23 January 2003
"Time is Running Out" for Saddam Hussein, Wolfowitz Says
(Deputy defense secretary: Iraq in deadly game of "cheat and retreat") (1340) By Judy Aita Washington File United Nations Correspondent New York -- "Time is running out" for Saddam Hussein to make the "fundamental change of heart" to fully and voluntarily disarm, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said January 23. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Wolfowitz outlined various problems U.N. weapons inspectors had with Iraq during the first attempt at disarmament which ended with the expulsion of the inspectors four years ago, and cited new examples that demonstrate Iraq's behavior has not changed during the current effort. If Iraq chose to disarm, "we would know it," Wolfowitz said. "We would know it from their full and complete declaration of everything that we know that they have, as well as by revelations of programs that our intelligence has probably not yet discovered. ... We would know it from an attitude of the government that encouraged people to cooperate with the inspectors rather than intimidated them into silence and lies." So far, he said, Baghdad has treated disarmament "like a deadly game of hide-and-seek or cheat and retreat." Saying several times throughout the speech that "time is running out," the deputy secretary said that "the imperative" is that "Baghdad must disarm -- peacefully, if at all possible, but by force, if necessary." "Disarming Iraq and the war on terror are not merely related," Wolfowitz said. "Disarming Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and dismantling its program to develop nuclear weapons is a crucial part of winning the war on terror." Wolfowitz held out the hope that "if Saddam is faced with a serious enough threat that he would otherwise be disarmed forcibly and removed from power," he might decide to adopt "a fundamentally different course." "The decision on whether Iraq's weapons of mass terror will be dismantled voluntarily, or whether it will have to be done by force is not up to us, not up to the inspectors, or to the U.N.," Wolfowitz said. "The decision rests entirely with Saddam Hussein." U.N. weapons inspectors are due to report to the Security Council January 27 on the progress of their activities since being allowed back into Iraq in November and on Iraq's compliance with the council's resolution 1441, which threatens "serious consequences" if Iraq fails to disarm. The deputy secretary talked about: what inspectors can and cannot do in the disarmament process; Iraq's practice of hiding and moving its prohibited weapons; Baghdad's use of its own intelligence abilities not only to conceal its illegal activities but also to spy on and intimidate U.N. inspectors; and its policy of obstruction and lying. He used the nuclear disarmament programs of South Africa, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to illustrate "what real disarmament looks like." After his speech Wolfowitz was questioned on why the United States has not provided more detailed intelligence information to the American public and its allies to back up assertions about Iraq's activities. The deputy secretary stressed that to do so would compromise intelligence gathering and could put people's lives at risk. However, as "evidence accumulates, our ability to talk about it will grow," he said. "It is very convincing." He added that part of his speech had to be edited because "it would reveal too much about what we are observing on the ground even today." "It is very important to make it clear we have a powerful case, it is a case grounded in history, it is a case grounded in current intelligence -- current intelligence that comes not only from American intelligence but from many of our allies; intelligence that comes not only from sophisticated overhead satellites and our ability to intercept communication, but some brave people who told us the truth at the risk of their lives," Wolfowitz said. It is possible that the United States has been misinformed on some items, the deputy secretary said, "but the only way to verify you have been misinformed is the kind of openness that the South Africans or Ukrainians demonstrated: Go into places and talk freely to people and look at all the records so you might be convinced." Wolfowitz said that one of the problems the United States has been facing in building up pressure on Iraq is the "well-intentioned belief" by some U.S. allies "that the key to preventing war is to persuade us that we mustn't act." "The key, in fact, here ... is to persuade Saddam Hussein that he must act," he said. The deputy secretary said he believes that U.S. allies "agree completely with us that (Saddam Hussein) has these weapons." "I would hope they put more effort into persuading Saddam Hussein than into persuading us," he said. "We have got to send a message to Saddam Hussein that he has to change," Wolfowitz said. "If he thinks that every little possible loophole in the case can be followed by explaining it away ... [and that] will get him off the hook, then we are going to continue marching down a road that leads to only one -- and one rather grim -- conclusion." Disarmament inspections teams can do a great deal to verify the dismantling of programs in a very short time when a government cooperates, he continued. But it is not the job of the U.N. inspectors to disarm Iraq. "They cannot be charged with a 'search-and-destroy' mission to uncover so-called 'smoking guns' -- especially not if the host government is intent on hiding them and impeding the inspectors' every move," Wolfowitz said. "Inspectors cannot verify the destruction of weapons materials if there are no credible records of their disposition," he said. "Think about it for the moment: When an auditor discovers discrepancies in the books, it is not the auditor's obligation to prove where the embezzler has stashed the money. It is up to the person or institution being audited to explain the discrepancy." He said it is "unreasonable" to expect a few hundred U.N. weapons experts to search every possible hiding place for weapons in a country the size of Iraq, especially since Iraq constructed mobile units for moving the weapons around. "There is a clear, important role for inspectors to play in verifying if you have genuine compliance. If you saw the signs of genuine compliance, you would also want the most sophisticated intelligence to make sure that those signs that you saw were not somehow deceptions," Wolfowitz also said. "But when you see absolutely clear signs that the fundamental decision to disarm has not been made ... the inspectors are disabled," he said. The deputy secretary pointed out that Iraq's December declaration "is a catalog of recycled information and flagrant omissions" and Iraq's Special Security Organization employs thousands to hide documents and materials from U.N. inspectors, sanitize sites, and to monitor inspectors' activities. Iraq has accumulated sufficient computer expertise to break into the U.N. inspectors computer systems and is likely to target U.N. computer systems through cyber intrusions to steal inspections, methods, criteria and findings, he said. In the past Iraq tried to intimidate U.N. inspectors and has again begun referring to the inspectors as spies "clearly hoping to make them uncomfortable at best and afraid at worst," Wolfowitz added. "Today we know from multiple sources that Saddam has ordered that any scientist who cooperates during an interview will be killed, as well as their families. Furthermore, we know that scientists are being tutored on what to say to the U.N. inspectors and that Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as scientists to be interviewed by the inspectors," he said. "We must look at Iraq's behavior, attitude toward inspectors, intimidation of scientists. These efforts to obstruct are very, very clear signs of Iraq's intentions," the deputy secretary said. (The Washington File is a product of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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