20 February 2003
Lieberman Submits Resolution on Reconstruction of Iraq
(Senator calls for transitional security force for Iraq) (1400) Senator Joseph Lieberman (Democrat of Connecticut) has introduced a resolution into the Senate on how the United States should proceed to reconstruct Iraq, if the U.S. resorts to military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Lieberman, the Democratic Party's 2000 nominee for Vice President, and a declared candidate for the party's 2004 Presidential nomination, submitted Senate Joint Resolution 6 (S.J. Res. 6) to the Senate February 13. The proposed resolution also calls for the United States to undertake sweeping initiatives to resolve long-standing disputes in the Middle East such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Syrian government's support for terrorist organizations. S. J. Res. 6 was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for further action. The proposed resolution urges the Bush administration to develop a plan "to reconstitute security, law, and justice institutions in Iraq and to restore to Iraqis the responsibility for managing their own affairs as quickly as is practicable." President Bush, S.J. Res. 6 says, should develop plans "for diplomatic initiatives to take advantage of any opportunity to influence political developments in the Middle East following a conflict in Iraq." S.J. Res. 6 urges President Bush to offer Iran "the opportunity to discuss with the United States" an end to Tehran's support of "terrorism and weapons proliferation." Following is the text of Senate Joint Resolution 6 from the Congressional Record: (begin text) Introduced in Senate SJ 6 IS 108th CONGRESS 1st Session S. J. RES. 6 Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to planning the reconstruction of Iraq. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES February 13, 2003 Mr. LIEBERMAN introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations JOINT RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to planning the reconstruction of Iraq. Whereas the United States may soon confront the need to defend with military force its national security and the security of its allies from the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq; Whereas such action will serve not only to end Saddam's pernicious threat to peace and security, but also to give the people of Iraq a new dawn of hope, liberated from a disgraceful tyrant who oppresses their liberty, abuses their humanity, and robs them of their future; Whereas the President's January 20, 2003 report to Congress pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243) provides a brief conceptual overview of the future of Iraq but provides no detail on executive branch planning or legislation that may be necessary and, most importantly, no estimates of the funding and other support from Congress that would be necessary for carrying out the reconstruction of Iraq; Whereas Congress has become increasingly concerned that the President has not provided adequate information regarding plans for the reconstruction of Iraq following a war, should that eventuality arise; Whereas United States experience with reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan offers useful lessons for improving future post-war reconstruction efforts; Whereas the lessons learned during the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, a far less complex and difficult endeavor, suggest that United States policymakers should give careful attention to planning the task of reconstruction in Iraq following a war; Whereas with Iraq the United States has the opportunity and the responsibility to avoid the mistakes made during the reconstruction of Afghanistan; Whereas success in the reconstruction of Iraq will require answers to many critical questions in advance; and Whereas United States actions in Iraq may well present the opportunity for diplomatic initiatives in the broader Middle East region: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of Congress that the President should-- (1) estimate the funds and resources that are necessary for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq and submit those estimates to Congress in order that Congress may as quickly as feasible fulfill its constitutional functions and ensure the timely availability of funds; (2) design a transitional security force for Iraq, taking into consideration-- (A) the oversight, authority, jurisdiction, and mandate of the security force; (B) the composition of the security force, whether composed of United States military personnel, civilians, or contractors, foreign nationals, personnel or troops contributed by other nations, or other individuals; (C) the utility of asking other nations to contribute to such a security force; (D) plans to assure the personal security of the interim Iraqi leadership; and (E) the additional funds and personnel that may be necessary for support of the security force; (3) develop a plan to reconstitute security, law, and justice institutions in Iraq and to restore to Iraqis the responsibility for managing their own affairs as quickly as is practicable, taking into consideration-- (A) actions necessary to dismantle Iraq's military forces and its multiple security forces and replace them with reconstituted military, police, law enforcement, and judicial institutions; (B) standards and methods for recruiting Iraqi nationals to those institutions and for purging from the existing forces individuals loyal to Saddam Hussein or guilty of serious human rights abuses; (C) the question of which officials in the executive branch of the United States Government are appropriate to perform United States responsibilities for carrying out the plan; and (D) the additional funds and personnel that may be necessary to carry out the plan; (4) develop a plan to respond to the humanitarian needs of an Iraqi population already in humanitarian crisis, taking into consideration-- (A) mechanisms and methods for carrying out humanitarian relief efforts; (B) the appointment of a transition coordinator, transitional administrator, or other individual responsible for ensuring coordination of both civilian and military efforts to organize relief; (C) the utility of urging Iraqi opposition groups to appoint individuals to undertake relief coordination, in cooperation with the coordinator, in order to avoid pursuing conflicting purposes, duplicating efforts, or so failing to address issues in a timely fashion that the issues become humanitarian disasters; and (D) any need for a more robust response to calls for pledges toward a relief fund, a fund to which the United States has to date pledged only $15,000,000; (5) carefully consider the most crucial security threat, the need to secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical precursors, in order to ensure that they are neither stolen nor transferred to terrorists or other parties inimical to the United States during the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's government; (6) develop measures necessary to temporarily steward Iraq's natural resources, in order to ensure that-- (A) Iraq's oil wealth is preserved so that it may be directed, at long last, not toward constructing palaces and weapons of mass destruction, but instead toward fulfilling the needs and future of the people of Iraq; (B) Iraq's oil fields, particularly those in the southern part of the country, are secured from sabotage by Saddam Hussein as his regime collapses; (C) contingency plans exist to react to and repair any damage Saddam Hussein may choose to inflict in retreat; and (D) mechanisms and systems, including anti-corruption measures, are implemented to ensure in the interim that Iraqi oil revenues are properly collected and accounted for and used in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the Iraqi people; (7) make provisions to establish an interim government and to ensure that it commands popular legitimacy, much as the Loya Jirga has for President Karzai's government in Afghanistan, in order that the interim government may administer the Iraqi state, draft a constitution, prepare and carry out elections, maintain security, and execute other appropriate functions; (8) plan to organize debtor and donor conferences in order to restructure Iraq's debt and post-Persian Gulf War obligations and accumulate sufficient resources to fund the needs of an interim government during transition; and (9) develop plans for diplomatic initiatives to take advantage of any opportunity to influence political developments in the Middle East following a conflict in Iraq, including-- (A) pressing for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; (B) engaging Syria and Lebanon in ending their sponsorship of terrorism; and (C) offering Iran the opportunity to discuss with the United States an end to Iran's support of terrorism and weapons proliferation. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
