Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=9-3-03

TYPE=INTERVIEW

NUMBER=3-784

TITLE=IRAQ

BYLINE=DAVID BORGIDA

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

CONTENT=

/// EDS: MR. CHRISTOPHER PREBLE IS DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, CATO INSTITUTE.///

MR. BORGIDA: Joining us now here in our studio, Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute here in Washington. Mr. Preble, thanks for joining us.

MR. PREBLE: My pleasure.

MR. BORGIDA: The composition of any multinational force, how important is that to the security and the psychology to Iraqis of who is around them and maintaining some security?

MR. PREBLE: Well, ultimately security for Iraq over the long term will be provided by Iraqis. So the sooner that process moves forward, the better. It is true that in the meantime, since the fall of Saddam's government, there has been so much lawlessness, so much uncertainty and instability, that it is useful, it seems to me, that additional forces become involved. And the fact is the United States simply doesn't have the military personnel in uniform to do the job exclusively.

MR. BORGIDA: It is, one would think, a fairly long-term project, however, to take and do all the interviewing and hiring and all of that, and the concern there is on the ground about who remains loyalty to Saddam Hussein and who doesn't. You've been in the military and you've studied these things; what is a reasonable expectation for a process like this to continue on so that there can be some training of Iraqis but a presence of another force as well?

MR. PREBLE: Well, I think that we should not place too many restrictions on who can or cannot participate from the Iraqi side. Clearly there are a few people, a handful of people, who are Saddam Hussein loyalists, who are implicated in the abuses of the regime, and should certainly not be allowed to serve in a successor government. But just because, for example, you were a member of the Baath Party, the reality is most people had to be a member of the Baath Party to work in Iraq. It was a socialist country; you had to be a party member in order to get a job for many people. That does not mean you're a criminal. And I think we need to draw a distinction there.

If we put too many restrictions, it will truly become even more difficult to staff up the civil service, which is so important.

MR. BORGIDA: Are you confident, Mr. Preble, that once Iraqis are trained, former members of the police force, the security apparatus and so on, that the Iraqis themselves can stabilize the country?

MR. PREBLE: Absolutely, I'm completely confident of that. This is a wealthy country. This is an educated country with a functioning middleclass, and there is absolutely no reason to believe that they could not sustain this going forward. Again, we should not place too many conditions, however, on the structure of government, what that government looks like. I think it's not unreasonable for us to demand that they not threaten the United States, that they not threaten their neighbors, and that they not harbor terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Beyond that, I don't think that it's right or even proper for the United States to place a lot of other additional conditions on their system of government.

MR. BORGIDA: Is it any surprise to you that some of the countries with whom the United States dealt with before this conflict are now somewhat reluctant to take part in a security force?

MR. PREBLE: No, it doesn't surprise me at all, and there are two reasons. Number one, at the leadership level I think there is a bit of perhaps a barely concealed kind of glee at the difficulty that the United States is having, it's sad to say. But we shouldn't ignore that a lot of leaders were opposed to the war in Iraq because their people were opposed to the war in Iraq. And I'm not convinced that the citizenry in Germany or France or a lot of these other countries that were opposed to the war has changed significantly. And so I think there is a task for the leaders to come to terms with the leaders in the United States but also to convince their public that it is in their best interest to help the United States in stabilizing Iraq.

MR. BORGIDA: How important is a timetable for elections and stability and so on? Does that give the Iraqi people some sense of closure as they begin to meet some of these deadlines?

MR. PREBLE: Yes, a timeline is essential, because if we continue to place more foreign personnel, foreign troops and foreign money, we send the message to the Iraqis that we aren't truly committed to them taking control. I think a timeline, including the creation of a constitution and ultimately elections, needs to be established. We need to demonstrate, not just by words but in actions, that we are moving the process towards Iraqi self-government and the eventual withdrawal -- hopefully the swift withdrawal -- of foreign forces.

MR. BORGIDA: And quickly, in about 30 seconds. I know the United States is looking for other help, but would you expect any last-minute effort to get more boots on the ground, as they say, more American soldiers there, or is the number there the number we're going to be seeing in the months ahead?

MR. PREBLE: The Pentagon is absolutely determined to maintain the U.S. troop level at its current level or to even reduce it, and there is going to be a lot of political pressure on the Pentagon to increase it, but I know that Secretary Rumsfeld is determined to try and hold the line on that.

MR. BORGIDA: Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute here in Washington, thanks so much for being our guest today. You've been here before; we appreciate your thoughts.

MR. PREBLE: My pleasure.

(End of interview.)

NEB/PT