peter Beinart, let's talk a little bit about what Josh brings up the issue of whether the U.N. is the proper place to get the authorization for the use of force. Richard Holbrooke, who was President Clinton's U.N. Ambassador, wrote a recent opinion piece in which he urged the Bush administration not to waste time pursuing an unnecessary second resolution here, and said that it was a very bad idea to pursue a resolution. Why does he make that argument?

Beinart: There is a feeling, and it may be right, that the best and strongest card the Bush administration has always had in this whole effort is the basic feeling amongst leaders around the world, that we, if necessary, would go it alone -- that this train had left station. And there's always been, this whole thing has always had the element of "confidence game" in it, in the sense that, if countries really believed America was going to do this, no matter what, period, then in the end of day, they would probably find it within their interest to go along, rather than be looking from the outside. And I think part of Holbrooke is getting at is that, once America starts to show indecision, or makes people think they [other countries] can really stop this, then all of a sudden the momentum starts to go the other way. But the countervailing pressure comes from the fact that, for good for ill, in much of the world, and particularly in Europe, the U.N. Security Council is seen as having a special credibility. And that comes into play particularly importantly in the domestic politics of countries, as Josh said, like Britain and Spain -- where public opinion is violently against American war without the Security Council, but [where] if you get Security Council approval, the public opinion polls change quite significantly. And I think Bush administration does deserve some credit, for not leaving its very close in loyal allies, like Tony Blair, hanging like this.

Host: Joshua Muravchik, at what point does the pursuit of an another U.N. resolution become counterproductive?

Muravchik: I think we're pursuing it now and it's going to happen quickly. So, I'm not so concerned about pursuing the second resolution. I think we owe it, as Peter was just saying, we owe it to those leaders who have stood with us. I think there's a stronger reason to question whether it was a good idea in first place to bring this to the Security Council. And certainly with the passage of time, the momentum has built among the opponents of U.S. action in Iraq. And maybe we ought to have done this, to have gone ahead with it, many months ago. And as I said, I don't think there was any legal need to go back to the Security Council the first time. Now that we've done it and there has been this buildup of public opinion, I think we have to be very solicitous of [Tony] Blair and [Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria] Aznar, and the other leaders who have allied themselves with us even in the face of their own public opinion.

Host: Peter Beinart, you've mentioned a couple of times an expectation that, at the end of the day, countries like France would come along with the U.S. and a "coalition of the willing," or in voting for a further U.N. resolution. Do you think though, that as this has played out that there's any likelihood that France has painted itself into a corner on this that it won't be able to get out of?

Beinart: Well, sure. I don't think I was saying that France would vote yes. I don't think France would vote yes. I think France might abstain. The French government is caught between domestic political pressures which are very strongly anti-war -- and for the matter anti-war almost throughout continent, even in the countries like those in Eastern Europe where the governments are more supportive -- but [the French government] fears what would happen if America did go to war and depose Saddam Hussein and France had no role in a future post-Saddam Iraqi government. So my suspicion is that, if France finds itself as the lone veto, it won't veto. But if it can veto with one other country, if it could veto with Russia or with Russia and China, then I think it [France] would do it [would veto], and gamble -- I think probably wrongly -- but still gamble that it might be able to still stop this.

Host: Joshua Muravchik, do you think that France will abstain or veto?

Muravchik: I have no idea what they're going to do. But I think that France may not be in such a bind. It has materially raised its profile and, at least for the moment, its influence on the world stage. It's now the other superpower -- the main rival of the United States. And I think that Monsieur Chirac may glory in that for a while, and French public opinion may glory in it for a while. I think that if you look in the longer term, those countries that have made it a point to make themselves America's adversaries have not made out very well. But for the moment I think France is on a roll.

Host: Peter Beinart, what have France and Germany proposed with regard to making the U.N. inspection regime more robust.

Beinart: There was this proposal that was out there a week or two ago to dramatically beef up the inspections -- many more inspections, more U2 [surveillance plane] overflights, maybe even some kind of international peace-keeping force. And I don't think these proposals are bad in the abstract. In fact, ironically, if France had proposed them before September 11th, or sometime during the 1990s, when the sanctions and inspections regime were weakening and weakening, I think they would have represented some very encouraging movement. The problem is not the proposals per se, it's the fundamental reality that Saddam Hussein only acquiesces to inspections when a gun is to his head. And all his past behavior suggests that the minute the gun of American military force is no longer there -- and it can't be sustained indefinitely, we can't be on the verge of war for months and months and months like this -- that he will go back to doing exactly what he did in the 1990s, which is stonewalling. So the proposals aren't bad in and of themselves, but I think they ignore the fundamental political reality that, the minute war is not on the table, Saddam Hussein is not only not going to accept some kind of beefed-up inspections process, he's not even going to be willing to cooperate to the extent that he is now.

Host: Josh Muravchik, Peter Beinart talks about how Saddam Hussein's expectation that he might actually be met with military force changes his calculations. How has this ongoing debate at the U.N., and the opposition put forward by France and Germany, affected Saddam Hussein's calculations?

Muravchik: It certainly has encouraged him to resist. But I would stop short -- I feel very disgusted at the behavior of France and Germany on the whole in this crisis -- but I would stop short of making the accusation that, if they were [only] showing more unity with the United States that Saddam would be behaving differently. His bottom line has been to defy us. He defied us right to the end in 1990, 1991. No doubt his defiance his encouraged by the kind of feeling he has that he's got support around the world. But he's made amply clear over all these years that he's not going to comply with the full demand for disarming of his weapons of mass destruction.

Host: Peter Beinart, do you think that Saddam Hussein at this point thinks he can still avoid being disarmed forcibly by the U.S.?

Beinart: I don't know. This is always one of the questions about Saddam Hussein -- and it was this way before the first gulf war -- what kind of information is he really getting, how much of a kind of bubble is he in? I think that there were some reports that the Iraqi government took a great deal of solace from the anti-war protests. And again -- to follow Josh -- I'm not suggesting that the anti-war protests were meant to provide solace to Saddam Hussein, but I do think that Saddam may think that the tide is turning against the U.S. This is not a guy with a history of predicting well, or of taking the more responsible course. He tends to take very bad risks. And you also have to recognize that he probably is much more aware than all of us are that something that showed abject weakness in the face of American pressure could imperil him at home. Certainly there are many people who would like to see him gone in his own country. So I guess my suspicion, based on past experience, is that although there might be some last, last-minute flurry {such as] a greater discussion of exile in the minutes leading up to a war, Saddam won't go.

Host: Josh Muravchik, the U.S. has made it clear time and again that, even without further U.N. resolutions, it plans to disarm Saddam Hussein. Is there any chance that the U.S. is going to back down from that at this point?

Muravchik: I would be tremendously surprised if the U.S. backed off that. I'm not privy to the inner workings of the U.S. administration, but I can't recall in my experience any time in which a U.S. administration has given such strong indications of what it intends to do, so repeatedly, starting with the president in the strongest words and then going through his top officials -- including officials who were thought to dissent from the policy, like Secretary of State Powell, according to news reports about what went on inside the administration. They're all putting out the same message. And for them to turn around and back down from it at the last minute would be really stunning.

Host: Peter Beinart, I'm afraid we only have about thirty seconds left, but maybe you can answer, what would be the effect for the U.N. if the U.S. does go forward after the U.N. fails to pass an extra resolution?

Beinart: It will alienate the United States from the U.N., and I think probably set a precedent that the United States does not go to the U.N. for its military endeavors. And in that way, it will certainly weaken the U.N. Although I think we should say, in the name of all honesty, that the United States and particularly the Bush administration, has not historically shown much interest in an empowered U.N.

Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have for today. I'd like to thank our guests, Josh Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute, and joining us by telephone, Peter Beinart of the New Republic magazine. Before we go, I'd like to invite our audience to send us your questions or comments. You can email them to OntheLine@ibb.gov. For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.