Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=08/06/2003

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01372

TITLE=FREEDOM IN IRAQ

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT= [NUMBER CORRECTED]

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: How are Iraqis embracing freedom? Next, On the Line.

[music]

Host: Since the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, more and more Iraqis are getting down to the business of rebuilding their country and their lives. For the first time in years, they're speaking their minds, freely criticizing as well as complimenting the efforts of the U-S-led coalition. One of the most prominent of those welcoming what he calls the liberation of Iraq is Ayatollah Seyed Hussan Khomeini. He's the grandson of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the man who led Iran's radical Islamic revolution nearly a quarter of a century ago. Hussan Khomeini recently left Iran for the Iraqi city of Najaf, historically the center of Shia Islam, and now home for a growing number of dissident Iranian clerics. Joining me to talk about Iraq's new freedom, and what it means for the region, are Akbar Ahmed, chairman of the Islamic Studies Department at American University; Haydar Hamdani, an Iraqi-American journalist; and joining us by phone from London, Alireza Nourizadeh, director of the centre for Arab-Iranian studies. Welcome and thanks for joining us today. Akbar Ahmed, how significant is Hussan Khomeini's moving from Iran to Iraq?

Ahmed: Hugely significant. It has great symbolic value, not only the trip but what he has to say. Khomeini is a name known throughout the world, throughout the world, throughout the Muslim world. It has a resonance outside the Shia world. Then, what he has said -- the issues he's raising are highly significant. He's welcoming American intervention in Iran. He's talking about separation between state and religion. These are, in a sense, challenging not only prevailing orthodoxy, but his own grandfather. So here we have the potential for an important movement within Shia Islam.

Host: How significant do you think it is, Haydar Hamdani?

Hamdani: Very significant. A very significant move, not only for the Iranians who are living in Iraq, but also for the Iranian opposition group throughout the world, especially here in the U-S and France. They need someone like him. He's very open minded, you know. He's calling for the separation of religion and state. It could be very significant in the near future.

Host: Alireza Nourizadeh are you there by phone?

Nourizadeh: Yes, I am.

Host: You've been in touch with Hussan Khomeini. Why did he move at this point from Iran to Iraq?

Nourizadeh: Well actually, Hussan Khomeini's opposition to the current regime is something known to me and to other people for several years. He has been in a sort of exile in Qom, because he didn't have such a freedom of going out and moving around. He was just within a very close circle of his friends. Twice his life was threatened. Last time he was out of Iran, he actually decided to move out. But, then what has happened in Iraq encouraged him because he found an environment in which he could express himself freely and without fear, and that's why he decided to move to Iraq. He lived in Iraq for most of his [adolescent] years because he was two years old in Iraq, and he left Iraq when he was around sixteen or seventeen years old with his grandfather. Therefore, going back to Iraq is sort of going back to home, where he was brought up. As he explained to me, he wanted to present the real meaning of Shiism and Islam the way it should be taught and it should be listened to, not the way it's ruled by the Iranian regime.

Host: Akbar Ahmed, is Khomeini's moving to Iraq an indication of the level of religious freedom that's being enjoyed in Iraq at this point, not just for Shias, but perhaps for Sunnis as well.

Ahmed: Yes, certainly it's the air of freedom, free open debate, discussion, after the decades of repression and brutality of Saddam's regime. But also, remember, he's reclaiming the intellectual tradition within Shia Islam of high-class clerics openly speaking their minds and openly criticizing the establishment. This is a tradition not known in the West, but this is one of the strongest traditions in Shia Islam. It gives tremendous legitimacy to scholars like Khomeini, and therefore makes them very dangerous to the establishment. Remember the challenge is happening from within the structure, not from outside the structure.

Host: Haydar Hamdani, what kind of impact does this have on Iraq, not just for Iran, with cleric Khomeini's name coming to Iraq and setting up shop there?

Hamdani: Historically, Hussan Khomeini does not have a lot of support in Iraq. This is from my understanding. Rather, his father has a lot of support -- his grandfather Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. When he moved to Iraq, [he decided that] he's going to openly talk about the Shiism. He's now expressing himself freely, and I think there will be more effect on the Shia of the Iranians, rather than the Iraqis.

Host: Alireza Nourizadeh, do you agree with that?

Nourizadeh: Yes, absolutely. I just wanted to add something, what Hussan was saying. I was talking to him yesterday, and it was a fascinating discussion. He is saying within the Islamic society, like the communist countries, always the individual was sacrificed for the rule of majority or for the right of the Umma, or right of the nation, and we never respected the freedom of an individual in our society. Now is the time the individual should come and talk about his ideas and fight for his freedom. What he's saying is that the Islamic government would not be established before the appearance of the twelfth Imam of Shia. What is in Iran is not an Islamic regime. What is in Iran [is] a fake regime which calls itself [an] Islamic republic. It is not an Islamic republic. It has nothing to do with Islam, and there should be, as I think Mr. Ahmed mentioned, separation of state and religion, and this is something which we always ask for, and the majority of the Iranians want separation of state from the church.

Host: Akbar Ahmed, on this question of church and state separation, there's been a lot of talk about whether in Iraq there would be a push if there are or when they're democratic elections for an Islamic republic that would combine church and state. Has the Iranian experience, perhaps as expressed by Khomeini coming to Iraq -- is that well known in Iraq, and does that shape how people are viewing the relationship between church and state?

Ahmed: I think it will have an impact, Eric. This will be the big debate in the coming time. Remember the significance of the statement. Within Shia Islam, you have the principle of lineage, which means that Khomeini has a legitimacy because of who he is. He's the grandson of a very well known, revered figure within Shia Islam. The entire principle of the Imamite -- the Imams -- who in a sense guide and advise Shia Islam are based on lineage. Now this is quite distinct from Sunni Islam, and you've got to make this point here, because the significance of what he's doing is enormous within Shia culture and Shia Islam, and therefore, we need to watch the developments that are taking place.

Host: Haydar Hamdani, even within Shia Islam, there seem to be very different viewpoints coming out. You have Moqtadah al-Sadr, who's expressing vocally anti-American [and] anti-coalition-forces sentiments, and other Shia clerics who are more similar to what Khomeini has been saying, how is that shaping up in Iraq, and who is gaining the most popular support?

Hamdani: The person gaining the most popular is the Ayatollah Sistani. He is a very traditional Shia leader. He is controlling the situation in Iraq right now. A lot of people listen to him. A lot of Iraqis listen to him especially in the center of Iraq, and the south of Iraq. Moqtadah al-Sadr, he is a young man, and he [wants] to have a power. He does not represent the Shia ideology because he has taken it from his father. His father has a legacy. His father was assassinated in 1999, Mohammed al-Sadr. We see here right now [that] the Sistanis are dominating the area. It's dominating the Shia sector in Iraq, and I think he will have more effect on Iraqis than Moqtadah al-Sadr.

Host: Alirezah Nourizadeh, do you agree, and what is it that Sistani is saying?

Nourizadeh: Actually, what I wanted to add, is [that] Moqtadah al-Sadr is not a religious leader. He hasn't been in any school. He did not have enough time to attend seminaries and the school. Suddenly one day, he decided to put [on a] turban and imam and become a clergyman. So nobody believes in him as a clergyman. He is more or less a gang leader. He has some support from the tribesman, and from some youth in Najaf. Therefore, you cannot compare him with Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who was an Ayatollah for the past twenty years, and he became a grand Ayatollah after the death of his teacher, Grand Ayatollah Imam Khoei. Sistani represents the traditional way of thinking of Ulama and the clergyman. His school in contradiction with the school of thoughts the grand Ayatollah Khomeini [belonged] to, or the school of revolutionary Shiite or revolutionary Ulama. Hussan al-Khomeini is closer to Sistani than to his grandfather and to the rulers of Iran. He believes that Ayatollah Sistani, he is representing the ideas and thoughts of real Shiism, real Islam, and real [Arabism]. Therefore, he believes this holy establishment should stay away from politics, statesmanship, and getting involved in politics.

Host: Akbar Ahmed, often in the West, this issue of the separation of church and state has often been debated in the context of not just of the state, but of involvement of politics was bad for the study of religion. Are there similar debates going on at this point in Iraq?

Ahmed: Certainly, it is not a new debate. This is a debate that has been going on for centuries within Islam. In fact, within Iran, within Shia Islam itself, there's always been a debate between the men of scholarship and the men of power -- the men of the sword -- the clash between them. Many scholars believe that if we became rulers like the rulers in their palaces, we will become corrupt, we will be susceptible to the corruption. We are, after all, ordinary human beings, and therefore, we should stay away from power. There's a very famous saying of the prophet of Islam that the good scholar must stay away from the men of power because it corrupts. "Power corrupts." Lord Acton. At the same time, Ayatollah Khomeini, the grandfather of the present Khomeini, in fact moved in the opposite direction -- which is, he assumed power, fusing the state and religion, causing really many of the dilemmas, tensions, and the conundrum that Shia Islam faces. So in a sense, what we are seeing is the opening of a very important theological debate, political debate, and cultural debate by young Khomeini.

Host: Haydar Hamdani, we've been talking a lot about what's going on within Shia Islam. What about the Sunni population in Iraq? Has there become, in terms of religion conflict, any conflict between Sunnis and Shias, or has that conflict not come forward?

Hamdani: Actually, before the war, there [were] a lot of people who said the Shia and the Sunni in Iraq, they are going to fight each other and there's going to be a civil war. Actually, in our history, there is no civil war between the Shia and the Sunni in Iraq. They are working together, living together, and integrating together. You know, there is a strong relationship between them. So far, right now, we are seeing part of the Sunni Muslims in Iraq are leaning towards the Wahabbism. This is why we see so many attacks on the coalition forces, because they do have associations with Wahabbism. But, if we talk about the Sunni and Shia in Iraq, they are living together. They don't have a problem with each other. They've lived there for a long time. They will move on with their life and build a good country.

Host: Alireza Nourizadeh, how do you see the relations between Sunnis and Shias?

Nourizadeh: I agree with Mr. Hamdani. Actually, what's happening in Iraq we should distinguish between the Sunni and the minority as my friend rightly put it, through either effective through the idea of Salafi or Salifism, and we know that the Wahabbi establishment in Saudi Arabia is also threatened by the government itself. The government is fed up with the Mullahs. Therefore, some of those mullahs have moved to Iraq, or some of them have followers in Iraq, in Kurdistan, in central Iraq, and those are the people who are believing that there is an opportunity for them to establish the sort of government they had in Afghanistan. We shouldn't blame the Sunnis, who, like the majority of Shias, want a strong Iraq, an independent state, a secularist state, and I think we shouldn't pay too much attention to the noises coming from Moqtadah al-Sadr, or some of those shades in the Sunni sectors.

Host: Akbar Ahmed, Hassan Khomeini once who was in Iraq said to the New York Times, "All the countries in the region fear Iraq becoming a free, liberal, and democratic state." Is he right about that?

Ahmed: Yes, because the success of America in Iraq will mean that other countries in the region will be following that particular model. If there is failure in Iraq, if there's failure to engender democratic institutions, make it all work, economic development, and so, -- above all, law and order, then other states can continue as before: business as usual. So there is a great deal of interest in how things work out in Iraq itself. Having said that, we also need to be aware of all the complexities of the situation on the ground -- the tribal rivalries, the sectarian rivalries, the historical rivalries. We are discussing Shia-Sunni. This rivalry goes back to the seventh century. They are patterns of history which in a sense, we are hearing words like Salafi and Wahabbiism. These are all rooted in history, and history in the Middle East is alive, so that people today sit and talk of Najaf and Karbala, events that took place in the seventh century as if they happened yesterday. So these are some of the things that American administrators [should notice], and I don't envy [ambassador] Paul Bremer at all. He needs a quick crash course in Islamic culture, Islamic history, Islamic tradition, without which he will be in trouble in that part of the world.

Host: Haydar Hamdani, can people in Iraq get beyond these historical divisions of various kinds that Professor Ahmed mentions?

Hamdani: Absolutely they can. We're seeing it right now. We're seeing the Iraqi council. They have legitimacy, and people in Iraq are supporting this governing council. My belief, and I was in Iraq and I know the Iraqis will put these things behind them for their future. I don't think there's going to be a lot of conflict between the Sunni and the Shia, and all these historical events, but rather than we'll see the Iraqis are getting along, and do their business.

Ahmed: It's important to point out, Eric, that only yesterday the Arab League unanimously turned down support for this council. So, they don't see the world through such rose-tinted glasses because there is a problem. The Arab world around, the entire neighbor has rejected it. Whether we agree with them or [not], that is the reality on the ground.

Host: Alirezah Nourizadeh, what do you think of the Arab League rejecting the Iraqi council?

Nourizadeh: I don't think it's [very] important. [The] Arab League [has been] dead for a long, long time. They're carrying a dead body here and there. The Iraqi people are really fed up [with] their Arab brothers. When they look at this satellite T-V, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, and all of them, as if they are representing Saddam Hussein. Every day, when I watch the burial ceremony of Uday, Qusay, and Mustafa on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia. They just wanted to say that such great people were buried, such martyrs of Islam. I don't think the Iraqi people care if [the] Arab League is accepting the new government or not. The most important thing is that the Iraqi people, if they look at the council, they will see that they have the representative of most of the parties, tribes, and religions in this particular council, which has been formed after a long study. I envy my colleagues in Iraq. When you have a hundred newspapers and there is no censorship. If they encourage killing and other things, the American administration [would] just give them a warning. I look at my country. Tens of my friends and colleagues are in jail. Mrs. Kozami, an Iranian journalist from Canada goes to Iran and gets killed under tortured by Mr. Mosasami. I would compare the two countries and I would say Iraq has a brilliant future, and that's why governments like Iran are so scared. They see the making of a democratic state in their neighbors.

Host: Akbar Ahmed, are other people in the region seeing this example as Mr. Nourizadeh points out?

Ahmed: One of the journalists being killed?

Host: The difference between a free press in Iraq at this point as compared with what's been happening in Iran.

Ahmed: There is a tendency as Mr. Nourizadeh correctly pointed out to see things as, for instance, Al-Jazeera [does], which is seen to represent the Arab point of view, or American media, which is seen to represent the American point of view. So there is this division in the world today in looking at Iraq itself. Ultimately, Iraqis themselves will allow us to see the reality, and that will only depend on the success story.

Host: I'm were out of time and we've got to go. I'd like to thank my guests today: Akbar Ahmed, of the American University; Iraqi-American journalist Haydar Hamdani; and joining us by phone from London, Alireza Nourizadeh from the Center for Arab-Iranian studies. Before we go, I'd like to invite you send us your questions or comments. You can e-mail them to: OnTheLine@I-B-B dot G-O-V. For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.