27 January 2003
Iraq Failed Two Key Tests of U.N. Compliance, Negroponte Says
(U.S. envoy's remarks to Security Council) (2910) United Nations -- The United States sees no evidence to indicate that Saddam Hussein is voluntarily disarming his nation of its biological and chemical weapons, nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles or that he will actively cooperate with the United Nations to assure the international community that he has fully disarmed, U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte told the Security Council January 27. The ambassador said that Iraq has failed two tests: providing a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programs and delivery systems; and cooperating fully with the U.N. weapons inspectors. Negroponte said that the council is living with the results of a 12-year "failed strategy" which was to try to limit the damage Saddam Hussein could inflict instead of disarming Iraq. The council heard reports from the chief U.N. weapons inspectors on the first 60 days of the United Nations' renewed disarmament work in Iraq. The reports were required under Security Council resolution 1441, which gave Iraq one last chance to rid itself of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons program or face "serious consequences." The council's consultations on the reports were closed to the public, but the U.S. Mission to the United Nations released to the news media the six-page text of Negroponte's remarks. Citing a litany of instances over the past two months when Iraq failed to live up to its obligations to provide evidence on deadly weapons programs that the U.N. inspectors were seeking, the U.S. ambassador said that "the unavoidable truth is that Iraq hopes that the council will accept a facade of cooperation instead of true disarmament." "The reality we must confront is that this declaration makes no real progress in disarming Iraq," he said. Pointing to instances of voluntary disarmament in South Africa, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Negroponte said that "the international community knows what voluntary disarmament looks like, and this, most emphatically, is not it." "The time is fast approaching that we will have to demonstrate that we meant what we said on that November day" when council members adopted resolution 1441, the ambassador said. "There is little time left for the council to face its responsibilities." Following is the text of Negroponte's remarks: (begin text) I would like to thank Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei for the briefing they have presented to the Council as well as for the work they and their teams of inspectors have done over the past two months in Iraq in the face of innumerable challenges. My government will have a further response to today's briefings in Security Council consultations on Wednesday. However, as an initial reaction, I must say that there is nothing in either presentation that would give us hope that Iraq has ever intended to fully comply with Resolution 1441 or any of the 16 resolutions that preceded it over the last 12 years. We see no evidence to indicate that Saddam is voluntarily disarming his nation of its biological and chemical weapons, nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles. We see no evidence that he intends to account for Iraq's weapons programs or to proffer the active cooperation required to assure us that he will do so. Without cooperation, disarmament cannot be proven. Without disarmament, Iraq cannot comply with Resolution 1441. I would like to stress that the purpose of 1441 is disarmament. Twelve years ago, this Council decided that Iraq must give up its WMD and long-range ballistic missile program. Iraq accepted this condition as part of the cease-fire agreement to stave off further coalition military action. For 12 years, the international community has demanded the disarmament of Iraq but has settled for less, trying to limit the damage Saddam Hussein could inflict, while we sought to induce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. And throughout that time Saddam has constantly tested, and correctly assessed that none of these measures had any real teeth. We are living with the results of this failed strategy: Iraq continues to deceive the world concerning ongoing programs for weapons of mass destruction; it has failed to cooperate with inspections; indeed it has an active program of denial and deception. It was never the task of the inspectors to look under every rock to find Iraq's hidden weapons. It must not be the purpose of the Council to condone Iraq's continuing defiance of its obligations. This Council passed Resolution 1441 to bring to an end an intolerable situation -- one that threatened both the region and the integrity of the U.N. itself. With 1441, the Council returned to its original demands of 1991 -- full, verifiable disarmament, if not peacefully, then by other means. Today there is still no sign that the regime intends to comply fully with the terms of that resolution. But the threats to the region and the threat to the U.N.'s integrity remain. It benefits no one to let Saddam think he can wear us down into business-as-usual as he has practiced it over the past 12 years. Resolution 1441 provided at least two tests to see if Iraq was prepared to seize that Resolution's "final opportunity": The first test was the Declaration, intended to determine whether Iraq would submit a currently accurate, full and complete account of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programs and delivery systems. The Iraqis failed this test -- their Declaration was neither "currently accurate," "full," nor "complete." Dr. Blix told us the document was "rich in volume" but "poor on information and practically devoid of new evidence." As we said at the time, it was a further material breach and yet another challenge in Iraq's long list of challenges to the United Nations' authority. Council members similarly expressed their disappointment during our meeting on January 9. More recently, the Iraqis failed to take the opportunity of their recent meetings with Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei to provide the missing information required; instead, the Iraqis hollowly insisted that all the answers were in their already-discredited Declaration. In UNMOVIC's own words, "the Declaration does not answer the questions; it does not help." Some of you may not remember the "UNSCOM Compendium of Outstanding Disarmament Issues". This is my copy. This 463-page document, available on the Internet, is the product of much hard work at U.N. Headquarters by UNSCOM inspectors after they had departed Iraq in 1998. The Compendium includes both priority issues on disarmament as well as a separate annex detailing actions by Iraq to obstruct disarmament. The Compendium is an important source for much of UNMOVIC's work today. It also provides an outline of the key questions Iraq still must answer. Some have asked for more clarity in what the Iraqis need to do. Disarmament was the Council's requirement in 1991; it remains so in 2003. Resolution 687 spelled out this requirement, which has been repeated in a succession of resolutions and decisions in the intervening 12 years. The Iraqis have chosen not to comply with any of those resolutions, and indeed continue not only to hide but to advance prohibited programs. In what was supposed to be the "currently accurate," "full" and "complete" declaration demanded by 1441, Iraq failed even to address the questions UNSCOM raised in the Compendium in 1999. There are indeed questions that I would like to raise here -- questions that are illustrative of the gaps that need to be filled in order to judge Iraqi compliance: -- Where is the evidence to account for what has happened to 26,000 liters of anthrax and 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin? UNSCOM concluded that Iraq vastly understated production of botulinum toxin. On December 19, Dr. Blix said that Iraq's declaration on anthrax "may not be accurate" and Iraq needed to provide further evidence. -- Where is the evidence to provide a complete account of Iraq's VX chemical weapons program? Dr. Blix cited this issue on December 19 as a critical unresolved disarmament question. UNSCOM and international experts rejected Iraq's previous declarations on the chemical nerve agent VX. -- Where is the evidence to credibly account for 550 mustard gas shells and 400 "R-400" aerial bombs capable of delivering biological agents? On December 19, Blix said Iraq needs to account for the mustard shells. -- Where is the evidence to credibly account for over two metric tons of imported missing biological growth media? On December 19, Blix cited biological growth media as a particular concern, including missing information on growth media imports. -- Where is the evidence to credibly account for mobile biological agent capabilities that we know Iraq has developed in recent years? Why hasn't Iraq presented the mobile facilities for inspection or provided the production/storage records and location of support facilities to the inspectors? -- Where is the evidence to credibly and completely account for recent attempts to procure and enrich uranium? -- Where is the evidence to credibly and completely account for all of Iraq's work on delivery systems, including CBW drop tanks and spray systems, at least 12 aerosol devices UNSCOM suspected were specifically for biological weapon dispersal, and unmanned aerial vehicles intended to deliver chemical and biological agents? In the December 7 declaration, Iraq denies any intent to use unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver a biological agent, despite previously admitting to UNSCOM work on this very objective. -- Where is the evidence to account for missing warheads? U.N. inspectors have made discoveries that physically prove the Declaration is deficient. The 16 122-mm rocket warheads uncovered recently were not in the Declaration. It is, however, likely that they are among the 15,000 missing 122-mm rocket warheads cited in the 1999 UNSCOM Compendium -- rockets that UNSCOM said it could not verify were destroyed because the Iraqis had not presented convincing evidence of their destruction. -- Where is the evidence that Iraq has provided all the pertinent documents? The 3,000 pages of documents recently found in the private residence of an Iraqi physicist were also not in Iraq's Declaration. These include official Iraqi Government documents, marked "secret" and "top secret." Discovery of these documents came as a result of an intelligence tip, not information volunteered by the Iraqi Government. Does anyone really believe these were just private research documents and academic exercises? In a police state like Iraq, is it credible to believe a scientist would really keep at home so many secret and top secret documents unless the government had instructed him to do so? How many more caches of such undeclared, hidden documents are there in other Iraqi homes? Iraq not only failed to fully disclose all of its information in the declaration, but has been caught red-handed in the act of concealment. -- We have learned from inspections that Iraq is developing missiles with ranges greater than 150 km in direct violation of Council resolutions and UNSCOM's prohibitions. Does anyone really believe that these missiles are anything but a prohibited missile development program? The unavoidable truth is that Iraq hopes that the Council will accept a façade of cooperation instead of true disarmament. And the reality we must confront is that this Declaration makes no real progress in disarming Iraq. Mr. President, the second test posed by Resolution 1441 was one of cooperation. It demanded that Iraq "comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution," and "cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA." Eighty days after Resolution 1441 was passed, we see none of the cooperation the Resolution called for. -- As Resolution 1441 requires, has Iraq allowed "immediate, unrestricted, unimpeded and private access" to all officials, inside or outside Iraq? No. We have witnessed the relentlessness of "minders" -- at times five minders for each inspector. We know Iraq is using this show of force to intimidate potential witnesses. Last weekend Iraq with great fanfare agreed to "encourage" officials to meet privately with inspectors. Since then, interviews have been cancelled and Iraq on January 23 said it could not "convince" its officials to meet the inspectors privately. This is a tactic Iraq used with UNSCOM and now is using again with UNMOVIC and the Council. Promise one thing; do another. The regime's latest claim that no Iraqi is willing to be interviewed in private is, on its face, laughable. If the regime wanted them to, they would. We know the fate of those who resist the "encouragement" of this totalitarian regime. -- Has Iraq allowed the free and unrestricted use of aircraft, including reconnaissance vehicles? No. UNMOVIC helicopter missions have been cancelled due to Iraqi interference. Iraq has refused Dr. Blix's request to employ the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, a clear violation of OP 7 of Resolution 1441. -- Has Iraq provided a complete list of Iraqi personnel linked to its past and current WMD programs? No. As Dr. Blix reported on January 9, the list was egregiously incomplete. Iraq agreed on January 20th merely to supplement its list based on "advice" from the inspectors -- a legalistic, unhelpful response when Resolution 1441 couldn't have been clearer in demanding access to "all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programs and the associated research, development and production facilities." -- Has Iraq provided "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access to and any all, including underground areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records and means of transport." No. Records have been found at a private home and we have many reports that other records, equipment and weapons have been hidden or moved to keep them from inspectors. Opening the door to a facility means nothing if proscribed material has been hidden or moved. The international community knows what voluntary disarmament looks like, and this, most emphatically, is not it. What we are seeing in Iraq is not what we saw from South Africa, or Ukraine or Kazakhstan. When the Council adopted Resolution 1441, our message was simple: Non-compliance is no longer an option. We clearly explained that 1441 afforded Iraq a "final opportunity" to disarm. "Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance," we committed the United Nations to living up to its responsibilities, if the Government of Iraq persisted in its refusal to disarm. Others joined us in articulating this final opportunity. The time is fast approaching that we will have to demonstrate that we meant what we said on that November day. Security Council Resolution 1441 said that Iraq is required to immediately, unconditionally and actively cooperate. It does not say that Iraq is to negotiate the terms of cooperation. At Iraq's initiative, UNMOVIC and the IAEA issued an "Agreed Statement", which gives us very little confidence in Iraq's willingness to comply. The statement merely highlights Iraq's failure to meet obligations to which it had already agreed. And even as this agreed statement was being noted, Iraq was planning public demonstrations against the inspectors and chalking up its latest violation of Resolution 1441 by seeking to impose restrictions on UNMOVIC's use of the U-2 aircraft for aerial surveillance. We've seen all of this before: the partial results, inadequate disclosures, reluctant confessions, active evasion rather than active cooperation and promises made in the face of danger only to be abandoned when the pressure is off. By passage of Resolution 1441, the Council made clear its unwillingness to go down that road again. The Iraqis were presented with an opportunity, but they have chosen the path of non-compliance. On September 12, President Bush gave a speech on the challenge posed by Iraq to the United Nations. He could have delivered that speech anywhere -- to the U.S. Congress, to a political rally, or indeed on a military base. He deliberately chose to give his Iraq speech at the United Nations, asking us whether we could show that the promise of the United Nations could be fulfilled in our time. He challenged the delegates to the United Nations -- us -- to take action and not to stand by while dangers gather. As President Bush said on September 12, "We created the United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions more than wishes." Let us remember why we are meeting here today, 60 days after the return of inspectors to Iraq. Resolution 1441 reaffirmed the Council demand that Iraq must be disarmed. We must not mislead ourselves into believing that inspections are our ultimate goal, or that not blocking access to sites from which prohibited materials have been dispersed represents full procedural cooperation, or for that matter, that procedural cooperation is the same as substantive compliance. No one here today should be under any illusion. In the view of my government, there were two tests established in Resolution 1441 -- a full and accurate declaration and immediate, full, and active cooperation. Iraq has failed both tests. In the days ahead we believe the Council and its member governments must answer the following questions: -- What message does Council irresolution send to Iraq and other proliferators? -- Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? -- Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it choose to make itself irrelevant? There is little time left for the Council to face its responsibilities. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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