Testimony of Douglas J. Feith Under Secretary of Defense for Policy before the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate
Statement by Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 11, 2003
Post-War Planning
Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee:
I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you today about
efforts underway in the Defense Department and the U.S. Government
to plan for Iraq in the post-conflict period, should war become
necessary.
If U.S. and other coalition forces take military action in Iraq,
they will, after victory, have contributions to make to the
country's temporary administration and the welfare of the Iraqi
people. It will be necessary to provide humanitarian relief,
organize basic services and work to establish security for the
liberated Iraqis.
Our work will aim to achieve the objectives outlined by my
colleague, Under Secretary of State Grossman:
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If there is a war, the United States would approach its post-war work with a two-part resolve: a commitment to stay and a commitment to leave.
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As Iraqi officials are able to shoulder their
country's responsibilities, and they have in place the necessary
political and other structures to provide food, security and the
other necessities, the United States and its coalition partners
will want them to run their own affairs. We all have an interest
in hastening the day when Iraq can become a proud, independent and
respected member of the community of the world's free countries.
U.S. post-war responsibilities will not be easy to fulfill and the
United States by no means wishes to tackle them alone. We shall
encourage contributions and participation from coalition partners,
non-governmental organizations, the UN and other international
organizations and others. And our goal is to transfer as much
authority as possible, as soon as possible, to the Iraqis
themselves. But the United States will not try to foist burdens
onto those who are not in a position to carry them.
Security and Reconstruction
Administration officials are thinking through the lessons of
Afghanistan and other recent history. We have learned that
post-conflict reconstruction requires a balance of efforts in the
military sphere and the civil sphere. Security is promoted by
progress toward economic reconstruction. But economic
reconstruction is hardly possible if local business people,
foreign investors and international aid workers do not feel secure
in their persons and property.
To encourage the coordinated, balanced progress of economic and
security reconstruction in a post-conflict Iraq, President Bush
has directed his administration to begin planning now.
The faster the necessary reconstruction tasks are accomplished,
the sooner the coalition will be able to withdraw its forces from
Iraq, and the sooner the Iraqis will assume complete control of
their country. Accordingly, the coalition officials responsible
for post-conflict administration of Iraq - whether military or
civilian, from the various agencies of the governments - will
report to the President through General Tom Franks, the Commander
of the U.S. Central Command, and the Secretary of Defense.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
To prepare for all this, the President directed on January 20 the
creation of a post-war planning office. Although located within
the Policy organization in the Department of Defense, this office
is staffed by officials detailed from departments and agencies
throughout the government. Its job is detailed planning and
implementation. The intention is not to theorize but to do
practical work - to prepare for action on the ground, if and when
the time comes for such work. In the event of war, most of the
people in the office will deploy to Iraq. We have named it the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and we
describe it as an "expeditionary" office.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is
charged with establishing links with the United Nations
specialized agencies and with non-governmental organizations that
will play a role in post-war Iraq. It will reach out also to the
counterpart offices in the governments of coalition countries,
and, in coordination with the President's Special Envoy to the
Free Iraqis, to the various Free Iraqi groups.
The immediate responsibility for administering post-war Iraq will
fall upon the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, as the
commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in the field. The
purpose of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance is to develop the detailed plans that he and his
subordinates will draw on in meeting these responsibilities.
Various parts of the government have done a great deal of work on
aspects of post-war planning for months now. Several planning
efforts are underway.
An interagency working group led by the NSC staff and the Office
of Management and Budget has undertaken detailed contingency
planning for humanitarian relief in case of conflict with Iraq.
The group also includes members from the State Department, USAID,
the Office of the Vice-President, Treasury, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the CIA. The group is
linked to US Central Command. It has also established links with
the UN specialized agencies and NGOs involved in humanitarian
relief efforts.
This group has developed a concept of operations that would:
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Other interagency groups are planning for:
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The new planning office's function is to
integrate all these efforts and make them operational. It is
building on the work done, not reinventing it.
Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Detailed planning is underway for the task of securing, assessing
and dismantling Iraqi WMD capabilities, facilities and stockpiles.
This will be a huge undertaking. The Defense Department is
building the necessary capabilities.
This will be a new mission for the Department and for our nation.
It is complex and will take place as part of military operations,
continuing into the post-conflict period.
We must first locate Iraq's widespread WMD sites. We must then be
prepared to secure the relevant weapons or facilities, or rapidly
and safely disable them, so they are no longer a threat to
coalition forces. This will have to be done in many places and as
quickly as possible.
But the mission does not end there. After hostilities, we will
have to dismantle, destroy or dispose of nuclear, chemical,
biological and missile capabilities and infrastructure.
Equally important will be plans to re-direct some of Iraq's
dual-use capability and its scientific and managerial talent to
legitimate, civilian activities in a new Iraq.
Clearly, this will not be a mission that falls entirely to the
U.S. military forces. Other U.S. government personnel, including
those within the DoD, the Department of Energy's laboratory
system, and in other government agencies can contribute.
Coalition partners, including many NATO Allies, have nuclear,
chemical and biological defense-related capabilities and expertise
that can play an important role. The UN, IAEA and other
international organizations should be in a position to contribute
valuably to the elimination effort and perhaps to ongoing
monitoring afterward.
The task of eliminating all nuclear, chemical and biological
stockpiles, facilities and infrastructure will take time. We
cannot now even venture a sensible guess as to the amount. The new
Iraqi government will also have an important role to play.
Oil Infrastructure
The U.S. and its coalition allies may face the necessity of
repairing Iraq's oil infrastructure, if Saddam Hussein decides to
damage it, as he put the torch to Kuwait's oil fields in 1991.
Indeed, we have reason to believe that Saddam's regime is planning
to sabotage Iraq's oil fields. But even if there is no sabotage
and there is no injury from combat operations, some repair work
will likely be necessary to allow the safe resumption of
operations at oil facilities after any war-related stoppage.
Detailed planning is underway for resumption of oil production as
quickly as possible to help meet the Iraqi people's basic needs.
The oil sector is Iraq's primary source of funding. As noted, the
United States is committed to preserving Iraq's territorial
integrity. So we are intent on ensuring that Iraq's oil resources
remain under national Iraqi control, with the proceeds made
available to support Iraqis in all parts of the country. No one
ethnic or religious group would be allowed to claim exclusive
rights to any part of the oil resources or infrastructure. In
other words, all of Iraq's oil belongs to all the people of Iraq.
The Administration has decided that, in the event of war, the
U.S.-led coalition would:
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The Administration has not yet decided on the
organizational mechanisms by which this sector should be operated.
We shall be consulting on this important matter with many parties
in various countries, including Iraqi experts and groups.
"No War for Oil"
This is a good point at which to address head-on the accusation
that, in this confrontation with the Iraqi regime, the
Administration's motive is to steal or control Iraq's oil. The
accusation is common, reflected in the slogan "No War for Oil."
But it is false and malign.
If there is a war, the world will see that the United States will
fulfill its administrative responsibilities, including regarding
oil, transparently and honestly, respecting the property and other
rights of the Iraqi state and people. The record of the United
States in military conflicts is open to the world and well known.
The United States became a major world power in World War II. In
that war and since, the United States has demonstrated repeatedly
and consistently that we covet no other country's property. The
United States does not steal from other nations. We did not
pillage Germany or Japan; on the contrary, we helped rebuild them
after World War II. After Desert Storm, we did not use our
military power to take or establish control over the oil resources
of Iraq or any other country in the Gulf region. The United States
pays for whatever we want to import. Rather than exploit its power
to beggar its neighbors, the United States has been a source of
large amounts of financial aid and other types of assistance for
many countries for decades.
If U.S. motives were in essence financial or commercial, we would
not be confronting Saddam Hussein over his weapons of mass
destruction. If our motive were cold cash, we would instead
downplay the Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruction and pander
to Saddam in hopes of winning contracts for U.S. companies.
The major costs of any confrontation with the Iraqi regime would
of course be the human ones. But the financial costs would not be
small, either. This confrontation is not, and cannot possibly be,
a money-maker for the United States. Only someone ignorant of the
easy-to-ascertain realities could think that the United States
could profit from such a war, even if we were willing to steal
Iraq's oil, which we emphatically are not going to do.
The Structure and Funding of the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance
Returning now to the new Pentagon Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance: There are three substantive operations
within the Office, each under a civilian coordinator: Humanitarian
Relief, Reconstruction, and Civil Administration. A fourth
coordinator is responsible for communications, logistics and
budgetary support. These operations are under the overall
leadership of Jay Garner, a retired Lieutenant General who held a
senior military position in the 1991 humanitarian relief operation
in northern Iraq. He is responsible for organizing and integrating
the work of the three substantive operations and ensuring that the
office can travel to the region when necessary and plug in
smoothly to CENTCOM's operations. His staff consists of
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice,
Treasury, Energy, and Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for
International Development and the Office of Management and Budget.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance has only
just begun the task of estimating the cost of post-war
humanitarian assistance. In addition, it is working to identify
the projected post-conflict costs of dealing with the Iraqi armed
forces, including the costs of disarming, demobilizing and
reintegrating Iraqi troops into civilian society.
Except for the Defense Department, the USG is currently operating
under a FY 2003 continuing resolution. This has affected the level
of funding that can be made available now, as agencies have access
only to limited amounts of money.
In any case, the overall Iraq reconstruction and relief budget
would require a FY 2003 supplemental appropriation. Timing of a FY
2003 supplemental is important. Delays would hinder relief and
reconstruction programs.
As part of our post-war planning, CENTCOM has also established a
Combined Joint Task Force that will be responsible for U.S. and
coalition forces in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of a conflict.
The task force will work closely with the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance to facilitate relief and
reconstruction activities.
The Responsibilities of Free Iraqis
Because the Commander of the U.S. Central Command will have a key
role in administration in Iraq, many have thought that our plans
for Iraq are based on what the Allies did in Germany after World
War II. But that is not the case. Our intention, in case of war,
would be to liberate Iraq, not to occupy it.
Our administration would involve Iraqis as soon as possible, and
we would transfer responsibility to Iraqi entities as soon as
possible. Following the initial period of U.S./coalition military
government, we envisage a transitional phase in which
responsibility is gradually transferred to Iraqi institutions,
leading to the eventual establishment of a new Iraqi government in
accordance with a new constitution.
The following are examples of the ways in which Iraqis might play
a progressively greater role in administering the country. While
final decisions have not been made, and, in the nature of the
case, cannot be made until the actual circumstances are known,
these examples illustrate various mechanisms under consideration:
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Regarding post-war planning, much preparatory
work has been done, but much more remains. The Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance will serve as the US
Government's nerve center for this effort.
We look forward to consulting with this Committee and with the
Congress generally as we develop our ideas and plans for
post-conflict Iraqi reconstruction. War is not inevitable, but
failing to make contingency plans for its aftermath would be
inexcusable.
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