The opportunity to build a more stable and democratic Iraq, made possible by our stunning military victory, is now in jeopardy. We're seeing surprisingly fierce resistance to coalition forces and to our efforts to remake the country. But another kind of resistance is proving nearly as dangerous to our long-term security: the Bush administration's stubborn refusal to change course and build a safer postwar Iraq in partnership with the world.
Enough time has passed to conclude that what we are doing is not working. Iraqis are becoming convinced that we cannot -- or will not -- provide the security and basic services they need. The administration has postponed the transition to an Iraqi interim government and mishandled the efforts to get key allies on board, adding fuel to the fire of those who call this an occupation, not a liberation.
Saddam Hussein's loyalists, encouraged by rumors that he is still alive, are joining a growing number of angry and disillusioned Iraqis in a sustained guerrilla war against our troops. On average, one American soldier is dying each and every day. Our men and women in uniform are understandably puzzled and frustrated by this; as well-equipped and well-trained as they were for war, they were not prepared -- operationally or psychologically -- for this kind of peacekeeping.
We didn't send our young people to war unprepared; we must not ask them to keep a difficult peace without a clear strategy and adequate resources to do the job. As of today, they have neither. The unanswered question is whether the president is open to taking a new, more effective tack. So far in postwar Iraq, we see predetermined notions colliding with undeniable facts and refusing to yield.
During the 2000 campaign, George W. Bush and his supporters derided nation-building as a wasteful, liberal enterprise. They were wrong: It's vital to our security and the best way to conserve our victories in war in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Bush and his team were so convinced that peacekeeping is a poor use of resources that they ordered the Army's Peacekeeping Institute to shut its doors, making the United States unique among our allies in lacking such an institution. They were wrong: Well-trained peacekeepers stabilize a country and keep our own soldiers safe.
Administration officials insisted that we neither wanted nor needed any help from friends and allies. Again, they were wrong. Sharing responsibility with other nations will provide more, not less, control over the chaos, help us build a more peaceful, stable and democratic Iraq and demonstrate to the Arab world that the United States is not an occupier and an enemy, as radicals have asserted.
It's not as if the president and his team didn't have plenty of warning. A similar dynamic played out in Afghanistan -- poor planning, little coordination and almost no follow-through. And many people, including me, admonished the administration about the price we would pay by repeating these mistakes in Iraq.
Nevertheless, this is no time for the administration to act defensive. This is a time for firm resolve and clear thinking, not overheated dialogue. What our troops need from their leaders are real tools to fight their real enemies -- not taunts inviting more attacks. The president's "bring 'em on" challenge, beyond being unpresidential, was unproductive. He shouldn't focus on getting a rise out of the insurgents but on getting the insurgents out of Iraq.
Fixing the problems of postwar Iraq and getting the region back on track to peace and stability demand an honest assessment of the mistakes made and swift action to fix the damage done. The recommendations that many of us made prior to and during the war are still applicable -- and workable. In particular, I would urge the president to take the following steps immediately:
* Commit more U.S. troops and resources to Iraq. Despite the president's assertion that we have enough troops there, we clearly need both more forces and the right kinds of forces -- and we need them now. In Kosovo today there are 16 peacekeepers for every 1,000 citizens; in Iraq, a much more dangerous and tumultuous place, the ratio is less than half that.
* Ask NATO to assume command of the forces in Iraq. America cannot sustain supplying 150,000 out of 160,000 of the troops on the ground for any length of time -- but the nations we need as partners are unwilling to join forces with us under unilateral American command. NATO command is the answer; as we saw in Kosovo, it works.
* Immediately release a plan and timetable for creating an Iraqi interim authority with a real stake in the country's political future. The administration's repeated postponements have sowed confusion, doubt and anger among ordinary Iraqis and emboldened the radicals and terrorists.
* Make clear to Iraq and the world that the critical decisions about Iraq's oil will be made by Iraqis, and set up an international monitoring agency to show that all oil deals are above board. After initial presidential platitudes that Iraq's oil is for Iraqis, the Bush administration has taken steps that would allow the U.S.-British coalition to control the flow of oil for some period of time. Iraq's oil -- the nation's heritage and its economic lifeblood -- must be controlled by Iraq's people. Every last penny must be invested in the country's reconstruction, and the world needs to know it.
* Develop a clear process and timetable under which the people of Iraq will shape their own permanent government. With cynicism this high, "trust us" won't work.
* Work with the Iraqi people and the United Nations to propose an orderly, fair and effective system for public prosecutions of Saddam Hussein and his loyalists. The Arab world needs to see that we believe in justice -- not just vigilantism.
Unlike some in my party who continue to question our use of force in Iraq, I have not wavered in my belief in the justness of the war we fought. In this, I know I am following in the proud tradition of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Clinton, all of whom were ready and willing to apply our military might when necessary to protect our security.
But those great Democratic leaders also recognized that force alone could not keep us safe. The same holds true today. If we are to win the wider war against terrorism, we must do more than throw Saddam Hussein out of power. We must lift up the moderate Muslim majority around the world and give them the tools to take down the radicals who want an endless holy war.
The best way to do that is by demonstrating -- through words and deeds alike -- that we are democracy-builders, not empire-builders; peacekeepers, not profiteers. If the Bush administration continues behaving as though "to the victor go the spoils," to the victor will also go all the responsibility, all the risks, all the wreckage -- and all the blame for what happened in Iraq after Hussein was gone.
