
Daily Press Briefing
Richard Boucher, Spokesman
Washington, DC
January 22, 2003
INDEX:
IRAQ | |
2-3,6-8,9 | Communications with France and German on Iraq |
2,4-6 | UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and Failed Accountability |
3 | Catalog of Iraq's Violations and Pattern Failure by Iraq |
3, 11 | Secretary Powell's Satisfaction Level of UN Inspectors and Disarmament |
4,6-8, | January 27 Deadline and Action by the UN Security Council |
7 | Whereabouts of Weapons of Mass Destruction |
9 | Allies and the President's Decision for Possible Military Action |
10 | Relevance and Irrelevance of the UN Security Council |
11 | World Opinion Regarding Military Action |
TRANSCRIPT:
(...)
QUESTION: On another matter, in an interview yesterday, the Secretary had some things to say about France's position on Iraq, a little bit about Germany's position as well. And since that was yesterday, I wonder if anything has been communicated back and forth since then. He did refer in the interview to having spoken to the French Foreign Minister yesterday. Is there anything you have to offer to bring us up to date -- conversations or French remarks to the US or something?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything new on that. The Secretary did speak with Foreign Minister Villepin yesterday afternoon. I think what I'd do is, sort of, let me take the opportunity to remind you of where we are. The Deputy Secretary went over some of this yesterday. The Secretary of State went over some of this yesterday. I won't go back into all 16 of the resolutions that Iraq had violated before we got to 1441, but Resolution 1441, last November 8th, said that Iraq was in violation of all previous commitments.
The inspectors then reported in December that the Iraqi declaration failed to meet the requirements of the resolution. They then reported January 9th that there was only passive cooperation from Iraq; it failed to meet the requirements of the resolution. The inspectors then went to Baghdad last weekend to put the Iraqi regime on notice that they were not fulfilling the requirements of the resolution, and they came out reporting only partial results and largely in the form of promises that Iraq has to keep. And we'll see if they do or not.
We look forward to the inspectors' reports on Monday. At this point, we've seen nothing on the part of Iraq that changes the pattern. Iraq is failing to fulfill the requirements of Resolution 1441. Iraq has failed to account for weapons, failed to answer questions, failed to allow private interviews, failed to identify scientists, failed to prevent aerial reconnaissance, failed to explain its procurements, failed to encourage cooperation with the inspectors, failed to provide what the inspectors asked for, which is credible evidence of destruction of weapons of mass destruction.
In sum, Iraq is failing to disarm. We need to face these facts. We need to deal with this reality and not pretend that inspectors can disarm Iraq while Iraq is actively blowing smoke and hiding its programs.
Next Monday, we'll hear from the inspectors, and at that time we think we need to take up with other Council members how the Council should live up to its responsibilities. That's where we are today.
QUESTION: I was tempted to ask you an "if" question, but I know they're not usually well received. But the --
MR. BOUCHER: I always receive your questions, Barry.
QUESTION: No, the catalog of Iraq's violations of UN resolutions. A lot of these things can't possibly be addressed by continued inspections, can there? I mean, the US has a case -- does the US have a case against Iraq even if it, to use the Secretary's word, dribbles out a few more warheads?
MR. BOUCHER: I think that's the problem. Iraq is a big country. Iraqi programs were massive and wide. And as the Deputy Secretary said yesterday, we now know where 16 of the empty chemical weapons shells are. The previous inspections estimated there were 30,000. I mean, you can do the math. If we can find 16 a week, how long does it take to get rid of the 30,000?
So the point is that without Iraqi cooperation, the inspectors are not going to be able to disarm Iraq, particularly when Iraq is, you know, blowing smoke in everybody's faces.
QUESTION: Richard, in the Secretary's interview yesterday, he seemed to despair that the Germans and the French wanted to give the inspectors more time. And then he said flat out, "Inspections will not work." What does that mean?
MR. BOUCHER: It means what I just said. Inspec --
QUESTION: No, no, no. I mean what the Secretary said, "Inspections will not work." That's a flat out full sentence. "Inspections will not work," from the transcript that you guys put out.
MR. BOUCHER: It's a full sentence in a full paragraph in a full interview, Matt.
QUESTION: Yeah, exactly. So let's not try to explain it outside of the context, but --
QUESTION: Well, I'm not. I'm just --
MR. BOUCHER: The context is clearly the context that you can't expect the inspectors to disarm Iraq if Iraq is not disarming peacefully. And that is a point that we have made again and again.
QUESTION: All right. Maybe I was --
MR. BOUCHER: If Iraq continues its present pattern of behavior which, unfortunately, exactly mirrors their past patterns of behavior, inspections will not work.
QUESTION: Okay. Then maybe I wasn't clear enough. Isn't it, rather, the United States that's prejudging before Monday's date if you, in fact, come out and inspections will not work?
MR. BOUCHER: I think if the inspectors come out on Monday and tell us that Iraq is cooperating and disarming peacefully and that that's the fact, nobody will be happier than us.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. BOUCHER: We set up a resolution to try to do that. Unfortunately, as I've said, the pattern that Iraq has established not just over the last 12 years, but since the two months when this resolution was passed -- the pattern over the last two months has been that they have repeatedly failed to abide by this particular resolution that was passed just months ago, just 60 days ago by the Council.
QUESTION: Okay. And then just the last thing that you said today that the world should not pretend that inspectors can disarm Iraq. This appears to be -- you know, the inspectors -- and I think you guys have said this all along -- the inspectors aren't actually disarming Iraq, right? Iraq has got to disarm itself. The inspectors have no -- you know, no ability to actually go in and disarm Iraq. So are you trying to set a new bar here that --
MR. BOUCHER: No, no, I'm just -- I'm saying, what the Secretary said yesterday, what I said today, was unless Iraq is disarming itself, the inspectors can't disarm Iraq. It takes --
QUESTION: Well, I mean, the inspectors never could have disarmed --
MR. BOUCHER: Well, they can verify Iraqi disarmament. That's their job. That's what they're able to do. That's what they were sent out to do. Unfortunately, if there's no Iraqi disarmament, they can't verify it. Maybe that's a better way to put it.
QUESTION: So how can Iraq, at this point, prove it's disarming, specifically?
MR. BOUCHER: Do what countless other countries have done since, you know, the last ten or 15 years. Show the inspectors where the equipment is. Show the inspectors where the programs are. Show the inspectors where the scientists are. Give them a real list of people. Encourage people to cooperate with the inspectors. Tell us what they really had. Tell us what happened to all those pieces and mustard gas shells and VX and Sarin and growth media and long-range missile tests. Tell us what they bought. Tell us where it is. And let the inspectors verify it. That's what countless other countries have done over the last ten years, and you'll be hearing more about that, I think, in the speech from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz tomorrow.
QUESTION: So they don't have to show you the --
MR. BOUCHER: Plenty of examples. Yeah, the inspectors started this out saying, "Show us the equipment and we'll destroy it, or show us concrete evidence that it has been destroyed." They've gotten neither.
QUESTION: Can Saddam Hussein stop all this by leaving the country? Is it just him? Can he stop this war?
MR. BOUCHER: As I think the Secretary has made clear in a number of interviews, we certainly think that would be an option that he and his cohorts and his close associates, his family, should take. We would look to see an Iraqi regime that would be willing to live in peace with its neighbors, live in peace with its own people, that would be willing to get rid of all these weapons of mass destruction and would stop threatening people in its region and live by the same principles that other countries do. That's what we would look for.
Elise.
QUESTION: When you say that we have to face the facts and take what the Security Council -- what it does next, does that mean that you're -- that you've reached the conclusion that you'd like the Security Council to take further action, and at what point will you be taking this up with the Council?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, the first thing for the Council to do is to hear the report of the inspectors and to discuss that report, to discuss the pattern of Iraq's behavior, and to discuss whether or not Iraq is fulfilling the requirements that the Council laid down a few months ago.
On that basis, the Council then needs to discuss what its next steps are going to be, or the Council members need to decide what the next steps should be. So that'll be the way the discussion would proceed absent some change that's reported by the inspectors on Monday.
QUESTION: When you say it's up to the Council to decide whether Iraq is disarming, there are quite a few Council members that seem to disagree with you on various points of whether the inspections are working. And so when you say that the Council has to decide, it looks as if you're in for along the same lines of the long, protracted discussions that you had with the Council on the resolution in the first place.
MR. BOUCHER: No, I think we've made clear -- maybe I didn't make clear in my last sentence or two -- that we have promised in the earlier resolution, 1441, that there would be a consultation and discussion with other members of the Security Council. If the Council decides to do something and decides together what to do, then that's fine. If they don't, we still reserve the right to take action along with likeminded nations. So either the Council together or Council members will have to decide what they think the next steps should be in light of the situation.
QUESTION: Richard, you said that there is a range of options. Could you lay out some of those?
MR. BOUCHER: I did?
QUESTION: You did -- that are before the Security Council. Could you lay out what those options are, ranging from, obviously, continuing with the inspections and going to war? Are there any options in between that the US thinks could be on the table?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think we have a list of options at this point to present to the Security Council. As I said, the first step is for the Council to hear the report from the inspectors, to look at the facts of Iraqi cooperation and to face up to those facts, and to decide how the Council or the Council members can ensure that Iraq meets its requirements for disarmament.
QUESTION: I mean, you can understand why I'm asking this, because it sounds as if -- I mean, there are some people who, contrary to what the administration had been saying just about a week ago that the 27th was not a drop-dead date, it wasn't a trigger for war following the inspectors' report, if there are no other options in between beyond the inspections continuing and going to war, then that does sound like a drop-dead date.
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to speculate on what the options might be at that point. As I said, the Council or Council members will have to decide what they believe, what they think are the appropriate next steps. But it's got to be based on the facts. The first thing is to look at the facts and, frankly, look at the facts honestly and squarely. The Deputy Secretary made that point in his speech yesterday.
If we are seeing, as I believe we believe we are, the same patterns repeated of Iraq's behavior in all the other resolutions -- so this very reluctant confession, inadequate disclosure, superficial cooperation -- then we ought to face up to it, deal with that reality, and discuss how we can make Iraq fulfill their requirements.
QUESTION: Just a quick follow-on. Is the 27th still not a trigger for war or a drop-dead date?
MR. BOUCHER: It's still what we've been saying. It's an important date. It's an important date to listen to the inspectors, to see what they report, and to focus on the question of whether or not Iraq is disarming peacefully.
QUESTION: But it's not a trigger?
MR. BOUCHER: It's not a trigger.
QUESTION: Does the Secretary have any plans to continue discussions with the French Foreign Minister and will he be calling the German Foreign Minister soon? I mean, there are clearly serious disagreements between their countries and the US on next steps.
MR. BOUCHER: The Secretary, in his meetings at the United Nations and his discussions with other Foreign Ministers, including the French Foreign Minister and the German Foreign Minister, took the same approach that I have today and said we all need to look at the report that the inspectors produce, look at the facts of the matter, ask ourselves, "Is Iraq disarming peacefully in accordance with the resolution or not?" And then we need to be in touch. He promised he would be in touch with other leaders.
So we will be, I'm sure, consulting very closely with other members of the Security Council and other nations outside the Security Council after we hear from the inspectors and start to look at what the next steps should be.
QUESTION: But the French made it very clear that -- the French Foreign Minister -- that he did not see war as an option. And it sounded like he was saying no matter what.
MR. BOUCHER: Once again, I think, some of these issues, as you know, were discussed when we passed the first resolution, the Resolution 1441. We are looking at that resolution and trying to answer the question: Is Iraq fulfilling these requirements? That was a process of peaceful disarmament. Is Iraq peacefully disarming?
And if Iraq is not, then in that resolution, all 15 members of the Council promised that we would have to consider serious consequences of another failure. So that's what we expect people to live up to.
QUESTION: So even if someone vetoes this in the Security Council after the 27th, you still reserve the right to act with a coalition of the willing?
MR. BOUCHER: Vetoes what?
QUESTION: The -- any further action.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I don't know that the further action, that the next steps will be another resolution. It may or may not be. The Council will get together and talk. We will talk to other members of the Council at various levels and focus on what are the next steps needed to ensure that Iraq fulfills the requirements of the resolution and the expectations of the international community to disarm. That's what we intend to do. That's what it says in Resolution 1441. Whether that takes the form of another resolution or some other form of action by the Council or by Council members, I can't really say at this point. The first thing is to listen to the report of the inspectors and to ask -- to deal with the question of what's going on.
QUESTION: Richard, when you say that you reserve the right to act with a coalition of members or other Council members or other states, and to follow up on Betsy's point that the French Foreign Minister and the Germans clearly don't see a justification for war, does the United States believe that Saddam Hussein is such a threat to US national security and to international peace and security that it's willing to alienate two of its closest allies over many, many centuries and deal with the consequences of alienating itself down the line?
MR. BOUCHER: Without talking too much about history, I think you've seen that allies can debate and discuss things, that allies can come together sometimes, act jointly sometimes, sometimes not. And we do believe that the prospect that this dictator would threaten a vital region, would continue to be able to develop the wherewithal to attempt to dominate and intimidate this vital region of the earth, is something that affects our national interests. And it affects not only our national interests, but the interests of many other nations, including those who are there.
And therefore, we believe that should we decide it necessary to use military force, should we decide it necessary to take action that would result in a better region and a better future for the people of Iraq, that there would be other governments, other countries that might join us in that.
But at this point, the President has not made a decision. We have not made a decision on military action, and therefore not made a decision on how that action should take place. So we will see as we go forward, based on the facts of the matter, based on the report of the inspectors, what we know and what we've seen, we'll see how the countries come together or don't come together to do what's necessary.
QUESTION: But when you make that determination while you're considering all your options, are you considering the consequences that the US will face by going it alone?
MR. BOUCHER: We consider everything.
QUESTION: Richard, does the United States believe it's possible for the Iraqis to conduct an active program to develop these weapons at the same time as there are UN inspectors going around the country?
MR. BOUCHER: They did in the '80s when the --
QUESTION: There were no inspectors going round in the '80s.
MR. BOUCHER: You want to let me finish a sentence? They did in the '80s when the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors were going around the country. They did in the '90s when the UNSCOM inspectors were going around the country and they had active biological weapons programs. They did for the last five years when there were no inspectors in the country. And they've failed to account for the end of those programs.
When you have active non-cooperation, when you have the Iraqis putting smoke up everywhere, when a country such as Iraq -- as I said, without Iraqi cooperation, it's not possible to verify that these programs have ended, it's not possible to verify that these programs have been destroyed.
QUESTION: Richard, getting back to what Betsy asked a while ago, which I think you may have forgotten about in the answer, but it was, in fact, on Monday Foreign Minister Fischer's comments which first raised the eyebrows of the Secretary and prompted him to diverge from his prepared remarks and go on about impotence and all this other kind of stuff. And the Secretary has spoken with Foreign Minister de Villepin after he made his objectionable remarks in the press conference.
Has the Secretary talked to Foreign Minister Fischer or do you guys consider the Germans just a lost cause at this point?
MR. BOUCHER: Can I take Option C? (Laughter.)
QUESTION: I just want to know if he's talked to him.
MR. BOUCHER: No, he hasn't. I think I answered that part of it.
QUESTION: Well, is there any reason why you're taking -- why he would have a -- go ahead.
MR. BOUCHER: If you remember, I think the Secretary said so in his interview with the newspapers yesterday that as things played out on this issue in the Council, obviously the Secretary had spoken with both Foreign Minister Fischer and Foreign Minister Villepin, as well as the other ministers he met up there about the Iraq issue. We're quite familiar with their views. We've discussed it. We've had some back and forth with them and we've said, "Well, let's look honestly at the reports on Monday and continue to address these issues."
So the views themselves are not any particular surprise. As things played out in the Security Council, Foreign Minister Fischer was the first one to address the Iraq issue. The Secretary, then, in his remarks replied to that. And then it was later that Foreign Minister Villepin addressed the issues more extensively in his press conference. So the Secretary felt it was necessary to call Foreign Minister Villepin and make he understood our views on that.
QUESTION: Right. Okay. Does the United States believe -- the Secretary said in his interview yesterday that he, frankly, had to question the seriousness, or he wasn't sure whether these people -- and he was specifically referring to, I think, specifically referring to the Germans and the French -- were serious about ending the inspection process anytime soon, in other words calling -- you know, bringing an end to the process of inspections.
Do you guys thing that the French and the Germans, or particularly the French, have undermined the authority of the Council by coming out right now, a week ahead of the inspectors' report, and saying what they will, you know, basically laying their cards on the table, "We will not support a war," in the case of the Germans, or "We think the inspections are working and have no need to stop them," as the French said?
MR. BOUCHER: We will have to have these discussions with other Council members as we deal with the facts. The important thing is to honestly face the facts. As Deputy Secretary Armitage said yesterday, "We must not let the sensible reluctance to fight drive us into wishful thinking."
The importance for the Security Council is that the Security Council insist that its resolutions be honored. And if we have a pattern of non-cooperation, of active non-cooperation, then the Security Council needs to insist that its word is abided by and needs to do what it said it would do, which is to get together and discuss how to ensure that Iraq fulfills the requirements.
QUESTION: Are you still of the opinion that this-- that action, that this is the moment, this is going to be a defining moment for the Security Council to prove its relevance or irrelevance? Is that --
MR. BOUCHER: We are still of the opinion that the Security Council needs to demonstrate that it means what it says and that a resolution is upheld by the resolution of the members -- by the resolve of the members.
QUESTION: But right now, that resolve is up in the air, as far as you can --
MR. BOUCHER: Right now, we're just beginning a debate that will be further aided by the facts as reported by the inspectors. So let's not draw conclusions and postulate on eventualities.
QUESTION: Well, the reason I'm asking is --
MR. BOUCHER: What can I say? MR. BOUCHER: Let's not try to draw conclusions at this point nor predict how it'll all turn out.
QUESTION: But, well the reason I'm asking, though, is because you seem very happy and, in fact, now you're demanding that the North Korea issue be taken to the Security Council, and yet you're still not convinced that the Security Council is relevant. Is that a mis --
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think that's quite a fair analogy. There's a reason and a responsibility that make it almost imperative that the International Atomic Energy Agency report to the Security Council because the North Korean withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty is, by definition, a matter affecting international peace and security, and therefore one that should be reported to the Security Council.
QUESTION: Could we go on to that?
MR. BOUCHER: Can we go to something else?
QUESTION: On North Korea, since we're on that?
QUESTION: One more on Iraq?
MR. BOUCHER: We have a question back there.
QUESTION: Thank you. My question is related to the some of the latest questions. If President Bush decides to attack Iraq, what would that cost the US in world opinion, and does it matter?
MR. BOUCHER: I will go back to what I said before. If it comes about that military action is necessary to uphold the word of the Security Council, to rid the region of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, to rid the Iraqi people of a regime that's persecuted them and oppressed them and gassed them, then I think there will be other nations in the world and people in the world who will understand why that's necessary and correct.
So we are obviously aware of the feelings of people around the world. As Deputy Secretary Armitage said yesterday, "Nobody wants to fight a war." Americans no more than any other people are looking for war. But we also think it's necessary to face reality. If this threat is allowed to continue, if this threat is allowed to build, we'll all be in trouble. And if we have to deal with it, there will be others who will be prepared to deal with it as well.
QUESTION: Just one more on Iraq?
MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.
QUESTION: Richard, you keep talk about facing the facts. But if the facts are the facts that the inspectors are going to lay out next week, it sounds like you're not really willing to accept whether the inspectors are saying whether Iraq is cooperating or not. It sounds like you, like Matt said, you have already prejudged what the facts are going to be and your interpretation of them.
MR. BOUCHER: Let me go back through the list. Where are we today? Not going back 12 years and 16 violations. The resolution on November 8th said they were in material breach. The inspectors reported in December that their declaration didn't meet the requirements of the resolution. The inspectors reported January 9th that passive cooperation did not meet the requirements of the resolution. The inspectors went to Baghdad to put the Iraqis on notice that they had failed to meet the requirements, failed to answer the questions, failed to account for the weapons, failed to provide credible evidence. They came back with only partial results, meaning many of those failures continue and many of those failures we have promises, but not changes.
So we will look at what the inspectors report on Monday. But given this history of repeated failures, not just in the past, but today -- now, every day as this continues -- Iraq is failing to cooperate, failing to disarm peacefully, and given that it's Wednesday already, we'll see what they report on Monday, but I think we should be prepared to deal with the facts.
QUESTION: Do you have any information or reaction to documents that were given by the Iraqi Government to Mr. Blix?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't. That would have to come first from the inspectors in terms of what they might say to the public or report to the Security Council.
(...)
QUESTION: The reason I ask is that you guys --
[End]
Released on January 22, 2003
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