25 February 2003
Negroponte Calls Al Samoud 2 Missile Only Part of Iraq Problem
(U.N. ambassador's remarks after Security Council consultations) (1880) Iraq would have to have "a major, drastic, dramatic change in attitude" toward the disarmament process, not just destroy the Al Samoud 2 missiles, in order to stop the United States and its allies from proceeding with the new resolution in the Security Council, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Negroponte said February 24. Speaking with journalists after a closed Security Council meeting during which the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain presented a new resolution on Iraq, Negroponte said, "nothing that we have seen in the preceding weeks and months would encourage us to believe that that could happen." The draft resolution states that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity to disarm afforded it by U.N. Security Council resolution 1441, which was passed unanimously in November 2002. "It's not as if we rushed to judgment" on the new draft resolution, Negroponte said. "The president brought this issue to the United Nations on September 12. It took us seven weeks to negotiate resolution 1441. And we think that now, after more than 90 days, it's become amply apparent that Iraq does not intend to comply with the provisions of 1441." The Al Samoud 2 missiles, which the U.N. weapons inspectors have instructed Saddam Hussein to destroy by March 1, "would have a capability of to deliver weapons of mass destruction," Negroponte pointed out. "So even if he were to destroy those missiles, it would just be a very, very small part of what is actually required and called for by the situations," Negropone said. "[I]t doesn't come anywhere near to fulfilling all that is required of the government of Iraq." Negroponte called a French-German-Russian proposal to prioritize the key remaining disarmament tasks, set timelines, and increase the number of inspectors "much more process than substance." "We don't see it as contributing to the disarmament of Iraq and we view that paper with deep skepticism," the ambassador said. Following is a transcript of the ambassador's comments: (begin transcript) Remarks by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on Iraq, at the Security Council Stakeout, February 24, 2003 Ambassador Negroponte: As you heard earlier from Ambassador Greenstock, the United Kingdom has tabled a draft resolution this afternoon, which will be cosponsored by the United States and Spain. Last November, after more than eleven years of Iraqi non-compliance with the sixteen relevant resolutions, the Council passed Resolution 1441. Since then, after nearly four months and five reports to this Council by the heads of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, it is clear that Iraq has failed to avail itself of the final opportunity Resolution 1441 offered. Resolution 1441 was quite explicit. The requirements placed on Iraq were clear. And unfortunately what we have seen is more of the same: no truth, no real cooperation and, most importantly, no real disarmament. It is now apparent that instead of seizing this final opportunity, Iraq has tried to continue business-as-usual. But the Council -- the Security Council -- must not allow itself to return to business-as-usual on Iraq. By presenting this resolution, we hope to clarify the thinking on Iraq. There has been a lot of talk recently about "bench marks". Resolution 1441 is the benchmark. And Iraq failed the two basic tests set forth in that resolution. We have not received a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programs and we have not seen immediate, unconditional and active cooperation with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Resolution 1441 is not about inspections. It is about disarmament. And we have not seen what this Council insisted on seeing - a strategic decision to disarm. That is the bar set by Resolution 1441. And Iraq is immensely far from reaching that bar, and we all know it. We have listened carefully to the many voices calling for more time. But 11 years, 10 months and 23 days is more than enough time for Saddam Hussein to prove that he has disarmed. We gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to disarm precisely because we wanted to be sure of ourselves. We gave Iraq more time after the briefing on January 27 by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, now almost a month ago. We now believe that it is abundantly clear that Iraq has refused to disarm and has no intention of doing so. In the days ahead, we look forward to working with Council colleagues towards the prompt adoption of this very straightforward draft resolution. Iraq itself must bear the consequences of its continued disregard for the Council resolutions. Yes, sir? Reporter: Mr. Ambassador, if Saddam Hussein carries through on his threat, which will be aired by Dan Rather later this evening, not to destroy the Al Samouds. We have a deadline coming up of Saturday. What will be the U.S. position if that deadline passes, Saddam carries through on his threats and those missiles are still in the same status next week that they are now? (inaudible) Ambassador Negroponte: Well, I - he shouldn't have those missiles in the first place. They were developed in violation of disarmament obligations undertaken, or imposed upon, Iraq all the way back in 1991. But let me just add, as the President said in Crawford, Texas on Saturday, those missiles are just the tip of the iceberg. We're talking about some missiles that have a capability, or would have a capability, to deliver weapons of mass destruction, but we're not talking about the WMD themselves. The biological weapons, the chemical weapons, the nuclear programs, and all the other concerns that have been enumerated on numerous occasions. So, even if he were to destroy those missiles, it would just be a very, very small part of what is actually required and called for by the situation. Reporter: What happens if the Blix deadline comes and goes? That's going to be in the next few days. Ambassador Negroponte: I'm not going to enter into that conjecture. But it seems to me that he would do well to comply with that demand on the part of UNMOVIC. All I'm saying is, that even if he were to comply with that request, it doesn't come anywhere near to fulfilling all that is required of the government of Iraq. Yes? Over there. Over there. Reporter: Politically, how important is the Blix report for you to convince other Council members to get on board? Ambassador Negroponte: Well, I think we've tabled a very reasonable resolution. We've taken, it's not exactly as if we've rushed to judgment on this. The President brought this issue to the United Nations on September 12. It took us seven weeks to negotiate Resolution 1441. And we think that now, after more than 90 days, it's become amply apparent that Iraq does not intend to comply with the provisions of 1441. And we think that this is a draft resolution that is deserving, fully deserving, of the support of the other members of the Council. I don't want to prejudge what their position is going to be -- that is the process we're about to enter into over the next days. But, as others may have already pointed out to you, we will have consultations on Thursday on this resolution. And in this process, we would hope and expect that other Council members would share our view that this resolution deserves the Council support. Yes, sir? Reporter: What is the date for the U.S. invasion? Ambassador Negroponte: The -- Reporter: Mr. Ambassador - Ambassador Negroponte: Yes, sir? Reporter: You've said you have (inaudible). Are you not willing to wait until Dr. Blix comes back before the Council either March 5 or March 6, March 7, and then have a vote the following week? Or do you want it earlier than that? Ambassador Negroponte: I think we fully expect to hear from Dr. Blix next week. And as Ambassador Greenstock told the Council today, and it's certainly our position, that a reasonable amount of time needs to be allowed for not only delegations here to consider this draft, but to refer it to their capitals, get instructions and also to allow for communication between ministers of the 15 Security Council members. So, we're talking about a reasonable amount of time, but we're certainly not talking about seven weeks, as it took to negotiate Resolution 1441. This resolution is very straightforward, very simple, and it simply does not require that kind of time in order to be satisfactorily negotiated. Yes, sir? Reporter: (in Spanish) Mr. Ambassador, is there some relation, in time, between (inaudible) and military imperatives in the gulf (inaudible) window? Ambassador Negroponte: (in Spanish) I can't comment on military questions, but I would say that the diplomatic window is now closing and urge the passage of this resolution. We think this is a very reasonable draft that merits the favorable consideration of council members. Reporter: Mr. Ambassador, you say you do not agree with the French resolution of 120 days - that is not your timeframe? Ambassador Negroponte: Well, I'm not going to get into a discussion of specific time periods now but I would say time is short. The time for diplomatic action is narrowing rapidly and I would by way of comment on the French, Russian, German proposal say that as far as we're concerned, this is much more process than substance. We don't see it as contributing to the disarmament of Iraq and we view that paper with deep skepticism. I'll take one last question. Yes, sir? Reporter: I'm curious, why is the time running out? Why is the window now - what happens in 60 days? What happens after that that can't be corrected? Ambassador Negroponte: Well, I think we have been fairly clear all along. If you want to go back to Secretary Powell's briefing of the Council on the 5 of February, Iraq has mobilized an entire organization whose sole purpose in life is to frustrate the inspection process. They have a major effort at denial and deception. They have not been forthcoming; they have not been truthful. We have laid out the many different reasons why we have reached the conclusion, the inescapable conclusion in our view, that Iraq is simply not serious about disarmament and it is that conclusion that has lead us to join our British colleagues and our Spanish colleagues in tabling this resolution today. Very last question. Reporter: Now that this resolution is tabled, what if anything, can Iraq do to avert the serious consequences that your resolution now talks about? Ambassador Negroponte: Well, the only thing I can think of is to have an absolutely drastic change in attitude towards the issue of disarmament and all that that entails. But again, I would emphasize that it would have to be a major, drastic, dramatic change in the attitude that that government has displayed towards the issue of disarming itself of weapons of mass destruction and nothing that we have seen in the preceding weeks and months would encourage us to believe that that could happen. Thank you very much. (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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