15 August 2003
CPA in Iraq Seeks to Disrupt Smuggling in Southern Iraq
CPA also highlights humanitarian projects, investigations
Coalition forces in Iraq are targeting smuggling groups in southern Iraq, hoping to disrupt their trade in oil and copper, said U.S. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez at the August 14 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Operational Briefing.
Lt. Gen. Sanchez said the smuggling, which amounts to around $200,000 worth of oil per day, is being done by well-organized professionals in southern Iraq and "has a very direct impact on the families, the communities and the country...."
Coalition forces are training oil police guards and fixed-site security guards to supplement the 9,500 guards that have already been hired in the country, said Sanchez. He added that the CPA is working with the Iraqi Oil Ministry to register tankers.
"The Iraqi police have been helping us in these operations, and they truly are beginning to take responsibilities for a portion of this security problem," he said.
Sanchez also updated the press on the investigation into the July incident at a traffic blockade site in Baghdad's Mansour neighborhood that killed five Iraqis. He said coalition forces would improve the marking standards for temporary checkpoints in order to try to prevent similar incidents in the future. He also said the area's brigade commander and division commander met with the local district leadership and discussed the situation.
"Part of the effort and the reason we conduct these investigations, of course, is just to determine what has happened, what went wrong, if anything did in fact go wrong, and to make sure that we're improving on our procedures as we conduct these operations in the country," he said.
Lt. Gen. Sanchez also announced the establishment of a joint operations center to improve the coordination between coalition forces and Iraqi police in order to better "maintain situational awareness as these forces operate in this city."
Turning to humanitarian reconstruction projects, Sanchez said U.S. Marines had paid $74,000 to hire local Iraqis to repair the Al Hydi al Ghari Primary School for girls, and a Colorado-based combat engineering battalion had completed projects in the village of Al Sekor, northwest of Tikrit.
The battalion cleared out approximately 20 tons of rubble, installed new generators to stabilize the local power, provided medical assistance to the townspeople, repaired bicycles, and built a new soccer field and playground for the children, said Sanchez.
He added that 670 humanitarian projects were completed during the previous week, raising the total to more than 4,900 completed projects, an activity that "continues every single day," he said.
Following is a transcript of the August 14 Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Briefing:
(begin transcript)
Coalition Provisional Authority Operational Briefing
Presenter: Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez,
Commander U.S. Ground Force in Iraq
August 14, 2003
GEN SANCHEZ: (In progress) -- continue to conduct our offensive operations throughout Iraq on a daily basis in order to identify, locate, kill or capture noncompliant forces, Saddam Fedayeen, former regime loyalists, Ba'athists, and any supporters that are creating instability in this country.
The first thing I'd like to discuss today is going to be smuggling operations. And the issue -- this issue has been directly related to the security and instab -- and stability OR instability of Iraq, and this is a fairly well defined operation that has been conducted in this country for some time. It's being done by professionals and it has a very direct impact on the families, the communities and the country of Iraq.
We have some fairly well-organized groups, criminal groups, that are conducting these operations across the country. And lately we have been focusing on these groups down in the south, in the Basra area. Our objective is to disrupt these operations and, hopefully, end them. And the southern region is attractive because of its oil refineries, its ports and its access to the sea and ability to rapidly move that out of Iraqi-controlled waters and move it to other countries.
The other aspect of this smuggling is not just oil, but also copper. And these two resources flow out of here at a pretty good rate. The copper problem is a problem that impacts on our ability to provide power to the country, because a favorite technique of the copper smuggler is to drop the power lines, take the transmission lines, smelt that, and then go ahead and smuggle it out of the country.
To just give you an indication of how lucrative this is for the smugglers, and the disparity in the cost between Iraq and some of its neighbors here: The cost of oil in Iraq is approximately $100 a ton, and that has been held artificially low for some period of time by the previous regime, so a single truck's full of oil will yield about $500 for a smuggler. And some of these tankers are not registered and therefore pose a significant problem for those trying to identify the legitimate transporter from the smuggler.
We believe that somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 tons of various sorts of fuel are smuggled out of Iraq through the south. And the volume of smuggled crude oil, diesel and gasoline is estimated to be worth somewhere around $200,000 a day.
The other element that complicates our problem down there is some of the attacks on the oil pipelines. And to give you a perspective, since late May, we have had 15 attacks on oil pipelines. And now, some of these are clearly sabotage, aimed at disrupting the production of oil, but some of them are to tap in to the oil lines in order to smuggle this product out of country.
So, what we have done is we have taken a multi-pronged approach to this problem. We have begun to train oil police guards, fixed-site security guards, in order to protect some of this key infrastructure. And at this point in time, we have in excess of 9,500 guards that we have hired nationwide. And that's not enough at this point. We still continue to hire and train them and field them. And we have been assisting the Iraqi Oil Ministry in registering tankers. And at this point, we have about 120 oil tankers that have been registered.
Of course, the enforcement side of this must contain an enforcement element, a kinetic element, if you will, and that is our Operation Power Crude. Operation Power Crude is targeting oil initially, and we have impounded 79 tanker trucks, 20 barges and, as you may have -- I'm sure most of you are aware we have seized the Navstar. And once we seized the Navstar and brought it in to port, we determined that it actually had 3,500 tons of diesel, instead of the 1,100 that we thought it contained when we first detained it. And then also, we have detained the tanker Cindy on suspicion of smuggling. And we think this ship has probably another thousand tons of diesel that were going out of the country illegally.
The Iraqi police have been helping us in these operations, and they truly are beginning to take responsibilities for a portion of this security problem.
Now, let me go back and cover the status of some of the investigations that we have had ongoing. I know last week, we discussed a couple of the incidents that had occurred where there were some Iraqis who had either gotten hurt or killed. And all of these investigations are still ongoing, but let me give you an update on a couple of them.
Part of the effort and the reason we conduct these investigations, of course, is just to determine what has happened, what went wrong, if anything did in fact go wrong, and to make sure that we're improving on our procedures as we conduct these operations in the country.
And I mentioned to you last week that in the al-Mansour raid that was conducted, we had, in fact, learned that our traffic control point procedures needed some improvement, and that we were going to improve the marking standards for these hasty checkpoints, in order to attempt to prevent anything of this nature happening in the future.
A consequence of that initial investigation caused the brigade commander and the division commander that was responsible for this district to meet with the district leadership and discuss the situation. And they met for about three hours and discussed a whole range of issues, in order to get at some consensus on the way ahead.
Simultaneously, there were -- two of the families filed claims in this case, and two of the families have not filed any claims to this point. And the residents that had property damage done -- those also have been taken care of. So we still have a little bit of work to do there in policing up that incident with those two families have not filed any claims.
In the incident where the Iraqi police were involved, in here, we have known for some time that we must improve the coordination between the Iraqi police, our military conventional forces and the military police as they conduct operations in this city. And we've taken initiative to establish a joint operations center. That would be co- located at the maneuver force headquarters. That will allow us to maintain situational awareness as these forces operate in this city.
You all know that the Iraqi police are conducting independent operations now here in Baghdad, which is exactly what we want them to be doing. And as part of this, it comes with a bill, and that is the need for us to increase our coordination.
In this incident, we continue to investigate this incident, and what we understand is that the police car was responding to a call unilaterally and that it came upon a hasty traffic control point, and they were fired upon. The actual details are still not completely sorted out, and when I those completed, I will present those to you and describe the lessons that we may have learned and the procedures that we -- or identify if any procedures need to be adjusted as a result of this incident.
Also, there was a -- in the Sumer (sp) neighborhood at Hatamiyah (sp), there was a traffic control point incident in which a vehicle approached the checkpoint at a high rate of speed, did not stop. It struck an Iraqi interpreter, and the vehicle was engaged, and in that incident two women were killed and two males were wounded. One of the young men remains in the hospital and is doing well, and the other one is still in critical condition. The inquiry was completed on the 10th of August. The battalion commander met with the uncle of the deceased and was able to take care of funeral expenses for the women.
There was also on the -- we continue to work with the neighborhood advisory councils here in the city of Baghdad whenever these incidents occur in order to make contact with the families at the right time, whenever the family is prepared to talk to our commanders on the ground. And we're using that medium to ensure that we have linkage between the local authorities and the families as we try to take care of some of these problems.
Now, if I may, let me turn to the conduct of operations in the sector. Over the last week, we've conducted over 13,000 patrols, over 180 raids. And some of the successes in the last 24 hours, the 101st Airborne Division has confiscated a series of anti-aircraft guns that were armed. And also, we had some Iraqis interested in increasing the stability and security of the country have come in into the 4th IB CMOC in Tikrit and identified an ammunition cache of 98 rocket- propelled grenades. Also, in the 3rd ACR zone, we discovered a cache that was a significant cache. This included over 800 rocket-propelled grenades, the warheads. It had 920 120mm AT rounds; had over 300 illumination rounds in it; 120 -- 125 AT tank rounds. So, as you can see, a fairly big ammunition cache that could have been a source of improvised explosive device that has now been eliminated.
In the area of our Civil Defense Corps, extremely good response out in all parts of the country up to this point, and we've recruited over two battalions worth of Iraqis to serve in this force. And up in the north, in Mosul, they're already conducting operations. We had the first joint operation between the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and our forces up there. As you may recall, their duties will be as translators, drivers, route security, convoy security, and other small-level tasks.
Now, let me highlight a couple of items in the reconstruction area that are important for us. The first one, if you look at the slide we've got off to my right here, I want to highlight the Al Hydi al Ghari (ph) Primary School for Girls. This is a school for girls ages 6 to 12. About 500 girls are in this school. This was a school that was attacked by the coalition forces when we came into the country because there were air defense weapons that were stored next to the site, and therefore, we had to eliminate the air defense threat.
The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force took on this project; paid about $74,000. It was of economic impact to the area. It hired about 40 to 50 local men that worked six days a week for about three months. And all of the material that was used in this project to come up with what you see up there on the slide now was procured locally. So all that was money that went right back into the economy, and that's what the school looks like today after the Marines completed the project.
The other project I'd like to highlight for you today is Al Secor (ph), is in the -- located in the area northwest of Tikrit. This small village has a population of about 1,200. And the 244th Combat Engineer Battalion out of Denver, Colorado, took on the business of clearing out about 200 loads of rubble, about 20 ton dump trucks' worth that they removed from this area. They installed new generators to stabilize the local power. They built a new soccer field.
Next slide.
They designed and built a playground for the children. This photo here shows our engineers building that playground. The engineers, welders, specifically, repaired old bicycles for the children. And during this whole time, the battalion's physicians assistance was providing medical assistance to the 1,200 people in the village. And in the end, the children came out of there with a soccer field and a playground that they did not have before.
This is what our (surp ?) funds are doing for the people of Iraq. I've been keeping you abreast of how much money is being spent out there by our commanders. At this stage, we're up to about $50 million that have been distributed to the military commanders. We've got more than 4,900 projects that have been completed, and this continues every single day. And we have 670 projects that we completed last year -- correction -- last week.
Now, there's one other final issue that I'd like to discuss before I take your questions. I think some of you are aware that there was an order that went out eliminating embedded media in units. That order has been rescinded. And there was never any intent for us to eliminate that embed program. There has been too much, way too much value to this program. This is exactly what America needs so that the American people can understand what our soldiers and our units are doing in this great effort. The order was rescinded and you will be able to continue to highlight our soldiers as they conduct operations out in the field. Clearly, there are times when we are employing certain capabilities, that should not be appearing in the media, and when we conduct certain operations where OPSEC and safety are of tremendous concern to us, and in those cases, just like we have in the past, we will restrict media access. And so, you know, we have rescinded that order, and we will work to clarify instructions to our units.
With that, I will now open up to your questions.
Yes, sir?
Q: Darryl Smith (sp), Financial Times. There was a news item yesterday at the -- (word inaudible) -- Mosque, Square 55 in Sadr City, or Saddam City or al-Thawra City, whichever one you want to call it. This incident appeared to have started when an American helicopter took down a religious flag from a communications tower, and it seems to have ended with American troops opening fire on civilians. Can you tell me why American troops would want to take down such a flag? Can you tell me if you know how many civilians you killed or injured? And can you tell me what affect you think this might have on your attempt to win the hearts and minds?
GEN SANCHEZ: Yeah, the demonstration was about 3,000 people. When we sent the unit to investigate, the unit came under fire by small arms, and actually, an RPG was fired, also, from the crowd. Our unit returned fire, and they wound up killing the RPG gunner and they wounded four others.
The helicopter was, in fact, there. Apparently, the helicopter did -- either blew down the flag, or somehow, that flag was taken down. And we are taking steps to ensure that that doesn't happen again. There is no policy on our part to fly helicopters up to communications towers to take down flags. And my understanding at this point is that, in fact, there has been an apology issued by the commander on the ground because of this -- the incident that blew down that flag. And our investigation continues at this point.
Q: Sorry, I mean, just to clarify, are you saying that the incident with the helicopter and the flag came before the group gathered to demonstrate? Because the eyewitnesses that I've talked to have said that the incident with the flag preceded the demonstration; and indeed, the demonstration was a response --
GEN SANCHEZ: That's what I said. Yeah, that's what I said. Yeah. Okay? And that's why I just told you the commander has gone in and said we're not going to let this happen again. Okay? We'll take precautions. We understand that that's -- you know, that's important to the people of Iraq. We have been -- in fact, we have been on the ground working with the local leadership in order to ensure that we understand exactly what -- you know, what transpired there. Okay?
Yes, sir?
Q: Thank you, sir. I would like to ask about the explosion in the Jordan embassy.
GEN SANCHEZ: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you think that there is some connection between King Abdullah received or allowed for these two daughters -- (inaudible) -- Saddam and this explosion?
GEN SANCHEZ: Sir, at this point the investigation is ongoing. That is some of the speculation that I've seen in the papers. We continue to investigate the incident. I have no idea what the motivation was for the bombing.
Q: Your answer is (very necessary ?), sir. Thank you.
GEN SANCHEZ: Yes, sir?
Q: (Name inaudible) from Al-Jazeera. Sir, we have a statement here, it was distributed in the area of (Sadr ?) -- (inaudible) -- from the coalition forces. Let me read what they said in English. "The attack which happened on Saturday the 9th of August will lead to the cutting off of all humanitarian aid programs, including rebuilding schools, medical clinics, rehabilitating the water system and removing trash, unless the citizens of the area inform on the person who carried out these attacks." So this is the one, the people gave it to us, and they said that the American soldiers gave it to them. So is this a new policy of collective punishment for the area where there is an attack or something?
GEN SANCHEZ: I'm not aware of us distributing those. I mean, it's possible. There is no collective punishment policy in place.
Q: But the people said that they got it from the American soldiers. So if it isn't -- I mean, are you going to investigate that?
GEN SANCHEZ: Oh, sure. I'll take a -- I'll look into it. I'll look into it. Next week I'll let you know what we find out. But there is -- what I'm telling you, from the JTF level there is no collective punishment policy in effect.
Okay? Yes, sir?
Q: (Name inaudible) -- from Kyodo of Japan. There are reports of many terrorists being paid for attacks on coalition forces, on civilian areas. Would you elaborate on that? Details? Who those terrorists are, how much are they paid, whether you have proof on that or not?
GEN SANCHEZ: Whether I have what, sir?
Q: Any proof.
GEN SANCHEZ: Oh. Okay.
Q: Thank you.
GEN SANCHEZ: Just about, well, as long as I've been here, off and on we've been getting reports that tell us that some of this is being done, that in fact there are people that are being paid, from $100 up to -- I've seen numbers up to about $10,000 -- to kill Americans and coalition forces. And you know, my guess is that what we're up against here is either fundamentalists or former regime loyalists that are trying to recruit some of the unemployed young men that are out there, that have a need for some money, to conduct operations against the coalition.
Q: Sir, in that case, would it practical to call these people "resistance"? Isn't this a similar way of working?
GEN SANCHEZ: I'm sorry. I didn't quite understand the question.
Q: Can these people be called, termed as resistance people if they get money for doing their job?
GEN SANCHEZ: Sure. I mean, you can call them mercenaries. Mercenaries are hired --
Q: Thank you. Do you call them mercenaries, sir?
GEN SANCHEZ: I haven't called them "mercenary." I said you could. (Chuckles.)
Q: Thank you.
Yes, ma'am?
Q: Hi. Theola Labbe for The Washington Post. General, you've mentioned the Mansour incident and the incident where Iraqi police were killed. You mentioned something called hasty checkpoints, hasty TCPs set up. Are you saying, essentially -- because there have been complaints in the past about checkpoints not being clear and civilians dying because of that, are you saying now that there is an issue with checkpoints being set up sort of hastily and, you know, therefore leading to civilian deaths?
GEN SANCHEZ: No. What I said was that our procedures -- as we looked at those procedures, we determined that we had to improve the marking of those hasty checkpoints. And we are modifying those procedures.
Q: Do you know how many there are?
GEN SANCHEZ: How many checkpoints there are?
Q: That need modification.
GEN SANCHEZ: Oh, no, no, a hasty checkpoint is a checkpoint that we set up -- we call them either hasty checkpoints or flash checkpoints, which is a checkpoint that isn't permanent. We take our soldiers and put them at a spot that is critical for our operation, and in some limited period of time, that checkpoint goes away.
Yes, ma'am?
Q: Gina Wilkinson, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. I just wanted to check something. Sorry. When the gentleman from Al- Jazeera mentioned the (notice ?) being handed out, threatening to cut off humanitarian aid, did you say it was possible that that has happened? If it is possible, how is it possible that American troops did that?
GEN SANCHEZ: Somebody put that out. I mean, is it possible? Of course it's possible. I don't know that it's probable. But you know, I'll look into it and get back to you.
Q: And given that you can say that it is possible that U.S. soldiers are doing things like that, and in recent days we've seen helicopters tearing down Muslim flags --
GEN SANCHEZ: No, I said "blow down" the flag. It's different from "tearing down" the flag. Tearing down implies a physical action on the part of a soldier.
Q: But the helicopter was hovering over the tower and --
GEN SANCHEZ: Yeah. I mean, we hover around every place where we have -- you know, where we've had some kind of an incident. We fly around this city 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
Q: So do you think it could be that there's a problem with these threats to cut off -- possible threats to cut off humanitarian aid, possible flag incidents, that some of your soldiers are still viewing Iraqi people in general as the enemy rather than someone they need to help?
GEN SANCHEZ: I think it's -- I think it's very clear what I've told you here in the last couple of weeks, that we are moving towards a precision approach in the conduct of our operations that begins to take into consideration the Iraqi culture, the sensitivities. And we want to be precise in our application of combat power. We're going to continue to be aggressive. We have to be aggressive because we're fighting a low-intensity conflict here. And therefore, we'll continue with our operations. But we want to make sure that we're being precise, based on human intelligence that's coming to us, and in order to allow us to accomplish our task of eliminating this non-compliant force problem we have out there.
Yes, ma'am?
Q: Kimberly Gosher (sp) from CBS News. What do you do, then, to mitigate the effect of yesterday's incident in Sadr City? What do you do to calm people down? They believe an eight-year-old girl was killed in the shooting. They mentioned nothing about an RPG assailant.
GEN SANCHEZ: I think I described what we have done. After the incident, we've gone in, we've met with the local leaders, we're talking to the local leaders in order to mitigate this and to prevent this from happening again.
Yes, sir?
Q: (Name inaudible) -- from the Iraqi-American Council. General, there are lots of indications that there is an organized crime building up in Iraq, like happened in the old Soviet Union. There are reports that I'm hearing from al Kefar (ph) area and some other areas, of gangs basically blocking the neighborhoods and fighting. There are also attacks on rich people. Some people are getting notes in front of their homes, who are merchants, that by 2:00 we need, let's say, $100,000 or your kids will be kidnapped. So also, what you mentioned about the smuggling about oil and copper.
What resources do you have, and what are the measures you're going to take to stop this phenomenon that's obviously obstructing the rebuilding of Iraq?
GEN SANCHEZ: I'm not sure exactly the locations that you mentioned. I'm not that familiar with those specific sites. But I'll tell in general terms, the Iraqi police here in the city of Baghdad, operating in conjunction with the military police and the conventional forces, which number about 36,000, are focused on eliminating this kind of a problem.
I think you may be aware that the Iraqi police, in conjunction with Mr. Kerik's organization, have, in fact, conducted some very successful operations at taking down some of these criminal gangs that are operating in here. I believe that, in fact, there are some organized criminal activity that is occurring, and we are focused on this, reestablishing and helping the Iraqi police establish that law and order. And that's going on every day. Okay?
Yes, sir?
Q: (In Arabic.) That's the first question.
Second -- (in Arabic.)
STAFF: Thirty minutes.
GEN SANCHEZ: Sir, I'll come back to your second question here and get a little clarity on it. But let me answer the first one.
It is absolutely expected that my units operating in the field can establish a hasty checkpoint at the lowest possible level without central supervision. That is exactly what we build into our forces. We teach the American soldier to display initiative, flexibility and aggressiveness in the conduct of his operations. And it is young sergeants being given directions by his next-higher commander that allows them to establish and react in a very, very quick manner to counter a threat.
So clearly, it is possible that these hasty checkpoints, without central supervision, could establish themselves within 30 minutes. And I would tell you that it is way below 30 minutes -- what our standard is -- for setting up a checkpoint.
And if you could now give me a little bit more clarity on your second question, maybe I can answer it.
Q: Sir, but just to follow the first questions, what I mean -- there is about 30 minutes they can't -- but if they can't do the checkpoint -- but let's suppose -- we're still on the first question. Let's suppose every car must be -- have -- (aside in Arabic) --
STAFF (?): Requirements.
Q: -- requirements for the checkpoint, and they must -- the every -- Hummer cars must have -- what -- we need civilian to know that there is a checkpoint.
GEN SANCHEZ: Yes, sir.
Q: Sorry that I'm not good in English.
GEN SANCHEZ: And that is -- no, that's fine. I understand your question. That's exactly what we're fixing -- to make sure that we have the right equipment, to put markers out there that lets the people know that they're coming up on a checkpoint, in order for them to comply and stop. So that's what we are fixing.
Q: But sir, sorry. But there is no -- in any car or any vehicle material -- military vehicle -- there is no -- any -- anything to do that. I think it's possible --
STAFF: (Off mike.)
Q: (In Arabic.)
GEN SANCHEZ: Okay, I think I understand. The intent is for us, just like we have the checkpoints -- the permanent checkpoints, we have signs out, the intent is, when we set up a hasty checkpoint, that we have enough standoff so that people that are getting close to it will know that it's there and can slow down and comply with the hasty checkpoint that has been established in a non-permanent location, so that it's -- what you don't have is a vehicle that's coming up to the checkpoint has no idea that it's there, and the first time it knows that the checkpoint is there is when it starts getting warning shots. So that's what we're working.
Yes, sir?
STAFF: (Off mike.)
GEN SANCHEZ: Oh, the second question. Yes. Clarify that for me, because I'm sorry; I didn't understand.
Q: (In Arabic.)
GEN SANCHEZ: Okay, yeah, I understand. I can take this and get -- I know that we have been working to reestablish some of the security systems -- preexisting systems and stand those back up, because that was the best and quickest way to get capability. I can go back and find out what has been done or whether the presidential site security and the airport security has specifically been addressed, and we'll get you an answer. Okay?
Yes, sir?
Q: Hi, I'm Michael Mathis (sp) from AFP. I'd like to ask you a question about your thoughts on the al Qaeda threats in Iraq. Ambassador Bremer has spoken about Ansar al-Islam and how it's associated with al Qaeda and how he sees it as a growing threat with people coming into Iraq from neighboring Iran to join the group or to return to the group. Also, there's been an incident in Fallujah a few weeks ago, where a group claimed they were associated with al Qaeda. And then yesterday, gunmen battling U.S. troops left calling cards that said they were from al Qaeda. Do you think it's growing -- it's a growing threat; it's very serious? What is your estimation? And what do you plan to do to combat that threat?
GEN SANCHEZ: What we plan to do to combat the terrorist threat is every day, we're out there trying to find them so we can kill or capture. That's a steady state requirement that we have for this low- intensity conflict environment.
In terms of al Qaeda's actual intensity here or level of capability, that is something that we watch, also, on a daily basis. I had not heard this report of calling cards having been left behind, but we will pursue that and see if, in fact, that's out there.
I couldn't, at this point, tell you that there has been an increase. We do know, as I've stated before, that we've got foreign fighters that are coming in here. We do know we have some fundamentalists that are coming into this country to attack coalition forces, and that will continue. And we will continue to find, fix, kill and capture.
Yes, ma'am, in the back?
Q: Thanks. I'm Pam Hess with United Press International. A couple of quick questions to tie things up on the helicopter incident. Do you know what time the helicopter was there and blew down the flag? Was your team that was investigating, were they investigating the flag incident or were they responding to the demonstration? And how do you know that you killed the RPG shooter? Did you see his body or collect that?
And then, a question on the checkpoints --
GEN SANCHEZ: That's about six questions there, Pam. (Laughs.)
Q: Yes, but they're so short. It's like yes, no, yes.
GEN SANCHEZ: I lost track of them all!
Q: The helicopter -- the time of the helicopter. Why the -- the team that responded, were they responding to that or to the demonstration? And how you know you got the RPG killer.
GEN SANCHEZ: Yeah. As far as the timing, I don't have the details right now on exactly what the right sequencing was. Okay? I do know that we have in fact linked up with the leaders. The report on the RPG gunner having been killed, that's what I got from the unit in the reporting that came up to our headquarters. And I can't tell you whether we actually policed up the body or whether it was just a visual report from the unit as they were engaging. Typically, what happens in that kind of an incident, the local Iraqis will police up the wounded and take them to the local hospitals or return them to the family, if they have been in fact killed.
And, I'm sorry, your last question was -- ?
Q: On the traffic control points, I don't mean to armchair- general you, but it seems that -- it's just obvious that you would put markers out well in front of a hasty checkpoint. Why has it taken until now to do that?
GEN SANCHEZ: Well, we've got a lot of young soldiers that are out there doing the best that they can every single day. And we're learning a lot from the operations that we're doing. And that's part of this warfighting business. And we make -- you know, we all make mistakes sometimes, just like the enemy is making mistakes and killing Iraqis, which I'm sure they don't intend to do. Sometimes we're making mistakes also. But when we do, we'll take care of that.
Yes, sir?
STAFF: Forty minutes.
Q: (Name inaudible) -- from Time Magazine. I have a question about smuggling. In light of the recent interception of an SA-18 being smuggled into the United States this week, is there a concern inside Iraq of shoulder-fired surface-to-arm missiles that belonged to the Iraqi army previously, being smuggled out of the country and into, say, the United States? And also, is there any indication that Stinger missiles from, say, countries like Afghanistan, are making their way into Iraq with foreign fighters to target American aircraft?
GEN SANCHEZ: On the second part first, no indications that I'm aware of.
On the first thing, on the first one on surface-to-air missiles that may have been here in this country, clearly, as I have described repeatedly here there is an unbelievable problem with captured enemy munitions and just enemy munitions that exist across this entire country. Every single day we continue to find caches, like the one I just described to you that we found in the last couple of days. There's, by no means, any sense of comfort on my part that we have identified and secured everything that was out there.
The other complicating factor here, of course, is that we have open borders for the most part. So, my level of comfort -- if you asked me: Is anything going out of here, or are you able to prevent that? -- the answer is, obviously, no. So there could be, you know, all sorts of munitions, and just about every other kind of smuggling could be happening. And we're working very hard to try to establish border control. I've described the border control -- or the border police efforts that we've had ongoing for some time to reestablish control of Iraq's borders, but that's going to still take us some time.
Yes, sir?
Q: (In Arabic.)
GEN SANCHEZ: I'm not sure what you mean by "sticks." What do you mean by "sticks"?
(Pause while interpreter provides explanation.)
Okay, first of all, on the new Iraqi army, as we have described in the past, the Iraqi army will be a motorized infantry organization. They will have wheeled vehicles and the complementary weaponry that comes with being that type of a force. Of course they're going to be armed. They already are. We have the weapons, the small arms for them to be able to perform their mission as a motorized force. And at the end of the two years, when we've stood up those three divisions, they will be capable divisions that will be a professional force, they will be a multi-ethnic force that is focused on protecting the integrity -- territorial integrity of the country. And of course they're going to have capability to do that.
On your second question of why are soldiers carrying sticks in front of these different places, I'm still trying to figure out in my mind. But let me tell you that we are -- my soldiers are operating in a low- intensity conflict environment. And they are getting attacked every day in -- at service stations, LPG stations, in hospitals, on the road, and of course they're going to be prepared to defend themselves and to fight. So, I mean, I think it's a very simple, straightforward answer that we are in combat, and we're going to be prepared to accomplish our mission.
Yes, sir?
Q: John -- (name inaudible) -- ABC News. The demonstration here in Baghdad yesterday was one of the largest in sometime, and then the demonstration down in Basra earlier in the week was also quite large. Given all this, do you have any worries that resentment three months after the end of major combat operations is growing among the Iraqi people?
GEN SANCHEZ: Well, it's -- I think if you look at the two different demonstrations, you can extrapolate from those two and generalize the way you have, but when you look at the actual causes for the demonstrations, they're very specific and distinct, okay? In one case, it appears that it was driven by the fact that we had flown a helicopter and inadvertently either knocked down this flag or as the crowd described, and therefore, it caused an adverse reaction on the part of the people. And, as I said, we've gone in there and tried to fix that problem.
The other case is a case where people were frustrated by a multitude of things. One is the extreme heat, obviously. They're sitting in line to get gas, and the gas isn't flowing because electricity problems, and all this comes together to create an environment that is very short-fused and led to what we saw down there. And, you know, we're taking some very aggressive steps to ensure that we can provide some of these basic services to the people to prevent that from happening. That's, I think, what's expected of us.
So, am I concerned about resentment growing? I think that the aggressive nature of our work on the part of CPA and the coalition forces to reestablish the services, public services, to the people and some of the success that we're having cause me to say, no, at this point, I'm not concerned. We've got to do -- you know, we've got to keep the successes coming.
Let me turn to the right over here.
Yes, ma'am?
Q: (In Arabic.)
GEN SANCHEZ: Yeah, as I stated twice already -- well, first of all, our understanding is that one person was killed and four, not three, were wounded. And as I understand it, it was an issue of a flag having come off wherever the flag was flying, and it wasn't a destruction of the flag.
And as I stated twice already, we have gone back in there and talked to the leaders, to ensure that we clearly understand what is expected and what the way ahead is. That is -- our intent is not to alienate the Shi'a people.
In the back.
STAFF: Fifty minutes.
Q: (In Arabic.)
GEN SANCHEZ: Over there.
Q: (In Arabic.)
GEN SANCHEZ: On your first question, sir, we are working those initiatives. It is not just criminals but also the noncompliant forces that we're after when we set up and conduct our operations, especially here, really, across the whole country. So we are working that, in conjunction with the Iraqi police. Sometimes we work joint operations with them, sometimes they're operating independently, and sometimes, of course -- and a lot of the times, of course, we are conducting unilateral coalition force operations. But they're aimed at the spectrum of people that are creating problems for us out there.
On the issue of employment, what I can tell you is that the Coalition Provisional Authority is working very hard to get a jobs program that will begin to employ some pretty good-sized numbers of Iraqis and get them back on the job.
Also, as I've stated earlier, the $50 million that we have put into the Iraqi economy through the commanders' emergency response funds also concentrate and almost exclusively hire Iraqi contractors to accomplish all these projects. And a lot of these projects are done through Iraqi -- just by hiring Iraqis to perform services in their own cities, like cleanup of trash, cleaning up soccer fields. All of that is being done through these projects and providing some sort of economic benefit to the community.
Also, in the Babil area, there are significant numbers, in the thousands, of Iraqis that have been hired to clear irrigation ditches. So in some places that is ongoing, and it is bringing some economic relief to those areas.
Yes, ma'am?
Q: This is the first time that I heard an acknowledgement that there might have been something wrong with the traffic control points.
GEN SANCHEZ: I had mentioned that a couple weeks ago, that we, in fact, thought we needed to improve our standards.
Q: Okay. I wonder if this would have any effect on, you know, the families that have applied for compensation; I mean, you know, the fact that there is an admission that these traffic-control points were not as clear as they should have been and --
GEN SANCHEZ: Yeah. And that's exactly what we're doing. That's why -- what I stated, we're working with the families and there will be some sort of compensation --
Q: There will be?
GEN SANCHEZ: Yeah. We've already done that in some cases. We went to the uncle, as I described, and took care of the incident where the two women had been killed. And we've got the claims for the Mansour district, and the two families that we haven't contacted, we haven't given up on that.
Q: Okay. So actually there is going to be some --
GEN SANCHEZ: Oh, yeah. We've been doing that. We've been doing that --
Q: Because my understanding --
GEN SANCHEZ: -- we've been doing that across the country.
Q: Because my understanding from the lawyer from the -- (inaudible) -- was that, you know, these things are combat excluded even if grave mistakes were made on the part of the U.S. military.
GEN SANCHEZ: What I just stated is what we're doing.
Q: Making an exception?
GEN SANCHEZ: No, it's not exceptions.
Q: Okay.
GEN SANCHEZ: We've been doing this in other parts of the country. It's been done up in Mosul and we've done it in other places.
Okay. Ma'am, in the back.
Q: Hi. Yeah. Donna Friesen (sp) from NBC News. Just to further belabor the point of the incident yesterday --
GEN SANCHEZ: Some more, Donna? (Laughs.)
Q: Yeah. I'm just wondering if you believe an apology is enough, because local religious leaders have been not only demanding an apology but that U.S. forces withdraw from the area within --
GEN SANCHEZ: For? For what?
Q: The helicopter incident in al-Thawra yesterday.
GEN SANCHEZ: Ah. Okay.
Q: As you know, the local religious leaders are very angry, say that a child was killed, that a sacred place was defiled. Are you confident that an apology is enough, or are you concerned of a possibility of growing hostility in that area?
GEN SANCHEZ: Well, as I stated, we've got the commanders on the ground that are meeting with the local leaders to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution here. What I will tell you is that, you know, we've got a mission that we've got to accomplish here in the country. And the mission will be balanced with the local needs, and we will accomplish our mission at some point.
Q: Was there a mistake made yesterday?
GEN SANCHEZ: Oh, I don't know. You know, we'll let the investigation, the inquiry run its course, and then if there was a mistake, I'll come back and tell you whether there was or not.
Okay? Let's see. Over here.
Q: (In Arabic.)
GEN SANCHEZ: The answer is that we are working right now to identify where there may be sufficient capacity in existence already that can in fact assure the security of an Iraqi city. If the assessment is that that capacity exists, as we have stated over and over that we're going to be in there as long as it takes to get to that stage and no longer. And if in fact that's the case, and we make those assessments, and we've got the confidence levels that we can sustain it, we will pull our forces out of some cities.
I think you're well aware of what we have done in Fallujah. That's an area where we continue to operate in there, but our forces have moved to a compound.
So, we'll continue to do that. And our intent is to in fact stand up the Iraqi security forces so that they're able to handle the security mission. Clearly, that is the preferred -- that is the objective and the preferred solution, and we'll continue to work that very hard.
Yes, ma'am?
Q: Thanks. Do you have a policy for Iraqis that need to be on the roads at night, if they have a medical emergency? Is there some way that they can be on the road? And I don't know what the rules of engagement are; if they're on the roads, they're not going through a traffic checkpoint, are they in danger? And do you have some way of explaining this to the people of what to do in that instance?
GEN SANCHEZ: It's a common sense rule. I don't have a written rule that governs that, but it's a common sense rule. And I don't believe that we've had any incidents of Iraqis trying to get to the hospital for medical care where they've had any problem. There isn't an incident that I'm aware of.
Okay, one last question. Yes, sir?
Q: Sir, this morning, the BBC reported that al Qaeda operating in Iraq, alongside with the resistance and fighting the coalition and U.S. forces. Can you give me -- give us any new information about that?
GEN SANCHEZ: No, I think I answered that a little while ago; that, you know, we stay focused on terrorist organizations. That is clearly a priority for us. We hear -- I'm not aware of this report that you're referring to. And then, that's the second -- I heard the calling card, the al Qaeda calling card, question a little while ago. No, I can't give you any more. I can't verify that that's in fact the case. But I'll tell you that we maintain a very close focus through our intel systems on identifying what terrorist groups and what foreign fighters are coming into this country.
Q: But this first time --
GEN SANCHEZ: That's the --
Q: -- members of al Qaeda confessed there's a -- (word inaudible) -- inside of Iraq.
GEN SANCHEZ: Okay. Then, we'll go find them. (Laughs.) If you can tell me where they are, a little bit closer than all of Iraq -- (chuckles) -- I would appreciate it.
Okay, that's great. Nope, I said that was the last question. Sorry. That's been an hour now.
Q: Half a question.
GEN SANCHEZ: Half a question? No half-questions. (Laughs.)
Q: Please, sir. Commenting on Fallujah police --
GEN SANCHEZ: I said no half-questions. We're done! Thank you, sir. (Laughs.)
Okay, thank you all very much.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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