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11 February 2003

Text: U.S. Would Have Five Objectives in Post-War Iraq, Official Says

(Defense Under Secretary Feith testifies to Senate panel) (3400)
If there is a war with Iraq, "the United States would approach its
post-war work with a two-part resolve: a commitment to stay and a
commitment to leave," says Douglas Feith, under secretary of defense
for policy.
Feith, in prepared testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee February 11, said the United States would stay in Iraq long
enough to achieve five objectives: the liberation of the Iraqi people;
the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the
elimination of its terrorist infrastructure; the safeguarding of its
territorial integrity; and the beginning of its political and economic
reconstruction.
"But it is important to stress also that the United States would have
a commitment to leave as soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to the
Iraqi people. Iraq does not and will not belong to the United States,
the coalition or to anyone else," Feith said.
"As Iraqi officials are able to shoulder their country's
responsibilities, and they have in place the necessary political and
other structures to provide food, security and the other necessities,
the United States and its coalition partners will want them to run
their own affairs," Feith said. "[O]ur goal is to transfer as much
authority as possible, as soon as possible, to the Iraqis themselves."
The Defense Department has created the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance in order to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq, Feith
said. It is charged with establishing links with U.N. specialized
agencies and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that would be
expected to play a role in a post-war Iraq, he said. The plans that
the office has made would be administered by the commander of U.S.
Central Command, General Tommy Franks, Feith said.
Chief among those plans is eliminating Iraq's WMD. Feith said this
will be "a huge undertaking."
"We must first locate Iraq's widespread WMD sites. ... After
hostilities, we will have to dismantle, destroy or dispose of nuclear,
chemical, biological and missile capabilities and infrastructure,"
Feith said. "Equally important will be plans to re-direct some of
Iraq's dual-use capability and its scientific and managerial talent to
legitimate, civilian activities in a new Iraq," he said.
Moving to the topic of oil, Feith said, "[W]e have reason to believe
that Saddam's regime is planning to sabotage Iraq's oil fields." He
said the U.S. administration has decided that in the event of war, the
U.S.-led coalition would protect Iraq's oil fields from acts of
sabotage, and rapidly begin reconstruction and operation of the oil
sector. The aim would be to preserve the fields "as a national asset
of the Iraqi people."
Following is the text of Feith's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS J. FEITH UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS U.S. SENATE 11 February 2003
Post-War Planning
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you today about
efforts underway in the Defense Department and the U.S. government to
plan for Iraq in the post-conflict period, should war become
necessary.
If U.S. and other coalition forces take military action in Iraq, they
will, after victory, have contributions to make to the country's
temporary administration and the welfare of the Iraqi people. It will
be necessary to provide humanitarian relief, organize basic services
and work to establish security for the liberated Iraqis.
Our work will aim to achieve the objectives outlined by my colleague,
Under Secretary of State Grossman:
-- First, demonstrate to the Iraqi people and the world that the
United States aspires to liberate, not occupy or control them or their
economic resources.
-- Second, eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, its
nuclear program, the related delivery systems, and the related
research and production facilities. This will be a complex, dangerous
and expensive task.
-- Third, eliminate likewise Iraq's terrorist infrastructure. A key
element of U.S. strategy in the global war on terrorism is exploiting
the information about terrorist networks that the coalition acquires
through our military and law enforcement actions.
-- Fourth, safeguard the territorial unity of Iraq. The United States
does not support Iraq's disintegration or dismemberment.
-- Fifth, begin the process of economic and political reconstruction,
working to put Iraq on a path to become a prosperous and free country.
The U.S. government shares with many Iraqis the hope that their
country will enjoy the rule of law and other institutions of democracy
under a broad-based government that represents the various parts of
Iraqi society.
If there is a war, the United States would approach its post-war work
with a two-part resolve: a commitment to stay and a commitment to
leave.
-- That is, a commitment to stay as long as required to achieve the
objectives I have just listed. The coalition cannot take military
action in Iraq -- to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and the
Iraqi tyranny's threats to the world as an aggressor and supporter of
terrorism -- and then leave a mess behind for the Iraqi people to
clean up without a helping hand. That would ill serve the Iraqis,
ourselves and the world.
-- But it is important to stress also that the United States would
have a commitment to leave as soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to
the Iraqi people. Iraq does not and will not belong to the United
States, the coalition or to anyone else.
As Iraqi officials are able to shoulder their country's
responsibilities, and they have in place the necessary political and
other structures to provide food, security and the other necessities,
the United States and its coalition partners will want them to run
their own affairs. We all have an interest in hastening the day when
Iraq can become a proud, independent and respected member of the
community of the world's free countries.
U.S. post-war responsibilities will not be easy to fulfill and the
United States by no means wishes to tackle them alone. We shall
encourage contributions and participation from coalition partners,
non-governmental organizations, the U.N. and other international
organizations and others. And our goal is to transfer as much
authority as possible, as soon as possible, to the Iraqis themselves.
But the United States will not try to foist burdens onto those who are
not in a position to carry them.
Security and Reconstruction
Administration officials are thinking through the lessons of
Afghanistan and other recent history. We have learned that
post-conflict reconstruction requires a balance of efforts in the
military sphere and the civil sphere. Security is promoted by progress
toward economic reconstruction. But economic reconstruction is hardly
possible if local business people, foreign investors and international
aid workers do not feel secure in their persons and property.
To encourage the coordinated, balanced progress of economic and
security reconstruction in a post-conflict Iraq, President Bush has
directed his administration to begin planning now.
The faster the necessary reconstruction tasks are accomplished, the
sooner the coalition will be able to withdraw its forces from Iraq,
and the sooner the Iraqis will assume complete control of their
country. Accordingly, the coalition officials responsible for
post-conflict administration of Iraq -- whether military or civilian,
from the various agencies of the governments -- will report to the
President through General Tom Franks, the Commander of the U.S.
Central Command, and the Secretary of Defense.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
To prepare for all this, the President directed on January 20 the
creation of a post-war planning office. Although located within the
policy organization in the Department of Defense, this office is
staffed by officials detailed from departments and agencies throughout
the government. Its job is detailed planning and implementation. The
intention is not to theorize but to do practical work -- to prepare
for action on the ground, if and when the time comes for such work. In
the event of war, most of the people in the office will deploy to
Iraq. We have named it the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance and we describe it as an "expeditionary" office.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is charged
with establishing links with the United Nations specialized agencies
and with non-governmental organizations that will play a role in
post-war Iraq. It will reach out also to the counterpart offices in
the governments of coalition countries, and, in coordination with the
President's Special Envoy to the Free Iraqis, to the various Free
Iraqi groups.
The immediate responsibility for administering post-war Iraq will fall
upon the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, as the commander of
the U.S. and coalition forces in the field. The purpose of the Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is to develop the
detailed plans that he and his subordinates will draw on in meeting
these responsibilities.
Various parts of the government have done a great deal of work on
aspects of post-war planning for months now. Several planning efforts
are underway.
An interagency working group led by the NSC staff and the Office of
Management and Budget has undertaken detailed contingency planning for
humanitarian relief in case of conflict with Iraq. The group also
includes members from the State Department, USAID, the Office of the
Vice-President, Treasury, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and the CIA. The group is linked to U.S. Central Command.
It has also established links with the U.N. specialized agencies and
NGOs involved in humanitarian relief efforts.
This group has developed a concept of operations that would:
-- facilitate U.N./NGO provision of aid,
-- establish Civil-Military Operations Centers by means of which U.S.
forces would coordinate provision of relief and
-- restart the U.N. ration distribution system using U.S. supplies
until U.N./NGOs arrive.
Other interagency groups are planning for:
-- the reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq,
-- vetting current Iraqi officials to determine with whom we should
work, and
-- post-war elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction [WMD].
The new planning office's function is to integrate all these efforts
and make them operational. It is building on the work done, not
reinventing it.
Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Detailed planning is underway for the task of securing, assessing and
dismantling Iraqi WMD capabilities, facilities and stockpiles. This
will be a huge undertaking. The Defense Department is building the
necessary capabilities.
This will be a new mission for the Department and for our nation. It
is complex and will take place as part of military operations,
continuing into the post-conflict period.
We must first locate Iraq's widespread WMD sites. We must then be
prepared to secure the relevant weapons or facilities, or rapidly and
safely disable them, so they are no longer a threat to coalition
forces. This will have to be done in many places and as quickly as
possible.
But the mission does not end there. After hostilities, we will have to
dismantle, destroy or dispose of nuclear, chemical, biological and
missile capabilities and infrastructure.
Equally important will be plans to re-direct some of Iraq's dual-use
capability and its scientific and managerial talent to legitimate,
civilian activities in a new Iraq.
Clearly, this will not be a mission that falls entirely to the U.S.
military forces. Other U.S. government personnel, including those
within the DoD, the Department of Energy's laboratory system, and in
other government agencies can contribute.
Coalition partners, including many NATO Allies, have nuclear, chemical
and biological defense-related capabilities and expertise that can
play an important role. The U.N., IAEA and other international
organizations should be in a position to contribute valuably to the
elimination effort and perhaps to ongoing monitoring afterward.
The task of eliminating all nuclear, chemical and biological
stockpiles, facilities and infrastructure will take time. We cannot
now even venture a sensible guess as to the amount. The new Iraqi
government will also have an important role to play.
Oil Infrastructure
The U.S. and its coalition allies may face the necessity of repairing
Iraq's oil infrastructure, if Saddam Hussein decides to damage it, as
he put the torch to Kuwait's oil fields in 1991. Indeed, we have
reason to believe that Saddam's regime is planning to sabotage Iraq's
oil fields. But even if there is no sabotage and there is no injury
from combat operations, some repair work will likely be necessary to
allow the safe resumption of operations at oil facilities after any
war-related stoppage.
Detailed planning is underway for resumption of oil production as
quickly as possible to help meet the Iraqi people's basic needs. The
oil sector is Iraq's primary source of funding. As noted, the United
States is committed to preserving Iraq's territorial integrity. So we
are intent on ensuring that Iraq's oil resources remain under national
Iraqi control, with the proceeds made available to support Iraqis in
all parts of the country. No one ethnic or religious group would be
allowed to claim exclusive rights to any part of the oil resources or
infrastructure. In other words, all of Iraq's oil belongs to all the
people of Iraq.
The administration has decided that, in the event of war, the U.S.-led
coalition would:
-- protect Iraq's oil fields from acts of sabotage and preserve them
as a national asset of the Iraqi people, and
-- rapidly start reconstruction and operation of the sector, so that
its proceeds, together with humanitarian aid from the United States
and other countries, can help support the Iraqi people's needs.
The administration has not yet decided on the organizational
mechanisms by which this sector should be operated. We shall be
consulting on this important matter with many parties in various
countries, including Iraqi experts and groups.
"No War for Oil"
This is a good point at which to address head-on the accusation that,
in this confrontation with the Iraqi regime, the administration's
motive is to steal or control Iraq's oil. The accusation is common,
reflected in the slogan "No War for Oil." But it is false and malign.
If there is a war, the world will see that the United States will
fulfill its administrative responsibilities, including regarding oil,
transparently and honestly, respecting the property and other rights
of the Iraqi state and people. The record of the United States in
military conflicts is open to the world and well known.
The United States became a major world power in World War II. In that
war and since, the United States has demonstrated repeatedly and
consistently that we covet no other country's property. The United
States does not steal from other nations. We did not pillage Germany
or Japan; on the contrary, we helped rebuild them after World War II.
After Desert Storm, we did not use our military power to take or
establish control over the oil resources of Iraq or any other country
in the Gulf region. The United States pays for whatever we want to
import. Rather than exploit its power to beggar its neighbors, the
United States has been a source of large amounts of financial aid and
other types of assistance for many countries for decades.
If U.S. motives were in essence financial or commercial, we would not
be confronting Saddam Hussein over his weapons of mass destruction. If
our motive were cold cash, we would instead downplay the Iraqi
regime's weapons of mass destruction and pander to Saddam in hopes of
winning contracts for U.S. companies.
The major costs of any confrontation with the Iraqi regime would of
course be the human ones. But the financial costs would not be small,
either. This confrontation is not, and cannot possibly be, a
money-maker for the United States. Only someone ignorant of the
easy-to-ascertain realities could think that the United States could
profit from such a war, even if we were willing to steal Iraq's oil,
which we emphatically are not going to do.
The Structure and Funding of the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance
Returning now to the new Pentagon Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance: There are three substantive operations within
the Office, each under a civilian coordinator: Humanitarian Relief,
Reconstruction, and Civil Administration. A fourth coordinator is
responsible for communications, logistics and budgetary support. These
operations are under the overall leadership of Jay Garner, a retired
Lieutenant General who held a senior military position in the 1991
humanitarian relief operation in northern Iraq. He is responsible for
organizing and integrating the work of the three substantive
operations and ensuring that the office can travel to the region when
necessary and plug in smoothly to CENTCOM's operations. His staff
consists of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense,
Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for
International Development and the Office of Management and Budget.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance has only just
begun the task of estimating the cost of post-war humanitarian
assistance. In addition, it is working to identify the projected
post-conflict costs of dealing with the Iraqi armed forces, including
the costs of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating Iraqi troops
into civilian society.
Except for the Defense Department, the USG is currently operating
under a FY 2003 continuing resolution. This has affected the level of
funding that can be made available now, as agencies have access only
to limited amounts of money.
In any case, the overall Iraq reconstruction and relief budget would
require a FY 2003 supplemental appropriation. Timing of a FY 2003
supplemental is important. Delays would hinder relief and
reconstruction programs.
As part of our post-war planning, CENTCOM has also established a
Combined Joint Task Force that will be responsible for U.S. and
coalition forces in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. The
task force will work closely with the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance to facilitate relief and reconstruction
activities.
The Responsibilities of Free Iraqis
Because the commander of the U.S. Central Command will have a key role
in administration in Iraq, many have thought that our plans for Iraq
are based on what the Allies did in Germany after World War II. But
that is not the case. Our intention, in case of war, would be to
liberate Iraq, not to occupy it.
Our administration would involve Iraqis as soon as possible, and we
would transfer responsibility to Iraqi entities as soon as possible.
Following the initial period of U.S./coalition military government, we
envisage a transitional phase in which responsibility is gradually
transferred to Iraqi institutions, leading to the eventual
establishment of a new Iraqi government in accordance with a new
constitution.
The following are examples of the ways in which Iraqis might play a
progressively greater role in administering the country. While final
decisions have not been made, and, in the nature of the case, cannot
be made until the actual circumstances are known, these examples
illustrate various mechanisms under consideration:
-- An Iraqi consultative council could be formed to advise the
U.S./coalition authorities.
-- A judicial council could undertake to advise the authorities on the
necessary revisions to Iraq's legal structure and statutes to
institute the rule of law and to protect individual rights.
-- A constitutional commission could be created to draft a new
constitution and submit it to the Iraqi people for ratification.
-- Major Iraqi governmental institutions -- such as the central
government ministries -- could remain in place and perform the key
functions of government after the vetting of the top personnel to
remove any who might be tainted with the crimes and excesses of the
current regime.
-- Town and district elections could be held soon after liberation to
involve Iraqis in governing at the local level.
Regarding post-war planning, much preparatory work has been done, but
much more remains. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance will serve as the U.S. government's nerve center for this
effort.
We look forward to consulting with this Committee and with the
Congress generally as we develop our ideas and plans for post-conflict
Iraqi reconstruction. War is not inevitable, but failing to make
contingency plans for its aftermath would be inexcusable.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)