Daily Press Briefing
Richard Boucher, Spokesman
Washington, DC
January 9, 2003
INDEX:
TURKEY | |
| 9-10 | Consultations with Turkey on Iraq |
| 10 | Reports on Base Agreements and Elements of Cooperation |
| 10-11 | Plan Crash and Process of Positive Identification of AmCit |
IRAQ | |
| 11-12 | Dr. Blix's Study of the Declaration and Outstanding Activity |
| 12, 14 | Facts of Level of Cooperation/Gaps in Information |
| 12-14 | Effort to Interview Scientists |
| 15 | Secretary Powell's Meeting with Dr. EL Baradei |
UNITED KINGDOM | |
| 14 | Statement on the Iraq Inspectors and Possible Disagreements |
IRAQ/N KOREA | |
| 15-16 | International Community's Outlook on Inspections and Obligations |
TRANSCRIPT:
(...)
QUESTION: Iraq. I was wondering, do you have a final answer from Ankara? Are they going to cooperate with the United States?
MR. BOUCHER: We have not tried to give anybody else's final answer, and I think at this point we've made clear that the President has not decided that we will need military action, and therefore it's not time for anybody to give a final answer. But we have looked at cooperation with a number of governments. We've looked at ways we might cooperate and things we can do. And as I mentioned yesterday, we've made various requests and had a lot of meetings with the Turkish Government. We think they've been very receptive to our requests and they're working these things as -- through their system.
QUESTION: Is the Turkish press including to send the official Turkish news agency? They claim that the Turkish Government ready to sign for the base agreement which you are asking a long time ago. Did you reach the agreement?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything like that to announce.
QUESTION: On the same subject, Mr. Blix and his --
MR. BOUCHER: Same thing, Charlie?
QUESTION: Yes, sir. Do you know if Turkey has given its approval for the Pentagon's site survey team to go in and put the basic --
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to talk about any particular teams or elements of cooperation. We haven't done that with any particular country. I'm not going to start now with Turkey.
QUESTION: Can I stay on Turkey for one second? The crash yesterday, there was, I believe, one American citizen.
MR. BOUCHER: That's right.
QUESTION: Any others?
MR. BOUCHER: At this point, we know of one American citizen. We're waiting for positive identification of the individual.
First of all, let me say our sympathies go out to the families and the friends of those persons who lost loved ones in this tragic plane crash, as well as to those persons who lost loved ones in the crash in North Carolina that we had here yesterday.
In terms of the crash in Turkey, we know of at least one American citizen. We don't have final identification of the individual. We have been in touch with the individual's family. In deference to the family, though, we're not releasing the name at this time.
We're using the passenger manifest to try to identify other possible citizens, although positive identification is difficult. Our Embassy in Ankara is working with local authorities and airline officials in an attempt to obtain information that can help us determine the citizenship of the individuals aboard the aircraft.
Five consular officials from our Embassy in Ankara and our Consulate General in Adana are on the ground at the crash site today. So they're down there trying to help any Americans that might have been hurt, or otherwise help the families.
QUESTION: Do you know how many people there are that are -- were victims who are questionably -- that you're not sure of --
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have a number of people who might be. I don't think -- at this point, it's just really trying to go through the whole list and make sure that this was, indeed, the only American.
QUESTION: So there were no survivors who were Americans?
MR. BOUCHER: Not that I've heard of, no.
QUESTION: Can we go on to Blix? I don't know whether you've had time to study his briefing and prepare a response and comment on it. What do you think?
MR. BOUCHER: I, first of all, the discussion today of the Security Council is a continuation of the discussions that they've had before on the Iraqi declaration and the status of the inspections. It's a preliminary discussion leading up to a report from the inspectors on January 27th.
As always, the issue is whether or not Iraq is cooperating actively with the disarmament process. And I think what you'll see from the reports that people are issuing is that there is superficial cooperation and inadequate disclosures. The resolution makes clear that Iraq needs to actively cooperate. The declarations that Iraq has made, the information that they have provided, and I'd have to say the further study of that information since it was provided, leads to a lot of holes, a lot of questions outstanding from previous inspections, as well as Iraq's activities since 1998 that just plain haven't been answered. And the failure of Iraq to cooperate is becoming more and more clear.
There is no indication that Iraq has changed its approach from an approach based on deceit and deception. There is no indication that they've made a strategic decision to disarm. There is no evidence of disarmament. There's no active cooperation. And there are a lot of areas where Iraq has failed to come up with any credible evidence, which was the standard the inspectors set, any credible evidence to explain what happened to things like mustard gas shells, empty artillery shells, VX gas, missile fuels and missiles being tested.
The list of personnel that they provided is not complete and current. In fact, much of the information that Iraq has submitted, upon the examination that we and others have now been able to give it, proves to be incomplete, inaccurate and recycled.
The Iraqis have handed over only one document that the UN Special Commission on Iraq has requested and that's the list of personnel, but it stopped in 1991. So far Iraqi minders have been present at interviews to date, and now we have Saddam Hussein calling the inspectors spies. I'm afraid all that indicates a lack of cooperation rather than active cooperation. It's a pattern. It's a deliberate continuation of the pattern of deceit and deception.
Once again, we have to point out Iraq is missing an historic opportunity to comply peacefully and to disarm. If Iraq chooses not to seize this opportunity, Iraq will have to bear the responsibility of its actions.
QUESTION: Richard.
MR. BOUCHER: Betsy.
QUESTION: So, do you think that on a whole that this is enough, you know, sort of non-help from them, that it could lead to a military confrontation?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't want to say one way or the other what this might lead to. The inspectors report the facts. What we have here is a failure to cooperate. The nations will have to decide when we get the more complete report later this month what the next steps might be.
QUESTION: Do you think without a smoking gun, though, that the rest of the world would follow your lead to military action?
MR. BOUCHER: The UN resolution passed unanimously by 15 members of this UN Security Council requires Iraq to demonstrate active cooperation. The inspectors have said if Iraq is to claim that it doesn't have things anymore, then it needs to provide credible evidence. So the question is whether Iraq has provided credible evidence. The question is whether Iraq has established active cooperation. And unfortunately, none of what Iraq has done would allow us to say yes.
QUESTION: Richard, the list you just went through of all their failures sounds very much like laying the predicate for the argument that you're going to make in two or three weeks. Is that already the argument you are making to the Security Council members?
MR. BOUCHER: I think today's discussion is the facts of cooperation or lack of it. Today's discussion is what have the inspectors seen, not just in terms of what they've seen on their inspections, not just whether or not somebody opened the door when they knocked on it, but have they seen the active cooperation? We'll hear from the inspectors. We're hearing from the inspectors about the superficial aspect of this cooperation. We're hearing from the inspectors about the gaps that they're finding in the Iraqi information and data. And as I've said, unfortunately, the more that we analyze what Iraq provided, the less substantial it seems and the less current it seems.
QUESTION: Richard, do all these failures amount to material breach?
MR. BOUCHER: As we've said, the declaration itself had so many material omissions that those constituted material breaches. Yes.
QUESTION: And the other failures, too, that you've listed?
MR. BOUCHER: We're not -- the other failures are inherent in the previous failures. They of similar in nature and continuation of previous ones.
QUESTION: Among your list of sins, you said that the interviews that have been conducted thus far have -- there've been minders present. It's my understanding that the Iraqi officials involved asked there to be minders. What's the -- is that a problem? I mean, are you actually trying to -- are you wanting to force Iraqis to have it -- do these interviews without any presence?
MR. BOUCHER: I think we want to see people to be in a position to be able to talk freely about what they know about Iraqi programs. Honest Iraqis would talk freely because it's in the interest of their nation to disclose these programs, have the inspectors verify it and have the inspectors destroy that equipment. That's what necessary for a peaceful resolution.
So we want people to feel free and to be able to do that. We all know the circumstances inside Iraq. One can't imagine that an individual who said, you know, he's got to be there, is operating with full freedom to decide whether he wants them there or not. So, as I've said, so far this is the way the interviews have happened. We're dealing with the facts here. What conclusions need to be drawn, what the next steps might be, that will be something for members to discuss in the Council after we get the reports.
QUESTION: And your comments to this effect are based on the fact -- based on the inspectors saying that they did not believe they got the truth out of these scientists? Or you're making that assumption yourself?
MR. BOUCHER: I think we have always made that instruction. We have made that assumption, and the Council made that assumption when it put in to the resolution the authority to talk to scientists --
QUESTION: I'm not aware of the extent -- or maybe they have and I'm just not aware of it. Have the inspectors said --
MR. BOUCHER: Iraq is obligated to provide immediate, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons at a time and place of the inspectors' choosing. The inspectors have made clear that Iraq needs to instruct its officials to cooperate with the interviews. That's the kind of cooperation that we're expecting and the inspectors are expecting.
QUESTION: And the inspectors there have told you that they are not -- that these officials are not cooperating with them in their interviews?
MR. BOUCHER: The inspectors have told us and, I think, told you that there have been minders present.
QUESTION: That's not the same thing.
MR. BOUCHER: Under those circumstances -- you'll have to ask the inspectors what their conclusions are about that. But I think if you look at what the Security Council concluded in the resolution is that something more was necessary for people to be talking freely.
Terri.
QUESTION: Time has a story out that says that the effort to get the scientists out of the country for interviews is stepping up now and in conjunction with that an American offer to help protect them will also be ramped up. Can you confirm that?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I can't. I can't go into any of the details about our discussions with the inspectors about how their interview system can work and how we can help them. But I think I can say that in this, as in many other areas, we're helping them out in every way we can.
QUESTION: Do you know if the efforts are picking up steam, though?
MR. BOUCHER: I'd leave them to characterize their efforts.
Carl.
QUESTION: Just to follow-up again on your bill of particulars and list of all these failures and omissions to cooperate. Given all of that, is there any point in the inspectors continuing their efforts beyond January 27th?
MR. BOUCHER: That's a question you can ask us on January 28th. But no, at this point the inspectors -- this is a discussion today with the inspectors. As I said, they are providing more information about their analysis and others like us are providing information about our analysis of the Iraqi declarations. They're providing information for us to the Council about the cooperation, lack there of, what's happened, and they'll provide a report as required at the end of January and at that point, the inspectors will provide us with the facts and the Council members will be free to determine what they want to do next.
QUESTION: Can you take a question for January 28th, then?
MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, sure. Okay, we had more back here.
Mark, did you have one?
QUESTION: There were official statements that came out of Britain today indicating that Britain was prepared to allow the inspections to continue for some time. Is there any disagreement between the United States and Great Britain about the duration of inspections?
MR. BOUCHER: For what time? Sometime?
QUESTION: Beyond January 27th.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know what the statement was, I'd have to see what it is before I could comment on it.
George.
Okay, Nicholas.
QUESTION: The IAEA Director General has said that he's coming here tomorrow to talk to the Secretary and Miss -- Dr. Rice. Can you confirm that he's meeting with the Secretary and what other points, obviously North Korea and Iraq, but in more detail if you can? As much as you can?
MR. BOUCHER: I hate it when people give all my information away in the question. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. El Baradei, will be coming to Washington tomorrow. He will have meetings here with the Secretary of State and they will discuss Iraq and North Korea, I'm sure.
As you know, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Directors just passed a very significant resolution on the subject of North Korea and the Director General will be following up on that -- has, I think, already started to follow up on that with the North Koreans and so it's a good time for us all to talk to him and to talk about the situations in North Korea as well as the work that he and his inspectors are doing in Iraq.
QUESTION: Richard, Mr. Wolfe met Dr. Blix in New York earlier this week. What, specifically, did he propose or request that the inspectorate start doing?
MR. BOUCHER: The Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolfe, meets with Dr. Blix very frequently, often several times a week. We offer our support and we offer information, compare notes on issues, but again, I'm not in a position to go into any particular meeting.
Sir.
QUESTION: I understand that yesterday, he said that he might be visit to Baghdad and see the Saddam Hussein. Do you think he is preparing to Saddam safe passage to, you know, escape to country?
MR. BOUCHER: You can go ask him if you want. I don't know.
QUESTION: Richard, can you describe for us the difference between Iraq and North Korea insofar as inspection and taking it to the Security Council? You're not taking this to the Security Council on the North Korean situation.
MR. BOUCHER: I really do think that we've dealt with that question about a dozen times over the last 12 days, so if you can I'll give you the short version.
The international community has made clear that both Iraq and North Korea need to live up to their obligations. We've made clear, the United States and others, that we're looking for a peaceful resolution of these issues. The international community has dealt with Iraq for 12 years now, with various resolutions, been communicating, dialoguing, making clear what it was required, making offers of what Iraq could achieve in terms of sanctions lifting, in status of the world if they complied. And Iraq has not only consistently failed to comply, but has consistently tried to deceive and defy the international community. That continues. That's what I'm pointing out today.
North Korea is a different situation. We deal with it differently. We're also looking for a peaceful resolution. We and a number of other countries are looking to see an end to these nuclear programs on the peninsula and, you know, we're making that point to North Korea. Just because we have problems in two different places doesn't mean we will handle them exactly the same. I think we're bringing to bear the tools of diplomacy, the tools of the international community that are appropriate for each situation and that could try to resolve these situations.
(...)
[End]
Released on January 9, 2003
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