(Videoteleconference
briefing on the involvement of the First
Marine Expeditionary Force in Operation Iraqi
Freedom and in post-war stabilization efforts
from Baghdad, Iraq. Participating were
Bryan Whitman, deputy assistant secretary of
defense for public affairs (media
operations), and Lt. Gen. James Conway,
commander, First Marine Expeditionary
Force.)
(In progress.)
Whitman: --
from Baghdad. General Conway commands
the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which is
a 65,000-person division-size element, which
is the largest warfighting unit that the
Marine Corps assembled -- has assembled since
Operation Desert Storm. It brought together
Marines from both the Pacific and Atlantic
forces, and as all of you had followed, had
tremendous success during combat
operations. And many of those Marines
are still in the country as the stabilization
efforts continue.
And with that,
General, I believe you have a few things
you'd like to say before we start taking
questions.
Conway: I
do. Thank you for the
introduction.
Good morning, ladies
and gentlemen, and thank you for the
opportunity to answer questions about my
Marines and sailors. Just seven to 10
weeks ago, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
[MEF], consisting of about 85,000 U.S. and
British troops, was accomplishing feats in
combat never envisioned for a force whose
origins were from the sea. Marine Air was
smashing Iraqi armor well in advance of
attacking troops, flying columns of armor
were slashing through and around the area
defenses, and our support troops were making
22-hour trips one way to supply the materiel
of war.
The war now is
essentially over. Those courageous
Marine aviators are now flying Iraqi children
injured in automobile accidents to treatment
centers. The armor has been parked, and
our ground troops are engaged in building
police forces and repairing
schoolhouses. Our support troops are
clearing unexploded ordnance, providing Iraqi
farmers with diesel fuel and rebuilding
bridges destroyed during the
fighting.
Our Marines were
extremely innovative and adaptive during the
campaign, and they've carried those
characteristics into the aftermath. Our
current mission is to provide a safe and
secure environment in order to eventually be
able to turn Iraq back over to the
Iraqis.
As Marines, we go
about that tasking in a no-nonsense
manner. What we tell the Iraqis is that
we're here to do a job. Don't get in
our way, and nobody will get hurt; indeed,
you will like the results. Interfere with our
efforts or threaten our forces in any way,
and there will be consequences.
Thus far, we are
pleased to say that the people of southern
Iraq have generally welcomed our presence in
the cities and in the countryside. In
fact, since the MEF left Baghdad some five
weeks ago, there's been no significant
incidents that have resulted in a Marine or
sailor being seriously wounded or
killed. Today, with the help of
non-governmental organizations, Army civil
affairs teams, and multiple nations that will
soon join the coalition, we go about creating
-- recreating a quality of life.
We recently took
pride in our ability to rapidly topple the
regime of a vicious dictator. Today we
take pride in our ability to offer a bright
and prosperous future to the children of
Iraq.
Ladies and
gentlemen, I'd be happy to take
questions.
Whitman:
General, I'm not sure -- we're not getting
real good audio. If there's any way to
move the microphone a little closer to you,
that would be good.
And we'll start here
with Charlie Aldinger. Please go ahead
and give your name and your news organization
so the general knows who he's talking to.
Q: (Off mike.)
-- how many Marines are still in Iraq
now? And General Hagee said last week
that plans were to have all of the Marines
out of Iraq by the end of August. He
said that any final decision would be made by
General Franks. I wonder how that
schedule looks now. Is it possible,
given the problems you're having there and
the attacks, that you'll have all your
Marines out by the end of August?
Conway:
Charlie, to answer your first question, we
still have about forty -- maybe 41,000
Marines in Iraq and in Kuwait. We've always
had a significant chunk of the Expeditionary
Force in Kuwait, because now I can say that
our aviation was based there for the war, as
well as a rear command post, as well as some
of our logistics folks that were forcing
material forward from the piers and the
airports.
In terms of the
second question, we don't know the answer to
that yet. We're examining right now the
results of these last series of
attacks. I will tell you, as I
mentioned in my comments earlier, that things
have been fairly quiet in the South.
But in conjunction with our adjacent and
higher headquarters, we're taking a look,
even as we speak, at what our force structure
needs to be in the weeks, and perhaps months,
to come.
We do feel that when
we leave, we will not be able to leave a
void. So we very much may be dependent
upon the arrival of additional coalition
forces to relieve in place with us and allow
the Marines to go home.
Q: General,
this is Thelma LeBrecht with AP
Broadcast.
And could I also
make a request again; if there's any way you
can get that mike wherever you're speaking
into closer to you.
And if I could just
follow up a little bit on Charlie's
question. What happens if the coalition
forces, as we're now hearing, there are not
enough international troops now stepping up
to the plate? How do you foresee the
U.S. military being able to contend with --
is it going to be a longer stay, do you
think?
Conway: Pamela
(sic), we're here to do a job, and we don't
leave until the job is done. Now, there
are pressures, of course, that I think it's
fair to say the administration, the
Department of Defense will experience in
terms of getting our Marines out of the
theater due to additional deployments that
those Marines face. We have kept up our
deployment routine for the entire time that
we've been here. And at this point, I
have Marines who are in country now seven and
eight months, so we do have some concern that
they not be kept here any longer than must be
the case, so that they can get home, enjoy
their families and once again be prepared to
go someplace else in the not-too-distant
future.
Q: General,
this is Bob Burns from Associated
Press. Your comment about how it's been
relatively quiet in the south; I'm wondering
if you can an elaborate on why you think it
is that the Marines have encountered less
violence. And are you doing something
different than your Army folks are doing
further to your north?
Conway: Bob, I
think there's a number of things that
contribute. One, of course, we're
organized a little bit differently from the
Army. We have a lot more infantry
Marines in our regiments and in our division
that are able to get boots on the ground, so
to speak, and create perhaps a more diffused
presence. I think that's one
difference, perhaps, between us and the
Army.
But I think we're
also fortunate in that the south of Iraq has
a much larger Shi'a population. And of
course, as you know, they were very much
downtrodden during the Saddam years.
There are not as many Ba'athists, I think,
remaining in the south as perhaps there are
in the north, a lesser number of Sunnis, who
were sympathetic to the regime.
So I think a number
of factors pertain. I have been told by
some of the local Iraqis that just being a
Marine makes a difference; that the
reputation somewhat speaks for itself and
people don't want to be in our sector because
they know if they get hit, they'll get hit
pretty hard.
Q: General,
this is Pam Hess with United Press
International. I have two questions for
you, if you have the time. The first is
about the logistics. We saw, you know,
a pretty amazing military campaign where you
all moved very fast and over a very long
way. And one of the things they said
was that this was a real triumph of
logistics. But I've talked to a bunch
of returning Marines who recall going at
least a week eating one MRE [Meals Ready to
Eat] a day and having their water
rationed. That doesn't really add up to
a triumph of logistics to me. Could you
explain what happened there and if that is an
acceptable level of support, and how you
might be looking to change that?
Conway:
Yeah. Pam, let me say at the outset
that I am so proud of my logisticians that I
can probably not convey it in words.
The Marine Corps is not designed or organized
to go 600 miles deep into enemy
territory. Our logistics are simply not
built that way. We have tremendous
reliance on our shipboard logistics. We
essentially say that we come from the
sea. That said, that was not the CINCs
[Commanders in Chief] or the CFLCC's
[Coalition Forces Land Component Command]
plan in this case, and so we were asked to
execute something that was in excess of what
we were built to do. With Army augmentation,
however, and with, I think, some wise
planning that tied our logistics to airfields
along the avenues of approach, we made it
work.
Now, if you ask me
if every Marine went into the attack with a
full tank of gas in his tank and three MREs
in his pack and all the water that we might
like to have, the answer is absolutely not,
because we certainly stretched the rubber
band. But that said, I think there was
a level of comfort in the Marines in the
combat units that as they crossed the line of
departure in the morning, they could look
over their shoulder and see a supply convoy
arriving that would have those things for
them by the end of the day.
So logistics never
truly halted the attack, but based upon those
supply lines that we faced, even doing the
best job we could with emergency resupply via
air and so forth, we were never rich in
supplies. That was a conscious risk
that we were willing to accept, and one in
this case, I think, proved itself to be worth
the risk. We felt that through speed,
we could save lives. And we weren't
willing to sacrifice that speed for the sake
of full tanks and full packs.
Q: Hey,
General, it's Mark Mazzetti with U.S.
News. I hope you're doing well.
Question: Talking to your staff toward
the end of the war, they said that since the
area you control is predominantly Shi'a, that
they were concerned that -- of actions that
Iran might take to sort of move over the
border and try to establish sort of a base of
influence in Iraq. Have you seen that
at all since the war ended, or any actions by
Iranian elements to move over the border and
do that?
Conway: Hey,
Mark, good seeing you again. But I'm
sorry; now you all are breaking up. I
got about 30 percent of your question.
Could you please repeat it?
Q: Sure.
I'll go a little more slowly, too.
Talking to your guys during -- toward the end
of the war, they were saying that since the
area you control is predominantly Shi'a, they
were concerned about actions Iran might take
to move over the border and establish a
little bit of a, you know, sphere of
influence in eastern Iraq. And I'm
wondering whether you've seen any of that
since the end of the war or any actions by
Iranian elements to do that?
Conway: Yeah,
Mark. Got it that time. We have
seen some of that. We have -- in fact,
there are SCIRI personnel who -- and that
acronym I'll provide to you -- but they are
folks, they are Iraqis, who have spent time
in Iran who are now coming home who are a
political presence. And I think their
beliefs are basically fundamentalist
beliefs. The military arm of SCIRI is
the Badr Corps. It has a military
connotation, but I will tell you that we have
not seen any threat yet arising from
them. That said, they are here in some
numbers, we're keeping a close track on their
activities and we will watch them with great
interest in the days and weeks to come.
At this point, they're playing by all the
rules. And we have no reason to be
convinced that they're doing things untoward
that would cause us to react towards them in
any way. SCIRI, by the way, stands for
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in
Iraq.
Q: It's John
McWethy with ABC News, General. You
described stretching the rubber band; that
there were times when your forces never had
full packs, but the risk was worth the reward
of speed and saving lives.
There are generals
in uniform back here who are telling us
privately that to stretch the rubber band was
a high risk, and that had there been a bit
more resistance, it could have turned very
bad for U.S. Marines in particular, on that
march to Baghdad.
Can you describe the
measure, the level of risk that you did in
fact take?
Conway: Yeah,
that's a very perceptive question, John. And
I think I can. As you all will recall,
there was a halt, an operational halt, that
allowed us to build supplies. We were
well up Highway 1 at that point, still south
of the Tigris River, at that point really
making a feint on the underbelly of
Baghdad. And we held forces in place
for two or three days, allowing that rubber
band to maybe become a little less taut, and
to get some supplies built up to the point
where we were comfortable that we weren't
experiencing extreme risk.
While that was
happening -- and you have to understand, I
guess, some about how this MEF fights.
But we have a tremendous air arm that was
able to put about 300, 320 sorties a day on
our enemies out in advance of our ground
troops. So while we were stationary, we
were, in fact, attacking with our air, taking
maximum advantage of intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities
to determine what the enemy was that we
faced.
And quite frankly,
again, we weren't fully topped off with the
supplies that we might like, but every
indication that we had was that the enemy had
been significantly pounded by our air, and
our intelligence resources were telling us
that he was not there in large numbers.
So those two things combined told me, and I
suspect my superiors, that it was a risk that
was manageable and a risk that we could take,
again, in order to generate the speed that we
did.
Q: General,
thanks for being with us. This is
Hunter Keeter from Defense Daily. I
wanted to ask you about the movement from the
sea to marry the troops up with their
equipment. Could you just detail a
little bit about that process from the
Maritime preposition stocks that you met your
troops with? And then talk a little bit
about, if you would, what your assessment is
of the future of that capability; where you
would like to see it go, if you had to do
this all over again with a little bit better
capability.
Conway:
Hunter, we have always felt in the Marine
Corps that the MPS concept, Maritime
Prepositioning Ship concept, is a real
success story.
It proved to be so
during the last Gulf War, to the extent, I
think, the United States Army saw the value
in it and it created a very similar
capability, at least here in Southwest
Asia.
This time through,
it performed magnificently. We brought
11 ships in from two separate MPS squadrons,
and the estimate was somewhere between 20 and
25 days for the off-load. We did it in
16. And we're extremely proud of our Marines
and the process that allowed that to happen,
because it gave us two full brigade sets of
equipment on deck. And that did not
include the Amphibious Task Forces, East and
West, sailing with additional Marines, armor,
helicopters, fixed- wing aircraft and those
types of things. So, this Marine
Expeditionary Force truly arrived from the
sea.
Now, an important
component of that is the support that we get
from the United States Air Force in that they
fly over large numbers of Marines, both with
Air Force air and contract air, to link us up
with that equipment and then move it into
tactical assembly areas. But suffice it to
say that we brought in about 60,000 Marines
in about 45 days, once the Department of
Defense and the administration decided that
it was time to prop the force and make it
ready.
Where we go from
here is, I think, an interesting
question. I will tell you that our
planners at Headquarters Marine Corps are
looking at even more efficient ways to
organize the ships, and I think the
commandant has made the decision that that
will happen. What it basically involves
is like types of ships in like
squadrons. But I've got to tell you,
this is a pretty tremendous capability right
now, and I think any tweaking that we do will
be pretty much on the margins, because now in
two successive conflicts, it has truly proven
its value.
Q: Good
morning, General. Otto Kreisher with
Copley News Service. The corps had
about one-third of the ground combat forces
during the war, and yet, you took half or
slightly over half of the combat
casualties. There's a question of
whether that's, you know, Marine
aggressiveness, or whether it was the fact
that you got the hard -- the tough end of the
stick; you had to fight your way through most
of the cities while the Army was doing the
sweep to Baghdad mostly through the
desert. What would you say about, you
know, your ratio of casualties you took?
Conway: Otto,
you broke up a little bit, but I think I have
the essence of your question, so I'll answer
what I think you said. If I'm off the
mark, please ask it again.
From the outset, the
Marine Expeditionary Force was a supporting
attack. We had to cross one, two, three
-- arguably, four rivers. We had an
avenue of approach that Marine and Army
planners both agreed was essentially a
brigade-size avenue of approach, and we were
putting, essentially, a reinforced division
over it.
I asked my people in
the end how many Iraqi divisions did we
engage, and it's arguably somewhere between
eight and 11. We always knew that An
Nasiriyah was going to be a critical point on
the battlefield; that our supply lines, up
Highway 7 and across Highway 1, both cross
the Euphrates River at An Nasiriyah.
And we simply had to take that place and hold
it in order for the 1st Marine Division to be
able to sweep north, as it finally
did.
It involved some
close combat. And we saw that, I think,
repeatedly as we attacked north; that we
knocked out great formations of Iraqi armor,
but the forces that we had come up against us
were pretty much in the villages and towns
along the single avenues of approach that we
had that led into Baghdad. It was
close-quarter fighting, in some cases
hand-to-hand fighting. And I just think
that a combination of things, that nature of
close-in combat and the number of forces that
we had to face on secondary avenues of
approach to get to Baghdad, have led us to
those numbers of casualties.
And let me tell you,
we felt every one of them. I think
based upon some of the equipment that we now
have in the force, we're fortunate that they
were not worse. We tried to ensure that
every Marine had what we call a SAPI [small
arms protective inserts] plate, an armor
plate that goes on the front of the flak
vest. It covers the vital parts of the
upper torso. And we compute that we had
somewhere between 25 and 30 strikes 762 or
larger on the SAPI plates and they
worked. And we think that they truly
save lives.
Now, that's the
question I think you asked. If it was
different, please restate it.
Q
General, Dale Eisman with the Virginian Pilot
in Norfolk. You had a number of
friendly fire incidents, and I'm thinking in
particular of one near Nasiriyah; I think you
had something like 30 Marines wounded.
Can you tell us what you've learned about
what might have been behind those
incidents? Was there a common thread
running through them? And what steps
you might be able to take in the future to
further reduce friendly fire?
Conway: Dale,
you just hit on what is probably my biggest
disappointment of the war, and that is the
amount of blue on blue, what we call blue on
blue, fratricide in a lot of instances, that
occurred.
I spoke to every
formation before we crossed the line of
departure, I spoke separately to the officers
and I emphasized a number of things, but
among them were the fact that our weapons are
so accurate, are so deadly, that anymore,
that when it goes off the rail or it goes out
the tube, it's probably going to kill
something. And so you've got to make
certain that what you're shooting at is
indeed the enemy.
We did have a large
number of wounded at An Nasiriyah, based upon
a friendly fire incident. Fortunately,
no killed came out of that, that particular
engagement. There is another one that's
under investigation where we think that there
may have been an airstrike roll in on our
forces. And there are a number more,
frankly, lesser in number, that still
represent –-
(Audio break due to
loss of feed from Iraq).
(Pause.)
Whitman:
(Referring to teleconference video
feed.) It looks like he's frozen there,
doesn't it?
Q:
Yes.
Whitman: Let's
see if we get him back in a second.
(Incidental chatter not
transcribed.)
Whitman: If we
have lost the signal, it requires to reboot,
and rebooting is about a four-, five-minute
process. So let's see if we've really
been knocked off the air or not. We'll
know here in a second.
(Pause.)
Whitman: (To
staff.) Are we going to have to
reboot?
Staff: No,
sir. I think we're just going to be
able to reconnect, redial.
Whitman: All
right, well let's just stand fast a second,
then.
(Pause while connection
is restored. Incidental chatter not
transcribed.)
Whitman:
General Conway, can you hear me?
Conway: Yes, I
can. Can you hear me?
Whitman: Yes,
we can hear you fine now. We lost you
for a moment. You were talking -- where
we lost you, you were talking about friendly
fire incidents, and you had talked about a
possible aviation one. And then you
said that there were a number of others that
were being looked into or something, and
that's where we lost you.
Conway:
Okay. I went on to say that we had some
devices that we used in this war. One
was called Blue Force Tracker. It gave us
position locations and identification on
major units. It helped some, I think,
with location and identification of friendly
forces.
But what we truly
need is something that can identify a
friendly vehicle -- it either squawks or
beeps or emits some sort of power source that
tells a shooter -- an airplane or a tank or
whatever -- that they're looking at a
friendly piece of equipment. And I
think that the -- we've been trying to
develop that now ever since the Gulf War,
without success, I might add. And the
man that invents that, I think, will be very
rich, indeed. Because it continues to
be something that we see happen in the U.S.
military, and it's really something that
we've got to stop.
Q: General,
this is Lisa Burgess with Stars and
Stripes. It's a little bit difficult
back here to get a sense of how the Iraqi
people are reacting to the American
force. Reading the newspapers in the
last couple of days, it would seem that
there's a growing resentment against what's
being perceived as an occupation force.
Can you give a sense of what you're seeing
there, and whether there's been a change in
the past week or so?
Conway: Lisa,
I can speak for the southern region.
And I can tell you that I still see that the
reception that our Marines and sailors are
receiving here is overwhelmingly
positive. I fly over the landscape a
lot, and we don't pass a village without
little children, and oftentimes, adults
waving at our helicopters. They wave at
our helicopters more than the people in
southern California wave at our helicopters,
and that's because, I think, they're happy
we're here.
We've been told by
some sources that people want to see us go
away, and of course sooner is better. A
number more are saying, you know, we're
afraid when you leave that our freedoms will
leave with you because there are bad people
still there who would like to see other
things happen aside from democratic
principles and the ability to elect their
leaders.
I met just this
morning with about -- I don't know, 60, maybe
70 sheikhs, influential people who are tribal
leaders throughout all of southern and
central Iraq. And let me tell you, they
are delighted that we're here. They're
delighted with the progress that we're
making, again, especially in the south.
They want to complement our efforts as much
as they possibly can. I think that they
will probably -- they will be willing and
happy to say goodbye to us, but that day is
not yet. And I think that, again, the
reception that our Marines receive day in and
day out is just tremendously positive.
Q: General
Conway, Barbara Starr from CNN. Even
given the fact that you have a more -- what
you describe as a more stable situation in
the south, nonetheless, as a senior commander
in Iraq, what are your thoughts specifically
about what the U.S. military can do to get a
handle on what appears to be a continuing
series of random and sporadic attacks against
U.S. forces in Iraq? What can be done
to stop it, since it is so widespread and so
sporadic?
Conway:
Barbara, good seeing you again.
You've got some
great people out here working on that very
problem. I will tell you first of all
how we handle it in the south. I mean,
yesterday morning, we had a battalion-size
attack on what we were told was a training
area up in the very northern part of one of
our provinces. So I think that any
commander would much rather ferret out a
threat based on solid intelligence and act on
it quickly to eliminate it. You go
preemptive and don't allow them a chance to
finish training, in this case, perhaps
disperse to various locations and then do the
sniping and the ambushing and that type of
thing that we've seen potentially in the
north.
I think what we're
seeing are a limited numbers of attacks that
are, I think, in some cases being
mischaracterized as how the whole nation is
seeing our presence. I really don't
think that there's anarchy in Iraq, to
include northern Iraq. But there are
specific individuals that are very aware of
the fact that even a small-scale attack makes
large-scale news; are taking advantage of
that fact to create, I think, levels of
overreaction in some cases, and will continue
to do so because they don't want us to be
here.
But I think from a
U.S. military perspective, we have to keep
doing the things that we're doing -- build
the police forces, gain confidence in them;
provide point security on key infrastructure,
because these guys also know if they start
tearing down infrastructure, it also will
reflect badly on us. And there are
places where it's simply not guarded; you
can't guard it everywhere. And then we have
to be prepared to act quickly and severely
where we see that armed people are resisting
the future that we're trying to create for
this country.
Whitman:
Someone else?
Q: No.
Whitman:
Okay. Go ahead, Pam.
Q: This is Pam
Hess from UPI again. Just to tie up a
couple of loose ends, could you tell us how
many wounded or dead you might have had from
friendly fire attacks? And could you
give us an estimate of the number of SCIRI
and Badr Corps personnel that are in your
region that you know of?
Conway: Pam,
on your first question, I can't give you an
exact figure because those things are still
under investigation. And the first thing the
investigation has to determine is whether or
not it was friendly fire. So, I can't
give you a feel for that at this point.
But I will tell you that one is one too
many.
On the second issue,
the numbers vary widely. We tend to
think that in the southern area, there's
probably less than 1,000 of the Badr Corps
types. But again, that's not
certain. We're told that X number will
come in, perhaps, from Iran, but then will
attempt to recruit X number more who may be
sympathetic to their beliefs. And
again, a Badr Corps individual isn't
necessarily a bad guy. He doesn't
become that until he does something again
that goes against the rules that the
Coalition Provisional Authority has posed,
and then we would have to take action.
Q: General,
it's Mark Mazzetti again. The goal of
the military campaign in Iraq was not just
regime change, but also to get rid of the
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
And I'm wondering -- first of all, are you
surprised that seven weeks on, no weapons
caches have been found? And what is
your sense of the status of the WMD programs,
having been on the ground in Iraq for so
long? And, you know, what may have
happened to the weapons?
Conway: Mark,
you may recall as we moved north, there were
a couple of times there where everybody was
sleeping with their boots on and with their
gas masks pretty close. So, one of the
real surprises I think we all experienced was
that we did not get struck with weapons of
mass destruction as we crossed the Euphrates
or even as we crossed the Tigris and went up
against Republican Guard divisions.
In terms of what
we're doing about it now, we continue to
contribute our part in the south against SSEs
-- sensitive sites, if you will -- that may
yield weapons of mass destruction.
We've put teams on virtually every one that
intelligence or local Iraqis or any other
means has pointed out to us as perhaps might
be containing weapons of mass destruction, or
residuals of those kinds of things or
whatever.
So we continue to
join in the search to try to ferret it
out.
I can't answer your
question in terms of what may have happened
to it. I don't think that we've given
up on the search yet. And I think if
you're tracking the high-value target
captures, like all of us are, the
interrogations that followed, I think that
the day might well come when we ask the right
question of the right person and we open a
panacea of weapons storage and that type of
thing.
So seven weeks is
probably not enough time to look at a country
the size of California and come to the
conclusion that they simply do not exist
here, especially if you consider that the
regime had ample experience attempting to
hide those things as much as they were
visited by the inspectors.
Q: General, Otto Kreisher
again. You mentioned earlier that you
had a battalion-size operation against what
you thought was a training area, but you
didn't say what you found there. What
did you encounter on that raid?
Conway: Yes,
sir. What our intelligence told us was
that there were some Ba'ath Party members who
were conducting training, with a good bit of
shooting, with intent to potentially use that
force in some negative way on down
range. The battalion swept in at first
light. They rolled up on five different
objectives. They found a number of
automatic weapons, a number of
rocket-propelled grenades, which in tandem
were probably the favorite weapons of the
Fedayeen, certainly. They took 13
detainees, at least one of whom, a couple of
the detainees pointed out to us fairly
quickly, was a fairly high-level Ba'ath Party
member; and, unfortunately, had to shoot two
people who chose to resist their
movement.
So we consider that
a fairly successful sweep. It's a
pattern that we will continue to
follow. My division commander prefers a
cordon in the early hours before first light
and a first-light attack. First, we find some
of these people don't get up too early around
here, and that's a good thing; but secondly,
we're able to be more discerning with our
targets and we don't wind up shooting
innocent people, ostensibly women and
children, because of trying to do so
during the hours of darkness.
Q: It's John
McWethy from ABC again, General. Back
to the weapons of mass destruction. You
had, we were led to believe, fairly credible
intelligence indicating that some of the
units that you would be encountering had live
weapons of mass destruction, probably CW
shells, that had been moved forward to deal
with your units. At this point,
understanding that the exploitation of the
sites is still under way and that there are a
lot of unanswered questions, do you feel that
the intel was just wrong? Do you feel
that the enemy may not have ever had any of
these things in forward units?
It seems
inconceivable that if they had them in the
forward units that you have not found
something in a forward unit, and not buried
away in some storage area. Help us out
here.
Conway: John,
as Mark could probably tell you, the fact
that we were, again, not hit with weapons of
mass destruction -- I think we had four
triggers that we were prepared to defend
ourselves against -- different times when we
thought that the regime might try to employ
the weapons of mass destruction against
us. And we truly thought that they were
distributed -- not to everybody, not to the
regular army divisions that we saw in the
south. But my personal belief was that
they probably did reside in the Republican
Guard units, and we encountered, arguably,
three, maybe four, Republican Guard divisions
on the way to Baghdad. But my personal
belief was that the Republican Guard corps
commander probably had release authority, and
that we might well see them when we started
to encounter his force or enter his area.
It was a surprise to
me then, it remains a surprise to me now,
that we have not uncovered weapons, as you
say, in some of the forward dispersal
sites. Again, believe me, it's not for
lack of trying. We've been to virtually every
ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti
border and Baghdad, but they're simply not
there. Now, what that means in terms of
intelligence failure, I think, is too strong
a word to use at this point. What the
regime was intending to do in terms of its
use of the weapons, we thought we understood
or we certainly had our best guess, our most
dangerous, our most likely courses of action
that the intelligence folks were giving
us. We were simply wrong. But
whether or not we're wrong at the national
level, I think, still very much remains to be
seen.
Whitman:
General Conway, if I could thank you for
taking the time out of your busy schedule to
spend some time with us here today and to
give us some insight into your operations and
what you've been doing over there.
Thank you very much.
Conway: Thank
you, folks, for the great job you do. Have a
nice day.