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27 January 2003

Bolton Says U.S. Has Evidence Iraq Has Weapons Program

(Says U.N. Security Council will deal with North Korea violations) (5200)
The United States has "very convincing evidence" that the Iraqi regime
maintains "an extensive program for the production and weaponization
of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles that
have been forbidden to it since the time of the Gulf War Ceasefire
Resolution 687 in 1991," according to Under Secretary of State John
Bolton.
In a January 24 news conference at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Bolton
stressed to reporters that the issue facing the United Nations
Security Council, and the rest of the international community, was not
what the U.N. weapons inspectors were able to find, but rather whether
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's Baghdad regime is in compliance "with
a long string of Security Council resolutions requiring that its
weapons of mass destruction be eliminated."
The real issue, he continued, "is that under Resolution 1441, Iraq,
given the opportunity to file yet another full, final and complete
declaration of its weapons of mass destruction, on December the 7th
filed a declaration that, as Secretary Powell said, we found so
deficient, contains so many material misrepresentations and omissions
that it amounted to a material breach of Resolution 1441."
The work of the U.N. weapons inspectors, Bolton said, is "to try and
audit" that declaration."
The U.S. diplomat said it was likely that the U.N. weapons inspectors
would say "that they cannot certify that Iraq has complied with
Resolution 1441" and previous U.N. resolutions regarding Baghdad's
weapons of mass destruction.
Bolton said the United States would "at an appropriate time" explain
publicly "a good deal of what we know about Iraq's program, because
it's important that people understand that whatever the inspectors are
able to find, Iraq for the twelve years since the end of the Persian
Gulf War has engaged in a systematic campaign of denial and deception
in an effort to conceal its weapons of mass destruction from the
inspectors."
Regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program, Bolton said the
United States has decided to seek referral by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations Security Council of the
Pyongyang regime's violation of the Non-proliferation Treaty and its
"purported" withdrawal from the treaty.
"When the Non-proliferation Treaty is violated," he explained, "there
is automatically a requirement that the Security Council take the
matter up."
The U.N. Security Council, Bolton added, is vested by the U.N. Charter
with dealing with threats to international peace and security.
"Obviously North Korea's ongoing nuclear weapons programs amount to
just such a threat as the Council is intended to deal with," Bolton
said.
Bolton said a consensus was emerging among neighboring nations on the
situation created by Pyongyang's actions. He suggested the IAEA would
pass a third resolution regarding Pyongyang, and that the issue would
be referred to the U.N. Security Council.
The U.N. Security Council, he noted, has a range of actions it can
take toward Pyongyang. Bolton pointed out the question of getting the
issue to the U.N. Security Council was separate from the issue of
whether or not "at some point sanctions might be warranted."
Bolton reiterated U.S. policy that it has "no intention of invading
North Korea." He pointed out that "the President of the United States
has said that on several occasions."
Bolton added that the United States has also said "if writing that
down and memorializing it in some way is helpful that we'd be willing
to find a way to do that."
He reminded reporters that the threat to international peace did not
come from the United States threatening the regime in Pyongyang ruled
by Kim Jong Il, but rather from that communist leader's "persistent
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, not just nuclear weapons but
chemical weapons, biological weapons and long-range ballistic
missiles."
Following is a transcript of the January 24 press conference at the
U.S. Embassy in Tokyo:
(begin transcript)
Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton
Press Conference
January 24, 2003
U.S. Embassy
Tokyo, Japan
4:00 p.m. local time
U/S BOLTON: Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here today. I'll just
start off by saying that I've had a series of very productive meetings
here with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Abe, and a number of other senior Japanese officials. This is the
third and last stop on my trip in Asia this week. In addition to
covering the subjects of Iraq and North Korea, one of the principal
purposes of the trip from the outset was one of the regular meetings
of the Japan-U.S. Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament,
Non-proliferation, and Verification, where we covered a whole series
of arms control and non-proliferation subjects well beyond Iraq and
North Korea. These kinds of consultations, we think, are very
important for the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. They give us a
good chance to exchange views on a wide range of issues. Obviously,
when we face situations, as we do now on Iraq and North Korea, we
spend a lot of time on that. But nonetheless, the broader discussions
are also very useful. So, I'd be delighted to answer any questions
that you may have on those subjects.
QUESTION: I'm Sato Suzuki with TV Asahi. Mr. Secretary, with regard to
Iraq, despite all these reports from the U.S. and U.K. governments, we
still don't believe that we've seen clear indisputable evidence that
Saddam Hussein does have weapons of mass destruction and that he does
intend to use them against us. Are you still looking for such a
"smoking gun," possibly in Dr. Blix's report next week? Or have you
already concluded that there might never be such a smoking gun, and
that the United States will have to go to war without the full support
of the international community? Thank you.
U/S BOLTON: Well, let me say that we have very convincing evidence
that Iraq maintains an extensive program for the production and
weaponization of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic
missiles that have been forbidden to it since the time of the Gulf War
Ceasefire Resolution 687 in 1991. The issue before the Security
Council and the international community now is not what the inspectors
have found or not found. The issue is whether Iraq is in compliance
with a long string of Security Council resolutions requiring that its
weapons of mass destruction be eliminated. Now, we are of course
awaiting the report of the U.N. inspectors to the Security Council on
Monday the 27th, and we'll review it with great care. But it would be
our intention at an appropriate time, if it becomes necessary, to
explain in a public way a good deal of what we know about Iraq's
program, because it's important that people understand that whatever
the inspectors are able to find, Iraq for the twelve years since the
end of the Persian Gulf War has engaged in a systematic campaign of
denial and deception in an effort to conceal its weapons of mass
destruction from the inspectors. And, of course, for over four years
until UNMOVIC and the IAEA recently returned, Iraq has been completely
free of inspectors. So it's not surprising in many respects that the
inspectors have not located the kind of massive violations of Iraq's
obligations that we believe they face. But that is information that we
have, and I think that at an appropriate time and in an appropriate
way we will make the case about Iraq's violations.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My name is Takahata from a
Japanese newspaper; it's called the Mainichi Shimbun. My question is
on North Korea. You mentioned a couple of days ago that the IAEA would
most likely refer the issue to the United Nations, but including
yourself and Deputy Secretary Armitage, there's no intention of
immediately thinking about any sanctions of North Korea. It may sound
to some of the Japanese that what you're doing in the Security
Council... And also, it may sound precluding any kind of pressures to
do it right. Could you explain that?
U/S BOLTON: Certainly. The path that we have chosen to follow is to
seek referral by the IAEA of North Korea's violation of the
Non-proliferation Treaty and its purported withdrawal from the treaty.
When the Non-proliferation Treaty is violated, there is automatically
a requirement that the Security Council take the matter up. The
Security Council is vested by the U.N. Charter with dealing with
threats to international peace and security, and obviously North
Korea's ongoing nuclear weapons programs amount to just such a threat
as the Council is intended to deal with.
Now, once it's in the Council, of course, the Council has a wide
variety of political and economic and other means that it can take.
The question of getting the matter into the Security Council is an
entirely separate and very different question from whether or not at
some point sanctions might be warranted. Our view is that, given the
seriousness of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, it's important
to have the existing multilateral body charged with dealing with such
questions seized of the matter as soon as possible. So that's why
we've been seeking a meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA
that would pass the third resolution, hopefully unanimously, in this
series on North Korea, and refer the matter to the Security Council.
QUESTION: Hello, Secretary. I'm Hiroki Sugita of Kyodo News. I have a
question on Iraq. There are some reports that Germany is asking U.N.
inspectors to produce another report after the 27th (of January)
report. Some reports say that it's going be produced in mid-February.
Is the U.S. ready to accept that kind of idea?
U/S BOLTON: Well, I don't know of the specific German request, but
there has been discussion of the requirements, both of Resolution 1441
that requires UNMOVIC and the IAEA to produce a report on Monday the
27th, and Resolution 1284, which also requires quarterly reports by
those two bodies - the next one of which would be due, I believe, on
March the 1st.
The real issue now is that under Resolution 1441, Iraq, given the
opportunity to file yet another full, final and complete declaration
of its weapons of mass destruction, on December the 7th filed a
declaration that, as Secretary Powell said, we found so deficient,
contains so many material misrepresentations and omissions that it
amounted to a material breach of Resolution 1441. The purpose of the
work of the inspectors since that declaration has been to try and
audit the declaration, and I think one thing that it's likely that
they will say - as they have said in response to the declaration
itself - is that they cannot certify that Iraq has complied with
Resolution 1441 and the earlier resolutions.
So whether there's another report pursuant to Resolution 1284, really,
is an interesting additional fact, but I think not the real situation
that the Security Council now confronts, and it's really why the
report on the 27th is the important document.
QUESTION: Amy Vickers, Voice of America. Can you please clarify if
China, South Korea and Japan support the IAEA Board of Governors
voting to take the North Korea issue to the U.N. Security Council?
Thank you.
U/S BOLTON: Well, I'm glad I was asked that question, because what I'd
like to do is read what I actually said in response to that question
in Seoul and Beijing. I don't have anything new to say on it, really,
but let me just repeat what I said, as opposed to what some have read
elsewhere. I was asked in Beijing the following question: "What was
China's reaction to bringing it up to the Security Council?" And I
said, at that point: "I think you ought to ask them how they would
characterize it, but I do not detect any substantial opposition to
bringing the matter into the Council."
Then in Seoul on Wednesday, I was asked about China's stance and about
what South Korea had said about taking the North Korea matter to the
Security Council through the IAEA. This is what I said then: "Well, on
the question of our discussions here today about taking the matter to
the Security Council, we reached agreement that it would be
appropriate for the IAEA Board of Governors to pass its third
resolution on the subject and refer the matter to the Security
Council. I would think that would happen in the very near future,
because it is something that should be brought to the Council. So
we're glad that the United States and the Republic of Korea see the
matter the same way. In my conversations in Beijing, and with
Secretary Powell's conversations with the PRC's Foreign Minister Tang
in New York, they also did not object to bringing the matter to the
Security Council through the IAEA. So we see a consensus emerging,
probably by the end of this week, that there would be a third IAEA
resolution and the matter would be referred to the Security Council
and taken up for consideration there. In terms of the other permanent
members, there's absolutely no doubt that the United Kingdom and
France believe it is an appropriate matter for the Security Council,
and I believe Russia will have that view as well." That concludes my
answer there.
Now, I was apparently somewhat optimistic on the subject of Russia,
but it remains our view that we should have a meeting of the Board of
Governors of the IAEA, that there should be a third unanimous
resolution by the Board of Governors that refers the matter to the
Security Council. So perhaps we didn't make the objective of having
the Board meeting today, but it remains our objective to have a
meeting, and I remain optimistic that the meeting will occur in the
very near future and that there will be a third unanimous resolution
taking this matter to the Security Council.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I'm Hayashi with the Yomiuri Shimbun. I'd
like to ask a little bit about today's meeting that you had with
Foreign Minister Kawaguchi. What was your principal message, what were
the points you agreed with the Foreign Minister on, and what were the
disagreements? Thank you.
U/S BOLTON: Well, I think the Foreign Minister has already issued a
statement, which I've had a chance to review, and I find myself in
agreement with what the Foreign Ministry has said. I think we had very
fundamental agreement on two critical points. The first was the
importance of the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program, and second that this be accomplished through peaceful means.
This has been President Bush's consistent objective since we first
learned of the North Korean uranium-enrichment program this summer and
certainly a position we've carried through, even as the North Koreans
have exacerbated their violation of the Non-proliferation Treaty by
unsealing the plutonium reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon.
The Foreign Minister stressed the importance of absolutely close
Japan-U.S. coordination on this matter, and I assured her - as
Secretary Powell has said frequently - that we regard the
consultations with Japan and the Republic of Korea and the other key
nations involved here - the other nuclear powers, like Russia and
China, the United Kingdom and France - as vital to achieving a
peaceful resolution. We are exploring a number of mechanisms in
addition to referral to the Security Council, and we remain committed
to the proposition that North Korea's violation of the
Non-proliferation Treaty - its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program -
puts it at odds with the rest of the world. Not just the United States
but everybody else who supports the nuclear Non-proliferation regime.
QUESTION: Linda Sieg with Reuters. In the two weeks now since North
Korea did announce that it would withdraw from the nuclear
(non)proliferation treaty, there has been an awful lot of diplomatic
activity, and I'm just wondering how you see the situation now. Are we
any closer to a resolution, or is it as far away as ever, or further
away?
U/S BOLTON: Well, I wouldn't characterize it, really, one way or the
other. The North has taken a series of steps, really, going back over
five years - at least according to our best information - in a
clandestine effort to acquire nuclear weapons. So it's not so much a
question of what's happened in the last week or the last thirty days.
This has been a consistent effort to achieve nuclear weapons status
that really came to our attention in a significant way only last
summer. What we have been trying to do since then is establish the
basis on which we could have this nuclear weapons program eliminated
in a verifiable manner. That remains the objective that we've been
pursuing. Regrettably, since December the 21st the North Koreans have
exaggerated the problem by unsealing the reprocessing facility at
Yongbyon and taking a number of other steps. We've been in
consultation in order to tamp this matter down and to try and resolve
it peacefully, and that remains our objective. But I think it's very
hard to characterize sort of where precisely it stands. Our activities
- our diplomatic efforts - are obviously proceeding very vigorously on
a variety of fronts. Secretary Powell discussed the matter along the
margins of the Security Council ministerial meeting in New York
earlier this week and has been on the phone with counterparts
regularly about it. So it's a matter we're continuing to pursue, and
we will pursue it until we reach the objective of the peaceful
elimination of the North Korean nuclear weapons program.
QUESTION: My name is Fujita, the Asahi Shimbun. May I speak in
Japanese?
U/S BOLTON: Yes.
QUESTION: We are looking at the U.S. administration's position
vis-à-vis North Korea. I just wonder how much it has changed or how
much it has not changed? Just recently, the U.S. wanted to have North
Korea abandon their nuclear development program, and the U.S. has been
reported to be willing to write something saying that they do not have
any intention to invade North Korea and so forth. Does that represent
a positive attitude on the part of the U.S. administration vis-à-vis
the DPRK, or would you like to see a clear indication from North
Korea, first of all, that they don't have any intention to continue
their nuclear development program?
U/S BOLTON: It's been the view of the United States for a very long
period of time that we have no intention of invading North Korea, and
the President of the United States has said that on several occasions.
That's the highest form of assurance that anybody can get. But we've
also said if writing that down and memorializing it in some way is
helpful that we'd be willing to find a way to do that. I think the
fundamental point, though, is that the threat to international peace
and security we face here has nothing to do with the United States. It
has to do with Kim Jong Il's persistent pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction, not just nuclear weapons but chemical weapons, biological
weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. And that is a problem that
we have to solve.
QUESTION: Tim Kelly, Bloomberg News. You say that if the issue goes to
the Security Council, it doesn't necessarily mean sanctions against
North Korea. How long are you going to give North Korea to comply with
international demands, and would you eventually consider sanctions
against North Korea to persuade it to fall into line?
U/S BOLTON: I think, as we've said, all of the options are on the
table, but the question of sanctions is not something we have any
immediate intention of seeking. The resolution to this matter largely
lies in North Korea's hands, and if it would take concrete steps to
give up its nuclear weapons program, that would be a good place to
start. The point of having it in the Security Council, though, is that
the IAEA is not really equipped to deal with this kind of massive
repudiation of North Korea's NPT obligations or its ongoing nuclear
weapons program. This is something that the nuclear non-proliferation
regime expressly contemplates when a state tries to change from a
non-nuclear weapons state to acquiring nuclear weapons. By definition,
it amounts to a threat to international peace and security, which in
turns is the triggering threshold for Security Council jurisdiction.
So this is a fairly basic matter, and we've chosen to go through the
IAEA route because that's the best way to go. But I would just point
out that North Korea, in effect, has already given it to the Security
Council by writing to the President of the Council, among other
people, announcing its withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty.
But our objective remains. We want another IAEA Board of Governors
resolution, and we're confidant that we're going to get one in the
very near future.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Khaldon Azhari, PETRA News Agency.
Unfortunately, the common view in the Arabic countries is that there
might be a double standard by the United States in dealing with Iraq
and North Korea. While we see Iraq accepting the inspections, we see
North Korea challenging, perhaps, the international community. Yet the
common sense is that there is a diplomatic approach toward North
Korea, while a threat of war approach toward Iraq. And also, there are
a lot of violations against the Security Council resolutions by
Israel, and there is no pressure by the United States against Israel.
Do you have any comment on this? Thank you.
U/S BOLTON: With respect to Iraq and North Korea, there is no double
standard. The end result in both cases has to be the elimination of
their programs involving weapons of mass destruction. There are,
however, different circumstances between Iraq and North Korea, and the
different circumstances warrant different treatment. I won't repeat
everything that Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and
others have said on the subject, because I think we've made the case
previously at some length. The matter of Iraq is on one track, and the
matter of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is on another track.
QUESTION: Itar-Tass News Agency, Russia, Anatoly Krasnov. How do you
evaluate the visit to Pyongyang by Losukov, Foreign Vice Minister, and
what is the role of Russia in resolving the crisis around North Korean
nuclear weapons? Thank you.
U/S BOLTON: Well, we're waiting to get a complete readout on Vice
Foreign Minister's Losukov's visit. My understanding is he met with
Deputy Secretary Armitage in Moscow yesterday, and Rich Armitage is
back in Washington now. I think we're going to consider the report
very carefully. Secretary Powell and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov have
been in regular touch on this and other matters. Certainly we have
been in consultation with the government of Russia from the very
outset of our understanding and of what North Korea was up to. Back in
October, I visited Foreign Minister Ivanov as part of our
consultations beginning in Beijing with the other legitimate nuclear
weapons states, and we've been in very close contact on this. Our hope
and our expectation is that Russia, as a member of the five permanent
members of the Security Council, and given its role in the
non-proliferation regime, will work with us to convince North Korea to
give up its nuclear weapons program. That is there declaratory policy,
and we're hoping that we can continue to work together with them to
achieve that outcome through peaceful means.
QUESTION: (Yutaka) Ishiguro from Yomiuri Shimbun. North Korea is
threatening to restart the operation of the plutonium reprocessing
plant. Do you have information about the situation, of the capability
and preparedness of this facility? In other words, how quickly can
North Korea produce plutonium that is sufficient for producing a
nuclear weapon?
U/S BOLTON: Well, of course as long as the IAEA inspectors were at
Yongbyon we could have assurances that the existing reprocessing
facility was not in use. The North Koreans have now removed the seals
from that facility and the cameras. They've taken the seals and the
cameras off the spent fuel rods in the cooling pond, and from the
indications that we've had since the IAEA inspectors have left they
appear to be getting the building itself ready for operation, although
they've certainly not said that they've begun reprocessing. I think
part of the concern that we all have is the consequence of the North
Korean decision to expel the IAEA inspectors. The North Koreans have
said publicly that they've withdrawn from the Non-proliferation Treaty
not to produce nuclear weapons but to produce electricity. Now, one
might ask, well then why did you withdraw from the Non-proliferation
Treaty? Certainly having the IAEA inspectors back at Yongbyon and
resealing that facility would be a step in the right direction. But
the fact that they have broken their commitments yet again and
unsealed the reprocessing facility is a matter of substantial concern
to us.
QUESTION: Charles Scanlon from BBC News. As you say, the cameras were
disabled at the end of last year and the seals taken off and the
inspectors sent away. How then do you know that the North Koreans
haven't already started reprocessing those fuel rods, and what's your
estimate as to how long it would take them to extract weapons grade
plutonium once they started?
U/S BOLTON: With North Korea you don't have much assurance of
anything, since so many of their facilities are camouflaged. Our best
estimate is that they have not begun reprocessing, but I think it's
the common view - and certainly that of the IAEA - that if they were
to begin reprocessing it would be a matter of months before they could
run the spent fuel rods through and begin extracting plutonium. Of
course, we also don't know everything there is to know about the
uranium-enrichment program, and that and the capability of the North
Koreans to get weapons-grade uranium is just as much a concern as
their ability to extract weapons-grade plutonium.
QUESTION: My name's (Yoshiyuki) Aoki with NHK. Today, the talks
between North and South Korea, ministerial talks, ended this morning
with producing a statement, which says they - the two countries -
agreed to cooperate towards a peaceful resolution to this problem. But
some people say that there was not much progress toward peaceful
resolution. What do you think about it? Thank you.
U/S BOLTON: I don't really know anything that you don't know about the
talks between the ROK and the DPRK on the subject of nuclear weapons
other than that I believe the ROK stressed its very strong feeling
that the North had to abandon its nuclear weapons program. I may say
this is a matter on which all concerned parties except North Korea are
in fundamental agreement. I think that's critical, because if there's
a basis to proceed here, to get a peaceful resolution, it is the rest
of the international community remaining absolutely united in their
view, as they are now, that the North Korean weapons program is
unacceptable.
QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Secretary. Masakatsu Ota, Kyodo News. I would
like to ask you about your bold initiative regarding North Korea and
the bold initiative and the new arrangement that was mentioned by your
president - also by your secretary, Colin Powell. Could you elaborate
on the details of the bold plan and the new arrangement? What kind of
elements consists of those ideas? And also I'd like to ask you a
question about Japanese cooperation. What kind of expectations do you
have in terms of using "carrots" by the Japanese government? Thank
you, Sir.
U/S BOLTON: I'm sorry.  Give me the second question again, please.
QUESTION: What kind of expectations do you have for the Japanese
cooperation? They have a kind of "carrots," you know, using their big
finance money. So can you characterize the role of the Japanese
government in terms of the building the bold new plan or new
arrangement? Thank you, Sir.
U/S BOLTON: Well, I think what Secretary Powell was referring to was
to try and look to see if the North Koreans in fact verifiably and
irreversibly dismantled their nuclear weapons program and undertook a
number of other steps in connection with their other programs in the
field of weapons of mass destruction, the disposition of conventional
forces on the peninsula, and the human rights situation in North
Korea, that we would consider a new basis for our relationship with
the North, which is a not a matter of a quid pro quo negotiation. It's
a matter involving the fundamental transformation of the relationship
that we had been calling the "bold initiative" for some time.
Now, what that requires is a substantial transformation by the North
Koreans. It's not going to be a situation where we enter into
negotiations that reward bad behavior, such as the pursuit of a
nuclear weapons program, or where we follow their blackmail playbook.
But if there are substantial actions undertaken by the North - not
simply rhetoric, but the concrete dismantling of the nuclear weapons
program and other steps - then, as Secretary Powell said, we would be
willing to consider a new arrangement.
QUESTION: (Takahata, Mainichi Shimbun) This is a little bit of a
philosophical question. In 2001, President Bush called three nations
an "axis of evil", and then we have two of them come in tandem
(inaudible). Now, looking back, do you have any reflection that Mr.
President had stopped short of calling one nation (inaudible)?
U/S BOLTON: The decision to include Iraq, Iran and North Korea in the
"axis of evil," I think, reflects the view that they were the three
states with which we were most principally concerned because of their
support for terrorism and their pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction. I think what the President was outlining in the "axis of
evil" analysis was that these kinds of regimes posed the greatest
threat to the United States and its friends and allies around the
world, and he said, I think, very importantly, we cannot allow the
world's most dangerous weapons to fall into the hands of the world's
most dangerous people. So, I think it was a very important statement
to make, to try and alert people and educate them to the risk of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and it is one of the
fundamental objectives of the administration to try and stop that
proliferation and prevent the threat that it poses to innocent people
around the world to the extent we can. Hope that was a philosophical
answer to your philosophical question. OK, well thank you all very
much.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)